Skip to main content

Full text of "Analysis of the Interchurch World Movement Report on the steel strike [microform]"

See other formats


NO. 94-82026 


The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) 
governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted 
materials including foreign works under certain conditions. In addition, 
the United States extends protection to foreign works by means of 
various international conventions, bilateral agreements, and 

Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are 
authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these 
specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be 
"used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." 
If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction 
for purposes In excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright 

The Columbia University Libraries reserve the right to refuse to accept a 
copying order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve 
violation of the copyright law. 


Olds, Marshall 


Analysis of the 
Interchurch world 


New York 









Olds, MarshalL 

Analysis of the Interchurch world movement Report on 
the steel strike, by Marshall Olds, foreword by Jeremiah W. 
Jenks ... edited as to the law involved in labor controversies 
by Murray T. Qui^^ .. edited as to detailed accuracy of 
citations, quotations, and statistics by Haskins and Sells ... 
Part two: History of the Interchurch Report on the steel 
strike, with the assistance of numerous officials and associates 
of the Interchurch world movement. New York and 

London, G. P. Putnam's sons, 102S. /9Z2. 

xxiv, 475 p. 23i cm. 

1 Interchurch world m(>veraent of North America. Report on the 
steel sFrike of 1919. 2. ^teel strike, 1919-1920. i. 

QuigR, Murray Town- ^^^ send. n. Haskins & Sells, firm, ac- 
countants, New York. fl^B iii. Title. 23^ — 3332 

Library of Congress ^^ HD5325.1 5 1919.062 











m-i oo2in 















o m 

-vi o o 















- w m 





1.0 mm 

1.5 mm 

2.0 mm 

abcdefghiiklrrnopqrstuvwxyz 1234567890 





2.5 mm 
















■o m -D 

> C w 

X ^ ^ 

0</) 5 








»< JO 
M C/5 













N en 





Cobnntria (Hnft)er^ft|> 










Research Professor of Government and Public Administration, 

New York University 



Editor " Law and Labor " 




Certified Public Accountants 









^be "ff^nlcfterbocfter pre60 


1 • < t » » 

» • t V * * 

«■•! •9'* I 

« » • 1 t » 

• • » ♦ ( 


Made in the United States of America 

.* .' . . 

4 « • 

• • * 

. • » 

• • 

• • , • > ■ 



Copyright, 192a 

Marshall Olds 






By Jeremiah W. Jenks, Ph.D., LL.D. 

Research Professor of Government and Public Administration, 

New York University 

No question at the present day is of greater interest to 
the public than that of the relations between employers and 
their working men. Not only are these two parties inter- 
ested but the public in many cases loses even more in both 
finanaal mterests and lack of comfort and pubUc facilities 
than do either of the parties immediately concerned in the 
case of a great strike, which suspends an important business 
hke railroading, coal mining, manufacture of steel, the fur- 
nishing of milk to a great city, and other similar industries 
In consequence the story of a great strike, with its causes 
and allotment of fault and the results both to the parties 
Jrectly interested and to the pubUc, is of general concern. 

tt T J 7\'^ '* '' *° ^° 2*^ '^^^^ than harm, must 
be told with absolute unpartiality and complete regard for 
the exact truth. When the Interchurch World Movement 
was organized, most people interested in social and moral 
progress hoped earnestly for its success. It is generaUy 
recogmzed that no other organization in the civilized world 
IS of so great importance in promoting the welfare of society 
7JJ^^ -s the Christian Church, including all of the 

Sof r"^*-°"'. ^' ^"^ ^ consequence the eaxnest 
deare of pubhc-spmted men that the work be conducted 



with wisdom and thoroughness, so that its expressions of 
opinion on whatever subject would be received at full value, 
and influence social movements accordingly. 

Soon after its organization an industrial section was 
established, with the thought that it would take charge of 
investigations dealing with the various phases of industry 
from the moral and religious points of view. I was invited 
to attend as a delegate of one of the important social move- 
ments, an early conference of this industrial section. This 
meeting was held while the steel strike of 19 19 was under 
way and shortly after Judge Gary had declined to meet 
the representatives of the trade union in order to discuss 
with them the possible terms of settlement, he feeling it 
wiser to deal directly with his own men and with represen- 
tatives in the employ of the steel corporation whom they 
might select. This act of his was condemned openly in this 
meeting. One of the members proposed, apparently in 
some excitement, that a committee be appointed to in- 
vestigate and report upon the steel strike. Eviden \y the 
mover of the resolution expected a prompt condemnatory 

It has been my fortune to take an active part in a number 
of important investigations on industrial subjects. No one 
who has not been intimately connected with the manage- 
ment of business or who has not attempted such an investi- 
gation can understand its difficulties and the length of time 
required to secure impartial information and present it 
accurately. From the very nature of their business, minis- 
ters of the Christian religion have not the training or the 
experience to make such an investigation, or even to plan 
and guide such an investigation. Of course there are within 
the church organization trained business men and econo- 
mists who would be especially well equipped for such work. 
Generally speaking, experience shows that when ministers 
attempt to discuss in detail either practical or business 
questions of the day, which are of a partisan nature, they 
will inevitably offend a considerable portion of their con- 



gregations, because in controverted questions there are 
usually two sides and an average congregation will be 
divided in opinion. The minister, therefore, will please one 
section and offend the other. If, in the discussion of a 
partisan question, he confines himself to dwelling upon the 
importance of the truthful and wise solution of the question 
and to arousing the consciousness of his hearers themselves 
to make an impartial study of the question and then to act 
impartially with the welfare of the public in mind, he will 
usually have accomplished his duty far more effectively than 
if he attempts to instruct his congregation in the merits of 
the question itself. 

Very many of us felt, therefore, that for the Interchurch 
World Movement to attempt to intervene in this great 
strike was probably ill advised. If, however, it seemed 
best to the managers of the movement to undertake such 
an investigation, it was of prime importance both to the 
movement itself and to the public at large that the investi- 
gation be made by the best industrial experts, who would 
follow strictly scientific principles and debar absolutely all 
partisan spirit. If that could be done the report might be 
very helpful. If the report were made in any other spirit it 
was certain to be harmful rather than beneficial to the public 
and would certainly prove very damaging to the Inter- 
church World Movement itself. 

The investigation was made and the committee in whose 
charge the investigation had been placed made its report 
bhortly thereafter adverse criticisms were made, both by 
unpartisan reviewers and by prominent church people, on 
the ground that the report was partisan and inaccurate. As 
tar as I am aware, no detailed analysis of the report has yet 
been published. 

Sometime ago Mr. Olds, the author of this book, came to 
me explaimng that he was making a detailed analysis of the 
interchurch report on the steel strike; that he was endeavor- 
ing to be absolutely impartial; that he was using the great- 
est care m verifying his statistics and his statements ; that he 





was attempting so to present his analysis that it would be 
easy for the reader to segregate questions of fact from those 
of opinion, and in this way get a really accurate view of this 
report, its excellencies and its defects. He also explained 
to me that he had the cooperation in his work of some men 
who had been active in the preparation of the Interchurch 
report; that he was looking up the training and status of all 
those who had made the investigations and prepared the 
report, and that he hoped his work would prove of service to 
the public. I had known Mr. Olds before and believed him 
to be sincere in attempting to do an impartial piece of work. 
I have since read Mr. Olds' manuscript with care. I have 
not had the time and have made no attempt to verify his 
figures, his citation of authorities, or his quotations. In- 
asmuch, however, as this could readily be done by any party 
interested, as Mr. Olds has a reputation as a student of 
these questions to sustain, and as he has, I understand, 
taken the wise precaution of having all such matter carefully 
verified by competent outside assistance, I have no question 
that this part of his work has been carefully done. 

Considering the very great significance of both the Inter- 
church Movement and of the steel strike, his study is to 
my mind, of decided importance. It should be read by 
all who wish to make any use of the Interchurch report, to 
quote it or to base any judgment upon it. Especially should 
it be read and carefully studied by the leaders in the Inter- 
church Movement who have loaned their names to the 
report, or who were responsible for the investigation. No 
honest man can base arguments or conclusions upon a 
document whose accuracy he questions, without verifying 
by independent study the accuracy of the document. Mr. 
Olds' study of the report, impartial as it is in spirit and 
generous as it is in its criticism of the motives of those who 
have been responsible for making it, is nevertheless such 
that it is bound to raise serious question in the mind of any 
student of social problems who is interested in the report. 
It is to be hoped, therefore, that this study will have a wid 

circulation among those who are interested in the relation 
of the Church to industrial questions, especially those who 
believe that the Church should take an active part in the 
direct discussion and solution of industrial problems and 
particularly those directly connected with the Interchurch 
World Movement. 


Statement by 

Certified Public Accountants 

Pursuant to engagement, we have reviewed the manu- 
scnpt of your book Analysis of the Interchurch Report on the 
Steel Strike for the purpose of verifying, by comparison with 
their stated sources, the citations, quotations, statistics, 
and figures contained therein; and 

We Hereby Certify: 

That all citations are accurate; 

That all quotations, including excerpts in which the 
sequence of original passages has for clearness or brevity 
been vaned, are accurate as to text and, in our opinion, 
fairly represent the meaning of their original context; 

That all statistics and figures quoted have been verified 
by companson with documents from which quoted and 
those subject to mathematical proof have been so proved- 
and * 

That all statistics are presented and used in accordance 
with generally accepted statistical practices. 

(Signed) Haskins & Sells. 


Statement of 

Chairman, Executive Committee Interchurch World Movement 

which finally approved for publication the Report on the 

Steel Strike. ' 

"I fear from what I have heard, after the investigation 
had been made, that some of the actual investigators were 
not as unprejudiced as they should have been, and that, 
personally representing one side of the controversy, their 
testimony was therefore, liable to be discounted." 



Statement of 


Member Publicity Department, Interchurch World Movement, 

and original editor of the Interchurch Report on the Steel 


Upon the completion of my editing of the original draft 
of the Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike, I accom- 
panied my editorial notes with a memorandum which was in 
part as follows: — 

w « J*^e i7» 1920. 

From: Stanley Went, 

To: Mr. Dennett 

Re: Steel Report. 

In accordance with your wishes, I have edited the accompanying 
steel report as lightly as seemed compatible with the end in view. That 
end, as I understand it, was to present the report in a form which should 
give the least possible impression of bias on the part of the investigating 

J Originally Dr. John R. Mott was Chairman, and Dr. Foulkes Vice- 
Chairman of the Executive Committee. Dr. Mott, however, left for 
Europe before May loth, the date on which the Report on the Steel 
btrike was submitted to the Executive Committee. 

I would a great deal rather the Report was published in its original 
than its present form for the bias of the original seems to me so patent 
that it would make it a comparatively easy matter to discredit the entire 
report. My feeling, after editing the report, is that even now I have 
used the pencil too lightly; but I have rather leaned over backwards in a 
desire to present the case of the Commission as much as possible in the 
way the original writer thought that it should be presented. 

The activities of the Interchurch World Movement came 
to an end very soon after I had completed that first editing 
and my connection with the Movement ceased. Subse- 
quent editing was done by other hands. My opinion 
regarding the merits of the Steel Report was well known at 
the time to some of my associates in the Interchurch World 
Movement, and under ordinary circumstances, I should not 
have expressed it further. Since, however, the Interchurch 
World Movement has ceased to exist, no possible obligation to 
keep silent remains, especially since the prestige of the Move- 
ment itself is being used, illegitimately I believe, in the dis- 
semination as propaganda of this unfortunate Steel Report. 
On that account I welcome Mr. Olds* careful analysis of 
this Report and of the circumstances surrounding its origin 
and publication, and have been happy to give him what 
assistance I was able to afford. Mr. Olds' analysis presents, 
in detail, facts that speak for themselves. I can only add 
that in my opinion his treatment throughout is moderate 
and that I know him to share my own sympathy with the 
ideals of the Interchurch World Movement. 

Statement by 


Leading Publication of the Presbyterian Denomination. 

The Steel Strike Report Editorial, Nov 4, iq20 

"The most unfortunate fact about the Report is that on 
its face it is not the work of the Commission which the Inter- 
church appointed under Bishop McConnell. The title 
page says the Commission had 'the technical assistance of 








the Bureau of Industrial Research of New York' and the 
style and point of view characterizing the document through- 
out suggest strongly that this 'technical assistance' extended 
to the writing of the entire text. Consequently it does not 
impress the reader as being in any typical sense a Church 
Report, still less an Interchurch Report. ... On the 
contrary it has quite obviously been prepared from the 
standpoint of some mind convinced beforehand that the 
United States Steel Corporation is an insincere, oppressive 
and iniquitous organization ... the Interchurch protested 
impartiality and those who saw the inquiry begin certainly 
expected something like a judicial rendering of opinion— not 
a brief for the prosecution." 

The Second Steel Report Editorial, Oct. ij, iq2I 

"The reports rest for their real meaning wholly upon the 
names of their individual authors; their authority is the 
authority of their respective writers. In no sense can 
they be looked upon as Church deliverances. The only 
way in which such matters could be dealt with by the 
Church even representatively would be thru the official 
appointment of eminent Church leaders who could and 
would take the time to carry forward all needful investi- 
gation by their personal examination. But the Com- 
mission appointed to look into the Steel Strike never even 
considered that method of procedure; it immediately hired 
professional 'researchers' none of whom were persons of 
reputation in the reHgious world and at least some of 
whom were totally out of touch with the Church ... to 
call it a Church investigation of the Steel Strike was and 
is preposterous.'* 

Statement by 
The New York Legislative Investigation on Radicalism 

{page 1137) 

"The most recent proof of the invasion of the Churches 
by subversive influences is the Report on the Steel Strike bv 

a committee appointed by the Interchurch World Move- 
ment. It is not generally known that the direction of this 
inquiry was not in the hands of unbiased investigators. The 
principal 'experts' were David J. Saposs and George Soule 
(Heber Blankenhom joined the investigation later) whose 
radical view-points may be gathered from their association 
with Mr. Evans Clark acting under the direction of Ludwig 
C. A. K. Martens, head of the Soviet Bureau in the United 
States, their connection also with the Rand School of Social 
Science and certain revolutionary labor organization." 



The facts and information here contained are chiefly from 
three sources : 

First, from officers or members of the Interchurch World 
Movement or those directly or officially associated with that 
Movement. The individual or individuals responsible for 
each such fact or statement is in each case specifically 
named: This refers particularly to Part Two;— 

Second, from the Interchurch World Movement's Report 
on the Steel Strike and its other reports, resolutions and 
findings, all of which are published and can be specifically 
referred to in connection with each such fact or statement 
here made; — 

Third, from public records and public statements, all of 
which are printed and generally available. Such authority 
is in each case referred to directly and specifically. 

Except for a conversation with one man who was promi- 
nently and officially connected with the Interchurch Investi- 
gation and who is also active in the " Labor Movement " no 
one connected with either the steel companies or the Labor 
Movement was consulted or informed as to the proposed 
publication of the present analysis until after this analysis 
had been completed in substantially its present form.* 





The author's reasons for believing that a detailed analysis 
of the Interchurch Report should be published and thus 
made a matter of public record will doubtless become 
obvious from a reading of the present volume and perhaps 
can, in the particular circumstances, be more fittingly 
stmimarized in an "Afterword" than stated in a Foreword. 
Preliminary to the formulation of any definite plan as to 
how the facts shown in the present analysis should be 
published, or even if they should be published, such of them 
as were then available were gone over in the Spring of 1921, 
with a number of the author's personal friends who had been 
associated with the Interchurch Movement. As Dr. 
William Hiram Foulkes had been Chairman of the Execu- 
tive Committee of the Interchurch World Movement during 
the time the Report on the Steel Strike was being passed on 
for publication, and as that Committee is stated in the 
Report as the final authority to pass on and approve the 
Report for publication, it was suggested that the facts 
under discussion and the idea of making them public should 
be first taken up with Dr. Foulkes. 

Shortly thereafter these facts were presented to Dr. 
Foulkes during a long conversation in which the author 
stated that while he was convinced that these facts should 
be presented to the public, he had no fixed plan as to the 
method by which they should be presented. The author 
suggested, however, that if. as he was convinced, the Inter- 
church Report had published as facts many things that were 
contrary to the facts and was otherwise highly inaccurate, 
the Interchurch World Movement which had underwritten 
the Report, and particularly the individual men who had 
signed the Report, either personally or as members of com- 
mittees, would be the most fitting medium through which 
any corrections should come. He stated that he was 
entirely willing to cooperate with the Interchurch Move- 
ment or individual members on any basis they might 
suggest, provided only that such errors in the Interchurch 
Report as could be demonstrated and which had received 

the widest publicity should be publicly admitted and 
corrected. Dr. Foulkes stated that many of the facts in 
regard to the Interchurch Report which the author pointed 
out, had already been called to his attention. He stated 
that under the circumstances, he personally believed that a 
careful and impartial analysis of the Interchurch Report 
should be made. He of course could not, and did not, 
commit himself in advance in regard to any particular 
analysis which might be made. He also suggested a plan 
of operation looking towards such an analysis which in- 
cluded the possible cooperation of certain other gentlemen 
who had been prominently connected with the Interchurch 
World Movement. 

The point of view on the subject of the various individuals 
thus named by Dr. Foulkes — as far as they were seen, and 
with the exception of Dr. Jenks — ^is stated in Part II of 
the present Analysis. In general that point of view was 
that they personally were in no way responsible for the 
Interchurch Report and they considered it a "dead issue." 
It was emphasized in regard to the first point that the public 
had widely accepted the Interchurch Report on its face 
value largely on the reputation of the Interchurch World 
Movement and that that reputation had rested largely on 
the prominence of themselves and other individuals whose 
names were widely advertised as the leaders of the Move- 
ment. It was emphasized in regard to the second point 
that a second Interchurch Report was at that time being 
widely advertised as about to appear. Their attitude how- 
ever remained unchanged. 

Dr. Jeremiah W. Jenks had been an invited delegate to 
represent the public point of view, in the Hotel Penn- 
sylvania conference at which the movement to investigate 
the steel strike was inaugurated. Doubtless because of his 
wide reputation as an economic authority he had also been 
invited to serve as an ex-officio member in an advisory 
capacity to several of the various committees which were 
appointed to consider economic questions and was other- 

r ~ 


wise closely associated with the Movement. His attitude 
toward the Interchurch Steel Strike investigation and the 
Interchurch Report has been stated in his foreword to the 
present analysis. The author saw and talked with Dr. 
Jenks at the beginning of April and thereafter during the 
course of the preparation of the present analysis and has 
followed such suggestions as Dr. Jenks has made in the 
presentation of the present analysis. 

Part I of the present analysis dealing with the Interchurch 
Report itself was completed in preliminary form by the 
middle of August. Part II, dealing with the history and 
personnel of the Interchurch investigation, was not com- 
pleted until later. Dr. Foulkes was at this time on an 
extended trip- in the West. In his absence the author had 
had several conversations with Dr. A. E. Cory, then acting 
head of the Interchurch World Movement. This draft of 
Part I was at once turned over to Dr. Cory to whom the 
statement was made that the author was willing to put the 
material in the hands of the Interchurch World Movemcmt 
without reserve to go over and analyze as they saw fit and 
that he would cooperate with them in any use they desired 
to make of the material so long as that use included either 
the specific disproving of the facts brought out in the present 
analysis, or if they could not be disproved specifically, the 
presentation of these facts to the public. It was further 
emphasized that irrespective of such cooperation, the author 
would welcome any specific criticism and would corrcict 
any errors in the analysis which could be pointed out. 

Two days later (August i8th) the author received a letter 
from Mr. John A. Fitch, who is listed by the New York 
Legislative Investigation of Radicalism as having assisted 
in several capacities the I. W. W. and as being associated 
with the Bxireau of Industrial Research, which organization 
is specifically stated to have been the technical adviser in 
the preparation of the Interchurch Report, caUing attention 
to an error in a single obscure sentence in the middle of 
the manuscript. As this indicated that the Interchurch 



Movement's judgment of the present analysis was being 
formulated by the very group of "technical advisers" 
whose technical advice in the Interchurch Report itself is 
the chief subject of criticism of the present analysis, the 
author immediately called Dr. Cory on the telephone and 
pointed this out. He urged that the question of whether 
or not the Interchurch Report is so flagrantly inaccurate 
and more than merely inaccurate as the present Analysis 
specifically shows, should be regarded as of sufficient import- 
ance to be most carefully considered. He mentioned 
several Columbia University professors of recognized econo- 
mic standing who were immediately available and urged 
that the opinion of some such recognized authority as these 
should be obtained by Dr. Cory and at least also considered 
in formulating the Interchurch Movement's opinion on the 
question. The same day however, Dr. Cory wrote the 
author stating that the members of the Commission who 
pubHshed'the Steel Strike Report or the Executive Com- 
mittee could avail themselves of the right to answer any 
inaccuracies in the present analysis after it was published 
if they so desired. 

This first draft was then placed in the hands of Dr. Jere- 
miah W. Jenks and shortly thereafter, a first draft of Part 
II was completed and placed in his hands. 

Mr. Stanley Went as a member of the Publicity Depart- 
ment of the Interchurch Movement had written the official 
Hand Book of the Movement, he had written three of their 
cilici. J surveys and had been the original editor of the Report 
on the Steel Strike and was otherwise intimately informed as 
to various subjects under discussion in the present analysis. 
A carbon copy of both parts was therefore also placed in 
the hands of Mr. Went for his suggestion or correction. 

The author had been frequently informed that Mr. Harold 
C. Reynolds, who had been Superintendent of the Religious 
Press Division, and Mr. James E. Craig, who had been 
Superintendent of the Bulletin Division and Superintendent 
of the Reporting Division of the Interchurch Worid Move- 



ment, were, because of the particular nature of their office;; 
and otherwise, intimately informed in regard to the facts in 
connection with the investigation of the Steel strike. Thesti 
gentlemen had both been absent from the city but had 
returned in the Fall. The preliminary drafts of both Pari; 
I and Part II were turned over to these gentlemen who, 
after going over the manuscript carefully together, agreed 
to, and did, makevolimiinous editorial notes and corrections. 

In the intervening weeks, Dr. Jenks had gone over thci 
whole manuscript with care, making numerous suggestions. 
He particularly suggested that special effort should be 
made to obtain information as to the nattire of the "affida- 
vits of 500 steel workers" which the Interchurch Report 
itself states constituted "the rockbottom" of the findings. 
At this time also it was announced that the second volume; 
of the Interchurch Report, consisting of evidence on which 
the first volume was based was about to appear, and it was 
decided to postpone further editing till this material should 
be available. 

In the meantime also Dr. Foulkes had returned and the 
first draft of the entire present analysis, including a state- 
ment of many of Dr. Jenks' editorial suggestions, was placed 
in his hands. Some weeks later Dr. Foulkes stated in a letter 
dated November ist, that the present analysis "deals with 
so many alleged facts and conclusions which are out of the 
range of my observation and knowledge that it does not; 
seem wise for me to attempt to pass any detailed judgement; 
on the statements you have made." He also added at the 
same time — rephrasing for publication the point of view he: 
had expressed in a previous discussion — his own personal 
point of view as to the merits of the Interchurch Report,, 
which statement appears at the beginning of the present 

The appearance in the late Fall of the second volume of 
the Interchurch Report, containing a number of the sub- 
reports which in turn contained much more of the evidence 
on which the Report itself was based, and the fact that this; 




volume also contained a small number of the "rockbottom 
affidavits," on which the Interchurch Report states it is 
chiefly based, made it then possible to give more detailed 
consideration to certain sections and particularly to certain 
arguments and conclusions of the Interchurch Report. 
Accordingly the section of the present analysis, dealing with 
the Interchurch Report's allegations as to Social Conse- 
quences "—particularly its allegations of the "denial of 
the right of free speech," of "police brutality," and of dis- 
crimination against the strikers on the part of the courts — 
were considerably enlarged. 

As these matters involve many questions of law and facts 
in regard to labor controvesies, the author secured the assist- 
ance of Mr. Murray T. Quigg, editor of "Law and Labor" 
to collaborate with him on certain parts of these sections 
and to edit these entire sections. 

An effort had been made in September to bring the 
analysis to the attention of Judge Gary for the expressed 
purpose of obtaining any criticism or suggestions which he 
or other representatives of the steel industry might have 
to offer. His office stated however that the immediate 
demands on his time were then such that he could not hope 
to give attention to new or outside matters for at least 
several months. In December the matter was again taken 
up and his office agreed to put the manuscript in Judge 
Gary's calendar of work for his own decision as to whether 
or not he would read the manuscript, or have it read, with 
this end m view. 

At the end of March, as no reply had yet been received 
from Judge Gary's office and inquiry revealed that the 
matter was still merely awaiting his attention, the author 
urged an opportunity to present the whole matter to 
Judge Gary personally. In a brief interview the author 
explained the origin and nature of the present analysis, 
mcluding the fact that it had been carefully edited and 
would be still further edited before publication by men who 
were both impartial and particularly qualified to pass on 





the subjects in the present analysis to which they were giv- 
ing special attention. He urged the desirability, for the 
sake of completeness and accuracy, of obtaining the point of 
view of the steel industry and if possible Judge Gary's own 
opinion on certain specific points. Judge Gary replied 
in effect that under the particular circumstances surround- 
ing the Interchurch investigation, and especially because of 
the nature of some of the conclusions reached by the present 
analysis, he felt that if he went over the analysis in advance 
of publication and offered any suggestions that that fact 
might be misinterpreted as having unduly influenced some 
of the conclusions reached. He believed, therefore, it was 
wiser for him to remain in the position of having no detailed 
knowledge of the subject matter of the present analysis. He 
stated, however, that he hoped that great care would be 
exercised in the matter of its detailed accuracy as, in his 
opinion, such an analysis wovild be valuable, from any point 
of view, only to the extent that its accuracy could be 
absolutely depended on. He added that while no in- 
formation would be volunteered, Mr. Filbert, the Comp- 
troller of the Corporation, who was present, would supply 
any merely detailed figures or facts which he reasonably 
could and which the author would take the initiative in 
requesting. The few specific figures which were thus 
ultimately supplied are in each case accompanied by a foot- 
note stating their source. 

As stated the present volume has been prepared in two 
parts. The main section — 




consists of a critical analysis of the evidences, arguments 
and conclusions of the Interchurch Report on the Steel 
Strike as published. 
In his foreword to the present volume, Dr. Jenks has, 


very properly, emphasized that the story of such an import- 
ant industrial controversy as the steel strike, if it is to do 
good rather than harm, must be told ''with complete regard 
for the exact truth." Certainly then an analysis which 
presumes to criticize the accuracy of such a story must itself 
be punctilious in this regard. Dr. Jenks had pointed this 
fact out from the beginning; this was the only suggestion 
Judge Gary had been wilHng to make; in all editing it had 
been kept particularly in mind. But the editing up to this 
point had been chiefly constructive. In June (1922) Part 
One was put into type so that copies of the text could be 
submitted in whole or in part for a wide variety of detailed 

The statistical sections were thus reviewed with particular 
care. On the suggestion of certain statistical authorities 
with whom the author advised, such sections were submitted 
to Dr. Ernest S. Bradford, Vice President of the American 
Statistical Association, for the purpose of having them sub- 
jected to the most rigid and detailed technical criticism. 

Dr. Bradford turned these sections over for this pur- 
pose to Mr. Arthur R. Burnet of the American Statistical 
Association and Mr. W. Herman Greul, M.E., a specialist in 
Industrial Engineering. Mr. Burnet and Mr. Gruel kindly 
gave some two weeks of their time to a study of these 
sections— namely Chapters III to IX inclusive— and 
offered many valuable suggestions as to simpler and more 
uniform methods of presenting the various statistics in- 
volved. These suggestions have in each case been followed. 

As Mr. Burnet and Mr. Greul were not in a position to 
devote further time to the subject, and as the author had 
planned from the beginning of the work to have the de- 
tailed accuracy of all citations and quotations as well as all 
statistics throughout the analysis passed on by competent 
outside authority of recognized impartiality, Haskins and 
Sells, Certified Pubhc Accountants, were employed for 
this purpose. Their statement of certification appears on 
page ix. 




consists of a brief outline of the facts and circumstances which 
led up to the Interchurch investigation and Report on the 
Steel Strike ; statements as to the personnel of the principal 
committees or other bodies which assisted towards or in the 
investigation and publication of the Report; together with a 
brief history of the composition and authorization of the 

The facts and circumstances dealt with in Part Two are in 
general not matters of printed or even available written 
record. The evidence here is thus of an entirely different 
nature and must be treated on an entirely different basis 
than that analyzed in Part One. 

Moreover the Interchurch Report as a published docu- 
ment can be analyzed and judged on its own merits so that 
facts as to its origin and authorship must be regarded as 

For these reasons Part Two is treated entirely separately 
and subordinately. 

Attention is called to the fact thai the summaries to both 
parts One and Two consist chiefly, not of conclusions hut of 
recapitulcUions of evidence. 




L— Methods of Analysis Adopted 
II.— Purpose and Cause of Steel Strike 









III.— Wages in the Steel Industry 

IV.— Interchurch Arguments as to Annual 

Steel Wages 

* • • . 

v.— Interchurch Argument as to Wages 
PER Hour . . 

VI.— Interchurch Argument as to the Rela- 
tion BETWEEN Steel Wages and Living 

VII.— Changing the Whole Basis of American 

Social and Economic Organization 
VIII.— Steel Wages and Steel Profits 

IX.— Interchurch Arguments as to Steel 
Working Hours 

X.— The Nature of 12-HouR Work 

XL-Steel Working Hours Compared with 

Hours in Other Industries 
XII.— Hazards and Hardships of Steel Work 
XIIL— Existing Relations between Steel 
Companies AND Steel Workers . 


55 ^ 




• • • 












XIV. — Introduction to Section B . 
XV.— Origin of the Strike Movement . 
J XVI. — Radicalism in the Steel Strike . 
XVII.— Response of the Steel Workers . 




XVIII. — Social Aspects of the i 2-Hour Day 

XIX.— Trade Union Collective Bargaining . 

XX.— Trade Union Collective Bargaining as 
Particularly Applied to the Steel 

XXI.— "Social Consequences" of the Atti- 
tude OF THE Public towards the 
Steel Strike 

XXII.— " Abrogation of the Right of Free 
Speech AND Assembly " 

XXIII.— " Police Brutality" and "Denial of 
Justice "" -Rock Bottom'* Affidavits 
Analyzed . . . • • 


XXIV.— Actual Effect and Purpose of the 
Interchurch Report 

XXV. — Summary of Part One . . • • 








analysis of the interchurch report on the 

steel strike 

Analysis of the Interchurch World Movement Steel 
btnke Report— as to the accuracy and adequacy of its 
facts— as to the logic of its reasoning— as to the soundness 
of Its conclusions— as to the adequacy of the bases for its 
assuniptions and speculations. This analysis of the Report 
IS made entirely on the merits of the document itself without 
any relation to facts presented in Part Two. 

page 383, line 24 

" generally " should read " frequently." 

page 419 

Four statements not three bear dates later than Nov. ist. 

pages 441-2 

Mr. Dennett's statements accompanying his signed state- 
ment were not approved by him in their present form 
before publication. 





There are various possible methods of procedure in 
attempting to analyze any report of an investigation. 

Perhaps the most obvious method is to examine point 
by pomt the fundamental evidence on which the report it- 
self IS based, to discover if such evidence is adequate and if 
It fairly leads to the conclusions which the report deduces 
from it. 

The Interchurch World Movement Report on the steel 
strike states (page 9 — ^line 12) : 

''The sUitements and affidavits of 500 steel workers carefully compared 
and tested canshtute the rock bottom of the findings, the testimony of the 
leaders on both sides being used chiefly to interpret these findings. " 

Only a comparative few of these 500 affidavits, however, 
which thus *' constitute the rock bottom of the findings " 
are themselves presented in the Report or otherwise. Thei-e 
IS no way, therefore, of making any adequate examination 
of the fundamental evidence on which the Interchurch 
Report on the steel strike is based to determine whether 
or not Its conclusions are fair and warranted even by the 
evidence on which they are based. 

Moreover no evidence is presented as to who most of the 
500 persons were who made these affidavits except that they 
were chiefly "of the mass of low-skilled foreigners" (page 
9— line 4). No evidence, or even statement, is presented 

as to why it can be presumed that these 500 men spoke for, 
or represented the opinion of, the 300,000 other men who 
the Report says struck, or the 200,000 others who the 
Report admits did not strike. Not only therefore does the 
Report itself fail to offer any proof as to the adequacy of 
the "rock bottom" evidence on which it states it is based 
but even the most friendly honest critic cannot but ques- 
tion the possibility that 500 affidavits "chiefly of the mass 
of low-skilled foreigners" could under any circumstances 
be adequate "rock bottom" evidence on which to deter- 
mine complex questions involving 500,000 men and the 
operation of a great basic industry. 

With the possibility of analyzing the Interchurch Steel 
Strike Report from the point of view of the "fundamental 
evidence" on which it is based thus eliminated, the most 
obvious alternative is to take up point by point the con- 
clusions of the Report itself, analyzing such evidence as is 
presented, comparing it with all other available evidence 
and judging its conclusions accordingly. 

Even most casual examination of this Report, however, 
immediately reveals the fact that it presents 24 "Conclusions 
and Recommendations" in the "Introduction" (pages 11- 
19) and 41 "Conclusions and Recommendations" in a 
separate "Findings" (pages 246-250), which two groups of 
conclusions and recommendations have little organic rela- 
tion, as to either specific subject matter or expression, to 
one another. 

Moreover the seven chapters into which the Report itself 
is divided, while they of course have a general relation to 
both these separate groups of conclusions and recommenda- 
tions do not express that relation in any organized form 
either as to arrangement or wording. 

Finally any attempt to follow subject by subject either 
the "Conclusions and Recommendations" as expressed in 
the "Introduction" or as expressed chapter by chapter in 
the main report, immediately reveals the fact that in either 
case each sub-division deals with a complexity of subjects 




each one of which has often to be treated on an entirely 
different basis and each one of which is often referred to in 
many subdivisions. 

The third group of Conclusions and Recommendations— 
the "Findings" — were written at a different time and by 
different men than the Report itself including its "Con- 
clusions" and "Recommendations" as they appear in the 
"Introduction." These "Findings" are arranged with 
precision and in logical order but their phraseology is so 
different from that of the Report itself and is often so 
general that it is difficult, and frequently impossible, 
to relate it specifically to the evidence in the Report 

For instance the first Section of the "Findings" con- 
demns the "Boss system." The phrase "Boss system" 
does not occur in the index to the Report proper, as far as 
can be discovered is not discussed in the Report proper, and 
the phrase itself is so indefinite that it is impossible even to 
relate it with any assurance to the Report proper. 

Again the second Section of the " Findings" recommends 
"Industrial Democracy." That phrase also does not occur 
in the index and is not discussed in the Report proper; it is 
entirely vague in itself and neither the "Findings" nor the 
Report proper even remotely suggests how it is proposed 
that men stated to belong to 56 different nationalities with 
different languages, most of them with only a smattering 
of English, can be suddenly and arbitrarily formed into any 
kind of a democracy. 

As a matter of logical necessity then, the present analysis 
discusses the general subjects dealt with in the Steel Strike 
Report in a somewhat different order than they are dis- 
cussed in the Report. The particular order chosen and the 
reason for it are stated in the second chapter. 

It will be particularly noted in the following analysis 
that in certain instances only minor regard is given as to 
whether particular contentions of either the strike leaders 
or of the steel companies were more true. The steel strike 


is long since over and certain of its facts and contentions, 
as such, have only minor historical interest. 

It will be noted, however, that particular attention is 
given to the attitude and arguments of the Interchurch 
Report on such points because it is the question of the 
soundness of the Interchurch Report and its adequacy as an 
Industrial text-book that is of particular interest in the 
present analysis. ' 

The Interchurch Report states (page 8, paragraph 7) : 

" The United States Steel Corporation was the admittedly decisive 
influence. Whatever the Steel Corporation does, the rest of the industry 
will ultimately do," and again (page 1 1 , paragraph 3) " The conduct of 
the Iron and Steel industry was determined by the conditions of labor 
accepted by the 191,000 employees of the United States Steel manu- 
facturing plants. " 

Moreover in giving facts, figures and statistics in regard 
to the steel controversy, the Interchurch Report almost 
invariably gives such facts and figures as they refer to the 
U. S. Steel Corporation, undoubtedly because such figures 
are most available, as well as in keeping with its theory in 
regard to the determining influence of the Corporation in the 


As the present analysis is primarily of the Interchurch 
Report rather than of the steel situation as such, it follows 
the Interchurch Report's policy of thus putting major 
emphasis on facts and figures as they apply to the U. S. 
Steel Corporation. 

For the same reason the present analysis has, in certain 
cases where the Interchurch Report's own statements or 
figures reduce its arguments to self-contradiction or other 
logical absurdity, merely used such statement or figure to 
this end without going further into the merits of the state- 
ments or figures themselves. 

Finally the fact that the present analysis is of the Inter- 
church Report and not of the steel situation and contro- 
versy as such, makes it obviously inadvisable to bring up 




or discuss the right or wrong of any conditions in the steel 
industry except those brought up by the Interchurch Report 
or plainly related to those brought up by the Interchurch 

The present analysis is built on a careful study of some 
8000 pages of original evidence concerning or related to the 
subjects under discussion. It is seldom possible therefore 
in quotations to use more than excerpts from the original. 
Also in quoting from voltmiinous evidence involving ntimer- 
ous subjects and particularly where one subject is touched 
on and later returned to — ^as in testimony which is being 
cross-examined by several cross-examiners — the present 
analysis, for clearness and continuity, in a few cases quotes 
such excerpts in their logical rather than their original order, 
showing the break of cotirse by the conventional " . . ." 
Quotations are always, however, accompanied by specific 
citation of the original by volvmie, page, and paragraph or 
line, so that reference can easily be made directly to the 

The Interchurch Report throughout uses certain terms in- 
accurately or defines them incorrectly. For instance it 
continually uses such terms as "all steel workers," the 
"steel industry as a whole," etc., in connection with facts 
and figures which apply only to primary production de- 
partments. The present analysis when discussing Inter- 
church argviments in order to avoid confusion generally 
uses such terms in the same meaning as the Interchurch 
Report uses them. In discussing the same points on their 
merits, however, it will often define and use such terms 

All italics, unless otherwise stated, are the authors*. 

Comment within quotations enclosed in parentheses, i. e., 
( . , . ) is the author's. Such comment inclosed in brackets, 
i. e., [ . . . ] is part of the original. 






The Interchurch Report states the purpose of the Steel 
Strike (page 15, section 11): 

" The organizing campaign of the workers and the Strike were for the 
purpose of forcing a conference . . . this specific conference to set up 
trade union collective bargaining. " 

Mr. Gompers in his letter of June 20, 1919, to Judge Gary 

"... The A. F. of L. decided ... to taring about a thorough 
organization of the workers in the Iron and Steel Industry ... we aim 
to accomplish the purpose of our labor movement . . . to enter into an 
agreement for collective bargaining that is to cover wages, hours of labor, 
conditions of employment, etc. " 

That it was the purpose of the unionization efforts that 
preceded the steel strike to unionize the mills and set up 
trade unions collective bargaining with the employers, in 
which the A. F. of L. and its subsidiary unions were to 
represent the employees, and that the purpose of the strike 
itself was to enforce this demand for such collective bar- 
gaining, was repeatedly emphasized by other strike leaders. 

That the Steel Corporation regarded trade union collec- 
tive bargaining as the basic question at issue is plainly 
indicated by Judge Gary's statement to the officers of the 
U. S. Steel Corporation which was published in the Senate 
Hearings (Part I, page 97) : 


"Not long since I respectfully declined to meet for the purjwse of 
discussing matters pertaining to labor at our various plants a number of 
gentlemen representing certain labor imions. They claim that this 
furnishes cause for complaint and have stated that they intend if possible 
to prevent a continuation of operations at our mills and factories. . . . 
I entertain no feelings nor animosity toward the gentlemen personally 
and would not hesitate to meet them as individuals but I did not con- 
sider it proper to confer with them under the circumstances . . . fiist, 
because I did not believe the gentlemen were authorized to speak for 
large nimibers of our employees; ... we do not negotiate with 
labor unions because it would indicate the closing of our shops against 
non-imion labor and large numbers of oiu: workers are not members of 
unions and do not care to be. " 

There is no question, then, as to the expressed purpose 
of the attempted unionization of the steel industry or the 
steel strike — ^that it was to establish trade union collective 

Pursuant to their purpose of establishing trade union 
collective bargaining in the steel industry, with themselves 
as the official representatives of the men, after a certain 
period of unionization work among the men, the strike 
leaders proposed to Judge Gary a conference which in itself 
constituted a recognition and initiation of collective bar- 
gaining. Judge Gary though stating his willingness to 
meet the strike leaders as individuals refused to recognize 
them as representing the steel workers and meet them in 
such a conference as was proposed. 

The union leaders at the time of the strike put great 
emphasis on this refusal of Judge Gary to meet them in 
conference and tried to treat it as though it itself were a 
paramount issue in the controversy and the strike. 

Mr. Fitzpatrick, President of the special committee that 
planned and organized the steel strike testified before the 
Senate Committee: 

" The strike at the present time is brought about by the refusal on the 
part of Judge Gary to meet a conference. There is nothing else in- 
volved in the situation." (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 51.) 




Also the other strike leaders specifically declared that the 
cause of the steel strike was Judge Gary's refusal to recog- 
nize them as representing the steel workers and to meet 
them in conference, and therefore that Judge Gary was the 
cause of the steel strike. 

Such an allegation of course is fairly parallel to the 
possible allegation that a man who was shot, was shot 
because he refused to hold up his hands when he was told to. 
Such an allegation can only be justified if the man who did 
the shooting was an officer of the law or the circumstances 
were otherwise such that he had a right to demand and the 
victim had no right to refuse to hold up his hands. 

But whether under the existing circumstances the strike 
leaders did have a right to insist upon, or whether in view 
of all the conditions Judge Gary had no right to refuse such 
a conference is at the least a matter of opinion based on the 
interpretation of the facts in regard to those conditions and 

circumstances. ^ 

Moreover, considering the known pomt of view and th6 
express demands of the strike leaders and the known point 
of view of the steel companies, there is little question that 
such conference, even if it had been held, would have 
resulted so unsatisfactorily to the strike leaders that the 
strike would have been called just the same. 

Even if there is assigned, then, as much weight to Judge 
Gary's refusal of a conference as the strike leaders them- 
selves assign to that refusal as the immediate cause of the 
strike the facts which caused the strike leaders to insist on 
this conference and caused Judge Gary to refuse it, ai^ 
back of and paramount to this request and refusal, and 
these circumstances are plainly those in regard to the 
attempts by the strike leaders to unionize the steel workers 
and to establish trade union collective bargaining in the 
steel industry and Judge Gary's reasons for refusing to 
acquiesce in such collective bargaining in the steel industry. 

The reason stated by Judge Gary for his refusal to recog- 
nize or cooperate in trade union collective bargaimng with 


the strike leaders as representatives of the A. F. of L. also 
representing the steel workers, was : 

"We do not think you are authorized to represent the sentiments of 
the majority of the employees of the U. S. steel corporation and its 
subsidiaries . . . the corporation and its subsidiaries are opposed to 
the 'closed shop ' (the admitted aim of trade union collective bargain- 
ing). They stand for the 'open shop' which . . . best promotes the 
welfare of both employers and employees. . . . In wage rates, living and 
working conditions, conservation for life and health, care and comfort 
in time of sickness or old age, and providing facilities for the general 
welfare and happiness of employees and their families, the corporation 
and its subsidiaries have endeavored to occupy a leading and advanced 
position among employers." (Judge Gary's letter of Aug. 27, 1919, to 
Committee of Strike leaders.) 

" The strike was inaugurated by the union leaders not by the men. 
The union leaders have been attempting all these years to organize the 
men. The men have not been seeking the assistance of anyone to 
organize them." (Judge Gary, Senate Hearings, Part I — Page 153, 
Line 28.) 

It was the contention of the strike leaders, on the other 
hand, that they "did represent the sentiment of the vast 
majority of the employees in this industry'*;— were "acting 
in behalf of the men " and were "selected by duly accredited 
representatives of the employees" (letter of Strike Com- 
mittee to Judge Gary, Aug. 26, 1919) and that the vast 
majority of the employees wanted and required trade union 
collective bargaining because 

"conditions of employment, the home life, the misery in the hovels of 
the steel workers is beyond description . . . the standard of life of the 
average steel worker is below the pauper line" (Letter of Strike Com- 
mittee to Judge Gary, Aug. 27, 1919). 

These points at issue, with their variations, were dis- 
cussed in detail in the correspondence between the strike 
leaders and the company, in the testimony before the Senate 
Investigating Committee, in the Interchurch Report on the 
Steel Strike, in Mr. Foster's book, The Great Steel Strike 
and in other published discussions either official or from 







official information. The Interchurch Report also dis- 
cusses at great length a considerable number of alleged 
points at issue which had not previously been raised— at 
least publicly— by either party to the controversy. A 
careful study of all this documentary evidence indicates 
that at least the principal points at issue may be summarized 

as follows : 

First, the strike leaders claimed that in their effort to 
unionize the steel industry on the basis of trade union collec- 
tive bargaining they represented the great majority of the 
steel workers and the interests of all the steel workers. The 
steel companies denied that the strike leaders represented 
the workers or the sentiment of the workers in general or 
the interest of the workers, but insisted that the strike 
leaders were outsiders who had taken the initiative in pro- 
jecting themselves into the steel industry without invita- 
tion from the men and against the wishes of the majority 
of the men; and that their unionization efforts included 
"radical" agitation among the foreign workers. 

Second, the strike leaders asserted that the workers re- 
quired trade union collective bargaining because they 
neither possessed nor were allowed to establish any ade- 
quate channels for expressing or negotiating as to any 
grievances with their employers. On the other hand, the 
steel companies stated that it was their practice to take the 
initiative in seeking continually to advance the interests 
of the workers and that the workers were always free, and 
had, when the occasion had arisen, frequently availed them- 
selves of that freedom, to present grievances and that it had 
been the instruction of the companies to all executives to 
give the utmost consideration to any such complaints. 

Third, the strike leaders alleged that trade union collec- 
tive bargaining was necessary to the workers' interest 
because the workers were being paid wages below the pauper 
level. The steel companies stated that steel wages were 
among the very highest in industry and that it had always 
been their policy to keep them there. 



Fourth, the strike leaders insisted that trade union collec- 
tive bargaining was necessary to improve the working 
conditions and particularly to relieve the men of their long 
oppressive hours of work. The steel companies stated that 
the majority of their men preferred the longer hours because 
of the higher pay they brought — that because of automatic 
machinery and periods of intermission a great part of the 
work was not unduly hard and that where the work was 
especially hard and the men had expressed the desire for it 
the hours had been reduced to eight instead of ten or twelve 
a day. The Interchurch Report makes very much more of 
the heaviness and also of the hazard of steel labor than was 
made by either the strike leaders or the men themselves, 
who testified as to working conditions. 

Fifth, the strike leaders insisted that trade union collec- 
tive bargaining was necessary for certain other purposes — 
in order that "the principle of seniority (instead of that of 
merit) should apply in maintaining and reducing and in- 
creasing working forces" — in order that "existing local 
unions should be abolished" — in order that "physical 
examination of applicants for employment should be 
abolished" in order that the "check off system of collecting 
union dues and assessments" (the system by which the 
union dues are collected by the union from the company 
and subtracted from the worker's wages instead of being 
collected from the worker himself) should be established, 
and in general that trade union collective bargaining was 
necessary to change and control other and general condi- 
tions of work and the relations between the men and the 

It will at once appear from any analysis of the foregoing 
points at issue that certain of them constitute direct issues 
of fact. In the following analysis, these will be considered 
first under Section A . 

It is equally obvious that other points constitute issues of 
fact as to the opinions of large nimibers of men or are based 
on interpretation of facts or on which of various facts are to 




be regarded as more important. Any conclusion as to the 
merits of such points at issue must be determined by the 
weight of evidence. Such points will be discussed second 
under Section B. 

Finally it will be noted that certain of these points at 
issue involve broad general industrial or social considerations 
which involve to a particular degree individual opinion. 
Such points at issue will be discussed third under Section C. 



Issues in the Steel Strike and Arguments of the Inter church 
Report which are susceptible of being determined on a basis of 
definite FA CTS, 









In Appendix B of the Interchurch Report on the Steel 
Strike, pages 265 and 266 are entirely taken up with a table 
which is itself not discussed or even referred to in the Report 

The first figures given, which are stated to be from the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Review, October, 1919, are as follows: 

Iron and Steel ^FuUWefk' 

All Employees ^5^5 ^g 

Common Labor ^4 lo 

Other Labor (including skilled and semi-skilled) ^1,7^ 

Below these figures this Interchurch Report Appendix 
table then gives in considerable detail earnings for ten other 
general industries. The industries whose wages are thus 
given are, as will appear from the wage figures discussed 
later, among the highest-wage, if not the highest-wage 
industries in the country. In some cases the Interchurch 
Appendix gives these earnings separately for common labor 
m the industry and for the industry as a whole, in other 
cases, it gives them for common labor and for the bal- 
ance of the industry— that is for skilled and semi-skilled 

These figures which the Interchurch Report publishes in 
Its own Appendix as from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics, from the Federal Raikoad administration and from 





other authoritative sources, but which it does not discuss 
or consider in its main argument, show the following: 


1919 . „ 

Earnings Per 

Industry ^^^ ^''^ 

IRON AND STEEL {skilled and semi'Skilled) 151-74 

U. S. ARSENALS {skilled and semi-skilled) 36-53 

BUILDING TRADES {all skilled) : 

Brick Layers 3947 

Carpenters 34-56 

Cement Workers and Finishers 36.28 

Wiremen (inside) 35-4© 

Painters 32-6i 

Plasterers 39-02 

Plumbers ^0.66 

Sheet Metal Workers 35-6o 

Steam Fitters 40.83 

Structural Iron Workers 4^-45 

NAVY YARDS {skilled and semi-skilled) 38-35 

PRINTERS Various cities {all skilled): 
Linotype Operators: 

Newspapers, day 35-7^ 

Book and Job -' 30-50 


Newspapers, day 35-59 

Book and Job 26.28 

RAILROADS {all skilled) : 

Machinists 3456 

Blacksmiths 34-56 

Boiler Makers 34-56 

RAILROADS {semi-skilled): 

Firemen, Freight 28.80 

Firemen, Passenger 26.40 

Firemen, Yard Service 24.96 

Hostlers ;•• 25.49 

SHIP YARDS Pacific Coast {skilled and semi-skilled) — 36.38 

There is not a single class of the most highly skilled 
workers in any of the other representative industries given 




whose earnings come within $10 a week of being as high as 
the average for skilled and semi-skilled steel workers. 
These same tables also show the following: 

• Skilled, Semi-Skilled and Common 




All inside Occupations -^ qq 


All inside occupations %% a2 

{In both cases, outside occupations bring the whole average 

much lower— Anthracite to $2g.8g) 


BUILDING TRADES, New York City. ... tl' L 

SHIP YARDS, Atlantic Coast :. ^^ l! 


North Atlantic ^8 oo 

South Atlantic 

North Central 3.'^; 

Western .'.''".'.'.'.".'.'.'.'.'.'.'"!.'.' 27 86 

The Unweighted average excluding Iron and Steel is; . . 32. 1 1 

The average earnings of all iron and steel workers is thus 
a week higher than average earnings in the next highest 
mdustry— coal mining— even with all the lowest paid classes 
of coal workers omitted, and is from $10 to $20 a week higher 
than for all other given industries which are among the 
highest paid in American industry. 

As regards common labor these same tables from the 
Interchurch Report Appendix show the following: 



Industry H^fW ^.^ 

Full Weph 


COAL MINING: *^^''^ 

Anthracite inside (outside $2 1 .26) ^g ^^ 

Bituminous inside... '^ 


U. S. ARSENALS $22.08 



RAILROADS (footnote i): 

Section Men 37-2^ per hour 

Yard Switch Tenders 34-7^ " " 

Other Yard Employees 374^ 

Engine House Men 42-3^ 

Other Unskilled Labor 4i-3^ " " 


Pacific Coast '. $24.96 

Atlantic Coast 17-28 

It is plain then in regard to common labor also that the 
steel worker is by far the highest paid in all the industries 
given which as stated are among the highest paid in the 
country. The figures given for coal mining include only the 
highest paid inside and leave out the lower paid outside 
common labor. They are otherwise higher than the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor, December, 1919, Monthly Review, from 
which they are alleged to be taken, actually shows they 
should be. But taking them as given, steel common labor 
wages were still $5 to $8 a week higher, and steel common 
labor wages were $12 to $17 per week higher than common 
labor wages for all other industries given. 

But perhaps the most interesting comparison of all is 
that between the actual earnings of the lowest paid steel 
worker — common labor, and certain classes of the highest 
paid skilled workers in other of these industries, and between 
steel common labor and all workers — ^including skilled and 
semi-skilled — in the other industries given. 

Reference to the Interchurch Report's own Appendix 
figures given above, most of which are stated to be from 
official government sources — show at once that the $34.19 
a week earnings for steel common labor is substantially the 

» Two classifications listed by the Interchurch table as common labor 
are here omitted because they are as a matter of fact, and as their wage 
rate shows, semi-skilled. 




same as that for skilled carpenters, cement workers, wiremen, 
painters and sheet metal workers of the building trades. 
It is substantially the same as the earnings for all the skilled 
railroad workers given and is from $6 to $10 higher than the 
earnings given for semi-skilled railroad workers. It is higher 
than the average earnings of skilled printers in large cities 
where their wages are highest. 

The comparison between the $34.19 earned by the lowest 
paid group of steel workers and the average earned by all 
workers in all the high-wage industries given, is self-appar- 
ent by reference to Table Number 2 above. The Inter- 
church Report Appendix figures do not in any case give 
numbers of workers considered so that they cannot be 
weighted to produce exact statistical averages for exact 
comparison. The mathematical average of the earnings of 
all classes of workers— including skilled and semi-skilled— 
for all these other high- wage industries is $32.11.. Steel 
common labor earnings were $34.19. 

Moreover the farther this comparison is carried into still 
other industries, the more it becomes apparent that the 
lowest paid steel worker— common labor, received higher 
wages than all workers— including skilled and semi-skilled, 
m the great majority of all American industries. 

On page 6 the Interchurch Report, in naming its major 
authorities and those who assisted in the preparation of the 
Report, lists "the Bureau of Applied Economics in Wash- 
mgton" and elsewhere mentions this organization as one of 
Its authorities. This Bureau of Applied Economics has 
pubHshed m its Bulletin Number 8 (1920) entitled "Wages 
in Various Industries and Occupations" perhaps the most 
comprehensive r^sumd of comparative wages that has yet 

Statisticsas to wagesaregenerally given on one of two bases. 
U. S. Government statisticians, statistical engineers and 
other technical authorities in this field follow the practise 
of giving wage figures in terms of ''actual earnings'' which 
are derived by dividing actual wage pay-rolls for each group 


. ; 


of workers by the number of workers in that group. Wage 
figures in terms of *' earnings'' therefore, represent the 
wages the workers actually receive. All the figures above 
given and discussed are, as specified, based on ''earn' 

The second basis on which wage figures are given is known 
as "wage rates'* which represent merely theoretical or 
"paper wages. " Wage figures given out by labor unions — 
particularly in regard to their own industries — are generally 
in terms of ''wage rates" Wage rates of course may in some 
cases approximate actual earnings but in general they are 
higher and often very much higher than earnings. For 
instance, Bureau of Applied Economics Bulletin Number 8 
on pages 14 to 25 gives detailed figures as to wages in the 
Building trades partly for 191 9 and partly for 1920, which 
figures were chiefly "furnished by union officials." They 
are in terms of wage rates. It appears from these figures that 
on the basis of wage rates carpenters* wages were $43.97 P^r 
week, yet as already shown carpenters' actiial earnings (191 9) 
were $34.56. Similarly wage rates for painters were $42.32 
but earnings only $32.61. As a matter of fact the actual 
earnings of steel workers were so much higher than the wages 
for all other workers for which authoritative figures for 191 9 
can be discovered that it makes small difference whether 
these other wages are in terms of earnings or rates. 

The first fifteen chapters of the Bureau of Applied 
Economics Bulletin Number 8 are devoted to detailed 
figures as to earnings or wage rates in industries which, as 
far as 191 9 figures are given, have with a few exceptions 
already been covered in the preceding tables, and in most 
of which cases, the figures are either the same or more 
detailed presentations of original government figures from 
which the Interchurch Report Appendix figures are also 
taken. The wage figures given in these chapters which 
have not already been considered, consist of farm labor 
wages which averaged in 191 9 for the country $56.29 a 
month or about a third that of steel common labor earnings; 


and navy wages which because they include "keep" are so 
much lower as to be incomparable with steel wages. 

Chapter XVI of Bulletin No. 8 is devoted to a detailed 
study of teachers' wages throughout the country. They 
were for all schools in the coimtry in 191 8, $635 a year or 
$15.87 a week on the basis of a 40- week year. 

Chapter XIX of Bulletin Number 8 is devoted to a study 
of earnings in various New York State factories. In 191 9 
the average weekly earnings for all workers including skilled, 
semi-skilled and all office workers as well as common labor 
in all New York State factories represented, was $23.50 or 
$1 1 a week less than the earnings of the lowest class of steel 

Beginning with Chapter XX the balance of Bulletin 
Number 8 is devoted to the detailed study of wages in a wide 
variety of other principal manufacturing industries. All 
these figures are based on actual earnings. They are for 
both male and female workers whose earnings are in most 
cases treated separately. The averages as given are 
weighted, and where the averages themselves are not given, 
details are given which make computation of an exact 
comparable average possible. In a few cases, two sets of 
figures, representing either different groups or different pay- 
roll periods for the same industry are given. These actual 
earnings per week as given, or as computed by the weighted 
average of the detailed figures given, are as follows : 


For male workers only. In all but three industries given, women 
workers bring average earnings much lower than these stated. 

Averages include skilled, semi-skilled and common labor 

Full Time 
Industry Per Week 

Boot and Shoe Manufacturing $25.90 

Brick 25.52 

Chemicals 25.44 

Chemical Manufacturing 26.20 


Confectionery $I9>I9 

Cotton Manufacturing 17.10 

Furniture 20.55 

Glass 24.46 

Hosiery and Underwear 24.66 

Leather 26.14 

Lumber 20.03 

Metal Manufacturing 24.75 

Mill Work 20.36 

Overalls 27.24 

Paper 27.23 

Paper Boxes 19-75 

Paper Manufactiuing 22.40 

Pottery 32.04 

Pulp 22.70 

Rubber 27.62 

Rubber Manufacturing 29.35 

Silk 23.55 

Silk Manufacturing 22.69 

Women's Clothing (no common labor included) 36.72 

Wool Manufacturing 18.61 

Combined Average (weighted and computed by Haskins and 

Sells) 24.35 

All these elaborate wage statistics taken from the Inter- 
church Report's own authority, show, just as did the Inter- 
church Report's own figures — which it publishes in its 
Appendix but omits to consider in its argument and con- 
clusions — that steel wages are not only higher but higher 
out of all proportion than wages in any other industry given. 
Out of the 87 occupations of the 17 industries for which 
detailed figures are given, (in addition to the unspecified 
occupations for the 8 industries for which only average 
figures are given) in these last chapters of Bulletin Number 8, 
only one skilled occupation (Pottery kiln placers — earnings 
$43.49) comes within $10 a week of earning as much as the 
$51.74 average earnings of all semi-skilled as well as skilled 
steel workers. The great majority of the skilled workers 
in all the occupations given earn at least $15 per week less 
and great groups of them earn $20 less than the average 
earnings of all semi-skilled as well as skilled steel workers. 


Except for the Women's Clothing industry— whose 
earnings of $36.72 include no common labor and do not 
consider the greater part of the employees in the industry 
who are women workers earning from $15 to $21 a week — 
and except for the Pottery industry — whose earnings of 
$32.04 do not include the greatest proportion of the workers 
who are also women earning in general $15 or $16 a week — 
there is no other one of the 25 industries given whose 
average earnings for all workers is within $15 a week as 
high as the $46.78 average earnings of all iron and steel 

But again perhaps the most interesting fact thus shown 
in regard to iron and steel earnings is that except for women's 
clothing where the figures do not include any common labor 
and none of the largest proportion of lowest paid workers 
in the industry, there is not a single industry here given 
whose average earnings for all workers including skilled and 
semi-skilled, are as high as the earnings of steel common 
labor and steel common labor earnings were $10 a week 
higher than the average earnings of all workers in all these 

Turning from wage statistics given by the Inter- 
church Report itself— but only in its Appendix— or 
by its own stated authority, to other authorities, the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in its monthly Labor 
Review for June, 1920, reports on pages 83 to 95 the 
results of its study as to wages in the Automobile, Freight 
Car, Electrical Apparatus, Foundry, Machinery, Machine 
Tool and Typewriter industries, all industries whose labor 
is predominantly high class, high skilled. The figures pub- 
Hshed are from actual pay rolls for months from September, 
1918, to May, 1919. They are weighted averages of actual 
earnings and so can be exactly compared with figures for 
steel and other industries already given. 
. This U. S. bulletin shows that of all the highly skilled labor 
employed in the Automobile industry only four classes of 
skilled labor received as much as unskilled labor in the Steel 




industry and that all classes in this highly skilled industnr 
averaged $28.22 per week or $6.00 less than the lowest paid, 
unskilled steel workers. 

All workers in car manufacturing plants, also including an 
especially high per cent of skilled men average $27.98 per 
week or over $6.00 less than mere unskilled steel workers. 

Makers of electrical apparatus are preponderately skilled 
workers, yet only two groups were paid as high as unskilled 
steel workers, and all workers averaged $9.00 less a week 
than the lowest paid steel workers. Similarly all makers 
of machinery averaged $6.00 a week less, all makers of 
machine tools $6.00 a week less, and all makers of type- 
writers $8.00 less than steel common labor. 

Judge Gary, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
largest unit in the steel industry, testified before the Senate 
Committee investigating the steel strike : 

" I wish to state Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen that there is no basic 
industry in this country, nor in the world, in my opinion, which^ 
paid larger wages to its employees than the United States Steel Cor- 
poration." (Senate Hearings, Part I, page I47-) 

To this general statement. Judge Gary later added (pages 
156-158) detailed statements as to average wages. 

Finally Mr. John Fitzpatrick, Chairman of the Speaal 
Strike Committee, testified before the Senate Committee 
during the strike (Senate Hearings, Part I, page74,hne 

46) : 

Mr. Fitzpatrick: "We, or at least I. understood that the perc^tage 
of increase of the wages of the steel industry was even higher than that. 

Senator Wolcott: " Higher than i n per cent.?" 

Mr. Fitzpatrick: "Yes. But it is not a question of wages. The 
steel industry of course came up with the wages. 

Yet the Interchurch Report on the steel strike says: 

" That steel common labor has the lowest rate of pay of the trades for 
which there are separate statistics for laborers. " (In italics page 102- 
line 23.) 



" In 1919 the unskilled (steel) workers' annual earnings were more than 
$109 below the minimimi subsistence level and more than $558 below 
the American standard of living, " (page 94 — line 8). 

"The bulk of unskilled steel labor earned less than enough for the 
average family's minimum subsistence" (page 13 — line 3). 

" The annual earnings of 72% of all (steel) workers were and had been 
for years below the level set by government experts as the minimum of 
comfort level for families of five" (page 12 — line 32). 

In other words whereas the United States government 
statistics and all other authoritative available data, show 
definitely that all steel workers were paid far higher wages 
than similar workers in any other industry and that steel 
common labor actually received from 50 to 100% more than 
average American common labor, the Interchurch Report 
by definite statement and by constant repetition and itali- 
cizing, attempts to deny these statements and constantly 
states and insinuates that steel labor is not only the poor- 
est paid in industry but is not paid enough to keep body and 
soul together. 

In view of this definite and sweeping contradiction of 
what has always been heretofore regarded as evidence of 
the highest authority, the question naturally arises as to 
what previously unknown evidence the Interchurch In- 
vestigators have discovered or what special methods of 
analysis they have employed which thus proves that all our 
government statistics and leading students and economists 
have for years been entirely wrong in their belief that steel 
labor is the highest paid, and which justifies the Interchurch 
Investigators in the opposite conclusion that steel workers 
are the poorest paid in industry. 

The Interchurch Report, as has been remarked, entirely 
omits any mention or consideration in its wage arguments 
of the official figures of the U. S. Government as to wages in 
the steel industry, although it publishes them in detail in 
its appendix and discusses the tables of which they are a 
part constantly and in detail in its discussion of steel work- 
ing hours. It does not mention or consider the voluminous 


wage studies of the Bureau of Applied Economics although 
it specifically mentions this organization as one of the au- 
thorities which furnished "technical data" for the Report. 

It does however print in some detail (pages 87 and 88) 
Judge Gary's public statements as to wages and his figures 
taken from the books of the steel company, not however in 
any attempt to analyze or refute them, but merely to at- 
tempt to cast insinuations and slurs as to their being a 
source of "popular illusion." 

Aside from such continued attempts at argument through 
insinuation and sarcasm the Interchurch Steel Report at- 
tempts to disprove what it calls the "popular illusion that 
steel is a highly paid industry" in three ways: 

These three distinct and different types of argument are 
not however distinctly organized but on the contrary are 
rather inextricably mixed. The whole Interchurch argu- 
ment as to wages begins with a premise which is not de- 
veloped imtil after a second argimient has been well begun 
and the conclusions to each, which are quite different, are 
used or combined quite indiscrintiinately in each further 

The argtiment in regard to annual wages that is begun 
second but finished first undoubtedly merits first attention. 

The argument in regard to wages per hour which is begun 
first and concluded last will be considered second. 

The third argument here considered, that in regard to the 
relation between wages and estimated living costs, is the one 
to which the Interchurch Report gives most space and whose 
conclusions are most strongly and frequently emphasized. 



The first argument the Interchurch Report advances 
in regard to steel wages consists of an attempt to estimate 
the average earnings of different classes of steel employees 
on an annual basis. 

There can, of course, be no question of the average wage 
of steel employees on a full time daily or weekly basis. 
The Appendix of the Interchurch Report, quoting the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, gives the wages of Common labor 
as $3419 a week. On page 267 of the Appendix the Inter- 
church Report itself gives a table of figures (from U. S, 
Bureau of Labor) which seeks chiefly to emphasize the num- 
ber of working hours but which states incidentally (but never 
uses these figures in the main argument) that the "earnings 
per Ml week for common labor (iron and steel industry) was 
in 1919 $37.34" for the " Pittsburg District." 

It is a matter of the commonest knowledge that at least 
during 191 7 and 191 8 and 19 19 the steel industry was 
working at capacity. The Interchurch Report itself spends 
the whole of Chapter III emphasizing, and emphasizes 
repeatedly in many other sections, that "the steel industry 
was speeded up in every direction" (page 55, line 11). 
It specifically states, in its table on page 71, that common 
labor for the whole steel industry averaged 74 hours a week- 
more than 12 hours a day— in 191 9. The Report further 
states that approximately one half of all steel workers were 
subject to the 12-hour day and that one half the 12-hour 




workers were subject to the seven-day week (page ii, 
Sec. 7) — that the workers only get a Sunday off once in 6 
months (page 71 — line i) — and in general emphasizes what 
is common knowledge that the steel industry during this 
period worked at least full time. 

With these facts as to the amount of time worked a 
matter of general knowledge and of special complaint by the 
Interchurch Report, and with earnings per full time week 
given definitely by the Interchurch Report itself as $34.19, 
the obvious way to arrive at the average annual earnings of 
the steel laborer is the simple one of multiplying weeks 
worked by earnings per week. ' 

If we multiply the average weekly earnings of the 12 hotir 
common laborer in the steel industry as given by the Inter- 
church Appendix by 50 weeks, which allows each worker 
a two weeks' vacation each year, the average annual earnings 
0} common labor is $1709.50. 

If on the other hand we use the Interchurch figures from 
the appendix (page 267) of $37.34 a week and multiply that 

*In regard to the multiplication of the hourly earnings by hm-^ 
worked as a means of determining earnings, the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
statistics October, 19 19, has itself (page 105) issued the following 

"When the rate of earnings per hour of an employee has been in- 
creased by the addition to his r^ular earnings of extra pay for overtime 
or a bonus, it becomes impossible to compute full time earnings by the 
simple method of multiplying full time hours by hourly earnings.'^ In 
other words, the rate for instance of 46.4^5 an hour, given as full time 
hotirly earnings for common labor is made up on the basis of straight 
time for 8 hours work and time and a half for the additional four hours 
work of the 12-hour day. The 12-hour worker therefore received 12 
times this 46.4^5 hourly rate per day. The worker whose full time 
however is 10 hours did not receive 10 times 46.4ff per day because 
his hourly wage rate was based on straight time for 8 hours and time and 
a half for only 2 hours. In all original computations in the present 
analysis this fact has been carefully allowed for. In the present instance 
the wage figiu*es used are not on an hourly basis but are the full time 
weekly earnings as specifically stated by the Interchurch Report itself, 
or to make possible exact comparison, weekly earnings computed on 
the same basis. 



by 50 weeks, still giving the worker a two weeks* vacation 
which the Interchurch Report insists he didn't get, the 
average annual earnings of common labor is $1867 a year. 

Judge Gary states that the average wage paid all common 
labor on the 12 -hotir basis was $5.88 a day. If we multiply 
this by 300 days a year which gives each such laborer all his 
Sundays and more than all regular holidays off, his wage is 
$1764 a year. 

The lowest ''average earnings per hour'' shown by the 
elaborate U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1919, 
figures as to steel wages — ^the authority from which the 
Interchurch Reports own Appendix figures and the Bureau 
of Applied Economics figures are both taken — for any class 
of steel workers for the entire country is 44.9/ an hour for 
68.8 hours a week worked by common labor in the Plate 
Mill. Plate Mill common labor therefore received $30.89' 
per week oi s% 12-hour days or six 11. 5 -hour days which is 
$1606.28 per year. 

The lowest paid common labor for the entire industry 
shown by these U. S. Bureau of Labor figures is 161 laborers 
in Sheet Mills whose earnings were 46^2^ an hour for an aver- 
age of 66. 5 hours a week. This is $30. 59 ' a week or $ 1 590. 69 
a year. The lowest paid steel workers of any class shown by 
these Government statistics for the whole industry, were 
186 Sheet Mill Openers, semi-skilled, whose earnings were 
68.5^ an hour for a 44-hour week. This means that these 
workers received $30.14' a week or $1567.28 a year — but 
this is for an 8-hour day 53^ days a week. 

As has been emphasized, the Interchurch Report does not 
use or mention in its wage argument these figures for the 
whole country which it itself publishes in its Appendix and 
states are from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 

Although it had spent the whole previous chapter in 
emphasizing how "the steel industry was speeded up in 
every direction" during this period, it dismisses in a single 
brief sentence the obvious method of arriving at at least 

' Computed on same basis as Interchiurch figures above. 



approximate annual earnings by multiplying given weekly 
earnings by approximately full time. 

At the bottom of page 98 the Interchurch Report gives a 
table of weekly earnings for an individual "Open Hearth 
gang." These earnings for the common laborers among 
this **gang" are stated as $35-28 a week— substantially 
the same as the average for the country ($34.19) given in 
the Appendix. Following this table it states in italics, as 

" ... if the common laborers who make up 49 per cent, of Open 
Hearth employees, worked this 12-hour schedule for all but 26 of the 
365 days in the year, they would still be nearly $200 below the lowest 
* American standard. ' ' ' 

The Interchurch Report frequently, through the pre- 
ceding pages, defines the "lowest American standard" of 
living as $2024 a year. $200 less than this is $1824 a year. 
$35.28 weekly (the stated earnings of common labor in this 
particular "Open Hearth gang") multiplied by 52 weeks is 
$1834.56. Thus— although entirely indirectly— the Inter- 
church Report admits that 12-hour common labor which 
worked full time earned $1800 a year. But immediately 
after this indirect admission, it hastens to add, 

"But few men can stand it and few plants run without a lay-off, — 
many are 'down' from 8 to 20 weeks a year, and the year's earnings are 
never 'full time."* 

Therefore the Interchurch Report concludes, and empha- 
sizes on page 92 and repeats on pages 93, 94, 97 and elsewhere, 
that steel common labor received "under $1466 a year." 

Of course individual steel workers lay off for sickness or 
other reasons just as do workers in any other industry. Of 
course machinery, no matter how busy, must sometimes 
stop to be repaired. But as has already been shown, 65 
days a year may be allowed for such causes and still the 12- 
hour workers who worked 300 days a year at $5.88 a day — 

» This table shows plainly on its face a working schedule of 6 days a 
week yet the Interchurch Report presumes in the next paragraph to 
use this table as evidence of 7-<iay work. 


the average daily earnings for 12-hour common labor given 
by Judge Gary and which multiplied by 6 days gives $35.28, 
exactly the weekly earnings of the "Open Hearth gang" as 
given by the Interchurch Report — would receive $1764 a 

But the shut down of "many plants" of "from 8 to 20 
weeks " which the Interchurch Report specifically mentions, 
although it adduces no evidence to support this allegation, 
means a loss of far more than 65 days a year. An annual 
wage for all common labor of "under $1466 a year" when 
the given wage is $34.19 a week, if true, shows that the 
whole steel industry which was supposed to be operating at 
full-blast through all this period did not actually so operate 
an average of more than 268 days a year. This is so entirely 
contrary to all general evidence and beliefs as to the opera- 
tion of the steel industry during this whole period as to 
make an analysis of the argument by which the Interchurch 
Report prestmies to reach such conclusions extremely 

All the figures and computations on this point as far as 
they are given, are as follows (pages 91 and 92) : 

^ "In 1919 the Corporations wage and salary budget [$255,861,264 for 
eight months] went to 191,000 employees as follows: 

[eight months' budget multiplied by 50 per cent^ for an annual basis] 
58,064 skilled [30.4% of all] got 41.6% or $159,657,328 

60,165 semi-skilled [31.5% of all] got 30.6% or 117,440 320 

72,771 u nsknied [38.1 % of all] got 27.8% or 106,694,145 



That is individual average earnings were not higher than as follows 
since the above totals contain administrative salaries; 

In 1919: 

Skilled annual average earnings averaged imder 
Semi-skilled annual earnings averaged under 
Unskilled annual earnings averaged under 



> Obviously the Interchurch Report means 50% added to the figures 
for 8 months; that is how it has actually made the calculations. 



Tt is at once apparent that the basic figure on which tto 

c^,,o «i8i 7Q1 70-\ as the wage and salary ouugci- 
figure »3»3.79>-7yJ j Corporation does 

vear The annual report of the U . b. steei v^iy 

To^ve either figure or any similar figure and the Inter 
""f ^ReSrt S no authority for these figures. If this 
church Report gives iiu ou "L „„,„x- .11 the fieures are 

Interchurch Report figure is not accurate all the ngur 

"rrSlTtiXh Report divides tHs alleged annual 

Again the I«J^*^\ ^ es. But this is the number 
wage budget by 191.000 employ ^^^ 

of employees - one mon^ and -450^^^^^^^ ^^^ 

"r?. The Iv'aS Ji^ual wage of all steel workers 
Zefo e olsai which the Interchurch Reportjenv. 

from these figures and uses on P^^^l^Jl^t^'^S^. 
and all the other averages in the tables aDove q 

-rrbtirtll^This interchurch I^eport t^Ie^staj' 
^tcific and exact iigurjthat in ^ 9 .9^ 304%^^^ J^^ -el 

XrunSef itwTerS^ tL in ,.X9 the sldlled 
38.i%unskiuea ^^^ ^j^^ s^mi- 

Ttr^?li6%.tnd the unskilled .7.8%. Italsouses 
skilled group 30.0 /o, «\ j g calculations. In 

r'^'.f cTt^rrrrth: - Je. the mterchurch 
Appendix C at the ena ^^.^ ^^^^ g^^^^ 

S"a^^ntag?S! volume III of Senate DcK^ent 

"°*' „c Ti;i and i^S the Interchurch Report em- 

.^"*;at?enShthe"it extent to which the introduction 

phasize at length the gr ^^^„ t^e proportions 

5 SlS s^2d ani un^ed labor in the industry, 
.senate Document ""^^-^^ ^^^tt^^*^^ 



This fact alone, of the known change in steel jobs — which 
the Interchurch Report itself elsewhere takes such pains to 
establish, makes it obvious that these 1910 figures not only 
cannot be depended upon to represent 1919 conditions but 
are entirely unrepresentative of 1919 conditions. This 
much is obvious on the face of the situation. Reference 
however to page 80, Senate Document 1 10 Volume III, from 
which the Interchurch Report states it derives its per- 
centages, inmiediately reveals the fact that these figures 
do not pretend to be for the industry as a whole even in 
1910 but on the contrary are merely for one particular 
plant and are entirely different from the percentages for 
the industry as a whole which are given in Senate Docu- 
ment no on pages xxxi and xxxii. There it is shown 
that in 1910 skilled labor constituted 23.6%, semi-skilled 
26.71% and unskilled not 38.1% but 49-69%, of all steel 

The Interchurch Report figures show, and it itself states, 
that the average wage of all steel workers in 191 9 was $2009. 
Now it is obvious that the larger the proportion of unskilled 
labor the more nearly must the earnings of such workers 
approach the $2009 average earnings of all workers. Even 
on the basis of the actual 1910 figures therefore, the fact that 
the Interchurch Report by using figures for a single plant 
mstead of for the industry as a whole has placed the pro- 
portion of steel common labor 11.6% too low mean that its 
$1466 is correspondingly too low even if all its other calcula- 
tions were sound. But as has been pointed out, it has not 
only based this whole calculation on an assumption which 
It Itself shows elsewhere is untrue, uses as a basic figure in 
the calculations one for which it gives no authority, but has 
made further errors of calculation all of which have worked 
m the same direction. 

The fact, however, that the Interchurch Report's conclu- 
sion that steel common labor earnings were under $1466 is 
based on a self-contradiction and a multiplication of obvious 
errors, is less important perhaps than the fact that by this 


conclusion, the whole Interchurch Report is placed definitely 
and conspicuously in this dilemma of self-contradiction as to 
its main arguments. 

All these wage calculations are made without reference 
to the strike. There was of course no strike in 191 8 and the 
1 91 8 and 191 9 calculations are made on exactly the same 
basis. Moreover, in its 191 9 calculations, the Interchurch 
Report specifically bases its figures on the first 8 months 
before the strike adding 50% to these so that any change 
brought about by the strike should not be included. Its 
figures of course apply not to individual workers but to 
total number of employees. 

If then, the average weekly wage of all steel workers 
was $46.78 as the Interchurch Report itself plainly states 
in its Appendix on page 265, and the average annual wage 
of all steel workers was under $2009 a year, then all steel 
workers worked less than 43 weeks a year and therefore the 
whole steel industry averaged net less than 43 weeks of 
operation during the year. 

If the average weekly earnings of all steel companies 
common labor was $34.19, as the Interchurch Report also 
specifically states in its Appendix on page 265, and the 
annual earnings of steel common labor was "under $1466" 
then the average steel common laborer worked under 43 
weeks a year and the whole steel industry averaged under 
43 weeks of operation during the year. This of course is 
entirely in keeping with the Interchurch Report's statement 
on page 99 that "many (plants) are 'down' from 8 to 20 
weeks a year." 

An average of under 43 weeks worked for all steel workers 
and so for the industry means that the 7-day worker — who 
the Interchurch Report insists approximated 25% of the 
industry — averaged less than 301 days a year and therefore 
had over 64 days a year off. It means that the 6-day steel 
worker who must therefore have constituted 75% of all 
workers — worked under 258 days a year and had over 107 
days per year off. It means that all steel workers, including 



both 6 and 7 day workers and so all departments of the 
industry averaged only 268 days net out of the year. ' 

But such conclusions are not only entirely contrary to all 
evidence and information as to steel operation during the 
war and immediately after the war period, but are entirely 
contrary to the Interchurch Report's whole argument 
throughout and particularly in its chapter on the 12-hour 
day in which it insists "that the steel industry was (so) 
speeded up in every direction, " not merely during the war — 
** which permitted the steel companies free rein as regards 
hours, " but right into the "months of July, August, and Sep- 
tember, 1919, " that while "some (workers) got a Sunday off 
perhaps once in six months . . . most of them ... do not 
see the inside of a church more than once in six months be- 
cause they are forced to work on Sunday ' ' (pages 55 and 71)— 
that not merely during the war but for the "8 months and 
20 days previous to the strike" i.e. from January ist to 
September 20, 1 9 1 9, the employees of a certain Homestead de- 
partment only got 17 days off out of 244 (page 73) etc., etc. 
Attention is also called to the fact that the evidence of 
these important errors and self-contradictions does not 
appear in the main argument which shows merely certain 
very exact looking and otherwise impressive partial calcula- 
tions and then features the conclusions. Only a careful 
study of the Appendix, which is not referred to in the main 
argument, reveals the fact that, and the way that the Inter- 
church Report in this connection uses as the whole basis of 
its argument an assumption which it strongly denies and 
states to the contrary as the basis of a different kind of an 
argument in a different connection. The other flagrant 
errors in this argument— the fact that in addition to using 
1910 figures as representative of 1919 it takes the 1910 
figures for merely one "establishment" which happens to 
be useful to its argument and ignores the very different 
figures for the whole industry which refute its argtunent— 
are only discoverable by reference to original sources. Again 

' See foot note page 45. 



although the table showing percentages of different classes 
of workers for the whole industry, but which refute the 
Interchurch Report conclusions, appear plainly among the 
main tables at the beginning of Senate Document no — 
a section to which the Interchurch Report otherwise fre- 
quently refers — it passes this by without comment and 
uses an obscure table for a single establishment from the 
third volume, but which does happen to suit its argument. 
All such facts should at least be noted and borne in mind 
in the consideration of its further arguments. 






After stating at length its various conclusions as to wages 
in the Steel Industry in the beginning of Chapter IV, the 
Interchurch Report opens its argument to substantiate 
these conclusions by asserting that there is a "popular illu- 
sion that steel is a highly paid industry "—that there is "a 
public impression that steel may be mighty hard labor but 
its wages are mighty big. ' ' The Report then proceeds in all 
seriousness to prove that there is no basis for such a public 
illusion by the very ingenious line of reasoning that if the steel 
laborer did not work so hard his wages would not be so big. 

There is little question that the Interchurch Report is 
quite correct in regard to the existence of a general impres- 
sion that the public has gained from all standard sources of 
information that the steel worker does work hard or at least 
long and does make good pay. And there would be 
little grounds for discussing the Report's ingenious argu- 
ment that if the steel worker did not work so hard (long) 
his pay would not be so big, except for the fact that through 
a less obvious, ingenious series of false analogies, the Re- 
port presumes to lead this argument to such conclusions as: 

"Steel common labor has the lowest rate of pay of trades for which 

there are separate statistics for laborers" (in italics page 102, line 23). 

"As r^ards common labor steel is a low wage industry" (page 90] 

"A comparison of common labor earnings of steel with common labor 
earnings in five other major industries in the Pittsburgh district 
on the basis of a common standard week shows steel labor the lowest 
paid of the six " (page 90, line 25). 



The point was emphasized in the preceding chapter that 
whereas there exist ample government statistics and other 
authoritative data which show steel earnings plainly and 
definitely, the Interchurch Report based its own very dif- 
ferent statements as to general wages in the Steel Industry 
on a complicated compilation of partly doubtful and partly 
undisclosed figures which attempted to arrive at an actual 
annual wage on the grounds that because the cost of living 
is necessarily on an annual basis, wages can only be fairly 
judged on the same basis (page 98 — ^line 17). 

In the present second argiunent also, in which the Inter- 
church Report asstunes to compare steel wages with wages 
in other industries, the Interchurch Report again pointedly 
disregards all reference to standard Government figures, 
published figures of the Bureau of Applied Economics which 
it states was one of its technical advisors and other au- 
thoritative figures as to such comparative wages, and uses 
figiu-es as for merely the Pittsburgh district which authorita- 
tive data seldom specifically mentions. Moreover, entirely 
reversing its former attitude of insisting that steel wages 
can only be fairly judged on an annual basis because living 
costs have to be reckoned on that basis, in this second argu- 
ment, the Interchurch Report not only insists on basing its 
figures on an artificial and untrue weekly basis but insists 
on making its comparison with other particular industries 
where weekly earnings are least representative of actual 
annual earnings. 

The hypothesis of this aa-gument is that if steel workers 
did not work such long hours they wotild be poorly paid 
rather than well-paid workers. The alleged evidence it 
presents to justify that conclusion and the statement of 
that conclusion particularly emphasized in italics are as 
follows : 

Table from Page 102, Interchurch Report 

"Comparative earnings for 44-hour week at prevailing hourly rates 
(Pittsburgh district 19 19): 







Common Labor: 

Iron and Steel $21.12 (48 i per hour) 

Bitiuninous Coal 25.30 (57.5^ " " 

Building Trades: 

Building Laborers $22.00 (50 i an hour) 

Hod Carriers 30.80 (70 i 

Plasterers' Laborers 30.80 (70 ^ 

Average for Laborers 27.85 

"The comparison makes it plain that steel common labor has the 
lowest rate of pay of the trades for which there are separate statistics for 
laborers. " 

On analysis this table and its conclusion become interest- 
ing from a number of points of view. In the first place, 
turning to pages 265-266 (Appendix) of the Interchurch 
Report itself, it is plainly stated that the rates per hour 
as well as per week for common labor in various industries 
in 1 91 9 were as follows: 

Figures for Common Labor from U. S. Bureau of Labor and other 

Statistics as Published in Appendix (pages 265-266) 

interchurch report 

Earnings Average 

Per Full Hourly 

, , Week Rate 


Iron and Steel (common labor) $34.19 46.2^! 


Laborers (anthracite) $26.90 51.9^ 

Laborers (bituminous) 29.90 57-5i 

U. S. Arsenals (common laborers) 22.08 46 i 

Building Trades (common labor) 22.88 52 f« 

Navy Yards (common labor) 21.36 44.5^5 


Section Men 

Yard Switch Tenders^ 

Other Yard Employees. 








Engine House Men 

Other Unskilled Laborers 

Shipyards (east) Laborers $17.28 

' Here quoted as given in Interchurch table. Interstate Commerce 
Commission shows different classification and wage rate. 


36 i 


Again, taking the elaborate wage study of the Bureau of 
Applied Economics, and going through that study, industry 
by industry, it also plainly appears, according to this au- 
thority which is stated by the Interchurch Report to be one 
of its own authorities, that common labor earnings per hour 
as well as per week for the various industries were in 191 9 
as follows : 

Figures from Bureau of Applied Economics Bulletin Number 8. 

Anthracite Coal: 

Outside Labor 

Inside Labor 

Brick Making 


Confectionery (male) 



Mill Work 

Paper Box 

Pottery (male) 

Class I Railroads »: 

Section Men 

Construction Labor.'. 

Station Service Labor. 

Yard Switch Tenders. 

Other Yard Labor . . . , 

Other Unskilled Labor . 

Rubber (Tire M.) 

Rubber (Other Labor) . . 
Silk (dye house) 


Aver a 

Per Full 











39 i 













earnings or 


number of 




per week 


not given 









* The Interchurch Report's conclusions that, 

" The comparison makes it plain that steel common labor has the lowest 
rate of pay for the trades for which there are separate statistics for 
laborers, " 

— is sweeping and unqualified. It will be noted however that pre- 
viously there had been slipped in, in parenthesis, the qualification, 
"Pittsburg district." The Pittsburg district obviously covers,— and 
U. S. Bureau of Labor, October, 1919, Review, page 104 in the introduc- 


These tables quoted from official figures of the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor published in the Appendix of the Inter- 
church Report itself and from the figures of the Bureau of 
Applied Economics, specifically accepted by the Inter- 
church Report as one of its own authorities, show that there 
are separate statistics for labor in 22 separate trades or in- 
dustries or occupations. They too show specifically and in 
detail, as all other competent authorities show, that without 
question steel common labor received higher wages and in 
general far higher wages by the week, than any other com- 
mon labor in the country. But these tables particularly 
show specifically and in detail that in all the 22 trades or 
occupations for which there are these separate statistics 
or common labor, except for five — ^and these are special 
cases governed by very special circumstances as will be 
shown later — steel common labor received the highest 
wages not only per day and per week but also per hour — 
that it received 10 or I2ff higher wages per hour than was 
paid to common labor in whole groups of other industries 
including the Pittsbtirg district. The Interchurch Table 
and Conclusion therefore that, "steel common labor has 
the lowest rate of pay of the trades for which there are sepa- 

tion to its study of steel hours and wages from which the Interchurch 
Report Appendix chiefly derives its wage figiu'es, specifically states it to 
cover; western Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, and northern West Virginia. 
With a few exceptions, all the 22 separate industries or trades or occupa- 
tions listed in the 2 tables above are of course represented in the " Pitts- 
btu-g district." This district is a particular center of railroading and 
glass, brick, pottery and chemical manufacturing. Perhaps the largest 
paper plants in the coimtry and the cotm try's chief center of rubber 
manufacttu-e are in this district. The figures given above for all these 
industries are obviously therefore also for the Pittsburg district. This 
has been particularly checked in the case of the widest variety of com- 
mon labor rates given for any one industry — railroads; the Comp- 
troller of the Pennsylvania railroad having furnished the author with 
the hourly wage rates paid different classes of common labor "t» the 
Pittsburg district in J 91 9." These rates correspond closely class by 
class to earnings given above and are from 5^ to 8i per hour lower 
than the admitted hourly rate for steel common labor. 






rate statistics for laborers," is not only utterly and ridicu- 
lously untrue but is the opposite of the truth. 

From the point of view, however, of an analysis of the 
Interchurch Report the fact that this important and 
specially emphasized conclusion is utterly untrue is perhaps 
the least important fact that a careful analysis of the table 
and its conclusion actually shows. 

There are in these 22 trades or occupations for which 
there are separate statistics for common labor five in which 
the earnings per hour — but not per day or week — was 
higher than the earnings per hour in the steel industry. 
The pottery industry paid male common labor in 19 19 a 
fraction of one cent less per hour than was paid steel com- 
mon labor in the Pittsburg district but throughout the 
country it paid a little over i cent more per hour than was 
paid in the steel industry throughout the country. Common 
labor in the Rubber industry as a whole earned 39. 5j^ an 
hour — 7^ less than steel common labor. But one group in 
tire making plants, consisting partly of common labor and 
partly of * ' helpers ' ' which are low semi-skilled, received more 
per hour than steel common labor. Aside from these, the 
only common labor thus rated as receiving a higher rate per 
hour than steel common labor was the inside coal labor — the 
outside coal labor received 2}/^^ an hour less than the steel 
laborer — and the laborer in the building trades. 

Now it is distinctly shown by the Interchurch Report's own 
statistics that while the inside coal common labor and the 
building trade common labor receive a higher wage per 
hour than the steel laborer, they actually receive far less 
money per day or per week because of their shorter hours per 
day. But what is far more significant in connection with 
a wage comparison in these industries is the fact that the coal 
industry and the building trades are highly seasonal and 
therefore can give their workers work only part of the time. 
For while steel is essentially a continuous industry which 
over a long period of years has probably given its workers 
a higher average number of days work per year than any 


other industry in the country, ^ and while especially during 
this whole period under discussion the steel worker was 
working maximum time, the bituminous coal miner in 19 19 
worked only 191 days and for many years has rarely been 
able to work as much as 200 days a year. In the same way 
because of seasonal conditions building operations are often 
not possible during more than 150 days of the year and it is 
probably rare for the building laborer to average 200 days 
a year at his trade. The higher wage rates per hour there- 
fore in these seasonal occupations of mining and building 
are paid fundamentally for the reason that these industries 
can give labor only limited employment so that during the 
rest of the year such workers must go without employment 
or shift for themselves. 

Now the first thing to be noticed in regard to the Inter- 
church Report table on page 102 which presumes to justify 
the italicized statement that steel common labor wage 
rates are the lowest for all trades for which there are sepa- 
rate statistics, is that it entirely fails to mention or consider 
the 18 other trades or occupations which its own authori- 
ties plainly show, by separate statistics for common labor, 
paid lower wages per hour than the steel industry, and uses 
for comparison with steel only the coal industry and the 
building trades which chiefly because of the general seasonal 
nature of the employment, pay a higher wage rate per hour 
than the steel industry. 

But this fact — that the Interchurch Report thus carefully 

handpicks out of a long list of trades for which separate 

statistics for common labor are plainly given, the only two 

'During the first half of the past decade (1911-1915) the average 
number of U. S. Steel Manufacturing employees was 147,932. During 
this period the country went through a great industrial boom followed 
by a severe industrial depression with widespread imemployment, yet 
the average number of such U. S. Steel employees in the worst year 
fell only 11% below the average for the 5 years. In the last half of the 
decade (19 16-1920) the average number of such employees was 194,914 
and in no one of these years did the average vary from the average for 
the period as much as 4%. 



industries which could possibly even be made to appear to 
justify this utteriy false conclusion, and the fact that it 
thus specifically makes the absolutely false statement that 
these two industries are the only trades **for which there 
are separate statistics for conmion labor" — constitutes only 
the first way in which the table is flagrantly manipulated 
and falsified. 

Reference to the Interchurch Report's own table will 
show that under building trades, it specifies three classes of 
common labor— common labor which receives $22.00 a 
week of 44 hours or 50/ an hour ; hodcarriers who received 
$30.80 a week or 70J2J' an hour; and plasterers' laborers who 
received $30.80 a week or yopf an hour. It then averages 
these three alleged classes of common labor and states in 
its fourth line that the "average for laborers" in the build- 
ing trades is $27.85 a week. 

But it is a matter of the commonest knowledge to anyone 
fanailiar with the building trades, and has been especially 
verified for the present purpose— first, that hodcarriers and 
plasterers' laborers are not common labor at all but highly 
semi-skilled labor who, as a matter of fact, generally regard 
themselves as skilled labor, and second, that they are not two 
classes of labor but merely two different names for exactly 
the same labor. 

^ Mr. T. E. Rhodes is Vice President in charge of construc- 
tion for the Frederick French Construction Company and 
his extensive building experience includes all parts of the 
country. Mr. Rhodes states in writing in particular refer- 
ence to this Interchurch Table that 

"Mason's laborers or hodcarriers or plasterer?' laborers are at the 
summit of their trade and are skilled or semi-skilled but never un- 
skilled. This is true in Pittsburg and in all cities where organized 
labor's established methods exist. " 

In the same connection, Mr. E. M. Tate, Secretary of the 
Building Construction Employers' Association in Pitts- 
burg, states (letter to author August 30, 1921); 


"Our plasterers' laborers are hodcarriers and they are considered 
semi-skilled, . . . Common labor ... has nothing to do with making 
mortar or tiding the mechanics or supplying them with materials" 
which is the particular function of plasterers' laborers or hodcarriers. 

In Other words not only is the Interchurch Report's whole 
table grossly falsified in that its conclusion is false and in 
that it seeks to justify that false conclusion by hand-picking 
out of 22 trades for which there are separate statistics for 
common labor two special trades and representing these as 
the only trades for which there are separate statistics for 
common labor, but it is further falsified by adding in semi- 
skilled labor as common labor and also by counting exactly 
the same semi-skilled trade twice and counting all the other 
classifications of building common labor only once in order 
to make the common labor wage rate seem $6 a week higher 
than it actually was. 

The use of such a flagrantly manipulated and falsified 
table to make plausible to the casual reader the absolutely 
false general conclusion which follows it is of course— 
whether deliberate or only accidental— at least in its effect, 
precisely equivalent to the use of a weighted scale or loaded 

' When this and other similar instances of the use of manipulated and 
falsified figures were specifically called to the attention of certain officials 
and others prominently connected with the Interchurch Movement 
during the course of preparation of the present Analysis, one such 
gentleman replied in substance: "We should not consider the Inter- 
church Report from the point of view of mere detailed facts and figures 
I believe the Interchurch Movement was called of God to challenge the 
great mjustice of the steel industry. We know that God moves in 
myst«-ious ways and it is not for us. with our mere finite minds to ques- 
tion the Infinite." Professor Josiah Royce once replied to a similar 
argument, I know that all beings, if only they can count, must find 
timt three and two make five. Perhaps the angels cannot count; but 
rf they can, this axiom h true for them. If I met an angel who declared 
that his experience had occasionally shown him a three and a two that 
did not make five, I should know at once what sort of an angel he was " 



Among all classes of Americans, o\ir modem American 
standard of living has been achieved and is maintained be- 
cause under our modem industrial and commercial system 
two members of each average family can and do contribute 
to the family income. This fact is the basis of our modem 
American spending and enjo5ring power. It is the basis of 
our whole industrial and social and commercial organi- 

The third arg-ument by which the Interchurch Report 
seeks to prove steel wages low and on which throughout the 
wage discussion it puts most emphasis is the argument that 
the wages of one common laborer in the steel industry is not 
quite sufficient to maintain a standard of living for his family 
which, in all other industries in the country as a whole, it 
requires the wages of two workers to maintain. 

In the 13th United States Census Report, Vol. IV, pages 
30 and 31 are devoted to detailed facts and tables as to the 
distribution of wage earners. These show that 41.5% of 
our entire population is engaged in gainful occupation — ^that 
is, works for wages or profits. 

These same U. S. Government statistics show that the 
average family throughout the country consists of 4.5 in- 
dividuals. Of this average family of 4.5 persons, 1.868 
persons work for wages or profits. 

The Interchurch Report on the steel strike for conveni- 


ence sake, as is frequently done, uses 5 persons as the basis 
of the average family. According to these U. S. Govern- 
ment statistics therefore 2.075 members of each such family 
are engaged in gainful occupation contributing towards the 
family's support. 

These are average figures for all classes for the whole 
country, but the Census Report goes on to say on page 31 : 

" The proportion of gainful workers in the population usually is larger 
for . . . foreign bom white than for the native white people, for urban 
than for rural dwellers, and for manufacturing . . . than for agricul- 
tural communities." 

Steel workers are urban dwellers— engaged in manufac- 
turing—and at least the unskilled labor, as the Interchurch 
Report constantly emphasizes, largely consists of foreign 
born whites. On all three counts then, there are more than 
2.075 members per average family of five steel workers 
contributing to the family income. 

The National Bureau of Economic Research is a research 
organization whose directors consist of such gentlemen as: 

Hugh Frayne "former President of New York Federation of 
Labor; now organizer for American Federation of 
Labor, appointed (as director of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research) by the American Federation of 

David Friday/' econoimst . . . appointed by the American 
Economic Association." 

Walter R. Ingalls, Consulting Engineer and President of 
the Metal Statistical Association appointed by the 
Engineering Council. 

/. M. Larkin, "Assistant to the President of the Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation, appointed by the Industrial Rela- 
tions Association." 

The Director of Research is Wesley C. Mitchell, Ph.D., 
Professor of Economics of Columbia Ui^versity' 
Treasurer of the New School of Social Research. 





This Bureau was organized for the express purpose of 
getting together basic economic facts which wovild be so well 
founded and accurate that they would be accepted by 
authorities of such widely different economic belief as the 
above directors. 

Professors Wesley C. Mitchell, Willford I. King, Fred- 
erick R. Macaulay and Oswald W. Knauth, working jointly 
and under the auspices of this Bureau have recently pub- 
lished a study entitled, "Income in the United States." 
Table 20 on page 102 of this volume shows the average 
earnings of workers in substantially all industry. These 
figures exclude many part-time workers and include pensions, 
accident compensation, sustenance, etc., and are otherwise 
doubtless as high as can be justified. 

Average Annual Earnings of Employees in Agriculture, 

Mining, Manufacturing, Transportation, Bankings 

Government and Other Industries. 

1909 $626 

1910 656 

191 1 648 

1912 692 

1913 723 

1914 674 

1915 697 

1916 831 

1917 961 

1918 1078 

With two members of the average family of 5 "gainfully 
employed" the SLversige family income would thus be from 
some $1252 a year in 1909 to $2156 a year in 1918. This 
latter figure is about what the average individual worker 
in the steel industry earned in 1919. But the point in regard 
to all these figures is that they show on the basis of average 
individual income just what the Census states on the basis 
of nation wide investigation — that throughout the country 



the average family enjoys *' American" standards of living 
because two members contribute towards producing the 
goods and service which go to make up the American stand- 
ard of living and these two members are thereby enabled in 
turn to pay for the goods and service which go to make up 
the American standard of living. 

Yet the Interchurch Report through page after page of 
statistics and arguments as to wages and family living bud- 
gets makes no mention and takes no account whatever of 
this fact, which is not only statistically incontrovertible but 
a matter of commonest knowledge; that among every 
general class in every section of our country Americans 
enjoy the American standard of living, and all American 
commerce and industry is built on the buying and enjoying 
power of American standards of living, because two mem- 
bers of the average American family of five are working and 
producing and paying for that standard of living. 

The Interchurch Report sensationally states and in every 
section constantly repeats and re-emphasizes that: 

" The annual earnings of over one third of all productive iron and steel 
workers were, and had been for years, below the level set by govern- 
ment experts as the minimum of subsistence. ... The bulk of semi- 
skilled workers earned less than enough for the average family's 
minimum comfort" (page 85— line 6-21). 

" In 1919 the unskilled worker's annual earnings were more than $109. 
below the minimum subsistence level and more than $558. below the 
American standard of living " (page 94 — line 12). 

Yet in face of this simple obvious fact of more than one 
wage earner per family, all these arguments as attempts in 
themselves to prove low wages, mean absolutely nothing, 
except perhaps a strange blindness on the part of the in- 
vestigators as to a fact which must be of the commonest 
knowledge to them in their own personal experience, yet 
which for reasons that can only be guessed at, they com- 
pletely overlooked as a factor in the important national 
question under their investigation. 

The Interchurch Report goes into great detail to estab- 



lish two different standards of living, one of which is called 
the "Standard of comfort" level and the other "the Stand- 
ard of minimum subsistence" level. It may be noted in 
passing that the costs arrived at to maintain these particu- 
lar standards of living are taken chiefly from estimates 
which were based on prices in Washington, D. C, and New 
York City — ^undoubtedly the two single cities whose general 
price levels have been the highest in the country. Again 
the basis of these figures was the estimated needs of the 
family of a clerk in government service. There can be no 
question that there is a distinct difference between prices 
in steel communities and in Washington or New York ; and 
also a distinct difference in the requirements of a family of a 
steel worker and that of a Washington clerk. There are 
many other obviously questionable factors in these budgets 
but these are only details as compared with the fundamental 
unsoundness of the whole argtmient itself. 

The U. S. Bureau figures, appearing in the Appendix 
of the Interchurch Report, show as has been stated that for 
the industries there given common labor earnings were about 
$22.50 per week. The figures of the Bureau of Applied 
Economics, the Interchurch Report's own authority, show 
as has been emphasized that average weekly earnings for 
all workers — including skilled — for 25 leading industries 
was $24.35. These rates were for the more developed and 
organized industries whose earnings are higher than aver- 
age. Yet if such workers worked 52 weeks a year, which 
they did not, they would only earn $1266.20 — over $300 
below what the Interchurch Report sets as the subsistence 
level, exactly $200 further below than the Interchurch Report 
even claims the steel common laborer is. Yet American labor 
as a whole seemed to subsist pretty well during this period. 

The official speaker's manual of the Interchurch Move- 
menton page27B under the heading ' * Talking Points ' 'says : — 

" It is a known fact that steel workers receive two and three times as 
much as ministers. • . . Day laborers receive an average wage much 
in excess of the amounts paid to two thirds of the ministers." 



Ministers and their families certainly subsist. It is 
strange that the investigators, who themselves were, or 
represented, ministers, should not recognize that something 
was wrong in their argument that steel workers cannot sub- 
sist on earning two or three times as high as ministers' 

Mr. William Z. Foster, Secretary-Treasurer of the Labor 
Organization that had charge of the steel strike, in his book, 
The Great Steel Strike in a chapter dealing specifically with 
the living problems of the workers, states: 

" The fact is that except for a small impoverished minority the steel 
workers made their long hard fight virtually upon their own resources" 
(The Great Steel Strike, page 220 line 21). 

The Interchurch Report states frequently that the bulk 
of the strikers were the lowest paid workers, who, it also 
states, had not for years been receiving enough wages for 
mere subsistence. Yet it appears not only obviously on the 
face of the situation, but from the strike leader's own state- 
ment, that at least 99% of these very workers, whom the 
Report says didn't earn enough to subsist on, actually had 
enough money saved up to support themselves and the 
families up to three and a half months without working. ^ 

Again on page 244, the Interchurch Report itself, in 
speaking of the end of the strike says: 

"The steel worker went back ... to earning under a living wage" 
and then in line 28 on same page * ' began piling up money to get them- 
selves out of America. " 

Mr. Foster, the strike leader, states as above quoted, 
that there was, as is of course always inevitable, "a small 
impoverished minority among the steel strikers." The 

»The strikers' "Commissariat" which supported this "small im- 
poverished minority" during the strike spent $348,50942 (Great Steel 
Strike, page 220) . Based on this * ' minimtun of subsistence ' ' figure this 
would have supported just 774 strikers' families for the 15 weeks of the 
strike. On 1^ or X or even Vi subsistence rations this could only have 
supported at most a few thousand strikers' families. 



Interchurch Report itself states that "The statements and 
affidavits of 500 steel workers (which it also explains included 
chiefly representative cross sections of the mass of unskilled 
foreigners) constitute the rock bottom of its findings." 

Is it possible that these 500 workers (out of the total of 
500,000 steel workers) whose affidavits "constitute the rock 
bottom of the findings/* (which findings includes the con- 
clusion that the steel worker ** cannot subsist " on wages two 
and three times as much as ministers' salaries) happen by 
any chance to have somehow consisted chiefly of the "small 
impoverished minority" which Mr. Foster refers to as en- 
tirely exceptional to the great mass of steel workers who had 
seemingly enough saved out of past wages to support their 
families up to three and a half months without work ? 

This possibility, that its "500 rock bottom affidavits" 
somehow came to be obtained from the exceptional im- 
poverished, rather than from the average prosperous steel 
worker is of course one obviously possible explanation as to 
why the whole Interchurch Report overlooked the simple 
fact that American standards of living are universally main- 
tained by the earnings of two instead of one member per 
family — why it overlooked the fact that millions of Ameri- 
cans do subsist on wages far lower than those paid in the 
steel industry — why it even remained blind to the fact that 
other argtmients and statements in its own Report ipso 
facto reduce this argument to an absurdity. 

A close study of the report, however, also reveals one 
other possible reason why this line of argument was so 
blindly persisted in and so especially featured. 





The Interchurch Report in its final "Findings" (page 
250) recommends: 

" That a minimum wage commission be established and laws enacted 
providing for an American standard of living through the labor of the 
natural bread winner permitting the mother to keep up a good home-and 
the children to obtain at least a high school education. " 

No one questions the desirability of the proposition that 
every American family should have ample means for all the 
necessities and comforts of life, including the full, free edu- 
cation of each child. Moreover, the proposition of at- 
tempting to bring about such a highly desirable general 
condition by legislative enactment is not new. 

The question therefore is not as to the desirability of such 
a condition but as to whether or not such a condition can 
be brought about by mere legislative action and particu- 
lariy whether it can be brought about by legislation that 
each single worker— irrespective of other conditions and 
during his entire life — shall receive enough income to pay 
for all these desirable things for a family of five. 

The Interchurch Report spends many pages in the Re- 
port itself and goes into much greater detail in Appendix A 
to show that the minimum American standard of living for 
an average family of 5 requires a family income of $2025.56 
to $2262.47 a year. 

This Interchurch proposition is that every head of a 



family, no matter what his position or abihty, shoiild receive 
a minimum wage of between $2000 and $2200 a year. ' 

But the Department of Industrial Relations which in- 
augurated the Steel Strike Investigation, in the Report of 
its "Findings Committee" Document "No. 178 — II — 10 
Nov. 1 91 9" lays down the following basic principle for 
*' industrial readjustment*' which is emphasized at length 
but is epitomized in the one phrase that : — 

"IV 4. . . The determination of wages on the basis of occupation 
and service and not on the basis of sex. " 

And the official Speakers' Manual of the whole Inter- 
church Movement on page 44, lays down the same general 
principle in exactly the same words. 

But if legislation is to be passed that every man who is 
the head of a family, and every woman whether the head of 
a family or not, who does the same work that any married 
man does, must be paid a minimum wage of $2000 a year, 
it is obvious that as a matter of practical fact the man who 
is not married or who is a widower without family must also 
be paid on this same basis. 

In other words considering the constitutional inhibition 
against class legislation, and the impossibility of minute 
discrimination in industry, this proposition means that 
irrespective of position or ability or any other condition, 
every man and most women in industry must, on the basis 
of the minimum living costs established by the Interchurch 
Report, be paid at least from $2000 to $2200 a year. 

The National Bureau of Economic Research figures 
(see page 50 ibid.) show that in 1910 the average annual 
earnings of all wage earners throughout industry were $656. 
The division of all wages paid, as shown by the 1910 U. S. 

' A clear understanding of the merits of this particular argument is 
important, not only because of its definite emphasis by the Interchurch 
Report, but because the union leaders of the coal miners and railroad 
workers have both widely and strongly advanced the same argimient 
in recent attempts to advance war wages and as part of their advocacy 
of government ownership. 



Industrial Census, by the ntmiber of wage earners, gives 
an annual income for such individual workers of about $600. 
Such workers are obviously in very large proportion heads 
of families. Professor Streightoff of Colimibia by an 
analysis of the earnings of 19,658,000 out of the total of 
26,000,000 adult male workers indicates that in 191 2 the 
annual wage of such men who were of course preponderately 
heads of families was about $650. The National Bureau of 
Economic Research figtu-es show that the average earn- 
ings of all wage earners had gone up by 1918 to $1078. This 
$1078, for reasons already stated, may doubtless be re- 
garded as a maximimi figure for the average annual earn- 
ings of all American workers. 

The Interchurch Official Speakers' Manual states on page 
27-B in IQIQ that in the 

"Baptist church, the average minister's salary outside of some city 
churches amounts to less than $2.00 a day " (or about I700 a year). 

The basic proposition of the Interchurch's argimient as 
to wages and living costs then is that practically every man 
and woman worker in the country shall arbitrarily by law 
have their wages approximately doubled. 

The principle upon which all American society, including 
industry, now operates, is that all our people progress most 
surely and steadily through a sure and steady increase in 
production proportionate to the population, so that there 
shall be a continually greater amount of goods of all kinds 
to be divided and enjoyed either by consimiing them or 
saving their equivalent or enjoying that equivalent in 
shorter working hours or in some other way. 

Production per individual is actually about three times to- 
day what it was in 1 850, even with everybody working at that 
time 12 to 14 hours a day, and all our higher present stand- 
ards of living and our general shorter hours are the result.' 

^ M. C. Rorty of the American Statistical Association and President 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research in his pamphlet "Notes 
on Current Economic Problems" III, June, 192 1, says on page 10: 


Modem society also works on the basis that the best, if 
not the only way to insure production which shall be ade- 
quate for a constant general material advancement, is to 
hold out to each individual, who is the unit of production, 
the maximimi incentive for his individual production. 

To this end modem society has organized all production 
on a system under which each individual worker, if he works 
at all, is forced to produce enough to supply the necessities 
to support himself and one or two possible dependents. It 
forces him to provide for, or itself provides for his children 
and educates them well and free of charge till they are i6 
years old. 

Beyond this it holds out to the individual every standard 
of comfort and luxury as an incentive to greater individual 
effort and offers each individual at least the freest oppor- 
tunity that has ever been offered by any major social or- 
ganization in human history, to achieve whatever such 
standard of comfort or luxury his own energy and ability 
are capable of achieving. 

The present standard of American living — ^which is a far 
higher standard at least as regards material comforts and 
conveniences than has ever been generally achieved in any 
other age or nation and which has been brought about en- 
tirely on this basis — is one of such incentives. The very 
fact that such an unparalleled majority in one nation have 
set and achieved such a standard of living through increased 
individual efficiency and cooperative family effort is itself a 
conspicuous demonstration of the adequacy of that 

" The skilled worker's wage, in this country, will buy today over three 
times as much wheat flour as it would in 1855. Yet he is hardly more 
capable and works shorter hours than his predecessor of two generations 
ago. The difference lies almost wholly in the mechanical and scientific 
developments that have taken place. . . . Careful studies have shown 
that in the United States the annual production of useful goods increases 
with remarkable steadiness at a rate between 3 and 4% per flnnntn — 
whilethepoptdationincreasesat therateof only 2%. ..." 





Moreover, at least so far in hirnian experience every 
standard of living has in its turn been distinctly an achieve- 
ment. From the ages of savagery, men have won a bare 
living, then comfort, then luxury for themselves and their 
families in proportion to effort and foresight and ability. 
The whole American people has achieved its present Ameri- 
can standard of living on exactly the same basis — through 
generations of hard productive effort (generally on a 12- and 
14-hotU' day) through generations of foresight in increasing 
our national margins of production and of ability in using 
that margin. On no other basis would the enjoyment of 
our present standard of living and our present shorter 
working day have been possible. 

Exactly the same thing is true of the individual and of 
the family. It has been the incentive of realizing American 
standards of family living that has been the chief individual 
motive for both men and women for a special effort in pro- 
ducing and saving before marriage and for increased effort 
and better use of ability because of marriage. It has been 
the incentive of realizing American standards of family 
living that has been the chief motive for increased coopera- 
tive family effort as family responsibilities grew, in which 
effort older sons and daughters have joined in contributing 
to the advantages of younger brothers and sisters. Such 
incentives constitute an asset of paramount value both to 
the average American and the whole nation. 

All the tables and statistics and the whole argument in 
the Interchurch Report in regard'to maintaining an Ameri- 
can standard of living have been based on the single short 
period in family life during which four members may de- 
pend entirely on the support of one — a period which seldom 
lasts more than ten years out of the average individual 
working life of some 40 years and the very existence of 
which period offers the maximum incentive for energy and 
foresight during other periods. Moreover, it is a matter of 
commonest knowledge that during this period where neces- 
sary the family income is frequently contributed to by a 


father or mother or unmarried brother or sister who for the 
time being constitute part of the family. 

In other words the average worker only has 5 persons, 
including himself, to support at most for some 20% of his 
working life. During much more than half of his working 
life he has no one else or only one other person to support. 
To give him arbitrarily, irrespective of his ability to earn 
it, for all or most of his working life enough income to 
support five persons would not only tax all society to that 
extent but also to the extent that it would, to a large degree 
take away all normal incentive. 

Yet the Interchurch Report does not suggest or consider 
these facts, which, if considered, reduce by some 80% the 
force even of the face value of its argument, and it does not 
mention or consider the paramount value in industry and in 
all American life of the incentive which the ambition to 
achieve American standards of living for the individual and 
the family exerts in continually raising the whole standard 
of American life. 

The Interchurch Investigation was made among — and its 
argtmients and recommendations based on that investiga- 
tion refer to — the "mass of low-skilled foreigners particu- 
larly in the Chicago and Pittsburg districts." 

The majority of *' low-skilled foreigners" are from the 
very facts of their heredity and other circumstances — which 
facts are beyond the fault or control of any American institu- 
tion — undoubtedly limited as to their individual possibility 
of normal American economic advancement. But no one 
who knows the living conditions in the sections of Europe 
from which most of these foreigners come, can fail to appre- 
ciate the very material advances which what is called in 
America the subsistence level marks over such former 
conditions of living. 

Moreover there is probably no "low-skilled foreigner" 
in America who is not paid wages sufficient to maintain him- 
self and a limited number of dependents well above the 
subsistence level. There is probably no foreign labor in 


the country today which is paid as little as the Interchurch 
Speakers Manual says the average minister is paid. More- 
over there are tens of thousands of foreign-bom Ameri- 
cans who have become prosperous and wealthy. Also the 
children of foreigners are in no sense similarly limited and 
the second and third generations so far have achieved an 
economic status that is quite on a par with that of average 

In regard to the status of the immigrant worker the Inter- 
church World Movement in another report — a, Special 
"World Survey"— Vol. I.— pages 76 and 80 says: 

"In their own country they were overshadowed by a state religion 
which was ritualistic and political in its character. Economically they 
were compelled to work for starvation wages with no hope for their 
future. Socially they were handicapped in that they belonged to the 
lower classes and the possibility of rising to the level of the so-called 
upper classes was next to hopeless no matter what their natural ability 
might have been. 

" In America they had more to eat. They wore better clothes. They 
had the right to vote. They had access to free education. They were 
given better jobs . . . while they discovered that there were classes in 
America, they had the freedom to pass from one to another according 
to their character, general ability and personality . . . (and) it is being 
daily demonstrated in our American life that the children of these very 
foreigners are taking places of leadership and are rapidly becoming the 
backbone of America. " 

In the particular case of the Steel Industry, the unskilled 
foreign worker received wages per hour far higher than that 
paid the average of common labor, including the common 
labor which in many communities is largely or entirely 
American. And he had the opportunity of long hours and 
steady work so that in spite of his inherent economic handi- 
caps he was able to earn as much or more than skilled 
American workers in other industries, by means of which he 
can at least advance the scale of his children and grand- 
children exactly as former generations of Americans, by 
exactly the same method of long, steady hours of hard work. 


made possible the present scale of living of their children 
and grandchildren. ' 

Moreover the Steel Industry as a whole including the 
U. S. Steel Corporation and the many independent com- 
panies have already spent more than a hundred million 
dollars, in special schools and clubs and playgrounds and 
otherwise for the express piupose of providing every prac- 
tical facility to help at least the children of its foreign 
workers to achieve American standards of living. 

Yet the whole Interchurch Report does not discuss pro 
or con, or otherwise consider, or even mention any of these 
special inherent circumstances that are the true basis of cer- 
tain inevitable facts of the unskilled foreign worker's life. 
Nor has it paid any attention to the large-scale definite and 
direct work that is being carried on by the steel companies 
to change these inherent conditions at least as they apply 
to the next generation. ' 

Yet it proposes, by an argument based on this very partial 
consideration of certain inherent facts that apply only to a 
very special class, that we enact laws for the purpose of 
taking away from all society the chief incentives which 
Americans have always believed are necessary to the 
constant advancement that has actually resulted from 

But this is only the first point to be considered in regard 
to this "recommendation" that would double average 

Throughout all American industry, wages — ^including the 
wages of digging or raising the raw material, of transporting 
it and of carrying it through all the different steps that lead 
up to its final consiunption — amount to between 80 and 
90% of the cost of all products. It follows inevitably 

» A detailed presentation of facts in this c»nnection will be found in 
Chapter XVIII. 

' Vol. 11 which was published a year after the Report proper and has 
had no such wide circulation or pubUcity as the Main Report does devote 
a section to Steel "welfare work. " 



therefore — and this is recognized as axiomatic by every 
economic authority as well as every business man — that 
the doubling of all wages that enter into the production of 
any product inevitably means practically doubling the cost 
of the product. And this in turn means that all workers in 
spite of their double wages would soon be in the same posi- 
tion in regard to their cost of living as they were before. 
By the same token the possibility of entirely maintaining 
the high American standard of living for a family of five 
on the earnings of one individual would be in exactly the 
same position as it is at present. 

The basic fallacy of course of the Interchtirch argument, 
and particularly of this special Recommendation No. 7 in 
the Findings, is that it entirely fails to distinguish the differ- 
ence between what economists refer to as "nominal wages " 
and **real wages." ** Nominal wages" may be set at any 
dollars and cents figure you please but "real wages" — ^the 
actual buying power of the wage — ^remains the same on any 
given standard of industrial productivity. ' 

The distinction between "nominal" and "real wages" 
is one that all socialists, I. W. W.'s and other radicals are 
particularly emphasizing at the present time. 

Mr. George Soule, whose connection with the Interchiu-ch 
Steel Strike Report will be referred to later, in his book 
The New Unionism (page 274) says: 

"In the matter of wages a practical limit will before long be reached. 
If prices continue to rise, wages may rise correspondingly, but * real 
wages * must remain almost stationary . . . given a maximum pro- 
ductivity, real wages can rise only by diverting a larger share of the 
earnings to the wofkers; but under the present economic regime, this 

* Dr. Jenks points out that in certain exceptional cases, particularly 
in the production of luxuries and in production under monopolistic 
conditions, the burden of higher wages may l^itimately be shifted in 
part to the constuner and that such action limited to such cases, may not 
effect or effect only slightly, prices in general. Any sweeping advance 
in wages, however, will inevitably tend to raise prices accordingly tmless 
it is accompanied by a corresponding increase in production. 



process cannot go beyond a certain point without driving the employers 
out of business by making it impossible for them to secure further 

Mr. Soule again says in the same volume page 1 1 . 

H I 

The time is rapidly approaching as even its conservative (union) 
officials admit when no further (wage) gains of importance can be made 
for the members (coal miners) without pressing actively for the nationali- 
zation of the mines, " and again, 

"... the enunciation of the Plumb plan is a long step toward the 
acknowledgment of the need for a new economic order which can be 
attained not through collective bargaining, but only through combined 
political and economic (the taking over of the railroads by the workers) 
action. " 


the Interchurch Report and these fundamental theories 
upon which socialism, I. W. W.ism and other modem forms 
of radicalism are based, will be specifically discussed in 
Chapter XXIV of the present analysis. 


This basic socialistic program as to the proper solution of 
our basic wage problem is even more definitely and clearly 
stated in the preamble to the Constitution of the Amalga- 
mated Clothing workers one of the new "Revolutionary 
Unions" which states: 

"The industrial and inter-industrial organization built upon the 
solid rock of clear knowledge and class consciousness will put the or- 
ganized working class in actual control of the system of production and 
the working class will then be ready to take possession of it." 

In regard to this same problem the preamble to the Con- 
stitution of the I. W. W. says : 

" Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers 
of the world, organized as a class take possession of the earth and machinery 
of production. " 

That the same proposition is the fundamental principle 
of other extreme forms of radicalism including the Bolshevik 
is too well known to require specific quotation. 

The specific relation — ^undoubtedly entirely unrecog- 
nized by the majority of the members of the Interchurch 
World Movement itself — between the particular wage 
arguments and "Conclusions" and "Findings" featured in 




The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike states on 
page 13 line 18 — ^that; **the Commission's investigation did 
not include analysis of the Corporation's financial organi- 
zation." Nevertheless,' in two sections it brings up specifi- 
cally and in many other places touches on indirectly "the 
financial ability of the Corporation to pay higher wages" 
as an argument by insinuation that because the Corpora- 
tion could, therefore it should, pay higher wages. 

The most definite of such arguments by insinuation (but 
which are in no case developed) are: 

First: that in r^ard to " net earnings per ton of steel in 1917 and 
1918 as against the average since 1910 " (page 87 line 16) ; 

Second: that "increases in wages during the war were in no case at a 
sacrifice of stockholder's dividends" (page 87 line 14 — and page 14 line i ) ; 

Third: that the total undivided surplus of the United States Sted 
corporation was "large enough to have paid a second time the total 
wage and salary budget for 19 18 — [$452,663,524] and to have left a 
surplus of over $14,000,000 " (page 13 line 28). 

"The net earnings per ton of steel" is stated in the Inter- 
chttrch Report (page 87 line 18) to have averaged since 
1910 — obviously from 1910 to 1916 — ^$13.03 and to have 
been for 1917, $19.76 and for 1918 $14.39. 

No authority whatever is given for these figures, or if 
they were computed from other figures, any suggestions as 
to how they were arrived at. As a matter of fact they are 
merely quoted from an equally unsupported statement in a 
magazine article. Taken at their face value, however, they 
mean that in 191 7 the United States Sted Corporation 




earned net per ton of steel 51%, and in 1918 just 10%, more 
than the average earnings for the years 1910 to 1916 which 
includes the several very poor business years just before 
the war during one of which, 1914, the income account 
shows a net deficit of $16,971, 98383 (13th Annual Report). 
Against this 51% alleged higher earnings per ton in its 
best year, must be considered the fact that during the year 
1917. in which our entry into the war called for a maximimi 
enlargement of all steel facilities, the U. S. Steel Corpora- 
tion spent $87,988,000 in extra equipment to meet these 
war requirements. 

Moreover in 1 9 1 7 and 1 9 1 8 the dollar was worth very much 
less than between 1910 and 191 6. 

Finally, during this period, in which general commodity 
prices increased 107% and the value of earnings decreased 
50%, whereas the Interchurch Report does not even allege 
that average earnings per ton of steel increased for the two 
years more than 30.5%, it admits (page 97, footnote i) that 
wages increased (1910 to 1919) 150%. 

The second argument by insinuation— that wages whould 
have been further increased "because increase in wages 
during the war in no case were at a sacrifice of stockholders' 
dividends "—is repeatedly reiterated in this and similar 
forms. This argument is of course on its face obviously 
untrue because with any given income the more that is paid 
to workers the less can be paid to stockholders and vice 
versa. Moreover, the only possible reason for making such 
a statement and repeating it is to give the impression that 
the dividends to stockholders were increased more or at least 
as much as the increases of wages to labor. This is specifi- 
cally not true. On the contrary, wages to labor were in- 
creased very much more than dividends to stockholders. 

The cost of living by the end of the war— the period under 
discussion— had advanced according to the figures of the 
National Industrial Conference Board (whose figures are 
regarded as standard and used by the Federal Reserve Banks 
and the National Railroad administration) 64%. By 




September, 1919, the time of the steel strike, they had gone 
up 80%. Steel wages on the other hand had during the 
same time, as the Interchurch Report itself admits (page 
97) , gone up an average of 1 50% and in the case of the lowest 
paid labor had gone up 163%. 

The standard dividend on U. S. Steel common stock is 5%. 
It was 5% in 1910-11-12 and 13. In 1914 because of the 
$16,971,983.83 net deficit previously referred to, although 
wages were not cut at all but were paid at the full rate out 
of the surplus funds as will be shown later, the dividends to 
stockholders were only 3%, in,i9i5 i)4%, in 1916 S%%. 
In 1917 they were 17% — ^in 1918 14% — in 1919 and 1920 
5%. An exact and detailed comparison of the wages and 
dividends paid by the U. S. Steel Corporation thruout this 
period follows. It will be noted that wages are for all 
departments and do not include sales and administrative 
employees. Wages for steel manufacturing departments 
and for 12-hour workers averaged of course much higher 
and showed a much greater increase over 191 3. Even on 
this broadest basis of comparison, however, it appears 
plainly that steel wages were increased far more during this 
period than steel dividends. Moreover, while steel divi- 
dends returned in 191 9 to the 191 3 level, steel wages 
remained at the peak level until well into 1921 and in Sep- 
tember, 1922, they are at approximately the 191 8 level. 


Rate of 



1913 Wage 



5% = 100 

Wage Per Day 

$2.85 = 100 


3 % 













^7 % 





^^ % 





5 % 





5 % 




Average' 7.7% 




' Does not include selling or administrative salaries. 
* Weighted averages computed by Haskins and Sells. 





The third method by which the Interchiirch Report seeks 
to create the impression that the steel industry can afford 
to and therefore should, pay still higher wages, is again not 
by definite straightforward argument or statement, but by 
insinuations through cleverly coupled facts and vague 
clever phraseology in regard to the surplus funds of the steel 

The Interchurch Report in its conclusions in the begin- 
ning of the voltmie (page 13, Hne 23), states:— 

"Compared with the wage budgets in 1918, the Corporation's final 
surplus after paying dividends of $96,382,027 and setting aside $274,- 
277*835 for Federal Taxes, payable in 19 19 was $466,888,421— a sum 
large enough to have paid a second time the total wage and salary 
budget for 1918 ($452,663,524) and to have left a surplus of over 
$14,000,000. In 19 19, the undivided surplus was $493,048,201.93 or 
$13,000,000 more than the total wage and salary expenditure." 

There is little question that the foregoing statement, 
because of its particular phraseology would naturally lead 
anyone not familiar with accounting and the nature of a 
corporation surplus— which undoubtedly includes the great 
majority of the readers of the Interchurch Report— to be- 
lieve that the Steel Corporation's surplus of $466,888,421 
in 1918 was the surplus for the one year 1918 after paying 
that year's dividends, taxes, etc. ; and again that the sur- 
plus of $493,048,201.93 in 1919 was the surplus for merely 
that year. Unless that impression is to be gathered, why is it 
stated that the surplus in 19 18 could pay " a second time the 
total wage and salary budget" and leave a balance of 
$14,000,000, and then in the next year also again pay a 
second time "the total wage and salary expenditures" and 
leave a balance of $13,000,000? Moreover, the impression 
that these figures of $466,000,000 and $493,000,000 repre- 
sented surpluses for single years is further accentuated by 
the phraseology of the note which follows at the bottom of 
the same page which refers to them in the plural as "sur- 




As a matter of fact, however, the surplus of $466,000,000 
in the year 191 8 represented the cumulative savings of 18 
years and the surplus of $493»048,20i.93 in the year 1919 
consisted of this $466,000,000 accumulated surplus of 18 
years plus $26,000,000 which was the total surplus of the 
year 191 9. If therefore as the Interchurch Report suggests 
this 18 years' accumulated surplus was used in the year 191 8 
to double wages, instead of having any surplus at all in 
1919, with which again to double wages, all that would have 
been left of the surplus in 19 18 plus all the surplus for the 
individual year 1919 would not have paid 10% of the an- 
nual wages in 1919. 

A stuT)lus performs exactly the same function for a cor- 
poration as a bank account performs for an individual. It 
makes it possible to meet any sudden financial contingency 
without costly sacrifice through sudden ctutailment of 
expenditures — ^which in the case of a corporation means 
sudden reduction of wages or suddenly throwing large 
numbers of men out of work — and it makes it possible to 
meet a prolonged depression by a gradual readjustment 
which means a minimum loss to all concerned, including 

Attention has already been called to the fact that in 
the year 1914 the U. S. Steel Corporation had had a 
net deficit of $16,971,983.83. That same year dividends 
were decreased from 5% to 3% and the following year to 
i/4%- It has also been stated that wages that year were 
not decreased and the number of men laid off whole or part 
time was very small as compared with the general unemploy- 
ment throughout the country. Reference to the table at 
the bottom of page 13 in the Interchurch Report will also 
show that the total undivided surplus of the Steel Corpora- 
tion, instead of being gradtially increased as in other years, 
was in 1 9 14 decreased $16,593,956.99 or by almost the same 
amount as the net deficit for that year. 

In other words during this year of depression and net 
loss to the Company, dividends were decreased 40% and 





the following year 75% below the normal rate. But wages 
were not decreased because the Corporation had a surplus 
out of which it could meet its losses and maintain its wages 
and out of which it did meet its losses and maintain its wages. 
That this surplus was thus specifically and deliberately 
used to maintain wages and employment in this period of 
financial depression is particularly emphasized by certain 
instructions of Judge Gary to the Presidents of subsidiary 
companies given in that year and quoted in the Senate In- 
vestigation of the Steel Strike, Part I (page 237) as follows* 

"Now you will have some occasion perhaps during the immediate 
future to consider further some of these matters and they may involve 
considerable cost. If so I should consider the money well expended. 
It is even possible that there may be some distress among some of your 
employees or those who have been your employees but who are out of 
work, or in the families of these men. . . . Some of these families are 
occupying our houses and while out of work they may be unable to pay 
rent. In such cases, leave the families in the houses. Suspend the rent 
until they are able to pay it. The amount of money involved is of slight 
importance as compared with your duty and your pleasure as big, broad 
employers of labor. As suggested, you may have to relieve (Lay oflF) 
more men but do not interrupt their employment unless and until 
necessary. . . . If you can keep the men at work to some extent around 
the mills cleaning up, putting your property in condition I would do so. 
You may expect to meet considerable loss during the coming winter 
but if in so doing you have added to the relief, benefit and comfort of 
employees who in the nature of things are more or less dependent upon 
you, it should be a pleasure. " 

The whole question of surpluses has been particularly 
widely discussed in the last few years. Severe criticism 
has recently been generally expressed of a number of large 
corporations— particularly the Interborough Rapid Transit 
Company of New York, the American Woolen Company 
and other companies— who have been accused of having 
dissipated all their high earnings of prosperotis years in 
temporary too high dividends or too high wages instead of 
accumulating a surplus, which would have made sudden 
large scale unemployment and sudden financial difficulties 



avoidable. The Kansas Industrial Court has laid down the 
general rule that employers are in duty bound, as a measure 
of protection for their workers to lay up during their pros- 
perous years surpluses to meet the contingencies of less 
favorable business conditions. The Labor Union move- 
ment in England is on record in favor of national legislation 
to compel employers to accimiulate surpluses in times of 
prosperity and to use these surpluses, just as the U. S. Steel 
Corporation has used its surplus, to insure against sudden 
widespread unemployment in times of depression. Not 
only then can there be no question of the fundamental sound- 
ness of the accumulation of such a surplus, but there is no 
question that it is fundamentally unsound business practice 
not to accumulate such a reasonable surplus as opportunity 

The only possible questions therefore in regard to the 
U. S. Steel Corporation surplus, against which the Inter- 
church Report goes to such lengths to prejudice its readers, 
are its size, the rate at which it has been increased and 
whether or not that rate has seriously handicapped legitimate 
rates of wages or dividends. 

The total assets of the U. S. Steel Corporation as shown 
by the balance sheet of its i8th Annual Report, December 
31, 1 91 9, audited by Price, Waterhouse and Co., was 
$2,365,882,382.13. The $493,048,201.93 which represents 
its total of 18 years' accumulative surplus was just 21.7% of 
these total assets. This 21.7% surplus therefore represents 
an average increase during 18 years of less than i}4% a 
year. Certainly no private individual or ordinary business 
would be criticized for adding to its Hquid assets — that is its 
bank account or its equivalent — at the rate of iM% a year 
unless on the ground that the rate was unreasonably small. 

The total volume of business of the U. S. Steel Corpora- 
tion for the year 191 8 as reported in its 17th Annual Report 
(page 24) was $1,744,312,163. Itssurplus for the year 1918 
as stated in the same Annual Report of the Company (page 
5) — and clearly arrived at by a correct interpretation of the 




table at the bottom of page 13 of the Interchurch Report — 
is $35,227,617.75.' The surplus for the year 1918 then is 
just 2.02% of the volume of business for that year. Cer- 
tainly no private individual or ordinary corporation would 
be criticized for saving a bare 2% of gross income a year 
unless again perhaps on the grounds that such a percentage 
of saving was too small. 

The total volume of business of the U. S. Steel Corporation 
for the year 1919, as reported in the i8th Annual Report 
(page 24), was $1 ,448,557.835. The surplus for the same year 
as stated in this annual report (page 6) — which checks with 
a proper interpretation of the table on page 13 of the Inter- 
church Report — was $26,159,780,55 which is just 1.8% of 
gross income. Surely again no private individual or ordi- 
nary company would be criticized for saving 1.8% of gross 
income per year unless again on the ground that such a 
percentage of saving is too small. 

As a matter of plain demonstrable fact then, the Inter- 
church Report's attempt by insinuations and false or mis- 
leading statements in regard to surplus and profits, to argue 
indirectly that steel wages are low is equally fallacious and 
otherwise exactly on the same plane with its attempt to 
justify the same conclusion through a type of direct argument 
and a misuse of statistics that has already been analyzed and 

» This is shown by the financial statement to include some $6,000,000 
carried over from the previous year, therefore not to be surplus for the 
year 1918 only. 



The Interchtirch Report begins the chapter in which 
it discusses steel working hours, and calls "The Twelve 
Hour Day," with the following specific, emphasized 
conclusions : 

A. "Approximately half the employees in iron and steel manufactur- 
ing plants are subject to the schedule Imown as the 12 -hour day [that is a 
working day from 1 1 to 14 hours long] ; 

B. "Less than one-quarter of the industry's employees can work 
under 60 hours a week although in most industries 60 hours was re- 
garded as the maximum working week ten years ago: 

C. "In the past decade the United States Steel Corporation has 
increased the percentage of its employees, subject to the 12-hour day." 

These conclusions are largely the same in substance and 
phraseology as the specially feattired conclusions in the 
Interchurch Report's "Introduction," which consists en- 
tirely of conclusions and recommendations, with the follow- 
ing exceptions. Its Introduction states that approximately 
"one-half the employees of the steel industry (without the 
qualification *iron and steel manufacturing plants') were 
subject to the 12 hour day." In addition it is stated that 
" approximately one-half of these in turn were subject to the 
7-day week." It is also stated here that *'much less than 
one-quarter had a working day of less than ten hours." 

According to the Interchurch Report then, steel working 
hours are as follows: 



(i) "Less" or "much less" than 25% of the men "can work less than 
60 hours a week"; 

(2) Some 25%, although the Interchurch Report does not mention 
these at all, evidently work something between 10 and 12 hours; 

(3) 25 % work the 1 2-hour day 6 days a week ; 

(4) 25% work 12 hours and also were "subject to the 7-day week"; 

(5) " UsuaUy the shifts alternate weekly and the men must work the 
long turn of 18 or 24 hours — a solid day at heavy labor" (page 47). 

In contrast to this picture of steel working hours as pre- 
sented by the Interchurch Report, Judge Gary testified 
before the Senate Committee in October, 19 19, that the 
working hours of the United States Steel Corporation were 
as follows (Senate Hearings, page 157) : 

(i) 88,994 employees or 34% of all employees worked approximately 
8 hours a day. 

(2) 102,902 employees or 39.5% of all employees worked 10 hours 
a day. 

(3) 69,284 employees or 26.5% of all employees worked the 12-hour 

(4) The 7-day week has been eliminated. 

(5) Out of a total of 191,000 employees 82 worked a continuous 24- 
hour shift once in each month, 344 men worked a continuous 18 hotirs 
twice each month. (Senate Hearings page 202.) 

''Employees who can work less than 60 hours a week." 

There are two things to be noted about the Interchurch 
Report's conclusion that "less" or "much less than 25% 
of steel workers can work under 60 hours a week." 

The Senate testimony as to the working hours of all U.S. 
Steel Corporation employees stated specifically the ntunber 
of "approximately 8-hour" workers. The Interchurch 
Report has this statement and quotes frequently from other 
parts of the same paragraph but it does not mention or 
consider these definite figures that 34% of all workers work 
approximately 8 hours a day. Moreover it itself does not 
advance any figures as to 8-hour workers or as to 9-hour 
workers, nor does it as much as mention such workers. It 
entirely ignores the subject of the 8- or 9-hour workers — ^just 




as it leaves a complete blank as to the workers (obviously 
from its own figures 25%) who work between 10 and 12 
hours — except for these two sweeping conclusions that 
*'less" or "much less than one-fourth of the industry's em- 
ployees can work under 60 hours a week.'*' 

There are two principal authoritative sources of infor- 
mation as to conditions in the modern steel industry. The 
first of these is the figures as to steel wages and steel hours 
contained in the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly 
Review for October, 1 9 1 9. These figures — at least as far as 
they apply to 12-hour workers — the Interchurch Report 
uses constantly. 

This government study shows working hours for six 
principal departments, the hours for one of which were as 
follows : 

Monthly Review, October, 1919, Pages 122-123 

Sheet Mill 
average full time hours per week 
Occupation 1913 1914 1915 1917 "1919" 

Pair Heater 42.8 42.8 42.8 43.7 43.6 

Roller 42.8 42.8 42.9 43.7 43.6 

Rougher 42.8 42.8 42.8 43.7 43.7 

Catcher 42.8 42.8 42.8 43.7 42.8 

Matcher 42.8 42.8 42.8 43.7 43.7 

Doubler 42.8 42.8 42.8 43.7 43.6 

Sheet Heater 42.8 42.8 42.9 43.7 43.7 

Sheet Heater Helper 42.9 42.8 42.9 43.2 43.2 

Shearmen 42.9 42.9 43.0 43.5 43.5 

Shearmen Helper 42.9 42.9 43.8 43.2 46.6 

Openers 42.8 42.8 43.6 43.3 44.0 

Laborers 64^ 65.9 65 61.8 66.5 

The second principal authoritative source of information 
as to conditions in the modem steel industry is the still more 
comprehensive U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 218 

' One brief table presented on page 49 contains one line which says: 
"on 8 hours 10 per cent." 


(October, 1917)— a document of some 500 pages devoted 
entirely to a most elaborate and detailed study of labor 
conditions in the steel industry, partly for the decade and 
partly for the 5 years up to May, 1915. 

This study, in its conclusions, groups steel manufacturing 
throughout the country according to 10 representative de- 
partments. Its conclusions as to hours in each of these de- 
partments will be touched on later. In connection, however, 
with the Interchurch Report's efforts to hide the existence 
of the 8-hour day in the steel industry and its statement 
that "less than one-fourth of the industry's employees can 
work under 60 hours a week," the summary made by this 
document as to working hours in four of these 10 principal 
steel-making departments is extremely interesting. 

In summarizing working hours in these departments U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Bulletin 218 (October, 1917) says: 


"In 1915 (May, nine months after the war b^an) 24% worked s 
turns per week. 50% worked 6 days one week and 5 nights the next 
11% were employed in 3 shifts in 24 hours, two working five days each 
only, Monday to Friday, while the third (each shift altematingly) 
worked a turn on Saturday, making 6 for the week" (13% worked 6 
days per week; 1% 6 and 7 days alternately and 1% 7 days per week 
leavmg 85% working 5 or 5^ days a week). 


^^^^ Per cent, of all Employees 

48 to 60 g 

Over 60 and imder 72 . . ^ j 

7? ■.'.■'.'.'■■ 8 

Over 72 

(48% under 60 hours a week, 89^0 less than 72 hours.) 

" It will be noticed that the customary working time of the large num- 
ber of employees in this department was five days, five and six davs in ro- 





tation. In all except one of the plants covered, the hot mill employees 
were divided into three groups, each working 8 hours per turn, 5 turns 
per week, Monday to Friday inclusive, with one crew (alternately) 
working i turn Saturday morning." (40 hours each for two weeks and 
48 hours each third week.) 


"It will be noticed that the customary working time of a large 
percentage of the employees in this department was 5 days, 5 and 6 
days in rotation. In all the plants covered the r^ular turn employees 
were divided into 3 crews, each working 8 hours per turn, 5 turns per 
week from Monday to Friday inclusive with one crew (alternately) 
working an extra turn Saturday morning." 

Hours per week, 40 for two weeks and 48 each third week. 

The 7-day Week and the 24-hour Shift 

After beginning its chapter on steel working hours by 
the statement of the three conclusions already quoted and 
making certain further general statements, the Interchurch 
Report in defining the 12-hour day on page 47 says: 

" Usually the shifts alternate weekly and the men must work the 
'long tiu-n' of 18 hours or 24 hours ... in some plants the 36-hour 
turn is still not unknown. " 

In this same connection the Interchurch Report brings 
up the subject of the 7-day week in regard to which it says in 
its conclusions that one-fourth of the employees "were 
subjected to the 7-day week." 

In regard to the "long turn" the specific Senate evidence 
already quoted (Senate Hearings, part one, page 202) is 

"Out of a total of 191,000 employees (of the U. S. Steel Corporation) 
82 work a continuous 24-hour shift once in each month. . . . 344 men 
work a continuous 18 hours twice each month. No other employees 
work a continuous 18- or 24-hour shift except in emergency times like 
the war." 

Except for reference to it in connection with quotations 
from diaries or statements of some few individual workers 



the Interchurch Report makes no attempt to support its 
conclusion that ''usually'' the 12-hour worker must work 
the long shift ''alternately weekly'' \ makes no specific answer 
to Judge Gary's statement that out of 191,000 men only 82 
per month work a 24-hour shift although it elsewhere quotes 
the next sentence, and makes no reference whatever to the 
fact that it was only claimed before the Senate Committee 
(page 202) that 400 or 500 workers or some ^V of 1% of the 
workers were subject to such shifts. 

As regards the 7-day week there is no question that if it 
exists, or to the extent it exists, it justifies in the mind of 
the average American, such condemnation as the Inter- 
church Report gives it. The 7-day week is generally 
regarded as incompatible with modem social standards. 
But except in connection with war necessity, when it existed 
in many war industries, the Steel Corporation officials deny 
its existence in the U. S. Steel Corporation — except tempo- 
rarily in isolated cases of emergency such as are likely to 
happen in all kinds of work. In 191 1, the (Corporation 
ofl&cially declared that : *' Whether viewed from a physical, 
social or moral point of view we believe the 7-day week is 
detrimental." Positive instructions were issued to all 
departments of the company that 7-day work was not to be 
allowed and while it was stated that in any industry, *'at 
rare intervals there may come emergencies that would make 
absolute enforcement of any exact schedule of hours 
impracticable," it was also added that "any tendency on the 
part of any one to disregard the spirit or the letter of such 
order (against the 7-day week) should be sufficient cause for 
removal from service." This order is quoted in full in the 
Senate Hearings, Part I, page 231. 

In answer to questions in regard to Sunday and 7-day 
work under normal conditions — " i9i4for example," Judge 
Gary testified before the Senate Committee (Senate Hear- 
ings, Part I, page 179) : 

Mr. Gary: " Now the war came on and the government was clamoring 
for more and more steel . . . they were insisting on more and more days 



of work ... It was not until after the armistice of November 11, 19 18, 
that Secretary of War Baker through Riley, Adjutant General . . . 
wrote, * The Secretary of War directs me to notify you to stop all Sun- 
day work' . . . and we immediately put that into practise just as fast 
as we could." 

Senator Phipps: "Judge Gary, will you kindly give us the practice 
prevailing in normal times, say just before the war, taken in 19 14, what 
were the hours per day and days per week? " 

Mr, Gary: ** Sunday work was practically eliminated except as to the 
blast furnaces which are required to be continuously operated . . . and 
in those cases we reduced the days per week . . . giving each employee 
one day (off) during the week whether it was Sunday or another day." 

Mr. Clayton L. Patterson, Secretary of the Btireau of 
Labor of the National Association of Sheet and Tin Plate 
Manufacturers — among the chief competitors of the 
United States Steel Corporation — in a published pamphlet' 
in which he admits the limited existence of the 7-day week — 
from 10% to 14% varjdng with conditions — ^in the steel 
industries with which he himself is associated nevertheless 
says (page 73) : 

"The seven-day week has already been eliminated by the United 
States Steel Corporation and by many independent plants . . . (by 
using) an extra swing crew, which relieves each r^ular crew alternately. 
By this method each crew has one day off each week but that day may 
be any day in the week. " 

Now it is to be particularly noted that although no steel 
man denies the existence of a certain amount of 7-day work 
in certain "independent" plants of the steel industry — 
although Mr. Patterson, while emphasizing that the 7-day 
week has already been eliminated by the United States Steel 
Corporation, specifically admits its existence to a limited 
extent in the group of which he himself is an official, the 
Interchurch Report treats the question of the 7-day week in 
** independent plants" only incidentally and focuses its 
effort on attempting to prove that the United States Steel 

« Review of " The Steel Strike of 1919 by the Commission of Inquiry 
Interchurch World Movement. " 



Corporation is chiefly responsible for the continued existence 
of the 7-day week throughout the industry. 

The Interchurch Report particularly quotes the testimony 
before the Senate Commission in regard to the elimination 
of the 7-day week in Corporation plants. In addition it 
quotes (page 69) from a letter of January 30, 1920 to the 
Interchurch Commission in which Judge Gary said : 

"As to the 7-day week, however, b^ to state that prior to the war it 
had been eliminated entirely except as to maintenance and repair crews on 
infrequent occasions. During the war at the urgent request by govern- 
ment officials for larger production, there was considerable continuous 
7-day service in some of the departments. With the close of the war, 
this attitude was changed and the 7-day service has been very largely 
eliminated. At the present time there is comparatively little of it. We 
expect to entirely avoid it very shortly." 

Using this quotation as its hypothesis, the Interchurch 
Report begins its discussion of the 7 -day week with this 
question (page 71) : 

"What are the simple statistical facts concerning the 'elimination' 
of 7-day work and the 'reduction' of hours which, according to Mr, 
Gary, have been the object of such earnest eflFort by the Corporation?'* 

The Interchurch Report specifically states in its "Con- 
clusions" in the front of the book and elsewhere that one- 
fourth of all steel workers worked the 7-day week. It does 
not attempt, however, to offer any concrete evidence to 
support that specific figure, but rather depends on building 
up by "statistics'* or otherwise, the impression that a very 
large number of steel workers work the 7-day week. 

The first method by which the Interchurch Report seeks 
to build up an impression of the large amount of 7-day work 
in the steel industry is through emphasizing the amount of 
"Sunday work." 

Of course the only reason why 7-day work enters into the 
problem of the steel industry is because blast furnaces have 
to be run continuously day and night and Sundays in order 
to operate the industry. The only way it is possible to 


operate and give workers the 6-day week is by a special 
extra swing crew which alternately takes the place of 
different men different days, so that while every man gets 
one day off every week, he only gets one particular day off 
every six weeks. The existence of a large amount of 
Sunday work in certain departments therefore, as to which 
the Interchurch Report adduces much evidence, is no evi- 
dence at all as to 7-day work. 

Especially on pages 50 through 53 and frequently else- 
where, the Interchurch Report specifies the working sched- 
ule of many particular classes of workers as about 84 hours 
a week and quotes the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Monthly Review for October, 1919 as its authority. 
Here and thruout it refers to these figures as though they 
represent normal working hours in the steel industry. As 
a matter of fact, however, some of these figures go back to 
June, 1918 before the Battle of Chateau Thierry and the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor statement accompanjdng these figures 
expressly states (page 1092-104) that: — "It will be seen 
therefore that the schedules of 64 of the 73 establishments 
are for payroll periods in the months of December to 
March"; by far the largest number (27) are for December, 
1 91 8, the first month after the war, and over two-thirds are 
for December or January or earlier. In other words these 
figures which the Interchurch continually uses as for the 
year 191 9 and as representing nonnal' conditions actually 

» On page 50 the Interchurch Report says, " Taking the statistics for 
the center of the industry, the Pittsburg district, by the departments of 
plant for the last quarter of 1918 and the first quarter of 1919 as compiled 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (October, 1919, Monthly Review) we 
have for the largest department in the industry : stockers, 83.6 ; larrymen 
82.6; larrymen's helpers, 82.3, etc. " That is, in relation to this special 
table, the exact period covered by all the so-called 19 19 statistics is 
specifically mentioned but in this case they are not referred to as 1919 
statistics and there is nothing, except that they are occasionally referred 
to as from the same volume, which would lead any but a close student to 
recognize or even suspect that all further figtu-es which are stated as 
1919 and as normal actually were for the same period. 



represent, and themselves plainly state that they represent 
the period during the war or the first few months immediately 
after the armistice, during which period working hours in all 
basic industries were in no way near normal. Moreover as 
regards steel, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly 
Review June, 1920 (page 152 line 6 and chart) and other 
authoritative studies all show and state that January, 1919 
represented the peak of steel war activities and that the 
rettun to normal began in February, 191 9. 

Now as a matter of fact this U. S. Bureau of Labor study 
published in its Monthly Review for October, 1919 gives 
detailed figures not merely for " 1919" but for 1913, 1914, 
1915. 1917, and " 1919. " When these figures are analyzed 
as a whole it is possible to see to just what extent *' 1919" 
figures were influenced by war conditions and to what ex- 
tent they do represent the normal trend of hours in the 
industry. As a matter of fact they show plainly that hours 
in certain shorter-hour departments increased but that 
hours in the 12-hour departments shortened during the war. 
The point to be noted here is that they show certain excep- 
tional and extreme increases due to the war and that it is 
these extreme war-condition cases which the Interchurch 
Report chiefly features. 

The third argtmient of the Interchurch Report, however, 
in regard to the 7-day week, and the one in which it spe- 
cifically attacks the Steel Corporation as the stronghold of 
the 7-day week in the industry, is based on figures which 
apply to 1914, in regard to which period Judge Gary 
categorically stated that in all continuous operations in the 
United States Steel Corporation, where ftimaces had to be 
run over Sunday, the workers themselves worked only six 
days, being given some other one day off during the week. 

The Interchurch Report quotes on page 72 as follows: 

"Statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 218 (Oct, 19 17) 
reveal what actual successes were accomplished by the Corporation in 
' eliminating ' 7-day work. Seven-day workers in blast furnaces were (p. 
17) 191 1. 89%; 1912. 82%; 1913, 80%; 1914, 58%; 1915, 59%. Open 


I i 


hearths during this same period about equally divided among the 7- 
day; the 7 and 6 day alternately, and the 6-day groups. Even before 
the war the seven day 'eliminating' waited on what 'steel demand' 
decided. The best year's figures show that the Corporation never 
achieved even a half reform." 

This argument and conclusion which specifically cites the 
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics for its authority is 
very interesting. It particularly emphasizes that : 

"The best year's figures show that the Corporation never achieved 
even a half reform." 

United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 218 
(October, 1917), page 17, begins: 

"A blast furnace from the very nature of its process must be in con- 
tinuous operation day and night 7 days per week. In 1907 in 20 plants 
reported for that year for 97% of all employees in the occupation con- 
sidered, the customary working time per week was 7 days . . . but 
since iQio there has been a material reduction in 7-day work. Many plants 
having made provision to lay off each employee in rotation one day in 7 
(precisely as Judge Gary described), thus making a &rday week for the 
employee while the plant is continuously in operation 7 days. " 

U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics does not mention the 
U. S. Steel Corporation by name but Senate Document no 
is specific on this point. It says, Vol. Ill, page 168, referring 
to conditions of March, 1912 : 

"The plan was generally adopted by the Steel Corporation. . . . 
In all but one of the plants, the plans have eliminated 7-day work for all 
but a very few employees. In the (one) excepted plant, the plan for the 
elimination of 7-day work has not been completely introduced . . . 
but in the other blast furnaces the plans were so completely introduced 
as practically to abolish 7-day work." 

Bulletin 218 then gives the table just as quoted in the 
Interchurch Report for the purpose of showing the decrease 
in hours in the industry that was brought about by these 
many plants having eliminated the 7-day week. 



Then follows a summary showing that in Bessemer plants 
in 1910, 34% of a certain group of workers worked 7 days a 
week while in 1913 only 11% of the same group worked 7 
days, at the end of which table the Department of Labor 
Bulletin emphasizes that, *' Throughout the 9-year period 
(1907 to 1915) the majority of employees in Bessemer 
Converting departments worked 6 days per week while a few 
worked 6 and 7 days in alternating weeks. ' ' This simimary 
and conclusion the Interchurch Report makes no reference 

The Interchurch Report does, however, quote and em- 
phasize the next paragraph— that in regard to the " 7, 7 and 

6 and 6-day groups in open hearth furnace departments" 
being about equally divided. 

The next paragraph in this U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin 
says: "/« all rolling mills the per cent of employees working 

7 days a week was very small/' This paragraph the Inter- 
church Report also ignores. 

Moreover at the end of this section, 4 pages later, the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin recapitulates and again em- 
phasizes: "The very material reduction in working hours" 
during this period because of the many plants which had 
gone from the 7 to the 6-day week. 

In other words, in trying to bolster up its accusations 
against the United States Steel Corporation in regard to the 
7-day week and in a specific effort to seem to disprove Judge 
Gary's plain detailed statement, the Interchurch Report 
thus not only misinterprets the obvious meaning of the 
government figures which it quotes in an attempt to prove 
the opposite of what is actually indicated; it not only does 
this in face of the plain, twice-repeated statement of the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor itself as to what these figures actu- 
ally show; but it handpicks this U. S. Bureau of Labor 
evidence paragraph by paragraph, publishing only the figures 
or quotations which it can misconstrue and entirely leaving 
out the intervening figures or statements which are so plain 
they cannot be thus misconstrued. 



Number of 12-hour Workers 

In regard to the 12-hour day the Interchurch Report 
begins its whole discussion with the positive sweeping 
statement of two conclusions; that — 

A. "Approximately half of the employees of the iron and steel manu- 
facturing plants are subjected to the schedule known as the 12-hour day 
[that is, a working day, from 1 1 to 14 hours long] " and 

C. "In the past decade the U. S. Steel Corporation has increased the 
percentage of its employees, subject to the 12-hour day." 

As the Interchurch Report states these two conclusions 
in this order and because it is necessary to establish facts 
before it is possible to establish tendencies, it is desirable 
to treat these two subjects in this order, irrespective of 
the fact that in its argument the Interchurch Report 
itself does not. 

In attempting to establish its conclusion as to the pro- 
portion of steel workers who work in the 12-hour group the 
Interchurch Report — as in the case of so many other of its 
conclusions — ^immediately finds itself confronted by a plain, 
definite, official statement of the steel companies substanti- 
ally to the contrary of those conclusions. 

Judge Gary had testified before the Senate Committee 
that for the U. S. Steel Corporation, the niunber of 12-hour 
workers was 69,284 and that these represented 26.5% of all 

The Interchurch Report at once points out, and its 
position up to a certain point is well taken, that the total 
employees of the U. S. Steel Corporation include the 
workers in its ore-producing, coal-producing and transpor- 
tation companies. Although such workers are most cer- 
tainly engaged in the production of steel they are not in 
many instances working under the same conditions ; do not 
in general work the same schedule of hours ; are not involved 
in the problem of continuous operation, and particularly 
were not involved in the issues of the steel strike. If, the 
Interchurch Report therefore insists, consideration is 


limited, as it should be, to the ** employees of iron and 
steel manufacturing plants" these 69,284 twelve-hour 
workers would represent not 26.5% but 36% of all em- 
ployees that it is fair to include. 

By thus establishing with reasonable plausibility the 
percentage of 12-hour workers in the United States Steel 
Corporation at 36, the Interchurch Report has brought 
it within 14% of its own figures as to 12-hour workers 
throughout the industry. The Interchurch Report then 
might have considered the fact that the Steel Corporation 
employs less of its facilities than many other steel companies 
in producing crude iron and steel — ^in which processes hours 
are longer and the proportion of men to output less — and 
much more of its facilities than many other companies in 
producing finished products — ^in which processes the hours 
are shorter and the proportion of workers to output greater. 
It is obvious therefore that the United States Steel Corpor- 
ation may doubtless have a less proportion of 12-hour 
workers than the industry as a whole. ' 

But the fundamental hypothesis of the whole Interchurch 
Report, stated as "Summarized Conclusions No. i" and 
repeatedly throughout, is that: 

" I . The conduct of the iron and steel industry was determined by the 
conditions of labor accepted by the 191,000 employees of the U. S. 
Steel Corporation's manufacturing plants. 

"2. These conditions of Labor were fixed by the Corporation. . . . 

"Wage rates in the iron and steel industry as a whole are determined 
by the rate of the U. S. Steel Corporation, " 

— and in general the Interchurch Report insists on every 
occasion that practically every evil in the steel industry 

» Mr. Clayton L. Patterson on page 64 of his pamphlet on the 1919 
steel strike, already referred to, gives the percentage of 12-hour workers 
for May, 1920 for 20 "independent" plants manufacturing sheet steel 
(a more finished product) as 24.66%. On the other hand the number 
of 12-hour workers in 11 "independent" mills manufacturing steel in- 
gots, slabs, billets — the cruder forms of steel — was 39.26%. The aver- 




which it mentions is the restdt of the influence of the U. S. 
Steel Corporation— even going to the lengths, as has already 
been pointed out in the present chapter, of expurgating and 
falsifying the whole meaning of pages of government statis- 
tics in order to hide the fact that the United States Steel 
Corporation took the lead in eliminating the 7-day week. 

For the Interchurch Report to admit, therefore, that 
the United States Steel Corporation had, as evidence and 
common sense indicate, a somewhat less proportion of 12- 
hour workers than the industry as a whole, would, at least 
to that extent, have been to repudiate its first and most 
repeatedly expressed hypothesis. Instead, therefore, of 
making any attempt to reconcile its conclusions of 50% 
of 12-hour workers in the industry as a whole with the differ- 
ent U. S. Steel Corporation figiires, it deliberately takes 
these figures for its text and specifically builds up its 12- 
hour argument around the attempt to discredit them. 

The Interchurch Report seeks to contradict Judge Gary's 
figures and establish its own in three ways: — ^first, by 
elaborate detail quotations and certain deductions of its 
own from the so-called 1919 figures of the U. S. Bureau of 
Labor; 2nd, by generalizations from certain alleged figures 
for 3 particular steel plants; and 3rd, by attempting to show 
that part of the workers which the Steel Corporation figures 
specify as lo-hour workers actually worked 12 hours 
or more on alternating shifts and therefore should be added 
to the percentage of 12-hour workers. 

In regard to the elaborate statistics which the Inter- 
church Report gives through page after page from the 
so-called 191 9 figures of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
it need only be pointed out again that these figures are 
particularly stated to have been almost entirely for the first 
one or two months after the war, a period obviously entirely 

age number of 12 -hour workers per total of men employed for both 
groups of plants was 30.75%. These figures show plainly the variation 
in percentage of 12-hour workers in different types of plants. They are 
also for a period that is substantially normal. 




abnormal in steel as in every other industry; moreover they 
themselves give no specific facts as to nimiber of 12-hour 
workers. Whatever these certain extreme figures which the 
Interchurch Report picks out may or may not show, or 
whatever may or may not be fairly deduced from them is 
in no sense conclusive or indicative of working hotirs even 
for the same department 8 or 10 months later or under 
normal conditions. 

The second method which the Interchurch Report 
uses to try to arrive at the percentage of 12-hour workers 
in the steel industry is to attempt to generalize from three 
special instances. 

In one of these cases — ^for the Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Company — ^it states it obtained exact figures. This is the 
only case in which it specifically states it did obtain actual 
figures. These figures place 12-hour workers at 55%. 
It next quotes a *' verbal estimate of the President of the 
Carnegie mills," alleged to have been made **to the Inter- 
church Commission of Inquiry in November, 191 9." It 
states this estimate of 12-hour workers was 60%. Finally, 
it takes from the Senate Hearings Mr. Oursler's figures as 
to hours worked by different shifts in the Homestead plant 
in which the percentage of 12-hour workers is definitely given 
as 36, and attempts to prove from these figures themselves 
that the ntmiber of 12-hour workers in Mr. Oursler's plant 
was actually 52% instead of 36%. 

In view of the well-known fact, already emphasized, that 
in certain departments of steel work the percentage of 
12-hour workers runs very high, just as in other departments 
there is only i or 2% of 12-hour workers or no 12-hour work 
at all, the allegation that in three special cases the percent- 
age of 12-hour workers ran between 50 and 60 — even if that 
allegation were entirely true — obviously in no way proves 
or disproves the specific statement that for the entire United 
States Steel Corporation the percentage of 12-hour workers 
was 26.5%, or the corollary of that statement that for the 
steel mantifacturing departments it was 36.2%, which is the 


particular point the Interchurch Report insists on arguing. 
By the same token, it proves nothing as to averages in all 
departments of the "independent '* plants that make up the 
rest of the industry. 

Moreover a few isolated figures from both the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor study for December, 191 8, and January, 
1919, and the figures for 3 special departments for 8 months 
later, each obviously represent such special or limited con- 
ditions that even taken together they cannot be regarded 
as supporting each other to show general normal conditions, 
and certainly not sufficiently to overcome Judge Gary's 
and Mr. Patterson's very specific and comprehensive figures 
to the contrary. 

The third argimient by which the Interchurch Report 
seeks to substantiate its conclusion that 50% of all steel 
workers work the 12-hour day is contained in a footnote be- 
ginning on page 49 and running through 3 pages. This foot- 
note first quotes 3 brief sentences from a letter of Feb. 13th 
from Judge Gary to the Interchurch Commission dealing 
with Mr. Oursler's figures as to working hours in the Home- 
stead mill* and a few phrases from another letter of January 
30th to the Commission in regard to his own figures for the 
whole industry. 

The classification of all U. S. Steel Corporation employees 
according to working hours was officially stated as follows : 


12 hour txirns 69,284 26.5 % 

10 hour " 102,902 (39-39%) 

8 hour " 88,994 (34.1 %)" 

These figures do not make any mention of the exceptional 

worker who works 10 and 14 hours or 11 and 13 hours 

alternate weeks but averages 12 hours a day. It is to be 

presumed of coiirse, in face of the obvious facts, that such 

workers are included in this statement under the 12-hour 


•Quoted in full in Senate Hearings, page 482, and showing that at 
that time in that plant 36% worked 12 hours, 16.4% 11 hours, 25.9% 
10 hours and 21.2% 8 hours. 


The Interchtirch Report, however, raises the point that 
whereas these figures doubtless include the 13 and 14-hotir 
workers among the 12-hour workers, it suspects that they 
also probably included the group of workers who work 13 or 
14 hours on alternating weeks but who happened to be work- 
ing only 10 or 1 1 hours the ^eek on which these figures were 
based, as lo-hotir workers, whereas they average 12 hours a 
week and should be added to the 12-hour workers. It 
appears from the afore-mentioned footnote that the Inter- 
church Commission took this suspicion up with Judge Gary 
in connection with Mr. Oursler's figures and his own figures. 
It also appears that Judge Gary answered these letters, 
discussing this point, with regard to Mr. Oursler's figures 
and his own figures. From these letters this footnote 
quotes a few isolated sentences and phrases from which it 
seeks to show that Judge Gary became so mixed up in trying 
to answer this point that the figures which he gives in reply 
are a self-evident admission that the Interchurch Report 
suspicions are correct. Therefore the Interchurch Report 
argues, a large proportion of his lo-hour workers — ^it esti- 
mates about 15% — should be subtracted from his lo-hour 
workers and added to his 36.2% (based on steel manufactur- 
ing only) of admitted i2-hotir workers, making a total of 
over 50% for the industry. The merits of such an argu- 
ment cannot of course be determined one way or the other 
from a few isolated phrases of otherwise tmpublished cor- 
respondence. From the very nature of the case, however, 
the following is obvious. 

The Steel Corporation's figures of course cannot attempt 
to follow the various changes in hours of the individual 
worker but doubtless represent the hours being worked by 
different percentages of all workers at a given time. The 
most that is possible therefore is that these figures might 
represent as lo-hour workers that half of the 10 to 14-hour 
workers (or ii-i 3-hour workers) which were working 10 
hours at the time. But in order for these to make up its 
alleged 50% of 12-hour workers, the Interchurch Report 


must reckon this half of uneven shift workers — that is, 
workers who work lo hours one week and 14 the next — as 
15% of all workers, which would make a total of such 
uneven shift workers of 30% of all the workers in the 
industry, reducing the even 12-hour shift workers to 20% 
or only two-thirds of the odd shift workers. But it is a 
matter of the commonest knowledge and of plain common 
sense that the odd shift worker is the exception and not 
the rule, the odd shift being a bookkeeping and general 
inconvenience, only due to special circtmistances. As a 
matter of fact, the ntunber of such workers is so entirely 
negligible that neither the 500-page Bureau of Labor Bulle- 
tin 218, entirely devoted to a minute and detailed study 
of steel hotu^ and which does take up the 7.1 1,' the 9- and 
the 1 1 -hour classifications, or the U. S. Labor Bulletin of 
October, 191 9, or Judge Gary or Mr. Patterson or any known 
statistician in regard to steel working hours, give any sepa- 
rate consideration or even mention to such a class. 

The strong probability is that the official U. S. Steel 
Corporation figures included the comparatively small 
ntunber of such odd shift workers, who are obviously 12- 
hour workers, in the 12-hour class. As a matter of fact 
Judge Gary is quoted in one of the sentences from his 
unpublished letters to the effect that, "The percentage given 
of 36% is not correct if the percentage was intended to 
indicate those who work straight 12-hour turns. The num- 
ber of these straight 12-hour turn men is 26%," which indi- 
cates that odd turn men who average 12 hours are included 
as a matter of course under 12-hour workers. But even if 
they were not, one-half of such odd turn workers cotdd 
hardly change the Steel Corporation figures appreciably. 

Tendency of Steel Hours 

In addition to trying to establish its conclusion that 
approximately 50% of steel employees worked the 12-hour 

' 42.8 hours per week. 


day by arguments based on what it alleges were current 
conditions the Interchurch Report also makes by far its 
most lengthy and emphasized argument in regard to the 
12-hour day as follows: It states (page 54) : 

"In May, 1910, the percentage of employees working 72 hours' and 
over per week, i.e. at least 12 hours a day, was 42.58% [ibid. Vol. I 
p. xlii] " Ibid, refers to Senate Document no. 

With this 42% established for 1910 it then proceeds to 
argue that steel hours in general and 12-hour workers in 
particular, had so increased *4n a decade" as to make its 
conclusion that in 1919 50% worked 12 hours an inevitable 
conclusion. The Interchurch Report attempts to establish 
this increase in steel working hours in general and in the 
percentage of 12-hour workers in particular, by voltmiinous 
alleged quotation from Senate Document no and U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Review October, 1919. 

In its general stunmary of these alleged statistics, the 
Interchurch Report says (page 71) : 

"... we have [figures from Senate Document no and October 
Monthly Review U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics] : 

Average steel week — 1910 67.6 hours 

Average steel week— 1919 68.7 hours 

"That is ten years of reduction has increased the nimiber of 
hours. ..." 
"Take the figures for 1914 and 1919: 

1914 1919 

Common labor — ^hours per week 70.3 74 

Skilled and semi-skilled — ^hours per week 57 66 

All employees — ^hours per week 66.3 68.7 " 

" In each classification the length of the week has increased. " 
" Take the seventy-nine separate occupations in the steel industry for 
which statistics are given by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 

« Throughout this section the Interchurch Report's definition of 12- 
hour workers, i.e. those working 72 hours a week, and its use of the term 
"all employees," etc., in connection with figures which actually represent 
only primary production departments, is necessarily adopted. It will 
be noted that in the independent discussion of steel working hours in 
Chapter XI a different basis is used. 


compare 1914 and 1919. In eighteen classes, hours have decreased; in 
four remained stationary; in fifty-seven of the seventy-nine classes hours 
per week have increased. . . ." (Italics those of the Interchurch 

These tables, under analysis, show on their face, without 
reference to the original figures which they allege to quote 
that they are entirely false and manipulated. The Con- 
clusions that are stated on the basis of these careful manipu- 
lations are provably false from merely a little careful study 
of the tables themselves just as they are printed. When 
reference is made to the original sources from which these 
statistics are specifically quoted, it appears that from the 
first figure quoted — 67.6 hours as the average steel week in 
1910, through the last figure quoted — ^that "in 57 of the 79 
classes hours per week have increased, " every single figure 
as given, is either in itself or in its use absolutely false. 
Senate Document no is the source for all 1910 figures. 
The U. S. Bureau of Labor, October, 1919, study is the source 
for figures from 1913 to "1919." Senate Document no 
(page xliii) gives 6g.8 hours as the average steel week in 
1 9 10, shows on that page exactly how it arrives at this 
average and establishes and uses this figure throughout. 
But 69.8 hours for 1 9 10 is so much higher than any weight- 
ing or any manipulation outside of actual forgery can make 
the figures for " 1919" even appear, that to use the oflBcial 
government figure 69.8 for 1910 would at once ipso facto 
disprove the whole Interchurch Report argument that steel 
hours were lengthening. The Interchurch Report without 
comment, changes this 69.8 to 67.6 and quotes that as the 
ofl&cial figure. The way in which it obviously arrives at this 
67.6 is very interesting. Senate Document no, page xliii, 
gives its general summary as to steel working hours in 191 o 
for 14 departments. This table shows average working 
hoiirs in each of these 14 principal departments, weighted 
according to the relative number of workers per occupation 
within the department. At the bottom of the table is given 
the average — weighted according to the relative ntmiber of 



workers per department for the industry — 69.8. This is 
the only average given or suggested and it is used through- 
out the original document. By going through those same 
figures, however, and leaving in the weighting by occupa- 
tions but taking out the weighting by departments the result 
is 67.6 — ^the Interchurch Report figure. 

U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1919, study 
gives the average hours worked per week for 81 occupations 
throughout the industry in 1913, 1914, 1915, 1917 and 
" 1919. *' It itself gives no averages for departments or for 
the industry. 

The figures 66.3, given by the Interchurch Report table 
as the average working hours per week for the industry in 
1 91 4, is the straight mathematical average without any 
weighting whatever of the working hours for these 81 occu- 
pations for that year. The unweighted average of the 
working hours for these same 81 occupations for "191 9" 
is 66. 1. But this figure is lower than even the Interchurch 
Report figure for 1910 and also than its figure for 191 4. It 
shows ipso facto that steel working hours were distinctly 
and consistently shortening. The Interchurch Report by 
heavily and illegitimately over-weighting these figures (see 
chapter XI) gets 68.7 and represents that as an official 
government figure for average steel working hours in " 1 9 1 9. " 
It is of course understandable that those lacking statistical 
training might take government figures as given and use 
them incorrectly. But to be able to detect that government 
figures, which as given refute a particular conclusion may 
by reweighting of part of the detailed statistics, be so 
changed as to seem to support that conclusion, obviously 
shows an intimate knowledge of statistics. What is shown 
by the fact that the figure thus arrived at is offered without 
comment as the official government figure, must be left to 
the judgment of the reader. 

In connection with the Interchurch Report's final alleged 
quotation from the U. S. Bureau of Labor figures, however, 
the case is not complicated by the question of weighting or 


• r 


any other technical details. The Interchurch Report states 

"Take the seventy-nine separate occupations in the steel industry 
for which statistics are given by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
compare 1914 and 1919. In eighteen classes hours have decreased; in 
four remained stationary; in fifty-seven of the seventy-nine classes hours 
per week have increased. ..." 

The Interchurch Report thus specifies the figures hy 
occupations which is exactly the way the U. S. Bureau of 
Labor study gives them. The figures as the Interchurch 
Report alleges to quote them do not in any way remotely 
resemble the original figures. Not a single figure is the 
same or near enough the same to be in any way reconciled 
with the original. As far as their having any relation with 
the plain detailed U. S. Bureau of Labor figures as to "total '* 
increases and decreases of steel working hours by occupa- 
tions, which they specifically allege to quote, the Inter- 
chtu*ch figures are made out of whole cloth. 

The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics study in its Monthly 
Review for October, 191 9, to which the Interchurch Report 
specifically refers, is presented for the express purpose of 
showing the increases and decreases in working hours for 
various classes of steel workers from 191 3 through the war. 
The pages are 104 to 126. The majority of the statistics 
throughout the entire Interchurch Report are taken from 
these particular pages and a comparison between the Inter- 
church figures throughout its 12-hour chapter and these 
original tables shows that those responsible for the Inter- 
church "statistics" have gone through these U. S. Bureau 
of Labor figures with a fine tooth comb to pick out and 
publish each extreme case, and are otherwise thoroughly 
familiar with them. 

The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics divides this study 
into two parts. On pages 107 to 123 it lists the different 
classes of workers in 6 large representative departments of 
the steel industry. For each of these 81 (not 79) classes, 


it gives the full time working hours and the hourly rate of 
pay for the years 1913, 1914, 1915, 1917, and "1919," i.e. 
as already explained chiefly for December, 1918 and 
January, 1919 just at the end of the war and at the statistical 
peak of steel war activity. It gives these detailed figures 
for each such class of workers in each section of the coimtry 
then for the country as a whole. 

On pages 124, 125 and 126 the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics itself then recapitulates and summarizes the rela- 
tive increase or decrease of working hours and hourly wage 
rates for each of these 81 classifications for the whole coim- 
try, using percentages to make the relative increases or 
decreases simpler and plainer. Not only are the true facts 
thus made as plain and simple as they can be made but the 
results are stated in two different ways — actual figures and 
percentages— so that they can be double checked. 

The Open Hearth department is the one in connection 
with which the Interchurch Report condemns the 12-hour 
day most specifically and in regard to which it quotes iso- 
lated figures and instances most frequently. The full U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, showing the relative 
length of working hours for 1913, 1914, 1915, 1917 and 
*' 1919 '* for all classes of Open Hearth workers for the whole 
cotmtry, are as follows: 


Monthly Review, October, 19 19, Page 125 

Open Hearth Furnaces 

Occupation 19 13 

Stockers 100 

Stock Cranemen 100 

Charging Machine Operators 100 

Malters' Helpers: 

1st " 100 

2nd " 100 

3rd " 100 

relative full time hours 

I9I4 I9I5 















































Occupation 1913 

Stopper Setters 100 

Steel Pourers 100 

Mold Cappers 100 

Ladle Cranemen 100 

Ingot Strippers 100 

Laborers 100 

It will be noted that there is not a single class of workers 
in this entire 12-hotir department for the whole country 
that was not working shorter hours at the height of the war 
period than it worked in 191 3, and only one class which was 
not working shorter hours at the peak of steel war activity 
than in 1914. 

Figured on the basis of the detailed tables of actual hours 
given in the first part, and checked with the percentages given 
in the second part of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
tables, and thus double checked, the increases and decreases 
of steel working hours in each of the 81 given classifications 
in the 6 given departments between the year 191 3 and 
"1919" (i.e., chiefly in December, 1918 and January, 1919 
the peak of steel war activity) were as follows: 

"For all classes of workers given, the hours: 
In Blast Furnace, 

4 increased; 10 decreased: 

In Open Hearth, 

12 decreased: 
In Bloom Mills, 

12 decreased: 
In Bessemer, 

II increased; 8 decreased: 

In PlaU MUls, 

I o increased ; 2 decreased : 
In Sheet MUls, 

II increased; i remained same: 
Total for all classes given, 

36 increased; i remained same; 44 decreased. 

The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics itself bases 
its study in both sections on 191 3 as the norm. During the 


last of 1914, there was a panic; the N. Y. Stock Exchange 
closed for months; for the latter months of this year work 
was slack and full time hours in all industry inclined to be 
shorter. For this reason statisticians generally use either 
the first part of 1914 or 1913 as norm for this period as does 
the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in this case. This 
1914 depression, however, means that a comparison of hours 
in any industry between 1914 and the end of the war would 
show the maximtmi variation. The Interchurch Report 
without comment, omits the 1913 figure and uses the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics tables with 1914 for the norm. 
But even on this basis the results are only slightly different 
and do not in any way resemble the purely fictitious statis- 
tics which the Interchtu-ch Report gives and signs with the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' name. 

A comparison of length of steel working hours between 
1914 and **I9I9" made and double checked on the same 
basis as above shows th^t : 

"For all classes of workers given, the hours: 
In Blast Furnaces, 

5 increased; i remained same; 8 decreased 
In Open Hearth, 

I increased; 11 decreased 

In Bloom Mills, 

1 increased; 11 decreased 

In Bessemer, 

10 increased; 9 decreased 
In Plate Mills, 

12 increased; 
In Sheet Mills, 

11 increased; i remained same; 
Total for all classes given, 

40 increased; 2 remained same; 39 decreased. 

The Interchiu-ch Report states, and signs the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics' name to the allegation, that: 

57 increased, 4 remained stationary; 18 decreased. 

There isn't a single Interchurch Report figure even re- 
motely similar to the original and no addition or subtraction 


or recombination of the component groups of the original 
U. S. Bureau of Labor figures can make them even approxi- 
mate those which the Interchurch Report quotes as U. S. 
Bureau of Labor figures nor are the figures for any district 
or group as given in the stated original. Both the degree of the 
discrepancy and the nature of the discrepancy is such that 
there is no possibility that it could have been caused by ty- 
pographical or mathematical error. 

But no study of these volimiinous tables of the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics can fail to reveal the far more 
serious discrepancy between the real government figures and 
the whole 12-hour argument which the Interchurch Report 
seeks to build up around these very government figures 
themselves, partly by thus making figures out of whole 
cloth and signing the government's name to them; partly 
by picking out the most extreme cases ; and partly through an 
ingenious manipulation and falsification of tables embody- 
ing these extreme figures which will>e emphasized shortly. 
The most obvious thing shown by the real totals of the 
original U. S. Bureau of Labor figures as to increases and 
decreases of working hours for all these 6 representative 
departments is that for the whole 81 occupations given, the 
number in which working hours increased— heXween either 
1913 or 1914 and the peak of steel war activity— and the 
number in which working hours decreased, were about equal. 
The most obvious thing about the tables themselves— using 
either 1913 or 1914 for the norm— is that in the first 3 de- 
partments the overwhelming tendency was towards 
decreased working hours, in the fourth the increases and 
decreases about balanced; while in the last two the over- 
whelming tendency was towards increased working hours 
during the war. 

The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in showing the 
figures for 6 representative departments in the industry, 
selects as the first two— Blast Furnace and Open Hearth— 
the chief 12-hour departments of the industry. Its tables 
for these two 12-hotir departments (pages 107 and i loibid.) 


show that for all classes of workers in all parts of the coun- 
try, the working hours for the years given (1913-1919) in- 
creased or decreased as follows: 


Hours Remained Hours 

Increased Same Decreased 

Blast Furnace 4 j^ 

Open Hearth 

T^t^l "4 72 

In thus giving figures for representative departments of 
the steel industry the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
next selects— in the Bloom Mill, Bessemer, and Plate Mill 
departments— three departments which represent the 
"middle section" as to working hours, including chiefly 
10- and ii-hour workers but including also some 8-hour and 
some 12-hour workers. Summaries of all the figures given 
on pages no to 121 of the Monthly Review, October, 1919, 
for these departments, show, for all classes of workers in all 
parts of the country (i9i3-"i9i9"), the following: 


Hours Remained Hours 

Increased Same Decreased 

Bloom Mills 

Bessemer u ^ 

PlateMills 10 * 

Totals 21 - 

These middle group departments, as stated, are made up 
of 8, 10, II, and 12 hour workers. Of the 43 occupations 
of this group, 12 were working approximately 12 hours (70 
hours or more per week) in 1913. For all such workers 
increases and decreases of hours were as follows: 

Bloom Mill: i^i^ "iqiq" 

Heaters 71.2 67.5 

Bottom Maker 719 5^0 

" Helper 72 67.4 

Lalx»«s 73.1 6g6 



Bottom Makers 73.8 

Bottom Makers Helpers 73.1 

Ladle Liners Helpers 70.9 

Stopper Makers 70.6 

Laborers 75.2 

Plate Mill: 

Charging Mach. Oper 70.7 

Roll Engineers 72.4 

Heaters 71.7 

2 increased, 10 decreased 






Of all the 81 occupations for which detailed figures as to 
working hours are thus given by the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
study, 14 occupations in blast furnaces, 12 occupations in 
the open hearth, and 12 occupations in the "middle group" 
departments — a total of 38 occupations — worked approxi- 
mately 1 2 hours a day in 1 9 1 3. Of all these the working hours 
for 6 increased in "191 9" the peak of steel war activity, 
while working hotu^ for J2 of the 38 decreased. 

Moreover among the entire 81 occupations given, there 
is no case shown of any group of workers which worked less 
than 12 hours in 191 3 having become 12-hour workers even 
at the peak of steel war activity. 

In this connection it is also interesting to note that in all 
81 occupations given, in only 6 did hoiirs increase more than 
5% even at the height of war activity. The largest increase 
was that for the Bessemer Stopper Setter who worked 51.6 
hours in 1913, 50.7 hours in 1914, 51.5 hours in 1915, 49.6 
in 191 7, and then jtunped to 59.8 at the peak of war activity. 
The second largest increase — 9% — ^was for blast furnace 
common labor which had previously worked consistently 
12 hours or less a day 6 days a week but which during the 
height of war activity averaged about half a day on Sunday. 
Sheet Mill Shearmen Helpers also increased their working 
hours by 9% going from 42.9 hours per week to 46.6 at the 
height of war activity. Bessemer Cupola Tappers and 


Bessemer Vesselmen Helpers increased their hours by 8% 
and Mold Cappers by 7%, the increases being from 54 to 59 
hours, from 56 to 61, and from 57 to 61 hours respectively 
at the height of war activity. 

Finally in giving figures for 6 representative departments 
of the industry the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics selects 
one of the short hour departments — ^the Sheet Mill where 
normal working hours are 42.8 per week. Detailed figures 
as to working hours for this whole department appear on 
page 76 of the present analysis. 

It is entirely apparent then in regard to this general con- 
clusion of the Interchurch Report, alleging that for the 
separate occupations in the steel industry for which statis- 
tics are given by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, . . . 
in eighteen classes hours have decreased; in four remained 
stationary (and) in 57 . . . increased, that it is not only 
made out of whole cloth and states almost the opposite of 
what the U. S. Bureau of Labor figures actually show; but 
it is equally plain that the whole conclusion which the 
Interchurch Report seeks to draw from these figures, namely 
that the percentage of 12-hour workers is increasing, is the 
opposite of the facts. The facts are that for all the 38 
12-hour occupations given for all departments given, in only 
6 did hours increase while for 32 hours decreased. It is 
equally clear that the departments whose working hours 
did increase during the war were the shorter hour depart- 

So much for the years 1913 or 1914 — ^to *' 1919. " 
It will be remembered, however, that the Interchurch 
Report in seeking to emphasize the increase in the per- 
centage of 12-hour workers repeatedly insists that steel 
working hours have lengthened over a decade. On page 
46 it states : 


'Examination of government statistics . . . proves that the hours in 
the steel industry have actually lengthened sinu iqio . . . (and that 
the industry has shown an) unrestricted tendency toward lengthened 


And again (page 56) : 

" Five years ago the steel week was 2.4 hours shorter; ten years ago l.i 
hours shorter. Steel hours have lengthened in a decade. " 

But this very statement contradicts itself and the Inter- 
church Report's whole hypothesis that steel hours "have 
lengthened" and shown an "unrestricted tendency to 
lengthen,*' etc., "in a decade" for it itself states that steel 
hours actually shortened by 1.3 a week during the first half 
of the decade and right up into the war. Moreover this fact 
is entirely apparent in every table the Interchurch Report 
gives in regard to these years. 

There are two particular tables it will be remembered 
which the Interchurch Report uses to attempt to clinch this 
argtiment that steel hours in general, and the number of 
12 hour-workers in particular, have increased over a decade. 
They are as follows (page 71) : 

"... we have [figures from Senate Document 1 10 and U. S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics Monthly Review, October, 1919] ; 

Average steel week 1910 67.6 hours 

Average steel week 1919 68.7 hours 

"That is ten years of reduction has increased the nimiber of hours. ..." 
"Take the figures for 1914 and 1919: 

1914 1919 

Common labor hours per week 70.3 74 

Skilled and semi-skilled hours per week. . . 57 66 

All employees hours per week 66.3 68.7 " 

"In each classification the length of the week has increased. " 

The first thing to be noted about these two tables is that, 
just as in all similar cases, they group statistics for 191 o and 
"191 9" separately from statistics for 191 4 and "191 9" so 
that the figures for 1910 and 1914 never appear together. 
In other cases the Interchurch Report separates by 16 or 18 
pages the group 1910 and " 1919" from the group 1914 and 
" 1919. " In this case it will be noted these two groups are 
put in an entirely different form. The second is complicated 



by two other groups of figures and the common denomina- 
tor in the two tables is called "average steel week" in one, 
and "all employees" in the other. Taking the figures for 
this common denominator however, just as they appear in 
these tables, and putting them in their natural chronological 
order, the following appears 

"Average steel week" "all employees" 1910 67.6 hours 

"Average steel week" "all employees" 1914 66.3 hours 

"Average steel week" "all employees" " 1919" 68.7 hours 

In other words these very figures which the Interchurch 
Report itself publishes show on their face that the Inter- 
church Report's whole argtunent about the tendency of 
steel hours to lengthen over a decade is untrue because they 
show on their face that for the first half of the decade, and 
up into the war, steel hours actually shortened. 

It has already been pointed out that the figure which 
Senate Document no itself gives as the average steel week 
in 1910 is not 67.6 hours but is 69.8 hours, and that the Inter- 
chtirch Report obviously arrives at this 67.6 which it gives, 
by a partial reweighting of the original government statis- 
tics. It has also been pointed out that the Interchurch 
figure of 66.3 hours as the average steel week for 191 4 
represents a plain mathematical average without any 
weighting at all, while its figure of 68.7 for " 1919" is made 
two hours higher than the unweighted average by a heavy, 
illegitimate over-weighting. Fortunately, however, the proof 
of the absolute falsity of these figures does not depend 
on technical discussions of involved statistical methods 
because that falsity becomes entirely obvious the moment 
the Interchurch Report attempts to use those figures in any 
detail, as it does in the second table above. 

It will be noted that there are two extra sets of figures in 
the second Interchurch Report table under discussion — 
those in the first line alleging that in " 191 9" common labor 
worked 3.7 hours a week longer than in 1914, and those in 
the second line alleging that skilled and semi-skilled steel 


workers worked 9 hotirs a week longer in " 1919" than in 
1914. Common, and skilled and semi-skilled labor of 
course make up all the classes of which *'all employees*' are 
composed. The unweighted average between the 3.7 by 
which common labor hours are stated to have thus increased 
a week, and the 9 hours by which skilled and semi-skilled 
hours are thus stated to have increased a week, is 6.3 hours. 
But the ntunber of classifications of all workers given by the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor statistics, and which enter into the 
averages, run from 1 1 to 18 for skilled and semi-skilled to i 
for common labor. In other words any ' 'weighting' ' on this 
basis must be all in favor of the 9 hours. Also there are of 
course more skilled and semi-skilled workers than common. 
The Interchurch Report itself insists on page 92 that the 
proportion is 61.9% for skilled and semi-skilled to 38.1% 
for common. Again any ** weighting" must be entirely in 
favor of the 9. In other words, the first two lines of this 
table show an average increase of working hours for all 
classes of steel workers between 191 4 and ** 191 9" of some- 
thing above 6.3 hours a week. Yet the next line of this same 
Interchurch Report table specifically says that the increase 
for all workers was from 66.3 to 68.7 or just 2.4 hours. 
There is no possible average between 3 and 9 that makes 2. 

Plainly then these figures, which are specifically quoted as 
from the ''October Monthly Review U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics" are not only fictitious in that they do not them- 
selves appear among the original government figures; in 
that they specifically contradict everything that the original 
government figures do show, and therefore cannot by any 
legitimate means have been derived from the original figures, 
but by assimiing to show that the average between 3 and 9 is 
2 they are fictitious on their face. 

The 12-hour argtunent is the one most emphasized 
throughout the entire Interchurch Report. It has been the 
most widely emphasized and quoted in connection with the 
Interchurch Report. The second volume of the Interchurch 
Report, appearing a year and a half after the Report proper, 


again particularly stresses its 12-hour allegation. The very 
great publicity given this argument as well as its own im- 
portance warrant particular emphasis being placed on the 
fact that it is based throughout on the above type of "evi- 
dence, " presented with a constant, studied ingeniousness in 
seeking to achieve surface plausibility, and bovmd together 
largely with insinuations and sensational anonymous 



On page 64 the Interchtirch Report quotes from an in- 
dividual anonymous steel worker's diary, as follows: 


' You lift a large sack of coal on your shoulders, run toward the white- 
hot steel in a lOO-ton ladle, must get close enough without burning your 
face off to hurl the sack, using every ounce of strength, into the 
ladle and run, as flames leap to roof and the heat blasts everything 
to the roof. Then you rush out to the ladle and madly shovel man- 
ganese into it, as hot a job as can be imagined." "And this," adds 
the Interchurch Report, "is not the worst of his daily grind. " 

The Senate Committee went particularly into the ques- 
tion of the nature of the 12-hour work, and brought out the 
point strongly through the testimony of various steel 
officials and 12-hour workers themselves — ^including strikers 
— ^that such work was far from continuous. 

"Mr. Gary submitted to the Senate Committee photographs of oi)en 
hearth laborers at leisure,' ' says the Interchurch Report on page 64, "and 
asserted that they worked but half the time. This hardly accords with 
the open hearth laborer himself. " 

It is in specific answer to at least this part of the Senate 
evidence and to its own question, **What kind of jobs are 
these 12-hour turns," that the Interchurch Report published 
this quotation **from a worker's diary" as part of five 
pages of similar quotations interspersed with generalizations 
from them in which it seeks to picture the steel mill as a 
veritable inferno of flaming ftimaces and molten metal and 
of the crash and grind of "man-killing" machines, in the 



midst of which the worker slaves to the point of "daily 
exhaustion" and "old age at forty." 

In view of the fact that the Interchurch Report devotes 
much attention to building up such an impression of steel 
work and largely on the basis of this impression character- 
izes steel hours as "reHcs of barbarism" and demands that 
the church and the public and the government join with 
"organized" labor in forcing their change, it is particularly 
pertinent to examine the evidence on which it contradicts 
much of the Senate evidence and attempts to support its 

Throughout this chapter and in fact throughout the 
whole volume, the Interchurch Report reiterates such 
charges as that ' ' steel is a man-killer ' '— that * ' absentee cor- 
poration control" tends "inevitably to sacrifice the labor 
force"— that it is steel policy to "grind the faces of the 
hunkies," etc., but its "evidence" consists of these five 
pages of quotations from "workers' diaries." 

These "diaries" are presented in 15 separate quotations, 
spread, with intervening comment and argument, over pages 
• 60 through 64 and it appears upon careful examination that 
all of them are parts of the diaries of two men. There is no 
question that taken at face value, these diaries constitute 
the bitterest arraignment of the conditions they describe. 
Moreover the first diary is alleged to describe not merely 
the author's own experience but is expressly featured as 
"the observations of a keen man on how his fellows regard 
the job," and the second diary is specifically featured as 
describing general working conditions. The second alleged 
author, while stating that the conditions described were in 
an "independent" and not a Steel Corporation plant, also 
states that he worked for the Corporation and alleges that 
conditions there were even more harrowing. 

The Interchurch Report especially emphasizes that the 
first of these diaries "was in the spring of 1919, before the 
strike or this inquiry and selected here because no charge of 
exaggeration could be made concerning it" and repeats 


again in regard to both of them that *' these workers' records 
were made before the strike began and are open to no 
possible charge of bias." But of course the strike agitation 
was at its height during this period. 

The Interchurch Report also especially emphasizes that — 
**both of these workers were distinctly critical of labor 
organizers.'* The Interchurch Report, however, in other 
sections emphasizes that many of the strikers were distinctly 
critical of their leaders as too conservative. The Interchurch 
Report does not state that these alleged authors were not 
strikers or in any way connected with the strike movement 
which would be the simplest way of stating as a fact what it 
tries to convey as an impression. In view of the fact that 
these five pages of quotations constitute the chief evidence 
which the Interchurch Report produces to show that 1 2-hour 
steel work is a "relic of barbarism, " which the church and 
the public and the government shotdd unite in abolishing, 
and particularly in view of the fact that not only statements 
but quotations of the Interchurch Report have already been 
shown, when compared with the actual facts or with the 
sources of the quotation, to be highly misleading, meticulous 
inquiry into the actual value of such major *' evidence" can 
hardly be regarded as unjustified. 

Again these diaries are anonymous. This fact may be 
explained on the ground of protecting the authors. On 
the other hand it is well known that strike agitators were 
busy both before and during the strike, creating or highly 
exaggerating and coloring ** evidence" of all kinds for prop- 
aganda uses. When many of the ** statements and affidav- 
its of 500 steel workers [which] constitute the rock bottom 
evidence of the [Interchurch] findings," as these are pub- 
lished in the Second Volume, are analyzed, it appears, as 
will be shown later in detail, that they consist in large part 
of such doctored propaganda ** evidence," originated and 
circulated for such propaganda purposes, yet published by 
the Interchurch Report as "rock bottom evidence," even in 
some cases after the "author" under oath and cross-exami- 


nation by the Senate Committee had admitted the essential 
falsity of his whole previous statement. ' 

Moreover in certain very significant particulars the 
second of these diaries closely parallels other standard 
propaganda "evidence" that was widely circtdated in 
preparation for and during the strike in that it gets a large 
part of its effect through vivid insinuation rather than direct 
statement that can be directly controverted. One of the 
most widely circidated strike propaganda documents, for 
instance, contains the statement that the author "person- 
ally walked out into the middle of the street to stop these 
men (police) and ask them what did they mean by clubbing 
peaceful worshippers leaving the church" and one of the 
Interchurch Report's own ' ' rock bottom affidavits' ' declares : 
"there was no provocation for (the police) . . . riding over 
women and children." Yet under oath and cross-exami- 
nation it was admitted that the first man never saw anybody 
clubbed and only knew of one man being clubbed during 
the strike and in the second case, it was admitted that no 
women or children were actually ridden over or hurt at all. 
This Interchurch "diary" keeps repeating, "it is easy for a 
man to get badly burned" — "it is easy to burn your face 
off " — "operations if performed in wrong order, stove tender 
will break his stove and kill himself" — "unless tremendous 
pressure is first blown off the opening of another valve will 
blow operators to bits," etc., etc., without even alleging that 
any man ever did actually get "his face burned off" or 
"get blown to bits," etc. To any one who has read the 
"statements" and "affidavits" after "statements" and 
affidavits in the Interchurch second volume which consist 
of the most harrowing insinuations and exclamations but 
which carefully avoid actually alleging a single fact this 
similar method of getting an impression without any direct 
statement cannot pass unnoticed.' 

Again the Interchurch Report quotes the ' * author ' ' of this 
"diary" as insisting that in a "former job" "last spring" — 

* See chapter XXIII present analysis. 


"everyone in the department works 14 working da5rs out of every 
fourteen calendar days, on the i3-hotu* night turn, including the 24-hour 
turn within the 14 days" ... a "total 104 hours (including din- 
ner), . . . loyhoursundertheplantroof in the 168 hours in the week." 

Such an allegation as to hours — over 15 hours a day 7 days a 
week, for a whole steel department, goes so far beyond even 
any other allegation which has been made public that in 
spite of the Interchurch Report's insistence that this * ' diary'* 
"is open to no possible charge of bias," it seems unfortunate 
that other evidence as to such working hours for a whole 
department should not have been immediately gathered by 
some of the 15 Interchurch investigators which would not 
have had to be presented unsupported and anonymously. 

But whatever credence the individual reader may, under 
the circumstances, choose to place in such evidence, the fact 
cannot be overlooked that even this bitterly hostile witness 
admits the highly intermittent nature of 12-hour work. He 
does this indirectly by complaining that he does not always 
have **four or five hours to himself" or that cleaning a blast 
furnace stove, a hot job but one which from the very na- 
ture of blast furnace operation is never done more than once 
in 6 days, takes "from ten minutes to one hour," etc. 

As a matter of fact, the evidence is plain that work in the 
primary departments — ^where the 12-hour day exists — ^is 
inherently intermittent and, from its very nature cannot be 
"consciously speeded up" because of "war" or "steel de- 
mand" or for any other reason. 

U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review 
for June, 1920 contains a study of "hazard" in the steel in- 
dustry. This was a study of conditions during war times 
when of course all the "speeding up " possible was done, yet 
referring specifically to 191 8 this bulletin emphasizes on 
page 156-1462: 

" The operation of such mills as are here grouped — namely, blast fur- 
naces, steel works (open hearth and Bessemer furnaces) and rolling 
mills — are necessarily of a rather leisurely character and cannot in the 
nature of the case be hurried sufficiently to increase greatly the hazard of 
the individual man." 





— ^by exactly the same token these processes are "neces- 
sarily'' of such a '* leisurely character'' that they *' cannot 
in the nature of the case be hurried sufficiently to" change 
greatly the leisurely character of the work involved. 

How "leisurely" — that is how highly intermittent, such 
work actually is, is plain even from the most casual knowl- 
edge of the operations of these great 12-hour departments' 
and is brought out particularly clearly in the Senate 
Hearings and other government studies. 

Mr. S. E. Wilson, heater in the Gary Mill, testified 
(Senate Hearings, Part II, page 1046) : 

Senator Phipps: How many h6urs a day do you work? 

Mr. Wilson: Twelve hours. 

Senator Phipps: Is that continuous? 

Mr. Wilson: Oh, no, I suppose my work is so I could do it all in four 
or five hours if it could be so arranged. It is not any physical work I 
have to do. 

» The author of the present analysis lived during boyhood in a suburb 
adjoining the South Chicago plant of the Illinois Steel Company. The 
older members of a large proportion of neighbor's families worked in the 
steel mills. Many of his boyhood friends, including his brother, worlced 
during their high school vacations in the mills — his brother, as a com- 
mon laborer in the open hearth department. The author remembers 
distinctly that there was great competition for, and every pospible pull 
was exercised by these boys to get on the straight night shift, because 
they were almost invariably able to get from 3 to 5 hours' sleep on this 
shift so that after three or four more hours' sleep in the morning they 
had the rest of the day free. During his last year in high school, the 
author's brother had the opportunity to continue indefinitely on night 
shift work and argued with his parents to be allowed both to go to high 
school and work this shift on the ground that he could get practically 
enough sleep due to the intermittent nature of the 12-hour night work. 

It is notorious that steel towns are great baseball towns, a big extra 
patronage always being derived from the night shift workers who nor- 
mally are up by noon, and have the afternoon free. The United States 
Steel Corporation, as part of its welfare work, has equipped and main- 
tains 103 baseball fields, one for practically every commimity in which 
it has a plant. These fields are extremely popular. Their large use up 
to five o'clock on week-day afternoons is obviously by the night shift 




Mr. Jospeh Smith, a roller in the Homestead Mills, 
stated (Senate Report, Vol. I, page 455) : 

" My age is 58 years old ... I have been standing a 12-hour day for 
the last 33 years . . . and while I do not work pretty hard at times, at 
times I do work pretty hard . . . but we do not actually work the 12 
hours. We have a rest for lunch at 9 : 30 and again at 12 : 30 and in the 
afternoon we stop to adjust things around the mills." 

Diiring their personal visit to the steel centers, the 
Senate Committee carefully interrogated Superintendent 
August Mann of the American Steel and Wire Works at 
Denora in regard to this point as follows (Senate Hearings, 
page 714-715): 

"Senator Stirling: Is that same thing true with other workmen who 
work the 12 hours? 

" Mr. Mann: Well, they work one half hour and they rest one half 
hour— the roll hands. 

" Chairman: And do they have anything to do during that half hour? 

"Mr, Mann: They work a half hour and another man takes their 
position the other half hotir. 

" Chairman: Can they go outdoors for a half hour if they wish? 

"Mr. Mann: Yes, sir, the roll hands— the 'sticker-in.' 

" Senator Phipps: Take the other men that work the 12 hours a day- 
other than the rollers, they have one half hour of rest and one half hour 
of work? 

"Mr. Mann: Yes, sir. Now the other men, they take their spells 
out at any given time. A great many of them will sit down at nine 
o'clock and take Itmch. A great many of them will go out to the drink- 
ing fountain and sit down there. There is no time given for that but 
they will take their rest. 

" Chairman: But they are on duty all this time, are they not? 

" Mr. Mann: They are on duty all of this time. 

" Chairman: Subject to call? 

"Mr. Mann: Yes, sir." 

Even Mr. Oscar Edward Anderson, President of the 
Hustler Lodge Number 36 of the Amalgamated Association 
of Iron Steel and Tin Workers, and Chairman of the Allied 
Iron and Steel Workers' Council in Gary, which had charge 
of the strike in Gary, though he tried to evade and qualify 
on this point, finally admitted under cross-examination 
(Senate Hearings, page 959) : 



•Jl/r. Anderson: But a guide setter does his work whenever he gets 
a chance — whenever the mill stops rolling for a few minutes or something 
like that and the rest of the time he would be continually there and 
watching so that if anything happens he can immediately attend to it. 

"Senator Phipps: Yes, it is not continuous but is variable according 
to the conditions of the operation? 

"Mr. Anderson: Yes, sir." 

This statement of Mr. Mann was made to the Senate 
Committee while it was in the strike area, visiting the 
different mills and taking a far greater volume of testimony 
— often on the same points — from workers or strikers than 
from their employers. It is hardly possible, therefore, for 
even the most hostile critic to doubt that Mr. Mann's state- 
ments were accurate at least as regards conditions in his own 
plant. Mr. Anderson's statement is of course the admission 
of a hostile witness. The question remains as to how far 
conditions thus described are representative of conditions 
throughout the industry. 

Mr. Mann's statement referred specifically to a 12-hour 
rolling mill in igig. Senate Document no. Vol. III., page 
361, gives two tables for two typical 12-hour rolling mills 
of the hand type which then prevailed, showing in detail 
the amount of time each class of workers actually worked 
in igio. Bottom Makers in the first mill actually worked 
3 hours and 17 minutes or 28% of their 12 hours on duty. 
Such workers therefore, had 72% of their time largely to 
themselves. Chargers worked about 5 hours and had 
about 7 hours largely to themselves. Roughers and 
Pitcranemen worked about 7 hours and had about 5 hours of 
leisure. The various roll-hands however,^-which class of 
workers Mr. Mann stated worked just 6 hours a day in 
alternating reliefs in 1919 — ^averaged about 10 hours, and 
in one case 1 1 hours work out of the 12 in 1 910. Moreover, 
Senate Document no refers to these hand rolling depart- 
ments — obviously meaning these roll-hand occupations — as 
being most subject of all in the steel industry to the criticism 
of speeding-up. Just after thishowever, onpage363,itstates : — 

" Within the last few years small mechanical rolling mills of the con- 


tinuous type have been instaUed in a number of plants throughout the 
country ... in these mills the severe manual labor is almost entirely 
eliminated, the work consisting almost entirely of handUng levers . . . 
it is certain that within the next few years small rolling mills of the 
continuous type will supplant a great many of the hand mills. . . ." 

This is precisely what has happened. These "small 
mechanical rolling mills" have been both enlarged to per- 
form the heaviest rolling and developed to perform the 
widest variety of rolling, till today they are in ahnost imi- 
versal use. Take the rolled output of the U. S. Steel 
Corporation for 1920 as an example (see 19th Annual Re- 
port, page 15) ; all steel rails, blooms, plates, heavy shapes, 
tubing and pipe, and car wheels, as is well known, and 70%' 
of merchant shapes and 50%^ of wire rods— constituting 
8,937,934 tons out of 11,529,955 tons, or 77.5% of rolled 
products, are rolled in "mechanical mills " in which ''severe 
manual labor is almost entirely eliminated, the work consist- 
ing almost entirely of the handling of levers." 

Of the remaining 22.5% of rolled products two thirds 
consist of sheet and tin plate which cannot be rolled by the 
mechanical mill. But the whole department producing such 
products has for years, as has already been emphasized, 
worked on a three shift 8 hotu- schedule of 42.8 hours a week.' 
There remain certain mills making rod and miscellaneous 
merchant shapes, to a total of 8.5% of rolled production, 
which are still of the old fashioned "hand-rolling" variety! 
In these the other occupations actually work, as shown by 
Senate Document 1 10 tables ah*eady referred to, only about 
half of their 12 hours on duty, and for the more continuous 
roll-hand occupations all such mills now employ 2 men for 
each occupation who "spell " each other every hour or half 
hour as described by Mr. Mann. 

This, then, is what the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 

means specifically when it refers to the rolling mills— which 

together constitute the greater part of the industry— as 

among the departments where, even in 1918 at the height 

'Percentages furnished by U. S. Steel Coiporation. 



of war activity, the work was ''necessarily of a rather 
leisurely character ^ Moreover the facts are equally plain 
and specific as to what the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
means when it refers to the work in the furnace departments 
which make up the balance of the industry (the term "in- 
dustry" being used as the Interchurch Report consistently 
uses it, to mean the primary production departments) as of 
a "leisurely character.'' 

Mr. Clayton L. Patterson, in discussing the intermittent 
nature of 12-hour work in furnace departments says, on 
page 65 of his pamphlet, "Review of the Steel Strike,"— 

"Time studies made in the Corporation (U. S. Steel) plants indicated 
that all employees were actually working an average of 30 to 40% of 
their time in the blast furnace departments and an average of 40 to 55% 
in the open-hearth departments." 

In its four pages of quotations from steel workers' diaries, 
through which the Interchurch Report seeks to build up its 
specific detailed picture of the awful conditions under which 
the steel worker "labors to daily exhaustion" and "to old 
age at forty," it makes its definite references chiefly to 
the open-hearth departments. 

On page 316, Volimie III of Senate Doctmient no, as 
part of a detailed description of the work performed by all 
different open hearth workers, appears a detailed table as to 
the amount of time each different kind of worker has to 
work under a temperattu*e above normal. It is particularly 
stated that this study was made during summer when heat 
was naturally most oppressive and the outside temperature 
is specifically stated at 84 degrees. 

One man' in such a department has to work under a 
temperature of 98 degrees for 8 hours and 45 minutes out 
of the 12 hotirs. Two men have to work under a temper- 
ature of 126 degrees for 7 minutes at a time, ten times at 
regular intervals, for a total of one hour and ten minutes 

* This man is the foreman, no other man in the department has to 
work as much as 8 hours out of the 12-hour day. 


out of the 12 hours. Three men have to work at a temper- 
ature of 126 degrees for a period of about 7 minutes three 
times at intervals or for a maximum total of 30 minutes out 
of the 12 hours. One man has to work at a temperature 
of 1 12 degrees 20 minutes at a time 10 different times or for 
a total of 3 hotu^ and 20 minutes out of the 12 hours. Two 
men have to work at a temperature of 1 12 degrees 20 min- 
utes at a time 6 different times or for a total of 2 hours out 
of the 12 hours. Three men have to work at a temperature 
of 108 degrees for 15 minutes at a time 8 different times for 
a total of 2 hours out of the 12 hours. 

Page 355 of Voltune III Senate Document 1 10 shows that 
for all these different groups of 12-hour workers in an open 
hearth department, the average time actually spent at 
work is 40.2% while the time actually spent at rest — ^most 
of which the workers have to themselves, to sleep if it is the 
night shift, or as the Senate Investigation described, to go 
out to the fountain and eat or smoke or talk — ^is 59.8% as 
follows (last column and tmweighted averages computed) : 




Hours Per Day 

Per Cent. 

of Time 


Per Cent, 




or Obser- 

of Time 



Charging Machine 


First Helpers 

Second Helpers 

Third Helpers 


H. M. 

5 06 

3 16 

5 31 

4 26 

6 12 

3 36 

5 58 

4 25 

H. M. 

6 54 
8 44 

6 29 

7 34 

5 48 

8 24 

6 02 

7 35 






Ladle Cranemen 

Steel Pourers 

Brake-Men Engineers . . . 
Stripper Cranemen 


4 49 

7 II 







The problem, as such, of determining what the working 
hours in the steel industry actually are, or what working 
hours in industry as a whole actually are, is of no concern in 
the present analysis whose interest is merely in determining 
the accuracy of the Interchurch Report. But the Inter- 
church Report particularly emphasizes that steel working 
hours are "relics of barbarism . . . which must be compared 
with hours in other industries of the country" (page 55) — 
that the steel worker is "being un- Americanized by the 12 
hour day" in "scores of thousands" (page 84) and other- 
wise insists that steel working hours are so different and so 
much more harmful to the worker than working hours 
throughout the country that : 

" The church and every other American institution has a duty to per- 
form" which "duty cannot be fulfilled till the 12 hour day is abolished" 
(page 84). 

Moreover it here and elsewhere calls upon the church, the 
public, and the government to force a change in steel work- 
ing hours which shall bring them down to what it alleges are 
average American working hours. 

It is necessary, therefore, in judging the validity of this 
very important Interchurch Report charge and demand to 
determine as accurately as possible under the circtunstances 
what steel working hours actually are and how they compare 
with the actual working hours of average American workers. 

There are four principal sources of information in regard 
to working hours in the steel industry. 

First, Senate Document no — a 4 volume report of a 



most exhaustive study of the steel industry made by the 
government's own experts which gives detailed figures as to 
wages and hours of work for each production occupation in 
14 steel departments by sections of the country and for the 
entire industry. This report also goes in the greatest detail 
into conditions of labor and accident hazard, into methods 
of operation, into the nature of each different type of job, 
into the reason for the variation of hours, etc. These figures 
are for 1910. 

Second, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 218 
published October, 191 7. This is a 500 page study as to 
wages, hours and incidentally working conditions, chiefly 
for 10 principal representative departments of the industry, 
giving this information by sections of the country and for 
the industry as a whole, partly for the 9 year period and 
partly for the 5 year period up to and including May, 191 5. 
This study is particularly interesting for its own discussion 
and summaries based on conditions of May, 191 5. 

Third, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Review 
October, 191 9 giving first detailed figures as to full time 
hours per week and earnings per hour for the 81 occupa- 
tions in 6 representative steel departments for each section 
of the country and for the industry as a whole, and second, 
recapitulating this same information in percentages based 
on 1913 as norm. It gives these figures for 1913, 1914, 1915, 
191 7 and *'i9i9" — the so-called "191 9" figures represent- 
ing pay roll periods running from June, 191 8 to May, 191 9 
but about two thirds of which were for the months Decem- 
ber, 1 91 8 and January, 191 9. Except for a brief foreword 
this study does not itself discuss these figures or give totals 
or averages except occupation by occupation for the country. 

Fourth, the official figures for the U.S. Steel Corporation pre- 
sented before the Senate Hearings in September, 191 9, giving 
the number of employees and the percentage of employees 
working different groups of hours for all employees of the U. 
S. Steel Corporation, the biggest unit in the steel industry. 

Of the six representative steel making departments for 








which figures are given by U. S. Bureau of Labor statistics 
October, 191 9, study it will be remembered that the Besse- 
mer department is one of what was referred to in Chapter 
IX as the middle group — ^in which working hours averaged 
about 65 a week but which included' a certain proportion 
of 48 hour and 72 hour workers. It will also be remembered 
that this is the one department given in which increases and 
decreases in working hours about balanced — between either 
I9i3 0ri9i4 and " 1919, " the peak of steel war activity. 

By merely setting down each official government figure 
as to hours per occupation, without any averaging, weight- 
ing or other change but just as they are given in the first 
and third government doctmients above referred to, it is 
possible to get such a table as the following : 



Cupola Chargers 

Cupola Melters 

Cupola Tappers 

Blowing Engineers 


Regulators ist 


Vessel Scrapers 


Vesselmen Helpers 

Cinder Pitmen 

Bottom Makers 

Bottom Makers* Helpers . 

Ladle Liners 

Ladle Liners' Helpers . . . . 

Stopper Makers 

Stopper Setters 

Steel Pourers 

Mold Cappers 

Ingot Strippers 


Other Occupations 


1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1917 










58.1 55.5 











55-3 64 




61. 1 





! ; 

i< I 


It will be noted at once that there are no hours given for 
the last group of workers hsted as "other occupations" at 
the bottom of the 1910 column. Reference to the original 
soiu"ce of these figures (Senate Document no pages xliii and 
74) show that these *' other occupations" consist of elec- 
tricians and engineers who maintain power, bricklayers who 
reline furnaces, tool makers, repair men, etc., who con- 
stitute 25.3 per cent of the workers of the department. 
The working hours of these classifications, because of the 
special technical reason that many of such classes of workers 
in other industries belong to labor unions, are analyzed 
separately by Senate Document no and not included in 
the average of working hours for the department. These 
same or similar classes of occupations in all other depart- 
ments are also treated separately in Senate Document no. 
Therefore the exact extent to which they influence average 
working hours in each department is not indicated. 

Again it will be noted that there is a stated average — 
69.5 hours — at the bottom of the 1910 column. This is 
the government statistician's own weighted average of the 
working hours of the department. Similarly weighted 
averages are given by Senate Document no as to average 
working hours in each of the 14 departments given and for 
all these departments. 

These 1910 figures given by Senate Document no are 
homogeneous — ^the result of a single investigation. They 
are for 14 different departments, much more representative 
of the industry than 6 departments can be. These 1910 
figures therefore, can be fairly weighted and averaged and 
an approximately accurate figure computed from them as to 
average working hours throughout at least that part of the 
whole steel industry which they represent. 

The 1913 to "1919" figures on the other hand, are a 
composite of three different investigations, not only made at 
different times but involving different proportions of de- 
partments, different plants, and different numbers of 
workers. The figures for 1913, 1914, and 1915 are borrowed 





from U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin 218, a study based on 
10 different departments. The 1917 and *'i9i9" figures 
are based on two other studies each involving but 6 depart- 
ments. Take the Blast Furnace figures for instance. Those 
for 1 91 3 are based on pay rolls from 33 plants; those for 
1914-1915 from 35 plants; for 1917 from 14 plants; and for 
"1919" from 20 plants. Yet while the 35 plants in 1915 
employed only 878 Blast Furnace Stockers, the 20 plants 
in " 1 9 1 9 " employed 988 stockers. Again while the 8 Besse- 
mer plants in 191 7 employed 30 Regulators, 9 Bessemer 
plants in "1919" employed 23 Regulators. This same 
discrepancy in the average number of workers per occupa- 
tion—due chiefly to the fact that the figures represent 
different plants, appears throughout. Again figures are 
given for three times as many Blast Furnaces as for Sheet 
Mills whereas at least the Steel Corporation, for which 
definite figures are available, have more Sheet Mills than 
Blast Furnaces. * The Bureau of Labor figures give specific- 
ally the average hours worked each different year by each 
of 81 representative occupations — ^that is they say definitely 
that Bessemer Blowers throughout the country worked 
64.1 hours in 1914 and 63.1 hours in "1919, " that Sheet 
Mill Shearmen worked 42.9 hours in 1914 and 43.5 hours in 
*'i9i9," etc., etc. But because of the facts above em- 
phasized, to weight figures so limited and so non-homo- 
geneous to attempt to arrive at an actual working week 
for the theoretical average individual worker for the 
whole industry would be so subject to error that it cannot 
fairly be done and the government statisticians themselves 
have refused to do it. There are therefore no government 
figures as to working hours in terms of the average in- 
dividual worker since 1910, and no figures from which such 
an average can be fairly computed. 

Moreover these various government figures are based on 
6 departments, 10 departments and 14 departments. But 

'Average number employees per Blast Furnace (1919) 314; per Sheet 
Mill 397. 


'■t i 



the 14 departments do not include either Sheet Mill or Tin 
Plate Mill which are included in the studies based on the 
lesser number of departments. Thus even the most ex- 
tensive government report makes no pretence of being more 
than a study of a limited nimiber of representative iron and 
steel making departments. How limited these studies are 
is at once evident from reference to any Annual Report of 
the U. S. Steel Corporation. The 1919 Report, page 46 for 
instance, shows that in this single unit in the steel industry, 
over 40 various iron and steel making departments are 

Again while in the U. S. Bureau of Labor, October, 191 9, 
study Blast Furnaces are listed as i of 6 departments and 
their extremely long hours influence any averages accord- 
ingly, in the case of the U. S. Steel Corporation, not only do 
Blast Furnaces represent merely i out of 40 odd different 
types of departments but in the total of departments of all 
kinds there are only a total of 124 Blast Furnaces out of a 
total of over 1400 iron and steel making departments. 
Again the U. S. Bureau of Labor, October, 1919, study Hsts 
the long hour Blast Furnace and the short hour Sheet Mill 
departments equally as one each of 6 representative depart- 
ments. Moreover it gives figures for three times as many 
Blast Furnaces as Sheet Mills. But the Corporation 
records show that its 124 12-hour Blast Furnace depart- 
ments, are much more than offset by its 155 " Sheet Jobbing 
and Plate Mill departments" and 222 "Hot Mills Black 
Plate for Tinning" in which departments the 7 and 8 hour 
day prevails. 

Finally the last U. S. Industrial Census (1914) shows 
(Abstract page 96), 1,061,058 iron and steel workers in the 
country of which 29,356 Blast Furnace workers represent 
only about 3%. At the time of the steel strike the term 
iron and steel industry was generally used to mean that half 
of the industry which both produces and manufactures 
steel and which employes about 500,000 workers. Even if 
Blast Furnace workers increased 50% during the war they 




still represented less than 10% of the industry so inter- 

In other words it is plain that in an industry in which the 
smaller units have at least a dozen different departments, 
the largest unit over 40 departments and the industry as a 
whole at least 50 or 60 departments (see footnote); in 
which working hours vary from 42 to 72 per 6-day week, 
no approximation of average working hours for the industry 
as a whole is possible without an interpretation of what is 
included in the industry. 

Because of this and because the Interchurch Report 
continually confuses 12-hour workers with 12-hour depart- 
ments, a clear understanding of the relation between the 
different iron and steel making departments and the rela- 
tion between the working hours of the various departments 
and the working hours of many groups of employees in these 
departments, which are frequently very different, is corre- 
spondingly necessary. 

Iron and steel making departments may be roughly 
divided into two groups — ^the primary departments which 
through a series of carefully synchronized operations smelt 
the ore and process it in a continuously hot state into various 
semi-finished iron and steel products, — and the finishing 
departments which take up these semi-finished products 
cold and convert them into their finished forms. 

Blast Furnace 

The basic key department in all primary iron and steel 
making is the Blast Furnace which converts iron ore by use 
of coke and limestone into pig iron. To shut down and 
relight a Blast Furnace costs up to $50,000 and takes two 
weeks* time. This department must operate therefore day 
and night 7 days a week. As has already been shown 

^ In the ofl&cial list of its 40principal kinds of departments the Steel Cor- 
poration does not show Puddling Mills, Garret Rod Mills, or Crucible Fur- 
nace departments, all listed among the 14 representative departments, 
used by Senate Document no. There are numerous other such iron and 
steel making departments not represented in the Corporation activities. 





however, since 191 1 the U. S. Steel Corporation and the 
larger units in the industry have employed a swing crew in 
Blast Furnace operation so that the men themselves only 
work 6 days a week. The government figures however 
indicate that at least up to 191 9 this has applied only to 
about half the Blast Furnaces in the industry as a whole. 
Twenty-four hour operation means of course that the 
workers must work on a 2-shift 12-hour schedule or on a 3- 
shift 8-hour schedule. The stocking of a blast furnace is a 
regular and continuous hour by hour operation. However 
since the work is chiefly performed by automatic machinery 
the operator does not actually work much more than 50 
to 60% of the time. The iron is drawn off every 6 hours or 
2 times each 12-hour ttim. In 19 10 before much of the 
modem automatic machinery was installed, all Blast Fur- 
nace workers only actually worked, according to Senate 
Docimient no. Volume III, page 361, about 70% of their 
hours on duty. With modem machinery they actually work 
less than 50% of their time on duty or less than 6 hours out 
of the 12, for which of course they receive 12 hours* pay. If 
Blast Furnace work was put on a 3-shift 8-hour schedule the 
average worker wotdd actually work less than 4 hours a 
day, and because pourings are generally every 6 hours, the 
work could not as at present be evenly divided among the 
shifts. ' 

The molten iron goes from the Blast Furnace into Mixers 
which are in reality merely great reservoirs in which the 
molten metal is temporarily stored to be drawn off as re- 
quired for use in the Open Hearth and Bessemer Furnaces 
which convert it into steel. 

Open Hearth 

The Open Hearth is today the principal and by far the 
most rapidly expanding department in steel making. The 

» This is general practice. It is practicable, however, and some fur- 
naces are tapped 6 times per day. In such cases the work could b? 
evenly divided between 3 shifts. 


capacity of the average Open Hearth furnace runs from a 
normal of 12 to 14 to a maximum of 18 "heats" a week. 
That is, such furnaces are charged with a combination of 
molten iron and scrap steel and this product converted into 
Open Hearth steel under normal conditions about every 12 
hours. Except for cleaning up and minor jobs the work of 
the department is done in preparing and charging the 
furnaces at the beginning of the ** heat ** and in pouring the 
steel at the end of the "heat," the men in the meanwhile 
having their time largely to themselves. Senate Document 
1 10, Volume III, page 355, shows in detail as already quoted 
that the average Open Hearth worker in 1910 actually 
worked only 40.2% of his time or 4 hours and 49 minutes 
out of his 12 hours on duty and had 59.8% of his time or 7 
hours 1 1 minutes out of his 12-hour turn to himself. If this 
work were put on the 3-shift 8-hour basis, it would obviously 
mean that instead of preparing a furnace at the beginning 
of a turn and pouring the steel at the end of the turn — thus 
being responsible for one complete operation — part of the 
crews would have to pour a "heat" for which the previous 
crew had been responsible, and prepare and change a * * heat " 
for which a succeeding crew would have to be responsible, 
while each third crew would have a turn between charging 
and pouring during which it would have practically nothing 
to do.' 

The fact that the Blast Furnace must operate 7 days a 
week and that the Open Hearth uses the iron molten, years 
ago led to the practise of 7 -day operation in the Open 
Hearth department also. If this department operates only 
6 days and the Sunday production of Blast Furnace iron is 
allowed to cool, it must be remelted at the cost of about a 
dollar a ton. For this reason some of the smaller plants, 
which find it necessary to take advantage of every oppor- 
tunity to meet the competition of their larger and better 

» This again refers to normal practice and operation. In times of 
great steel demand when furnaces are pushed to 18 heats a week, or 3 a 
day, the work could be equally divided among 3 shifts. 


equipped rivals, continued to run their Open Hearth de- 
partments 7 days a week. The "1919" government figures, 
however, show average Open Hearth hours of 72.6 weighted 
or 71.9 unweighted per week for the whole coimtry. 


The second and older method of steel making is the 
Bessemer process which requires only from 20 to 30 minutes 
to convert pig iron into steel. Although for many of the 
occupations in this department the nattu'e of the work is as 
inherently leisurely and intermittent as in Blast Furnace or 
Open Hearth work, the mere rapid nature of the process 
makes the work in many of the occupations in this depart- 
ment entirely different. This difference in the nature of the 
work is plainly indicated in the table of Bessemer hours 
already given. The work of the Stopper Maker for in- 
stance is leisurely and intermittent and is therefore on a 2- 
shift basis. The work of the Stopper Setter however while 
only for a few minutes at a time with 10 or 15 minute rest 
periods is in close proximity to be the molten metal and 
hours for this occupation throughout the country except at 
the peak of war activity when they were 59 a week averaged 
51, 50 and 49 which means that in all but a few plants they 
are on a 3-shift 8-hour basis. Other occupations in this 
department are similarly on a 2-shift or 3-shift basis largely 
according to the nature of the work. The government 
figures also plainly show that this whole department 
throughout the country works 6 days a week and in a large 
part of the plants but 5 and a half days a week. 

The molten steel from both the Open Hearth and Besse- 
mer departments is poured into ingot molds and these ingots, 
of from I to 5 tons each, are carried to the "soking" pits 
where they remain under a high even temperature for from 
2 to 5 hours before they are passed on to the Bloom Mills — 
the first of the Rolling Departments. 


Rolling Mill 

Of the Rolling Mills which take the steel while hot from 
the furnace departments — ^the Bloom Mill rolls the raw 
ingots turning out the product in billets or slabs or sheet 
bars of various sizes according to further use. The average 
working hours for all occupations in the Bloom Mills were 
66.5 a week weighted and 64.6 unweighted in "1919" at 
the height of steel war activity. This means that the de- 
partment as a whole averages 5 and a half days a week on a 
2-shift basis. * 

From the Bloom Mill, the product in these various forms 
passes still hot into other rolling departments such as Rod 
Mill, Bar Mill, Structural Mill or Plate Mill which make 
various semi-finished products which are allowed to cool and 
finished or fabricated in other departments. 

In the Sheet Mill where the product is rolled cold and thin 
and flexible it requires a considerable amount of physical 
handling. Therefore as has already been shown on page 76 
by detailed U. S. Bureau of Labor statistics. Sheet Mill 
work throughout the country has for years been on a 3- 
shift 8-hour basis 5 and one third days a week or 42.8 hours 
a week. 

In the Bar Mills also a certain amount of physical han- 
dling of the product is necessary. Detailed statistics from 
U. S. Bureau of Labor statistics have already been quoted 
on page 72 showing that 48% of the workers in this depart- 
ment work less than 60 hours a week and 89% less than 
72 hours a week. 

As regards the bulk of the Rolling Departments however, 
it will be remembered that U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Monthly Review, June, 1920, includes these among the 
departments whose work is referred to as "necessarily of a 
leisurely character." Senate Document no, Volimie III, 
page 361, shows the exact amount of time worked and the 
amount of time spent in resting in the 14 different occupa- 
tions of two typical U. S. Steel Corporation Rolling Mills in 


1 9 10. These 2 mills worked 5 and and three fourths days 
and 5 nights on a 2-shift basis. Bottom makers in the first 
mill worked 3 hours and 17 minutes and had nearly 9 hours 
to themselves out of their 12-hour turn. Chargers worked 
5 hours and had 7 hours out of the 12 to themselves. 
Roughers and Pitcranemen worked 7 hours and had 3 
hours to themselves. The great bulk of Rollers however 
at this time worked 10 and a fraction hours out of the 12- 
hour turn. In plant number 2, hours actually worked and 
hours idle per occupation varied from plant number i but 
the average for both plants was practically the same — 74% 
of time working and 26% of time resting. Since 19 10, how- 
ever, the ** mechanical rolling mills" described by Senate 
Document 1 10 as then coming into use and thru whose use 
it states ** severe manual labor is almost entirely eliminated '* 
have been generally adopted and in processes where they 
cannot be used either the entire department has been put on 
an 8-hour schedule or extra roll-hands are employed so that 
this harder or more continuous work is now done by two 
men relieving each other every hour or half hour. Thus the 
average worker thruout the 12-hour rolling departments now 
actually works about half his time on duty. (See page 116.) 

All these departments are engaged in the manufacture of 
steeL In the manufacture of cast iron, the product goes in 
pigs directly from the Blast Furnace to the Foundries which 
are finishing departments for the manufacture of iron cast- 
ings. In the manufacture of wrought iron, it goes to the 
Puddling Mills in which the hours in 19 10 averaged 55 a 
week or 9 a day (Senate Document 1 10, page xliii) and for 
191 5 are summarized in detail on page 77 of the present 

It is plain then that the question of working schedules 
in these great primary iron and steel producing depart- 
ments involves 3 problems which are more or less imique to 
the steel industry. 

First, the necessity of continuous operation leaves no 
alternative except a 2-shift or a 3-shift system. In other 



words, it has never been possible for the steel industry to 
arbitrarily set or gradually reduce its general working hours 
as has been possible in other industries. 

Second, in many of the occupations in the primary produc- 
tion departments the fact that the only himian labor in- 
volved comes only at long intervals when furnaces are 
charged or poured or rolls changed, etc., means that the 
work is so highly intermittent that if hours on duty were 
reduced to 8, the only alternative of 12, the men in these 
occupations would only average from 2 to 5 hours actual 
work a day. 

Third, the fact that periods of work cannot be arbitrarily 
set but are determined by the time it takes the metal to heat 
and the fact that these periods in the 2 principal depart- 
ments are normally 6 or 12 hours apart means that the 
work could not under ordinary conditions be evenly divided 
between 3 shifts and that in the largest department— the 
Open Hearth— the crews which happened to be on duty 
only the 8 hours between charging and pouring would have 
practically nothing to do. 

In occupations or departments on the other hand in which 
the work is not inherently intermittent or is particularly 
hard either the work is actually on a 3-shift 8-hour basis or 
else such worker is periodically relieved. 

In regard to this whole subject of the variable working 
hours in primary production departments, U. S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Bulletin 218 (page 27) in its general con- 
clusions says : — 

" It wiU be seen therefore, that there is no standard turn for the iron 
and steel industry as a whole, and even if one were created arbitrarily 
to attempt to conform aU the odd turns to it would present insuperable 

Finishing Departments 

The other great group of steel making departments— the 
Pmishing Departments— which make tin plate, galvanized 
iron, horse shoes, woven fence, nails and a host of other steel 


products from car wheels to tacks, are in most cases not 
imder the necessity of continuous operation but are in 
general straight manufacturing departments whose hours 
are on practically the same basis as those of other ordinary 
maniifacturing industries. 

The proportion of the iron and steel industry as a whole 
which is devoted to primary production, i.e., "crude iron 
and steel and rolled products, " and the proportion devoted 
to finishing departments according to the last government 
figures (U. S. Abstract of Census of Manufactures, 1914, 
page 96) is as follows: 

Wage Earners 
Average Number 

Blast Furnace 29,356 

Steel Works and Rolling Mills 248,716 

Total Crude Iron and Steel and Rolled Products 278,072 

Other Iron and Steel Products 782,986 

Aggregate 1,061,058 

According to the U. S. Census interpretation of the term 
iron and steel industry then, the primary production de- 
partments, in which, because of continuous operation and 
highly intermittent work, the 12-hour day is a problem, 
constitute just 26.2% of the industry. Thus the 12-hour 
steel worker constitutes something less than 40% of 26.2% 
of all iron and steel workers. 

But while wire, steel tubes, nails, horse shoes, nuts, bolts, 
screws, barrelhoops, and a host of other such products are 
commonly made in finishing departments of companies 
which also produce the steel itself, much primary steel 
production is finished in plants which ordinarily do not 
produce the iron and steel which they consume. Steel plate, 
for instance, is largely bought from primary production 
departments and finished in stove plants or in boiler fac- 
tories or steel car works. But again this is not necessarily 
the case and in many instances primary producers of steel 
also make such finished products. In other words, it is 


plain, as already emphasized, that the problem of establish- 
ing even approximate average steel working hours depends 
primarily on the definition of what is to be included in the 
term iron and steel industry. 

The 24 International unions conducting the 191 9 steel 
strike interpreted the industry to include departments 
which employed about 500,000 men or about the same 
departments which are included in the U. S. Steel Corpora- 
tion outside of its shipyards, by-product and transportation 

The average working hours for U. S. Steel Corporation 
employees as given in the Senate Hearings, page 157, were 
in 1 91 9 as follows: 

12-hour workers 69,284 or 26.5 % 

lo-hour workers 102,902 or 39.39% 

Approximately 8-hour workers 88,994 or 34.1 % 

These figures are based on a 6-day Blast Furnace week 
instead of a 6J^ day week which the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
figures show to be the average for the whole industry in 
*'I9I9. " They also include such workers as electricians, 
engineers, repair men, etc., whose hours are not considered 
in the U. S. Bureau of Labor figures but who are very 
necessary factors in steel operation and who were distinctly 
involved in the steel strike. They include of course the 
Corporation's finishing departments. They also include 
about 20% of workers in mining, transportation and by- 
products departments not generally considered a part of the 
steel industry. In spite of this last fact, however, they are 
very obviously the most representative figures for the indus- 
try as a whole that are available. 

On their face these figures show an average working day 
of 9.85 hours or an average 6-day working week of 59.1 

Because the Interchurch Report has characterized the 
steel workers* hours in general and the 12-hour day in 
particular as a ''barbarism without valid excuse penalizing 



the workers of the country," as ** preventing Americani- 
zation of the steel workers" and otherwise made the 
most bitter arraignments against them, there remains the 
problem of checking the steel workers' hotirs against such 
information as we have in regard to the working hours of 
Americans as a whole. 

Now while the idea that the 12 hour day is more or less 
unique to the steel industry has been strongly impressed on 
the public mind through constant discussion of the 12 hour 
day in connection with the steel industry, and while the fact 
that in certain conspicuous industries the 8 hour day prevails 
has been so played up as to give a general impression that 
the 8 hour day is more or less standard in American industry, 
neither of these impressions fits the facts. 

Five hundred thousand bittiminous coal miners, although 
their labor leaders have been talking voluminously about a 
6 hour day, still according to the figures of the Interchurch 
Report (page 56) "work a 52.9 hours' weekly schedule." 

Street railway men, according to the Interchurch Report 
(page 55), work 56.4 hours a week — 27 minutes a day less 
than the U. S. Steel worker. "These are," the Interchtirch 
Report emphasizes, "the nearest competitors to steel hours 
in the list of principal industries compiled by the Bureau 
of Applied Economics of Washington, D. C." 

Bulletin No. 8 of the Bureau of Applied Economics, 
however, shows on page 62 that — 

In the brick-making industry which is not handicapped by 
the necessity of continuous operation, the average employee 
works 57.1 hours a week or just 20 minutes a day less than 
the average United States Steel employee. 

In the chemical industry, according to the same authority 
and on same page, the average worker works 56.54 hours a 
week, only 26 minutes a day less than the average U. S. 

Steel worker. 

In lumbering, a non-continuous industry, the average 
worker, according to this same bulletin. No. 8, page 59, works 
56.1 hours or just 30 minutes a day less than the average 


U. S. Steel worker, and the tables on each side gf this show 
that furniture makers work about the same length of time 
and mill workers only a few minutes a day less. 

Turning, however, from particular industries to industry as 
a whole the U. S. Census, and particularly the industrial 
census of 19 14, offer most comprehensive figures as to 
average working hours or from which average working hours 
may be estimated. 

The last U. S. Census (13th Census Vol. IV p. 57) shows 
30,091,564 male workers gainfully employed as follows: 

"Agriculture 10,760,875 

Professions 1,151,709 

Domestic and Personal Service 2,740,176 

Trade and Transportation 6403,378 

Manufacturing and Mechanical 9,035,426" 

The 1914 industrial census indicates that between 5% 
and 10% should be added to some of these groups and gives 
exact figures and detailed information in regard to the last 

Every one knows that these 10,000,000 farmers — ^whether 
in 1910, 1914 or today work 12 to 14 hours a day 6 days in 
the week in addition to a good half day's work on Sunday. 
Moreover no one relieves the farmer on his harder jobs 
every half hour and if he worked as intermittently as the 12 
hour steel worker, even in his slack seasons, he would go 
to the poor house. 

There are of course no figures possible as to average work- 
ing hours for doctors, lawyers, ministers, etc., because the 
very nature of their work generally makes it necessary for 
them to be available at all hours. When Senator Kenyon 
remarked to Mr. Gompers (Senate Hearings, page 429) that 
Senators *'have no 8 hour day at all," Mr. Gompers replied, 
" Me too," and it is probable that for at least the successful 
professional man in all lines — ^including the labor leaders — a 
day's work means much nearer 12 hours than 8. 

Domestics and Personal Service includes barbers, restau- 


rant keepers, cooks, waiters, and other such workers, in 
restaurants and hotels as well as in homes, policemen, fire- 
men, night watchmen, etc., by far the largest proportion of 
whom work 12 hours. 

Trade and transportation include a million retailers who 
the public demand shall keep open 12 hours and on Satur- 
days and special seasons for longer. It includes perhaps 
as many more retail clerks. It includes a million railroad 
workers who under threat of strike during the war obtained 
from the government the "basic " 8 hour day that was given 
the steel workers, but they work more than 8 hours a day. 
It includes street car operators whose working hours are 
g}4' It includes all sorts of draymen, cabmen, pedlars, etc., 
whose work probably averages over 12 hours a day. It in- 
cludes most office workers whose hours probably average 9. 

** Manufacturing and mechanical'* are divided into two 
classes — office workers and proprietors, whose hours prob- 
ably average 9 for the former and more for the latter, and 
wage earners whose weekly hours are specifically given 
(1914 Census Abstract, page 482) as follows: 

48 and Under 11.8% 

48 to 54 134% 

54 25.8% 

54 to 60 22 % 

60 21.1% 

60 to 72 3-5% 

72 1.5% 

Over 72 8% 

Weighted average (taking middle point of variables) 
55.65 or 9.27 hours a day. 

When steel working hours are compared in detail with 
the figures for this last group of "industrial wage earners" 
whose hours are the shortest of all groups of American 
workers, two facts are at once apparent: 

First, steel had a far greater percentage — the Steel Cor- 
poration in 1919 three times as many 8 hour workers as this 






whole group (1914) which is the only group in all American 
industry which emphasizes the 8 hoxir day and which has 
in general by far the greatest percentage of 8 hour workers. 

Second, steel has an entirely disproportionate number of 
12 hour workers. 

But steel faces an entirely different problem from most 
manufacturing industries in that many of the departments 
must be continuously operated. This is its reason for the 
large per cent of 12 hour workers. In manufacturing as a 
whole, on the other hand, the necessity of continuous oper- 
ation is negligible and this is doubtless a chief, if not the 
chief reason, for its negligible per cent of 12 hour workers. 

If we make the comparison on the basis of the figures as 
they stand — ^without allowing for the fact that steel faces 
the big disadvantage in its labor problems of continuous 
operation which average manufacturing does not — it 
appears that the average daily working hours of the U. S. 
Steel Corporation (1919) of 9.85 is J5 minutes longer, 
than the daily working hours (9.27) of the average *' indus- 
trial wage earner" in 19 14. 

Whether as a mere matter of fairness, steel working hours 
as a whole — ^including the 12 hour day — should be compared 
only with the working hours of general manufacturing 
industries which do not have the same big problem of 
continuous operation, or whether they should be compared 
with the working hours of other industries which do have the 
same or other special problems, must perhaps be left to 
individual opinion. But certainly it is not fair or even 
reasonably possible to characterize steel working hours as a 
whole or the 12 hour day in particular, as *' relics of barbar- 
ism," *' un-American" and " un-Americanizing " without 
comparing them with the working hours of the great and 
conspicuous bulk of other American workers in industries 
which have to face the same or other special conditions as 
the steel industry. 

When steel working hours are compared with those of the 
first great industrial group entunerated by the census, it at 



once appears that whereas less than 40% of some 300,000' 
steel workers work the 12 hour day, of 10,000,000 fanners 
practically 100% are forced by the special nature of their 
occupation to work more than 12 hours a day at both harder 
and less intermittent work than the steel worker. It is 
plain that well over 50% of the 2,740,176 workers com- 
prising the third great census group work 12 hours or more 
a day, it is plain that 60% to 80% or more of the largest 
class (retailers and assistants) in the next census group are 
forced by public demand to work 12 hours or more a day. 
Taking all these groups as enumerated by the last census 
it is plain that average steel hours (including all depart- 
ments) were substantially the same as average working 
hours for all Americans; and it is particularly plain that 
the 8 hour day was worked by a greater percentage of 
steel workers than of all American workers and the 12 hour 
day by a considerably less percentage of steel workers than 
of all American workers. 

The question of the 12 hour day in the steel industry has 
a social side, as a matter of fact, several social sides, and 
there is much to be said for each of them. From the way 
in which it has been so frequently presented it has been, 
and doubtless will continue to be, discussed from a sen- 
timental point of view. But the facts cannot be deter- 
mined by social or sentimental arguments and social and 
sentimental arguments at least ought to be determined on 
the facts. 

The facts very plainly are that if steel working hoiu^ are 
"inhuman" and *' relics of barbarism without valid excuse" 
— ^if 1 2 hour workers are being "un- Americanized "in * * scores 
of thousands," the same indictment, and in some particulars 
a worse indictment will have to be brought against working 
conditions throughout the country, for steel working hours 

'As already emphasized this percentage of course becomes corre- 
spondingly less in proportion as the industry is interpreted to include 
various steel finishing departments. 



represent a little better than a cross-section of average 
American working hotu^s as they were in 1914 — not to men- 
tion the working hours on which America and Americanism 
were built. 



The Interchurch Report in its "Conclusions" (page 12, 
line 13) states: 

"Steel jobs were largely classed as heavy labor and hazardous." 

It generalizes on page 98 and elsewhere in regard to the 
steel workers* 

"Exhaustion due to overwork. " 

It says on page 67 that : — 

" It was surprising in view of the reputation which the Steel Corpora- 
tion had been accorded for safety to find so large a number of strikers 
complaining about hazards. They described with specificness menaces 
to limb or life, concerning which they had complained to foremen and 
superintendents month in and month out without avail. " 

It states later on the same page that : — 

". . . it was inadvisable to pay great heed to the number of crooked- 
legged men always seen in the streets of a steel mill town." 

It emphasizes on page 66: — 

" The Steel Corporation set up a Safety Department which has been 
the recipient of many medals. Only statistics can determine to what 
extent the safety campaign is adequate. Statistically steel still ranks 
with mining for fatal accidents" 

— ^and makes similar statement either directly or by insinu- 
ation in many other places throughout the Report. 



There is no question that certain operation in steel pro- 
duction involve hard work just as certain operations in 
every other basic industry involve hard work. Plowing is 
hard work. Pitching hay is hard work. The handling of 
heavy merchandise in transportation is hard work. Driv- 
ing railroad tunnels through great mountains or subway 
tunnels under New York City involves hard work. Lum- 
bering, mining, firing engines on railroads or steam ships 
and a hundred and one other jobs — whose regular perform- 
ance is absolutely necessary to the very existence of modem 
society — all involve hard work. 

Again there is no question that certain operations in steel 
production involve hazards just as mining, lumbering, 
railroading, fishing, building construction and many other 
operations involve hazards. Almost every act of living 
involves hazards, of which taking a bath is the single most 
hazardous common act of all, for 30% of all accidents in 
and around a home result from slipping on the modem 
porcelain bathtub. 

On the other hand it is equally unquestionable that one 
of the major efforts and one of the most conspicuous achieve- 
ments of modem progress has been the effort and achieve- 
ment in reducing the extra hard labor and the extra hazards 
in both modem industry and in all modem life. From the 
thrasher to the tractor scores of machines have reduced 
the physical labor of farming. The automatic shute for 
loading and the automatic dumping device for unloading 
are typical of similar conspicuous achievements in reducing 
the hard manual labor in railroading. And both these are 
typical of the extent to which industry has been able to go 
in reducing both the hard work and the hazard of many of 
its operations. Nevertheless, handling a four gang plow 
12 or 14 hours a day with a tractor is still hard work. 
Firing a locomotive, pitching hay, mining coal or copper, 
loading a steamship, cutting and rafting timber, no less 
than any operation in the steel industry, are all hard and 
sometimes hazardous work. Yet every one of these is so 





necessary to the whole functioning of society that to 
eliminate them would largely reduce all modem society 
to the primitive individualistic basis where every man 
would be subject to the even harder labor and often even 
greater hazards of primitive existence. 

Given the facts of the laws of nature — ^that molten metal 
bums, that speed involves risks, that heavy objects require 
heavy effort to handle — on the one hand; and on the other 
hand that modem society demands to be heated and fed 
and transported, there inevitably exists the absolute neces- 
sity that men work hard and face hazards. The only basis 
of progress therefore is to reduce such hard work and such 
hazards as much as possible under the circtmistances. 

The pertinent question therefore, in regard to hard work 
and hazards in the steel industry, or any other industry is 
whether or not men are forced to work harder than is neces- 
sary or have to face hazards that may be made unnecessary. 

Unless the Interchurch Report means that "steel jobs 
were largely classed " as heavier labor than average or neces- 
sary, or as more hazardous than average or necessary, its 
whole statement in regard to hard work and hazards in the 
steel industry means nothing at all. That the Interchurch 
Report does mean to give the impression that most steel 
work is far harder than average or necessary and far more 
hazardous than average or necessary, is entirely plain from 
its statements above quoted and from the whole nature of 
its argimients and conclusions on this point. 

The Interchurch Report makes its most specific argtmient 
as to the hardship of steel labor in connection with the 
twelve-hour day — resting its case, as has been pointed out, 
chiefly upon a large number of quotations from the alleged 
diaries of two anonymous 12-hour workers. The actual 
facts as to the nature of 12-hour work however, have al- 
ready been sufficiently emphasized. 

In addition to its specific argument as to the hardship 
of 12 hour work, the Interchurch Report attempts to build 
up an impression of the hardship of steel work in general 

by mere constant repetition of such phrases as that "steel 
is a man killer" — ^that the men work "to the point of daily 
exhaustion "—to "old age at 40, " etc., etc. 

Some ten years ago, Mr. John A. Fitch, who also wrote the 
foreword to Mr. William Z. Foster's book The Great Steel 
Strike, and who is listed by the New York legislative in- 
vestigation as per footnote,' published a magazine article, 
entitled, "Old Age at Forty" in which he particularly em- 
phasized the hard nature of steel work. Although this 
article referred only to conditions of ten years and generally 
longer ago, before much of the present automatic machinery 
had been installed, the Interchurch Report particularly 
dwells on this phrase, "Old Age at Forty" and on the 
facts which Mr. Fitch then alleged. This same article 
was also several times referred to in the testimony be- 
fore the Senate Investigating Committee. 

As direct evidence on the accuracy of this talk about 
"Old Age at Forty" while at the Homestead plant, the 
Senate Committee obtained statistics (Page 529,Part II of the 
Senate Hearings), showing the ages of all the different em- 
ployees in that plant. This table shows that 4 of the 
workers in this mill are over 70 — 24 between 65 and 70 — 64 
between 60 and 65—132 between 55 and 60—216 between 
50 and 55— and that 27.6% of the entire working force 
were men over forty years old which, even without consider- 
ing the fact that 60% of the entire working force here was 

» The New York Legislative Investigation on Radicalism in its index 

"Fitch, John A. 
Assistance in preparation I. W. W. pamphlet. Page 1093. 
Industrial editor The Survey. Page 1093. 
Member I. W. W. defense committee. Page 1 094. 
Lecturer Bureau of Industrial Research. Page 1121. 
('Technical Advisors' to the Interchurch Commission.) 
National Committee American Civil Liberties Union. Page 

Special attention is called to the full context of the pages 
referred to. 





unskilled common labor with their large labor turnover, is a 
remarkably high average for any industry. 

The Senate Conmuttee also interrogated a number of 
witnesses either specifically in regard to the hardship of 
steel work or generally as to the nature of steel work and the 
attitude of the men toward the work. 

Mr. T. J. Davis who had formerly been for 14 years a 
member of the Amalgamated Association (labor union) 
who was a delegate to the 1902 Union convention and was 
for a time National Deputy Vice President of the Union, in 
testifying for the steel companies emphasized (Senate 
Hearings, Part I, page 439) the hard nature of his own work 
but stated that men in such processes only worked the 8 
hour shift and actually seldom more than 7 hours a day, 
for which he received $1 7 a day. Mr. Davis also stated that 
he had been in the rolling mills 34 years and had been doing 
that particular kind of work for 18 years and yet was still 
hardy enough at 55 years of age to have spent 15 months 
with the A. E. F. in France. 

Mr. Edward M. Lynch of the McKeesport Mills, also 
formerly a union man, stated he was 50 years old and had 
worked for the company " 34 or 35 years." He also stated 
that he had "what is termed the hardest job in the mills 
where I work — ^the heaviest job," but he stated it with pride 
rather than as a complaint. He worked ten hours and ten 
minutes on day turn and 12 hours on night turn "for $11 
a day" (Senate Report, Part I, page 459). 

Mr. Richard Raymond, an Englishman by birth, who 
was a day laborer at $6.03 a day in the Vandergrift 
Sheet and Tin Mill testified (Senate Hearings, Part II, 
page 691) : 

The Chairman: Do you want to work 12 hours a day yourself? 

Mr. Raymond: Yes, sir, I can stand 12 hours a day. 

Senator McKellar: Why do you want a 12-hour day? 

Mr. Raymond: I am like the rest, I want to get what money I can, 

Mr. Ashmead: How old are you, Mr. Raymond? 

Mr. Raymond: Sixty-seven. 


Mr. Ashmead: Have conditions been improving in the steel company's 
plants among the laboring classes? 

Mr. Raymond: It has been improving in regard to money matters 
and I am certain of one thing which has been improving — that men 
certainly do not work nearly so hard as I had to when I first came here. 

Among the strike leaders special witnesses were many ex- 
workers who were obviously most disgruntled. Yet among 
the many complaints of such strikers a careful reading of 
the whole Senate evidence does not reveal that even these 
particularly hostile witnesses made any specific complaint 
concerning the hardships of steel work. 

The Senate Committee, also in the cotirse of the investiga- 
tion, personally visited ntunerous mills and talked with a 
large ntunber of representative employees of all types who 
were at work and a large nimiber of strikers whom they 
met haphazard on the street. 

The testimony thus adduced was taken entirely from 
men chosen at random by the Senators themselves. The 
interviews were taken down verbatim and reported in 
full in the Senate Hearings. A large niunber of these men 
did not know who it was that was interviewing them. They 
all seemed to talk with the utmost freedom and frequently 
with a profanity that indicated anything but restraint or 
intimidation on their part. All the evidence was given 
during the strike when grievances are naturally exaggerated 
and multiplied. Yet among all the strikers thus inter- 
viewed, except for one man who admitted he was sickly and 
who remarked— but merely incidentally— that he "had to 
work like a mule," no worker or striker as far as can be dis- 
covered either mentioned, or directly or indirectly referred 
to his work as being either hard or hazardous. 

As regards hazard, it is a fact that has received the widest 
publication that the steel industry in general and the U. S. 
Steel Corporation in particular have made a most conspicu- 
ously successful effort in the installation of safety devices 
and the organizations of safety systems among employees. 
In competition with every other industry in every natioD 


in the world, the U. S. Steel Corporation has received the 
highest award for its exhibit of safety devices and of its 
special systems for promoting safety among its employees 
at practically every prominent safety congress held in this 
country or abroad in recent years. This single corporation 
has 7000 of its employees organized into special safety com- 
mittees with ex-committee men to the ntimber of 35,000 as 
ex-officio members. It has organized an elaborate system 
of competition for prizes awarded for the prevention of 
accidents or for ideas that will contribute to lessening ac- 
cidents. These facts too have been given the widest publica- 
tion and are emphasized in detail in the Senate Hearings. 

The Interchurch Report recognizes the U. S. Steel Cor- 
poration's safety efforts in this way. It says, page 66: 

"... the Steel Corporation set up a Safety Department which has 

been the recipient of many medals. Only statistics can determine to what 

extent the safety campaign is adequate. Statistically steel still ranks with 

mining for fatal accidents. The 19 18 report of compensable accidents 

for the State of Pennsylvania gives the four largest hazardous industries 

as follows: 

Per Cent of 

Number Total 

Mines and Quarries 23,161 33-12 

Metals and Metal Products 22,222 31.78 

Public Service 4.985 7-13 

Building and Contracting 4»i84 5-98 " 

and then goes straight on to the succeeding page : 

" It was surprising, in view of the reputation which the Steel Corporation 
had been accorded for safety, to find so large a number of strikers com- 
plaining about hazards. . . . Without adequate statistics it was impossible 
to weigh the value of these complaints, just as it was inadvisable to pay 
great heed to the number of crooked-legged men always seen in the streets of a 
steel mill town.'* 

Aside from certain quotations from individual strikers 
that a certain job was one on which a man if he wasn't care- 
ful might be badly burned, or that a worker had fallen from 




steps which were greasy,' etc., the Interchurch Report con- 
fines its evidence as to the hazardous nature of steel work 
to the foregoing— the statement that ''only statistics can 
determine to what extent the (U. S. Steel Corporation) 
safety campaign is adequate," followed by a table of 
statistics" and in the next paragraph the statement that 
'without adequate statistics'' the conplaints of workers as 
to hazards cannot be weighed — ^followed by an obvious and 
pointed insinuation. 

Upon analysis both the "statistics" that are given and 
the complaint about the lack of statistics become particu- 
larly interesting. 

Conspicuously featured and in detail in the record of the 
Senate Investigation (Part i, page 188) is a table of the 
official insurance rates of the Prudential Life Insurance 
Company on each particular type of steel work based on the 
hazard or lack of hazard of that work. 

This table shows that while in 1908, steel "blowing" was 
regarded as hazardous and the insurance rate was $13.22 
per $1000, age 35; by 1919, that occupation was regarded 
as normal and non-hazardous. The insurance rate for 
"blast furnace keeper" which in 1908 was $13.22 (hazard- 
ous) was in 1919 $2. 77 (non-hazardous). In the same way 
throughout the 1 1 principal processes of steel making which 
were in 1908 regarded as hazardous, in 1919 all such hazards 
had become so reduced or eliminated that whereas the 
average rate for these occupations had been $10.60 in 1908, 
in 1919 the average rate on the same occupations was less 
than $4.00. 

It is interesting to note that the Interchurch Report refers 
constantly to the Senate Hearings and refers at least once to 
the page in the Senate Hearings which faces this conspicu- 

«Prom the testimony of George Colson, which the Interchiu-ch 
Report quotes through a full page (67) but whose effect is afterward very 
much modified by the cross-examination which the Interchurch Report 
does not quote; for which see Senate Hearings, pages 728-735 and page 
3 74 pi esent analysis. 


ous and plainly headed table. Still it complains about 
statistics not being available. 

The first reference to an outside authority made by the 
Interchurch Report in the chapter in which it discusses 
"hazard" is to Senate Doctmient no: "Conditions of em- 
ployment in the iron and steel industry," and it refers to 
this doctmient frequently elsewhere. This Document no 
consists of four volumes of which the whole last voltune — 
341 pages — ^is devoted to a study of "Accidents and ac- 
cident prevention in the iron and steel industry." Its con- 
clusions however, are the opposite of those expressed by the 
Interchurch Report. 

Also between 191 3 and 191 9 the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics published in its various Monthly Reviews at 
least three elaborate statistical studies of accident "fre- 
quency" in the iron and steel industry, one of which is 
specifically referred to in connection with the prominent in- 
surance statistics on page 188 in the Senate Hearings which 
the Interchurch Report did not see although it fotmd and 
refers to an obscure sentence on the opposite page. The 
conclusions of all of these are also the opposite of those of 
the Interchurch Report. 

Undoubtedly the Interchurch Report cites or quotes 
from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly 
Review for October, 19 19 more frequently than from any 
other doctmient. Even the most casual reference to the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Review, October, 191 9, shows that 
the most conspicuous section in this whole docmnent, 
running through page after page of tables and striking 
curves and charts, is a most detailed statistical study of 
accident "frequency," 1913 to 1919, in the iron and steel 

At the end of these elaborate detailed government statis- 
tics in regard to the specific subject on which the Inter- 
church Report complains of the lack of adequate statistics, 
appears the U. S. Bureau of Labor conclusion (page 231- 
12 1 9): — 



"It is obvious that the efforts of the safety organization in these 
mills were well adapted to meet and control minor injuries. The curve 
of frequency is a sure index of success or failure in this particular. The 
organization did not, probably could not, control the tendency to rise 
during the period of adjustment to war conditions (raw labor was being 
hir< d) but it did prevent a rise above the peak established in the pre- 
war conditions of 1913. Further, with the establishment of relatively 
stable conditions, it was able to bring about a remarkable and continuous 
decline in frequency rates." 

Moreover so remarkable did the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
regard the results achieved by the Safety Organizations in 
the iron and steel industry in reducing accidents even during 
the war period that a few months later — but still before 
the Interchurch Report was published — ^it devoted pages 
151-1457 to 165-1469 of its June, 1920 Monthly Review to a 
further elaborate statistical study of this subject which 
states in conclusion that: 


I. Whatever form of classification is used [the fundamental depart- 
ments, production groups, or cause groups] the same trend is shown. 

"2. The period just prior to the war was a period of industrial de- 
cline . . . accident rates dropped more rapidly than employment. 

"3. As soon as the effect of European war orders began to be felt in 
this country employment b^an to increase. The accession of in- 
experienced men increased even more rapidly. Accident rates went up. 

"4. The iron and steel industry was alarmed by the increasing acci- 
dent occurrence and undertook a strenuous counter-campaign. 

"5. This was very successful in controlling and finally causing a 
decline in minor injury. 

"6. Major injury was not controlled so perfectly but was prevented 
from rising above the level of igij (in spite of new labor) and was finally 
considerably reduced. 

" This review of the war period strongly supports the contention that 
even in the most strenuous times it is possible to hold in check the tendency 
to rising accident rates by the application of the three cardinal methods 
of the safety movement: (i) adequate instruction of the men in skilful 
methods of work; (2) careful supervision of the well-instructed men; 
(3) 'engineering revision' by which the safety of work places is in- 
creased. . . . 

"A considerable number of industrial concerns took the position that 
the demands of war production were so imperative that they were per- 



fectly justified in relaxing attention to safety measures of all sorts. The 
result is reflected in the increased accident occurrence registered by 
most agencies. ... It is to the great and lasting credit of the iron and 
steel industry that it did meet the situation directly and endeavored to 
combat the inevitable tendency by increased efforts. The final outcome 
of these various efforts was first to check the rising accident rates {due to new 
raw labor) and finally to bring them down to points lovoer than the pre-war 

So much — ^for the time being — as regards the Interchiirch 
Report's complaint as to the lack of adequate statistics for 
which it substitutes its conclusion by insinuation. As re- 
gards the one table of "statistics" which the Interchurch 
Report itself does discover and quote there are a number of 
equally interesting things to be noted. 

The Interchurch Report leads to and quotes this one 
table of "statistics" as follows (page 66) : 

" The Steel Corporation set up a safety department which has been the 
recipient of many medal?. Only statistics can determine to what extent 
the safety campaign is adequate. Statistically steel still ranks with 
mining for fatal accidents, the 1918 report of compensable accidents for 
the State of Pennsylvania gives the four largest hazardous industries as 


Per Cent 

Number of Total 

Mines and Quarries 23,161 3312 

Metals and Metal Products 22,222 31.78 

Public Service 4.985 713 

Building and Contracting 4.184 5-98" 

In the first place this table clearly applies to the metal in- 
dustry as a whole, including copper and brass smelting and 
working, and so does not prove anything pro or con about 
the steel mills or the steel workers who were involved in the 
strike. This table could therefore mean exactly what the 
Interchurch Report tries to give the impression it does mean 
and still prove nothing about hazards in the steel industry. 
As it is, however, the principal so-called evidence which the 
Interchurch Report brings forward to supports its conclusion 
that the steel industry is partictdarly hazardous and as a 



further example of the type of "evidence" which the Inter- 
church Report uses — and therefore as bearing particularly 
on the question as to whether or not the Interchurch Report 
is a competent or adequate document — this table is most 

As regards the merits of the table itself as being adequate 
evidence in regard to anything at all it is to be noted that 
neither the table itself nor any statement in connection with 
it suggests the fact that there are far more men in Pennsyl- 
vania engaged in mining and metal production than in 
Public Service or Building and Contracting and that there- 
fore the percentages of accidents in these two industries 
would necessarily be far greater, even though the per cent 
of accident to men involved — that is the actual comparative 
hazards of the industry — ^were less. Giving, therefore, 
neither the number of accidents in proportion to the number 
of men employed, nor the number of men among whom the 
given accidents occurred, this table actually shows nothing 
whatever as to the comparative hazard even of the industries 
to which it does apply. 

Again it will be noted that this table is not a table of all 
industrial accidents but merely of "compensable" ac- 
cidents; which mean accidents to the employees for which 
the employer is liable under the particular technical rulings 
of the compensation law. These constituted, as the 
Pennsylvania Labor Bulletin from which this Interchurch 
Table is taken (indirectly) plainly states, but 37.8% of all 
industrial accidents. Moreover the relation between ' * com- 
pensable" accidents and all accidents varies widely in dif- 
ferent industries. For instance, comparison of the Penn- 
sylvania figures for "compensable" with the figures for 
total accidents at once shows that while in the metal 
trades 39% of all accidents are "compensable," in public 
service only 15% are "compensable."' In other words 

» Bulletin Penn. Dept. Labor and Industry, Vol. VI (1919) No. I, 
pages 237, 268 and 276. 



the Interchurch Report is trying to show comparative 
hazards of different industries by comparing 39% of the 
accidents in one of these industries with only 15% of the 
accidents in another industry. 

In other words this table, by which the Interchurch 
Report pretends to show the great hazards of the steel in- 
dustry — ^first, does not refer to the steel industry; second, 
does not show hazard at all because it does not show the 
relation of accidents to ntmiber of men employed; and third, 
while it includes 39% of all accidents in one of the industries 
shows only 15% of the accidents in another industry. 

But not only does this table in no sense mean what the 
Interchurch Report gives the impression it means, but the 
facts are the direct opposite of what the Interchurch Report 
tries to show from the table. 

The 1 91 9 and 1920 Bulletin of the Pennsylvania State 
Department of Labor and Industry — ^from which this Inter- 
church Report Table is (indirectly) taken, shows ^: 


All Industrial Accidents ... 1 84,844 

Fatal Accidents 3,403 or ( 1.8%) 

Serious Accidents 53.783 or (29.1 %) 

Minor Accidents 127,658 or (69.1 %) 

"Compensable Accidents". 69,920 or 37.8% 


2,569 or ( 1.7%) 

38,942 or (25.5%) 
111,033 or (72.8%) 

Now while thus plainly showing the percentage of fatal, 
serious and minor accidents among all industrial accidents 
the Pennsylvania statistics for the year 191 8 do not show 
the same facts for each individual industry. But f or 1 9 1 9 — 
for which figures and percentages are in general practically 
the same as for 191 8 — the proportion of fatal, serious and 
minor accidents for the individual industries is given. 

Bulletin, Pennsylvania State Department Labor and 

' 1919 figures from original source, page 49. 
19 1 8 figures from indirect source used by Interchurch Report and 
referred to later. 


Industry, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1920, Table 4, beginning page 40 
reduced to percentages shows : 


Fatal Serious Minor 

Building and Contracting 1-55% 27.7% 70.7% 

Metals and Metal Products 94% 23.1% 75-96% 

Public Service 1.84% 26.96% 71.18% 

Now it is to be particularly noted that the Interchurch 
Report quotes without further explanation its small part of 
Pennsylvania statistics on "Compensable" accidents in 
metal trades as compared with building and public service 
immediately after emphasizing the high percentage oi fatal 
accidents in the steel industry. But the Pennsylvania 
figures themselves thus actually plainly show that in the 
building trades the percentage of fatal accidents (1.55%) is 
exactly 60% higher than in the metal trades (.94%); and 
the percentage oi fatal accidents in public service (1.8%) is 
just twice as high as in the metal trades. 

Moreover it will also be noted that the percentage of 
serious accidents in the metal trades (23.1%) is less than in 
the building trades (27. y%), less than in public service 
(26.96%) and less than in the average industry (25.5%).* 

But there is still one other point to be noted. 

This table as printed in the Interchurch Report appears 
in a very different form than that in which it is given in the 
original 1919 (for 191 8) Bulletin of the Pennsylvania De- 
partment of Labor and Industry — ^being in fact merely a 
r^sum^ of pages of tables in the original document. This 
is of course not significant in itself — but on page 233-1221 
of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Monthly Review October y igig 

» The student interested in this subject of comparative hazards per se 
will find much interesting material in the Proceedings of the Casualty, 
Actuarial and Statistical Society of America 191 8-19, Volimie v., 
Numbers 11 and 12 where among other things it is shown that the 
average accident insurance premium for the four iron and steel classifica- 
tions given is .57 while for "house construction" it is .78. 


[ ii 


there appears a r^m^ of the 1918 Pennsylvania state 
figures as to compensable accidents. This table plainly 
states that these figures are a special class of 37.8 of all the 
industrial figures. It makes no pretense of showing com- 
parative hazards (which of course it does not show) but 
plainly states that the value of the table lies in its last two 
columns — ^which the Interchurch Report leaves out — show- 
ing the comparative amount of accident compensation and 
the comparative per cent of accident compensation the 
different industries paid in 191 8. 

Except that the Interchurch table leaves out some of the 
industries and all of the figures that give this table any 
meaning and omits all the careful explanation as to what it 
does mean, this special U. S. Labor October, 191 9 r6siun6 of 
the complex original Pennsylvania figures and the Inter- 
church R^sum6 are exactly identical. 

Moreover this table in U. S. Bulletin, October, 1919, is part 
of the conspicuous section already referred to of page after 
page of statistics and charts in regard to accident "fre- 
quency" in the iron and steel industry. It appears on the 
page opposite and facing that study. 

The Interchurch Report may not have noticed that the 
whole 341 pages of Vol. IV of Senate Document no, to 
which the Interchurch Report frequently refers, is devoted to 
elaborate statistics on steel accidents in regard to which the 
Interchurch Report complains of the lack of statistics. The 
conclusions of this Senate Document, however, are the op- 
posite of its own. It may have overlooked the several de- 
tailed statistical studies of the same subject appearing in 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin between 1913 and 1919 
whose conclusions are also the opposite of its own. Even 
though it fotmd an obscure sentence to refer to on the next 
and facing page, it may also have overlooked the detailed 
insurance statistics in regard to steel hazards on page 188 
of the Senate Hearings. But these also plainly show that 
its own conclusions are false. However, there does not 
seem to be a single table in all these studies which can be 


expurgated or otherwise twisted out of its true meaning. 
The plainly stated conclusions of the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Review, October, igig statistics are also the opposite of its 
own, but in connection with the October, 19 19, study there 
is this one table which if partly expurgated and taken out 
of its context can be so featured as to seem to show the 
opposite of what all other statistics plainly show and state. 
The Interchurch Report takes this one table, expurgates 
all the figures in regard to percentage of compensation, 
leaves out the statement that the table represents only a 
special 37.8% of all industrial accidents and is used only to 
show percentage of compensation, and then so introduces and 
featiures this expurgated table as to make it seem to bolster 
up a conclusion which is the opposite of the truth. 

1 :i 




The Interchurch Report says (pages 15 and 11): 

"11. The organizing campaign of the workers and the strike were 
for the purpose of forcing a conference in an industry where no means of 
conference existed. " 

"2. These conditions of labor were fixed by the Corporation without 
collective bargaining or any functioning means of conference also without 
above board means of learning how the decreed conditions affected the 

"3. . . . machinery of control gave . . . but n^ligible information of 
working and living conditions. " 

"In normal times the Steel Corporation had no adequate means of 
learning the conditions of life and work and the desires of its employees " 
(page 22 line 15). 

"In practice grievances which drive workers out of the steel indus- 
try are efifectually stopped from getting higher than the first representa- 
tive of the company reachable by the workers — the foreman" (page 26, 
line 17). 

Moreover in many other places throughout the Report 
it is stated and emphasized that the steel companies had 
little or no practical interest in the lives or working condi- 
tions of their men — ^that there not only existed no "func- 
tioning machinery" through which steel officials cotdd learn 
of the living or working conditions of their men or through 
which the men cotdd express their grievances or other feel- 
ings as to working and living conditions to the employers 
who controlled these conditions, but that on the contrary 



the "system of control" so worked that all expressions of 
grievance were arbitrarily prevented from getting any higher 
than the foreman \, tio had no authority to remedy them. 

The Interchurch Report in its discussion of this whole 
question rests the issues chiefly on the relationship between 
the United States Steel Corporation and its employees. 

In regard to the first point raised— that the steel company 
has no real interest in the lives or working conditions of its 
employees— it is a matter of general information that the 
United States Steel Corporation had up to the time of the 
strike spent nearly $80,000,000 in providing shower baths 
(3»oi6), insurance, old age pensions, churches (26), rest 
rooms (260), tennis courts (105), baseball fields (103), night 
and technical schools, etc., free for the workers themselves 
—playgrounds (138), special schools (50), with exceptional 
teachers (215), and other special facilities for the workers' 
children— community clubs (19), practical housekeeping 
centers (20), special educational classes, etc., free for the 
workers' wives— doctors (359), nurses (292), etc., etc. In 
addition to this $80,000,000 spent outright for such purposes, 
the Corporation had loaned further millions of dollars! 
practically without security, at 5% interest, to enable the 
employees to build their own homes. Such loans were 
made to practically any worker who wanted to build and 
own his own home and at the time of the strike the Corpora- 
tion had actually thus built for rent or purchase by its 
workers 27,000' such homes of a value of some $100,000,000. 
It is equally well known that this policy of improving 
the employees' working and living conditions was originated 
years ago during a time when there was no question of 
labor trouble and money has been appropriated for such 
purposes in just as large amoimts and often larger amoimts 
during years when labor was plentiful and the labor problem 
far more a problem to labor than to the employer. 
An interest in the better living and working conditions 

' According to U. S. Steel Corporation Bureau of Safety, Sanitation 
and Welfare Bulletin No. 8, the number in December, 1920, was 28,260. 

. Jf J. .,±4* . 1- 

f ■ 

n i, 


of its employees which has spent $80,000,000 and loaned 
other millions on such losing tenns is so conspicuous a fact 
that the Interchurch Report could neither have overlooked 
it nor argued it out of existence. Therefore, except for a few 
sarcastic references to it as a "toilets policy" and a policy 
of "grinding the faces of the hunkies and trusting to wel- 
fare to salve the exacerbations," the Interchurch Report 
entirely ignores this conclusive evidence that the Steel Com- 
pany has shown a very real interest in the working and 
living conditions of its employees. ' 

Moreover this expenditure of such immense sums to im- 
prove the working and living conditions of the employees 
in no sense stands alone as evidence of the interest which 
prompted it but is expressly part of a definite, carefully 
worked-out policy of the Steel Corporation. 

In his letter to the strike committee, in his testimony 
before the Senate Committee, and elsewhere. Judge Gary 
specifically stated — ^which statements have been widely 
published — ^that he and the other officials of the Steel Cor- 
poration take the greatest interest in the working and living 
conditions of their employees — that in fact he regards such 
an interest in, and such treatment of, his employees as will 

* This applies only to the original volume of the Interchurch Report. 
The second volume which appeared some 15 months later but unlike 
the original volume has not been widely reviewed or circulated has a 
chapter signed by Mr. George Soule devoted to a discussion of "Welfare 
Work. ' * The mere statement of the nature of this work and of its extent 
itself constitutes an impressive favorable argument. Mr. Soule makes 
such a statement, in general, adequately and fairly. Unfortunately the 
same cannot be said for some of his arguments and conclusicns. He 
complains of the stock subscription plan (page 252) that "it is not a 
simple business proposition," and complains in his summary of the 
welfare policy that, "it is a 'business proposition'" (page 259), and is 
otherwise captious and except in two instances obviously gives praise 
grudgingly. This chapter is particularly noteworthy, however, in that, 
as far as can be discovered, it is the only case in either volume in which 
any facts in favor of the steel companies are admitted. In several other 
respects also this chapter is the conspicuous high water mark of the 
whole Interchurch investigation effort. 



merit and get their loyal support one of the very most 
important functions of the company's management. 

But an "investigation" which can calmly ignore, except 
for a bit of passing sarcasm, $80,000,000 of evidence of the 
corporation's interest in the welfare of its employees, can 
hardly be expected to consider seriously a mere official state- 
ment of policy. After garbling part of Judge Gary's testi- 
mony in order to be more sarcastic about it (pages 24-25, 
122, etc.), the Interchurch Report sweeps the whole state- 
ment of policy aside with the insinuation that it is merely 
for public consumption. 

It is to be noted, however, that all such statements dur- 
ing the strike are only repetitions of many similar state- 
ments made long previous to the strike when there was no 
question of labor trouble, and that many such statements 
were made as fundamental principles of management during 
times when general business conditions were worst, labor 
was most plentiful, and when there was otherwise no reason 
why the Corporation should, and many reasons of immedi- 
ate self-interest why it should not, emphasize such policies 
and spend its money to carry them out unless the Corpora- 
tion was entirely sincere in seeking the best good of the 
workers at the time when the worker needed assistance 

On May 29, 191 1, during a time of general business de- 
pression and wage reductions. Judge Gary said to a group 
of his fellow manufacturers: 

"Gentlemen, let us not come to the conclusion of reducing wages 
until we are compelled to do so. Let us keep them as high as we can just 
as long as we can ... (in order that we may) . . . take pleasure in 
knowing that we are at all times doing all we can for the people in our 
employ in keeping their wages up and in bettering their conditions. " 
(Senate Hearings, page 236, second paragraph.) 

Other employers did reduce wages at that time. The 
U. S. Steel Corporation did not. 
Dtuing this same period of depressed business conditions 



and plentiful labor Judge Gary, on December 19, 1912, 
and again on December 17, 19 13 issued the following 
instructions to the presidents of the subsidiary companies: 


'It is a question simply as to whether or not when you consider the 
success of your corporation and the merits of the workman who does 
so much to make its business successful, you are giving him a reasonable 
division or share of the profits which are realized. I do not care whether 
the question is considered ft'om the standard of good morals or not, 
... I believe from the standpoint of what is for the best interests of your 
companies . . . it is wise to deal with your workmen not only fairly but 
liberally. ... It is a pleasure to be connected with the business when 
you consider that, departing from the general rides which have obtained 
between employer and employee throughout the world, you have by 
your treatment of these questions established the relations which now 
exist between you and your employees. " 

"Now you will have some occasion perhaps during the immediate 
future to consider ftu-ther some of these matters and they may involve 
considerable cost. If so, I should consider the money well expended. 
It is even possible that there may be some distress among some of yotu* 
employees ... I hope you will make an effort to keep posted. " (After 
detailed and specific instruction as to what is to be done in the way of 
remitting rent, keeping men working even at a loss, etc., etc., the state- 
ment concludes,) . . . "You may expect to meet considerable loss 
during the coming winter but if in so doing you have added to the relief, 
benefit and comfort of employees, who in the nature of things are more 
or less dependent upon you, it should be a pleasure. " (S. H., Part I, 
Excerpts, pages 237 to 238). 

As has already been pointed out the Corporation operated 
at considerable loss during this period and stockholders* 
dividends were reduced to 3% then to iJ4% but wages 
were not reduced but were kept up by these reduced 
dividends and out of surplus funds. Moreover during this 
same period of 1912-1915, $24,502,699 was spent outright in 
improving working and living conditions of the employees. 

At the annual meeting of stockholders April 16, 191 7 — 
just a year before the unionization drive began and two 
years before the strike, Judge Gary said, 

"From time to time eflforts have been made by outsiders to create 
dissension, to instill a feeling of animosity on the part of our men against 


our corporation but these efforts have failed. I say we are proud of this 
condition. ... We have tried to treat our men justly and liberally and 
as one man ought to treat another man but not simply because of our high 
regard for them, . . . but also because we realize as a business proposi- 
tion it is for our interest to do so. . . . We sometimes receive letters 
from stockholders complaining because we pay too large wages . . . and 
that we had better give to the stockholders in dividends a part of the 
money which we are paying the employees. I have one answer only to 
make to those stockholders ... it is decidedly to the advantage of the 
stockholder to have an organization that can retain in its employ 
(when there was great labor shortage and the country was full of labor- 
agitation) hundreds of thousands of men who are satisfied with their 
condition and who consequently are doing everything possible to 
protect and benefit the corporation" (Senate Hearings, Excerpts, 
pages 238 and 239). 

There can be no question then as to the definite interest 
of the Steel Corporation in the welfare of its men and as to 
its deliberate policy of seeking to improve their working and 
living conditions in order to make them more satisfied and 
so more loyal and efficient employees. There remains, of 
course, the question of the result of this interest and effort. 

When the United States Steel Corporation was formed, 
it was notoriously the largest corporation in industrial 
history and both its size and other conditions gave rise to 
certain serious questions as to its ultimate success. Both 
the amounts of capital involved and these other conditions 
demanded that its management should be of the highest 
ability, and certainly Andrew Carnegie and the elder 
Morgan were men who could judge and command such 
ability. The original capital stock of the Corporation was 
some $800,000,000 and it was widely considered that the 
actual material assets of the company were less than that 
sum. In eighteen years the management of the Corpora- 
tion has not merely made a complete success of the original 
venture but without any increase of capital has raised the ma- 
terial assets of the company to two and a half billion dollars. 

When management of this type of proven ability appro- 
priates $80,000,000 to improve the working and living 



conditions of its employees with the express purpose both 
by such improvements and through removing any cause of 
grievance, of obtaining their good will and loyalty, and 
spends this money over a period of years during which it can 
carefully watch results and vary the details of its policy 
accordingly, surely the prestmiption of common sense is 
that such money is not being spent in larger and larger 
quantities year after year unless it shows results. 

Moreover while in the coal industry which employs much 
of the same class of labor as in the steel industry, strikes 
and other labor troubles are so constant that the average 
worker throughout the industry loses, according to the 
U. S. Department of Labor figures, 30 days a year from 
strikes; and while repeated strikes and labor trouble have 
been one of the most conspicuous phenomena of labor condi- 
tions in many other prominent industries, the Steel Cor- 
poration under its policy of thus taking the initiative and 
the expense of cultivating the good will of its men went for 
18 years up to 19 19 with only one very ordinary size strike 
(in 1909) which lasted only a few weeks in a few mills. 

This remarkable freedom of the steel industry from labor 
trouble in the past is of such common knowledge and was so 
conspicuously featured at the time of the strike that both 
the strike leaders and the Interchurch Report were compelled 
to attempt to reconcile it with their allegations of the general 
discontent of the steel workers. One of the grounds on 
which they both attempted to do this was by claiming that 
the steel worker had been so suppressed and intimidated 
that he did not dare express his grievance. A reading of the 
Senate testimony, in which an ordinary workman who was 
one of the steel company's own witnesses flatly contradicted 
Judge Gary to his face about a minor matter and in which 
another worker contradicted Judge Lindabury , and in which 
common laborers expressed themselves with much volu- 
bility and often profanity to senators, certainly fails to give 
any impression that the steel workers were in any sense 
suppressed or intimidated. 


As a second argument to try to offset the well-known 
fact that the steel companies in the past had had practically 
no labor trouble, the Interchurch Report makes the ingenu- 
ous point that while there may have been no mass strikes in 
the past, the individual steel workers were constantly going 
on "individual strikes." On page 148 the Interchurch 
Report, in attempting to emphasize such so-called "in- 
dividual strikes," which it claims show the steel workers' 
"rebellious frame of mind," points to what it calls the "high 
labor turnover in steel plants," using as its trump card in 
this argument the alleged fact that the labor turnover in the 
Homestead steel works for 191 9 was 59%. 

The General Electric Company is generally regarded as 
a model employer. It uses a very large per cent of labor of 
high special skill. Its Schenectady plant is in a town where 
large numbers of other jobs are not readily available and 
so men have a special incentive for keeping their jobs. The 
plant is unionized and has elaborate systems of collective 
bargaining. The company makes every effort to, and un- 
questionably succeeds in, keeping its men better than the 
great bulk of employers throughout the country. Yet in 
the Schenectady plant of the General Electric Company in 
1919, their labor turnover was 68%, nine points higher than 
the Interchurch Report's figure for the Homestead plant. 

In 1918 Collier's Weekly made a special study of the sub- 
ject of labor turnover in a wide variety of industries and 
published (April 13, 1918) figures which showed that the 
"usual" labor turnover at this time was 120 to 180% or 2}^ 
to 33^ times what the Interchiu-ch alleges for the Steel Cor- 
poration and that at least during this particular period of 
labor unrest a "turnover" of 1300% was "by no means 
xmparalleled. " 

Again the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly 
Review gives a number of detailed figures as to labor txim- 
over dtiring this period, the March, I9i9,issue, page 36, show- 
ing the following facts for Cincinnati and the September, 
1919, issue page 45 for Chicago. 


Vtr Cent of Turnover Per Cent of Plants 

Cincinnati Chicago 

Under 50% turnover 7% None 

50 to 100% " 15% 20% 

100 to 150% " 21% 24% 

150 to 200% " 21% 16% 

200 to 250% " 7% 8% 

250 to 300% " 18% 20% 

300 to 350% " None 12% 

350 to 400% " 7% None 

400 to 500% " 4% None 

The average labor turnover in both these great and diversi- 
fied industrial centers was thus obviously at this same time 
some 150%, yet the Interchurch Report argues that this 
59% labor turnover which it alleges against the steel in- 
dustry proves the ** rebellious frame of mind" of the steel 
worker. In view of the actual percentages of labor turn- 
over in industry as a whole at this time a 59% ttmiover 
would certainly seem to show a very satisfied frame of mind. 

Moreover the notorious fact that, at least during 1916- 
17-18 when the demand for labor in all industry was so 
great that rival employers and a host of emplojmient agen- 
cies were combing the older industries to get employees for 
the new war industries, the Steel Corporation did not lose 
its workers but increased them by over 50% is the best pos- 
sible evidence that the steel worker stuck by his job because 
he was satisfied with it and not because he was intimidated 
and oppressed into hopeless acceptance of it. 

It is in connection with its elaborate and extensive 
"welfare work,*' which the Interchurch Report so carefully 
refrains from discussing, that the Steel Corporation has built 
up a most extensive organization which the Interchurch Re- 
port says it does not possess,' through which it keeps in 

» " The conditions of labor were fixed by the Corporation without 
collective bargaining or any functioning means of conference also without 
any aboveboard means of learning how decreed conditions effected the 
worker. " 

"... Machinery of control gave but negligible information of work- 
ing and living conditions, " etc., etc. (Interchurch Report, pages 1 1-15). 



direct and constant touch with the feelings and conditions 
of the workers, not only in their work but in their homes. 

In the operation of its $80,000,000 worth of welfare equip- 
ment, the Corporation has an organization of 35,574 
workers, chosen from every department and from every class 
of workers, who have in the past served on various welfare 
committees — as members of safety committees, as officers 
of employee clubs, as committees on the various activities 
of the workers, athletics and other forms of recreation, etc. 
As members of such committees these men worked in close 
touch with officers of the company, and having established 
this close touch, officers of the company, as a matter of 
policy, maintain this relationship as a point of contact with 
the feelings and points of view of all the great body of 

There is also at all times a similar group of current active 
conamittees composed of 7258 workers selected from all 
departments and classes of workers — a most considerable 
proportion, as is shown by their names, from among the 
foreign employees — who are in constant active touch with 
both the management and the men. 

This system which has been established and functioning 
for years, which consists of an organization of 40 odd 
thousands, almost entirely of the workers themselves, may 
not constitute a "functioning means of conference" ac- 
cording to the Interchurch Report's definition, but it cer- 
tainly is, despite the Interchurch Report's statement to the 
contrary, an "above-board means" of getting more than 
"negligible information of working and living conditions."' 

' The special chapter on " Welfare Work " in the second volume of the 
Interchurch Report emphasized — ^partly in italics on page 257 : " It is 
noteworthy that in this successful portion of the Corporation's labor 
poKcy it has consciously enlisted the cooperation of its employees as a group. 
Committees of workmen have been appointed to advise in the develop- 
ment of safety work and help in carrying it out. The committees are 
not elected but at least some attempt has been made to tap the resources 
of practical knowledge and power in the forces of labor. Over five thou- 
sand (7258) employees are serving on safety committees and about 


Moreover the fact that under this system, information as 
to working and living conditions and the attitude of the men 
in regard to them comes to the steel official through members 
of the working force itself instead of through outside pro- 
fessional labor leaders, appointed by and responsible only 
to outside professional labor officials, does not necessarily 
make such information less valuable or accurate. 

After stating that the Steel Corporation's machinery of 
control gave but "negligible information of working and 
living conditions," and that the Steel Corporation was 
"without aboveboard means of learning how decreed con- 
ditions affected the workers," the Interchurch Report states 
positively and repeatedly that it was impossible for steel 
workers to get their grievances considered by officers in 
power, and that in practice: 

"Grievances which drive workers out of the steel industry are effec- 
tively stopped from getting higher than the first representative of the 
company reachable by the worker, the foreman" (page 26) ". . . he 
can't change his foreman and he cannot get above the foreman," (page 
136), etc., etc. 

All the evidence, not only in the Senate Hearings, in- 
cluding the evidence given by the strikers' own witnesses, 
but the evidence on the subject presented by the Inter- 
church Report itself is definitely and positively to the 

The Senate Investigation Committee went into con- 
siderable detail in regard to what opportunity the workers 
had to get their grievances reviewed. Many workers, fore- 
men, and superintendents, who were company witnesses 
testified repeatedly that any steel worker could drop his 

eighteen thousand have been trained in first-aid and rescue work." 
35»574 niore are ex-members of safety committees, etc. Yet in spite of 
the fact that it thus acknowledges that this number of representative 
employees are in necessarily continual touch with the management 
the Interchurch Report insists that the management has no "above- 
board means of learning how the decreed conditions affected the workers' ' 
or of getting more than "negligible information as to living and working 



tools and walk right into the Superintendent's or even the 
General Superintendent's office at any time he felt he had a 
grievance. They testified as to various instances when this 
had happened. For instance, Mr. T. J. Da vies, a tin mill 
roller from the Newcastle plant who for 14 years had been 
a union man, who was a delegate to the 1902 convention of 
the Amalgamated Association, and a deputy Vice Presi- 
dent of that union, and who had served 15 months in 
France, testified as follows (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 


" Mr. Davies: Why, the humblest man in the mill, foreign or American, 
does not have to accept finally anything from them (foremen). Any 
grievance he may want to make, he can make it to the foreman and if the 
foreman won't take it up, he can just simply open the door of the main 
office and walk right in to the Superintendent. That condition obtains 
to the best of my knowledge and belief — to my knowledge (he had 
been 34 years with the company and had worked from day laborer up) 
all through the operations of the company. If grievances are felt the 
humblest man in the mill can walk past the foreman right to the general 
superintendent and get things remedied very quickly. 

*' Senator Phipps: Do you know of any instances where committees 
have been appointed to present these grievances to the Superintendent? 

" Mr. Davies: I have never known of the necessity. Each man — all 
of us can go off-handedly if we like, to the Superintendent. . . . We 
can take it to the manager. Things that they want remedied. For 
instance we had a complaint which was a big one and it was taken to the 
assistant Superintendent. It was a rougher 's question. . . . The 
roughers were asked to do something. They were asked to lift bars and 
put them in a place that was supposed to be of advantage to the com- 
pany and the foreman said, 'You have got to lift them.* Some of the 
boys told him it was not necessary and they took their complaint to the 
manager. . . . That was a pretty good size committee. I suppose 
there were about 25 or 30 and that is a good size committee. They went 
in there to the manager and took their case up and they didn't have to 
do the extra lifting. ... It was only a matter of about 18 inches of 
lift which they saved by making the complaint to the Superintendent 
but it was listened to and attended to. " 

But undoubtedly even more convincing evidence on this 
point is that which is given by witnesses brought by the 
strike leaders themselves for the express purpose of con- 


demning the steel company's system of handling complaints. 
(See Senate Hearings, Part II, pages 676, 711, 712, 730.) 

Of these perhaps the star witness for the strike leaders, 
because he was one of the few Americans who testified for 
them, was Matt O'Reilly of Donora, Pennsylvania. After 
a page of discussion about a petty quarrel with a foreman, 
the concluding testimony was as follows (page 677, line 8) : 

"Senator Stirling: You went back and since that time you never had 
any trouble with the foreman? 

" Mr. O'Reilly: I went back and since that time I never had any 
trouble with the foreman but I had to go to the Superintendent. 

"Senator Stirling: And in all of your years of work that is the only 
trouble you had? 

" Mr. O'Reilly: That is the only trouble I had. 

"Senator Stirling: And in this case you had — you did get a hearing 
from the Superintendent, didn't you? 

" Mr. O'Reilly: I got a hearing from the Superintendent. I made it 
my business to get a hearing. * ' 

George Colson, another star witness for the strike leaders, 
because he was an American, and a most disgruntled wit- 
ness, nevertheless, speaks on page 730 repeatedly and 
casually of taking up his grievance with the Superintendent 
as a matter of course. 

From the point of view, however, of the Interchurch 
Report statement that "grievances are effectively stopped 
from getting higher than the foreman," the Interchiu-ch 
Report's own evidence is undoubtedly the most significant 
of all because it definitely proves that statement untrue. 
On pages 213-218 of the Interchurch Report appear ten 
affidavits or statements — presumably of the "500 rock 
bottom affidavits" — in regard to specific grievances. Six 
of these ten show a common workman taking up his grievance 
with an officer higher than a foreman. The other four do 
not show that the worker made any effort to take his 
case higher than the foreman. 

For instance it is plainly stated (Interchurch Report, 
page 213) in regard to Joseph Yart, obviously a foreigner, 
that his whole controversy was not with his foreman but 




with the superintendent of the mill. Again it is stated 
plainly (page 214) that Charles Bacha, also obviously a 
foreigner, took his case from the foreman to the Superin- 
tendent, Dunk May, and from the Superintendent to the 
General Superintendent, Mr. Lumpkin, and was moreover 
allowed the privilege of taking up his same case four times. 
And again, John Kubarda, also obviously a foreigner, was 
told by his foreman, "Go down to the general office and 
fix it up with them " (Interchurch Report, page 217). 
Again on page 67 the Interchurch Report itself says : — 


' It was surprising ... to find so large a number of strikers complain- 
ing about hazards . . . concerning which they had complained to fore- 
men and superintendents month in and month out. . 


and there are many other plain though inadvertent admis- 
sions in the Interchurch Report itself that all steel workers 
went over their foreman's head to Superintendent or 
Manager constantly as a matter of course. 

All of the plain facts in regard to the relation of the Steel 
Corporation and its men show that the Steel Corporation 
deliberately decided years ago as a matter of fundamental 
policy to attempt to depart from the ordinary basis of rela- 
tionship between capital and labor and win the loyalty and 
support of its men by treating them not only fairly but 
generously, — by voluntarily raising wages and keeping wages 
as high as possible, by paying special attention to and spend- 
ing immense sums of money on their employees' working 
and living conditions — and by otherwise making a particu- 
lar effort to keep its men specially loyal by keeping them 
especially satisfied. 

Through at least ten years of hard times as well as good, 
the Corporation has consistently followed this policy. 

It has for years maintained a policy of industrial democ- 
racy under which, on the testimony of hostile Interchurch 
and strike leaders' witnesses, any ordinary workman, in- 
cluding the least skilled foreigner, can and does individually 
take his grievance to his Superintendent or General Super- 




intendent as casually and repeatedly as men in other in- 
dustries go to their foreman. 

In addition to this simple direct method of receiving and 
handling individual complaints, the Corporation maintains 
special contact with its men through committees consisting 
of over 40,000 of the men themselves through whom it is 
in constant touch with the general feeUngs and points of 
view of its men, which information it uses in taking the in- 
itiative in giving them every advantage that it reasonably can. 

Such a system is not the proposed labor leader system 
emphasized by the Interchurch Report of trade union col- 
lective bargaining under which professional labor leaders 
become irresponsible partners in managing many of the 
most vital functions in business. It is a system in which 
men responsible for the results of management insist on 
doing the managing. But it is a system tmder which the 
management has msdntained a production efficiency which 
over a period of years has given steady emplo5rment and 
higher wages to more workers than any other basic industry 
under any other type of management has ever done in 
modem industrial history. Moreover, under it, un- 
doubtedly more men have worked longer without any seri- 
ous labor trouble or agitation than in any other industry 
imder any other system in modem times. 

It is perhaps easy to understand why, not merely the 
difference of this system but particularly its success should 
prove a veritable red rag to the professional labor leader and 
the professional radical and make them particularly eager 
to attack the steel industry and particularly venomous in 
that attack. ' 

» The American Federation of Labor at its Thirty-ninth Annual 
Convention at Atlantic City, June, 1919, passed the following 

"Whereas, many steel corporations and other industrial institutions 
have instituted in their plants systems of collective bargaining. ..." 

"Resolved, That we disapprove and condemn all such company 
unions and advise our membership to have nothing to do with them; 
and, be it further 


It is not so plain, however, why the Interchurch Report 
should ignore the existence of this system and insist so 
volubly in its "Conclusions" in the front of the book that 
steel officials, under the existing system, were not and could 
not get in touch with their men, and that the men, imder 
existing conditions, could not take their grievances higher 
than the foreman, when it has, and itself plainly publishes 
in the back of the book, voluminous and detailed evidence 
that this is not true. 

" Resolved, That we demand the right to bargain collectively through 
ihe only kind of organization fitted for this purpose, the trade union. . . ." 


The ten statements and affidavits referred to in the preceding chapter 
constitute the only groups of the 500 "rock bottom" statements and 
affidavits, on which the Interchurch Report itself states that it is chiefly 
based, which appear in the main Report. 

The last two of these documents specifically state that the signer had 
been employed by the U. S. Steel Corporation. One of them, which four 
times specifies that the signer was discharged not by his foreman but by 
the Superintendent, is dated without comment August 15th, nearly 2 
months before the Interchurch investigation. 

The first eight of these documents on the other hand are prefaced with 
the statement (page 213) that they are part of 200 "signed statements 
and sworn affidavits" "obtained in two days" by "an investigator in 
November, 1919" Two of these— No. 7 and No. a— are " sworn affida- 
vits." But the notary's date on No. 7 is February 22, 19 19, and on No. 
8, February 24, 1919. To No. 7, the Notary has also added: "Paper 
not drafted by Notary" As to the other, unsworn statements, the follow- 
ing is to be noted. All recite facts alleged to have occurred from 8 to 
12 months before November, 1919. All are also very exact about dates 
and other details— -including exact quotations of alleged conversations. 
Again the language throughout is so grammatical, direct and otherwise 
such that it seems hardly possible that the dociunents could have been 
composed by the signers. It seems inconceivable for instance, that Nick 
Poppovidi who could not sign his own name should himself have said, 
"The forgoing occurred the forenoon of February 22d," "I beHeve I 
have a right to join a labor organization for my protection," etc., or that 
John Kubanda should have said, " I verily believe that it was through 
union affiliations that I was discharged," etc. Other of the documents 
are very formally expressed throughout in the third person, etc. etc. 




The Interchurch Report, Volume II, page 178, in presenting another 
group of its "rock bottom" statements and afl&davits, admits that "the 
language used in many of these docimients is ' interpreters' English,' " the 
documents themselves being merely "a brief statement, summary or 
affidavit " composed by a third party. The documents here considered 
show on their face that they also are thus composed by some other 
person than the signer. 

In considering who such third person or persons in this case were the 
question at once arises: is it reasonably possible that the one investiga- 
tor stated to have "obtained" these doctunents in November, 1919, 
could have examined, often through an interpreter, 100 witnesses a day, 
and in addition have composed, with the frequent necessity of translat- 
ing back again and correcting, 100 statements a day, with sufficient 
thoroughness and accuracy to warrant the specificness and exactness 
witii which the facts are alleged throughout these doctunents? Again, 
is it possible that any men, and particularly such men as signed these 
statements, could have recalled 8 to 10 months after the event, dates, 
quotations and other details with such exactness as these statements 
give them? There is moreover the fact that two of these documents, 
specifically stated to have been "obtained" by this investigator in 
these two days, show by notaries' dates that they were composed ten 
months before they were thus "obtained." 

Immediately following these ten "rock bottom" documents the 
Interchurch Report (top of page 219) sajrs: "These are examples. 
The range of the commission's data is given in a sub-report." The one 
sub-report published containing a group of "rock bottom" affidavits 
admits frankly (Volume II, page 176) that part of these documents were 
obtained "from President Maurer of the State Federation," i.e. Pennsyl- 
vania State Federation of Labor. As is shown in detail in Chapter 
XXIII and page 419 of the present analysis actually all the affidavits 
and most of the statements there presented, were "obtained" from this 
notorious radical who signed himself in now published correspondence 
with the MoscowSoviet as" representing 300 radical groups in 42 States." 
These sections also show in detail that the doctunents themselves con- 
sist largely of utterly false or misleading statements skilfully composed 
for propaganda piuposes. Because of the nature of the subject matter of 
the ten documents under present discussion, there is no available 
means of checking the truth or falsity of the basic allegations upon which 
they are built. There can be no reasonable doubt however, that like 
most of the other "rock bottom" affidavits as published, they were 
composed long before the Interchtu-ch investigation was thought of and 
were merely borrowed by the Interchurch investigators from the strike 



Issues in the Steel Strike and arguments of the Interchurch 
Report which involve facts as to the opinions of large numbers 
of men — facts as to motives and facts as to complex circum- 
stances, conclusions as to which can only he reached by a deter- 
mination of the weight of evidence. 






The effort to unionize the steel industry was made and 
the strike was called on the express grounds, as has already 
been emphasized, that the steel workers had certain griev- 
ances against the steel companies which it had been im- 
possible for them to remedy under existing circumstances 
and for which the promise of remedy lay in trade union 
collective bargaining which the unionization effort and the 
strike specifically aimed to establish. 

These alleged grievances, as stated by the Interchurch 
Report and the strike leaders, were principally and specific- 
ally unfairly low wages and unfairly long hours, and the 
lack on the part of the men of any voice in the management 
of their conditions of employment, which was not only a 
grievance in itself, but which was the alleged catise of many 
minor grievances. 

The alleged grievance of unfairly low wages has already 
been argued on the basis of definite and known facts and it 
has been shown as a matter of fact that wages in the steel 
industry were not unfairly low but on the contrary were 
conspicuously high as compared with other industries. 

The alleged grievance of the hardship and hazard of steel 
work, which is emphasized far more by the Interchurch 
Report than by the strikers themselves, has been shown to 
be without merit in fact. 

It has been shown as a matter of fact that the steel com- 





panics themselves have taken the greatest interest in the 
welfare of the steel worker— that they have taken the initia- 
tive and spent immense sums of money in improving work- 
ing and living conditions. It has been shown not only from 
general evidence but specifically from evidence which both 
the Interchurch Report and the strike leaders presented in 
regard to certain other points, that the men, under present 
conditions, have the simplest and easiest facilities for pre- 
senting any grievance they may feel. 

The issue as to working hours in the steel industry centers 
chiefly aroimd the 12-hotir day. In so far as this issue in- 
volves matters of fact — as to the number of 12-hour workers, 
the nature of 12-hour work, the tendency as to working 
hours in the industry, and the relative length of working 
hours in the steel industry and in American industry as a 
whole — ^the Interchurch argument and conclusions have 
already been analyzed in detail and shown to be not only 
in general contrary to the plain facts but in 2 of its 3 main 
conclusions to be based on clever manipulations and falsi- 
fications or on flagrant misquotation of official statistics. 

The steel companies have constantly maintained, and 
state this as a leading reason for the continuance of the 12- 
hour day, that the majority of the 12-hour workers them- 
selves prefer these working hours because of the larger 
earnings they make possible. Mr. Clayton L. Patterson on 
page 68 of his pamphlet, "The Steel Strike of 1919, " states 
that, *' according to the best information available," "half 
of the 12-hour workers prefer these hours because of the 
larger pay"; about one fourth "are indifferent or have not 
expressed themselves on the subject" while the remaining 
quarter "are willing to sacrifice the larger earnings for the 
shorter working day." 

On page 99, paragraph 2, in discussing " one of the real 
reasons why the 12-hour day has persisted in the steel in- 
dustry," the Interchurch Report states that for "30% of 
steel workers," particularly the "simple foreign worker," 
"these possibilities of overtime . . . constitute the bait*' 

and that "from this 30% the steel companies recruit their 
12-hour gang in considerable part." 

This paragraph admits this fact not in extenuation but in 
further condemnation of the 12-hour day. Nevertheless, 
in thus plainly stating that "30% of steel workers " do prefer 
the higher earnings of the 12-hour day, and that "from this 
30% the steel companies recruit their 12-hour gang, " which 
"gang" as a matter of fact does not constitute much if any 
over 30% of all workers even in primary production depart- 
ments — ^the Interchurch Report has gone even higher than 
the steel companies themselves in its estimate of the percent- 
age of 12-hour workers who prefer these hours. 

By this plain admission as to the large proportion of 12- 
hour workers themselves who prefer the 12-hour day — no 
matter how mistakenly — ^the Interchurch Report would 
seem plainly to eliminate the 12-hour day as one of the 
workers* grievances and make it necessary to argue the 12- 
hour question entirely on the basis of social expediency, 
irrespective of the wishes of the workers themselves. 
This particular paragraph however, and these particular 
admissions of the Interchurch Report, are only another 
example of its strange inconsistencies and self-contradic- 
tions, for throughout the rest of the Report, the 12-hour 
day is constantly feattired as the major grievance of the 
steel workers and the major reason why it was claimed the 
steel workers wanted Trade Union Collective Bargaining. 

Whether or not the majority of 12-hour workers them- 
selves do desire the 12-hour day because of its higher earn- 
ings, or, on the contrary regard it as a grievance, of course 
involves the opinion of something over one hundred thou- 
sand such men, which, barring its possible ascertainment by 
a fair and free vote on this specific question, which has not 
and perhaps cannot be taken, must be determined on the 
weight of all such evidence as is available. 

In the same way, the question as to whether or not other 
working conditions were felt generally by the steel workers 
themselves to constitute undue grievances obviously in- 



volves the opinion of nearly five hundred thousand such 
workers which opinion, except on the basis of a specific and 
fair vote, again can only be determined by the weight of all 
evidence available. 

Finally, whether or not the proposed remedy for these 
alleged grievances — ^Trade Union Collective Bargaining — 
was regarded by the majority of the steel workers themselves 
as an adequate and desirable remedy also involves the 
opinion of some 500,000 men. Barring the possibility of 
its expression through a specific and fair vote, these opinions 
again can only be determined by the weight of all the evi- 
dence available. 

The drive to unionize the steel industry was made ex- 
pressly on the basis that the steel workers themselves did 
feel the alleged grievances to be real and desired trade 
union collective bargaining as a means of rectifying such 
grievances. The strike leaders stated in advance that the 
strike itself would constitute a vote by the workers them- 
selves as to their attitude toward their alleged grievances 
and the proposed remedy. 

There can be no question that if other conditions had been 
equal — ^if the response to the unionization drive and the 
strike order were not undtdy complicated by other influences 
and considerations — ^the measure of that response con- 
stituted the strongest possible prima facie evidence as to 
whether or not the men themselves, at least at the time of 
the strike, regarded the alleged grievances as real and the 
proposed remedy as desirable. 

But it was a question very much in dispute at the time 
as to how big a proportion of the workers did obey the strike 
order. Moreover it is strongly urged by the steel companies 
that as regards the strike being an expression of a feeling of 
grievance, even on the part of the majority of those who 
struck, other things were not equal — ^that on the contrary 
the strike, even to the extent it was effective, was brought 
about by outside professional labor leaders who, uninvited 
and imdesired by any considerable proportion of the sted 


workers, began a campaign of agitation, including radical 
agitation, chiefly among the unskilled foreign workers, and 
by appealing to their ignorance and class prejudices, formed 
a strike nucleus, and then by skilful manipulation of mass 
psychology, coupled with intimidation, succeeded in getting 
only a minority of the workers to stop work and that even 
this minority rapidly dwindled as soon as protection against 
intimidation was assured. 

Nevertheless the response of the steel workers to the 
unionization drive and the strike order — ^irrespective of the 
fact that it may have been far from a free expression of 
opinion on the specific questions involved and must be 
qualified accordingly — ^is certainly the most conspicuous 
evidence, and also the most definite comprehensive evidence 
available as to the feeling of the steel workers themselves 
in regard to the alleged grievances and the proposed remedy. 

The question as to whether or not, and to what extent, 
the unionization drive and the strike represented such a 
free expression of opinion will be considered in the two fol- 
lowing chapters, *' Origin of the Strike Movement" and 
* ' Radicalism in the Steel Strike. ' ' The succeeding chapter, 
"Response of the Men to the Unionization Drive and the 
Strike Appeal'* will discuss, with any reservations which 
may then be established, what the unionization drive and 
the strike actually showed to be the attitude of the steel 
workers themselves as to their alleged grievances and as to 
Trade Union Collective Bargaining as a remedy. 



In regard to the origin of the strike movement the Inter- 
church Report (page 144, line 27) says merely that: 

" The labor movement initiated the organizing campaign, invited by 
the steel workers according to the labor leaders, invading where it 
was not wanted according to the employers. Both statements are 
correct and neither lays emphasis on the principle fact . . . these 
steel workers are more important than their leaders, etc. " 

The whole Interchurch argument and its conclusions as 
to the reasons for the strike and the relation of the steel 
workers to the strike are based on two assumptions both 
contrary to fact and the arguments from which are corre- 
spondingly fallacious. It is necessary therefore, although 
the Interchurch Report thus evades this point, to establish 
as part of the evidence of those fallacies the actual facts as 
to who originated the strike movement and why. 

Up to the time of the steel strike in 191 9 and the unioniza- 
tion drive which preceded it, there had been no strikes and 
no apparent agitation or unrest among the steel workers 
since 1910. Except for a small abortive agitation and strike 
which lasted only a few weeks and in a few plants at that 
time there had been no strikes or visible agitation and unrest 
since 1903. In other words before the 1919 strike, for this 
remarkably long period, — considering the average American 
conditions of labor unrest, — of sixteen years, the steel in- 
dustry had enjoyed apparently peacefid and mutually 
satisfactory relations between employer and workers. 



During the years 1916-17-18 general labor unrest and 
strikes throughout the country had multiplied till they had 
permeated every other basic industry and reached in the 
year of our entry into the war the unparalleled figure of 
4,324.^ Yet during these years of particular and acute gen- 
eral labor unrest, the steel industry, which had voluntarily 
raised wages eight different times during this period, had 
been conspicuously free from labor unrest. No suggestions 
of labor trouble or a strike had, according to the testimony 
of the steel leaders, been discerned by the watchful interests 
of the steel companies themselves and certainly no sugges- 
tion of labor trouble in the steel industry had come to public 
attention until the fall of 19 18. 

For a great many years Mr. William Z. Foster had been 
a prominent I. W. W. official and organizer. He was secre- 
tary of the Syndicalist League of North America and one 
of the American delegates to their international convention 
at Buda Pesth in 1911 (Senate Hearings, Part i , page 42 1 — 
last paragraph, page 422, line 47, etc., etc.). 

In 1914, however, Mr. Foster announced his decision: 

"that the only way for the I. W. W. to have the workers adopt and 
practice the principles of revolutionary unionism is to give up the at- 
tempt to create a new labor movement ... get into the organized labor 
movement and . . . revolutionize these imions" (Senate Hearings, 
page 418). 

Two years after the announcement of this conviction, 
Mr. Foster appears as an international organizer of the 
Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen, a regular trade union 
organization. The next year he presented an entirely novel 
plan to the American Federation of Labor for the unioniza- 
tion of the workers of the Chicago stockyards and in co- 
operation with the A. F. of L. was one of the leaders in the 
strike that succeeded in unionizing those workers. 

It was at this time that Mr. Foster originated the idea 

« U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Review, Tune. IQ20. oa^e 
204-1510. > y ff»t. 


and the plan of unionizing the steel industry, which idea and 
plan he himself describes in his own book, The Great Steel 
Strike, beginning page 17, line 3, as follows: 


'. . . as the War wore on and the United States joined the general 
slaughter, the situation changed rapidly in favor of the unions. The 
demand for soldiers and munitions had made labor scarce; ... the 
steel industry was the master clock of the whole war program and had 
to be kept in operation at all costs ... it was an opportunity to 
organize the industry such as might never again occur. . . . 

" The writer was one of those who perceived the unparalleled oppor- 
*^^ty- But being at that time secretary-treasurer of the committee 
organizing the packing industry, I was unable to do anjrthing substan- 
tial in the steel situation. . . . Immediately thereafter (at the end 
of the packers* strike) I presented a resolution to the Chicago Feder- 
ation of Labor requesting the executive officers of the American Feder- 
ation of Labor to call a general labor conference, and to inaugurate 
thereat a national campaign to organize the steel workers. 

"It was intended, " continues Mr. Foster {Great Steel Strike, page 21, 
lines 7-12) "that after the Chicago conference a dozen or more general 
organizers should be dispatched immediately to the most important steel 
centers to bring to the steel workers the first word of the big drive being made 
in their behalf. " 

Mr. Foster states incidentally that his resolution was 
"endorsed by twelve local unions in the steel industry," 
but what these unions were, how many members or what 
part of the industry they represented, he does not state. 

Moreover it must be borne in mind that the strike leaders 
themselves later claimed repeatedly that such local unions 
as existed in the steel industry were traitors to the workers' 
cause because they were against the strike and Mr. Foster 
himself says {Great Steel Strike, page 106, line 29) : 

"Much harm was done the morale of the strikers by local unions . . . 
refusing to recognize the national committee's strike call." 
He also says (page 45, line 24) : 
"Company unions are invariably contemptible." 

Mr. Fitzpatrick in his testimony (Senate Hearings, Part 
I, page 81) also bitterly condemns company unions as oppos- 
ing the strike. 


The American Federation of Labor passed a special Re- 
solution at its 1919 Convention specifically condemning 
local steel unions and one of the twelve official demands 
made by the strike leaders on which the strike was called 
was that all local unions should be abolished. 

Finally these twelve unnamed unions could not have been 
very important or representative or it would not have been 
necessary after the Chicago conference to send immediately 
men to the ''important steel centers to bring the first word 
. , . of the big drive being made in their behalf,'' 

On June loth to 20th, 191 8, ten weeks after Mr. Foster 
presented his plan. Resolution 29, authorizing the carrying 
out of Mr. Foster's plan, was "adopted by unanimous vote" 
at the convention of the A. F. of L. at St. Paul. 

Aher referring to Resolution 29 as "merely the shell," 
Mr. Foster goes on to describe his actual plan as follows: 
(Great Steel Strike, page 20) : 

"Its breath of life was in its strategy; in the way the organization 
work was to be prosecuted . . . The idea was to make a hurricane 
drive simultaneously in all the steel centers that would catch the workers' 
imagination and sweep them into the unions <?nwa5^tf . . . cooperating 
international unions were to recruit numbers of organizers and to send 
them to join the forces already being developed everywhere by the 
general organizers ... at least $250,000 (was) to be provided for the 
work. " 

This sum refers only to the initiation of the whirlwind 
campaign. As a matter of fact $1,005,007.72 was actually 
provided (Finance statement. Great Steel Strike, page 231). 

Moreover Mr. Foster says (page 236, line 6) : 

"The figures cited in the previous chapter as covering the general ex- 
penses, $1,005,007, is unusually low. . . . The United Mine Workers 
are authoritatively stated to have Fpent about $5,000,000 . . . about $400 
per man involved ... in the next campaign (next steel strike) all that 
must be different. The Unions will have to put some real money in the 
fight. Then they may win it. " 

Mr. Foster originated the plan of the steel strike. He 
was secretary-treasurer, one of the two most important 


officers, of the special committee that managed the strike, 
and the above account of how the steel strike was originated 
and carried out was deliberately given in a generally circu- 
lated volume which appeared six months after the end of the 

Moreover Mr. John Fitzpatrick, President of the special 
committee that organized and managed the steel strike 
gives, though in less detail, an exactly parallel account of 
the plan and the motives that were back of the attempted 
unionization of the steel industry. Mr. Fitzpatrick was the 
first witness before the Senate Committee. His statement 
was carefully prepared and conmiitted to memory as is 
obvious from the fact that when interrupted he began 
again to repeat word for word what he had previously been 
saying. He says (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 8, line 6) : 

" The labor organizations, realizing what tremendous influence the 
steel industry has on all other industries, made up its mind that it 
would have to organize the steel industry, no matter at what cost. " 

As to the origin of the Steel Strike Movement, Mr. 
Fitzpatrick again testified on the following page: 

"Senator Jones: Mr. Fitzpatrick, let me ask you, had the employees 
of the Steel Corporation made application to the American Federation of 
Labor for their organization or was the movement initiated by the 

"Jlfr. Fitzpatrick: The A. F. of L. instituted the movement." 

Mr. Fitzpatrick does say, and later, realizing the meaning 
of the insistence of this question as to who initiated the 
movement, Mr. Gompers emphasizes, but only in a very 
vague general way, what he had previously said in his letter 
to Judge Gary that * * upon the request of a number of men " 
in the employ of the U. S. Steel Corporation the American 
Federation of Labor had instituted the unionization move- 
ment. There is no possible question, however, as to the 
whole impression Mr. Fitzpatrick had and gave as to the 
initiation of the steel strike. In the part of his speech 


obviously committed to memory he states plainly and un- 
qualifiedly that the American Federation of Labor ** initi- 
ated" the unionization drive in the steel industry and he 
constantly comes back to the fact that it was: 

"absolutely imperative that the steel mills be organized, because it 
held the balance of the labor movement back " (Senate Hearings, page 
10, line 2). 

" Our position was to protect ourselves. We had to save our organi- 
zation, etc., etc. " (Senate Hearings, page 27, line 26). 

Mr. Tighe, President of the Amalgamated Iron, Steel and 
Tin Workers Union, which is the big union of the metal 
trades, stated definitely that one of the causes of the 1910 
strike, and he plainly indicated that it was a reason that still 
persisted, was that many other metal workers in his union 
*'had dropped out of the organization by reason of the fact 
that we were not taking an aggressive initiative attitude 
toward the (Steel) Corporation." 

In addition to these plain definite statements of the high- 
est officials among the strike leaders, that organized labor 
and not the steel workers initiated the unionization drive in 
the steel industry, is the strong circtmistantial evidence of 
the type of strategy used in the unionization drive. 

All the facts of the elaborate plans and preparations made 
to unionize the steel industry — the number of organizers 
required — the big sums of money — ^indicate of course that 
the drive expected opposition and had to be prepared to 
overcome that opposition. There are obviously but two 
possible sources of such opposition — the hostility or in- 
difference of the steel workers themselves or the hostility 
of the companies. It is equally obvious that in proportion 
as the organizers expected the opposition to be the indiffer- 
ence of the men, one type of organization strategy would be 
employed, and in proportion as they expected the chief op- 
position to come from the steel companies another type of 
strategy wotild be employed. 

Now it is entirely obvious that the steel companies could 


only fight the unionization movement in two ways, by hin- 
dering or persecuting the union organizers or by discharging 
the men who joined the unions. If the union organizers 
expected to be received and welcomed by the men and only 
this type of company opposition was to be overcome, it is 
plain that the best way to conduct such an organization 
campaign would be to hide their plans as much as possible 
from the steel companies, to keep their workers and work as 
inconspicuous as possible — to meet the men in small groups 
in their homes or otherwise and work from man to man. 
This would of course require large numbers of organizers 
and considerable money and time but the organization 
committee had money and a year's time. 

It is equally obvious that if this big opposition, which was 
being so elaborately prepared against, was to come from the 
hostility or indifference of the men themselves, that the best 
strategy to overcome such hostility or indifference was to 
play on collective mass psychology and mass enthusiasm to 
get the movement started and rush the men off their feet. 

" The idea, " says Mr. Foster, "was to make a hurricane drive simul- 
taneously in all the steel centers that would catch the workers' imagina- 
tions and sweep them into the unions en masse. . . . Great mass meetings 
built up by extensive advertising would be held everywhere at the same 
time throughout the steel industry . . . the heavy stream of men 
pouring into the imions would be turned into a decisive flood by the 
election of committees to formulate the grievances of the men and 
present these to the employers, etc., etc. " (Great Steel Strike ^ page 21). 

Again there is another group of facts which, by establish- 
ing clearly a strong motive, also constitutes at least strong 
circumstantial evidence as to who was responsible for the 
attempted unionization of the steel industry. These are 
the definite unquestioned facts as to the extent to which the 
labor organizations and the professional " organizers" would 
profit from the successful unionization of the steel industry. 

Out of the $1 ,005,007.72 put into the steel strike — a large 
part of this put in by the labor leaders themselves out of the 
treasuries of other workers they "represented" — some 


^348,50942 was put into the commissariat to supply food to 
"the small impoverished minority of the workers" who did 
not have enough money saved up to support themselves and 
their families the three months they did not work. This 
leaves a balance of over a half a million dollars which was 
spent in two ways, the chief of which was in pa5dng salaries 
to the principal, and a host of lesser, professional labor lead- 
ers, who were engaged in persuading the steel workers to 
accept them as "representatives." 

In the next strike into which "real money must be put " — 
Mr. Foster mentions a minimum of $5,000,000 — there will 
be some four or four and a half million dollars available— 
chiefly for paying salaries to a very much larger host of 
professional labor leaders. 

But this applies only to the unionization or strike period. 
Governor Allen of Kansas in his speech before the Harvard 
Union in April, 1921, stated that less than 4,000,000 Ameri- 
can workers, under the American Federation of Labor plan 
of trade union collective bargaining, are paying $50,000,000 
a year into the hands of 150,000 professional labor leaders 
who "represent" these workers in their collective bargain- 
ing. If the steel strike had succeeded the 500,000 workers, 
at an average of 50c a week dues— these are the dues of the 
United Mine Workers and are exceptionally low — would be 
paying $12,000,000 a year to its "representatives," a small 
percentage of which would be added to a cumulative strike 
benefit fund, a certain percentage for other benefits, but 
at least $7,000,000 to $9,000,000 of which would go every 
year to pay the office rent and salaries of about 20,000 
professional labor leaders to "represent " these steel workers 
in "collective bargaining" with the steel companies. 

Moreover as Mr. Fitzpatrick particulariy emphasized 
the unionization of the "key" steel industry would make it 
much easier to unionize other industries, which other indus- 
tries would yield correspondingly similar profits. 

As regards the origin of the campaign to "unionize" the 
steel workers then these points are plain as matters of fully 



established fact. The steel industry had for years enjoyed 
a conspicuous freedom from the labor troubles that had 
become more and more general. During a period in which 
the cost of living had gone up only about 80% steel wages 
had been voluntarily raised among the different classes of 
workers from 1 1 1 % to 163%. Relations between the com- 
panies and the men were apparently entirely satisfactory. 
The plan to attempt to unionize the steel industry was 
originated among professional labor leaders entirely un- 
connected with the industry. It is alleged that after the 
plan had thus been independently developed Mr. Foster 
submitted it to certain individuals or minor organizations 
in the industry but no evidence is presented or suggested as 
to who these were and Mr. Foster does not pretend that 
this changes the fact, and Mr. Fitzpatrick definitely states 
it to be a fact, that the initiation of the steel unionization 
drive was entirely with the A. F. of L. Moreover the whole 
scope of the plan of unionization as described by Mr. Foster, 
its author — ^the emphasis that was placed on its particular 
type of strategy — show plainly that those who originated it 
and were prepared to carry it through expected to meet the 
greatest indifference on the part of the workers themselves. 
Finally the immense profits in jobs and income and influ- 
ence which the successful unionization of such a great in- 
dustry would bring to the professional labor leaders who 
imionized it, establishes an entirely adequate motive to 
explain why such an effort should be made to seek to over- 
come this anticipated indifference on the part of the men 



^ The daily press at the time particulariy emphasized the 
influence of radicalism in the steel strike. It characterized 
Foster as the ''radical leader of the strike." Many of the 
witnesses for the steel companies before the Senate In- 
vestigating committee and witnesses and evidence presented 
by the government emphasized the radical influence in the 
stnke. Large quantities of radical literature were an- 
nounced as having been found in various strike centers and 
the U. S. Department of Justice arrested a number of men 
for radical agitation. Because of these facts and because of 
the widespread feeling as to the development of radicalism 
after the war, there is no question but that the pubHc 
thought radicaHsm a large factor in the steel strike. 

The Interchurch Report, however, flatly denies that this 
was true. It says in its conclusions : 

"13. Charges of Bolshevism or of industrial radicalism in the con- 
duct of the strike were without foundation." (Interciurch Report 
page 15, Ime 24). ^ * 

f.Z'^^^'f ? *^ interpretation of the strike as a Bolshevist plot 
failed entirely to substantiate it. On the contrary it tended to s^ow 
that this conception was without foundation in fact " (page 20, line 17). 

The Interchurch Report questions Mr. Gary's sincerity 
in charging radicaHsm in the steel strike (page 35, Kne 10) 

The Interchurch Report states the allegations in regard 
to radicahsm in the strike which it thus concludes are with- 
out foundations in fact, as follows: 










"... the allegation that the strike was plotted and led by Reds or 
syndicalists or Bolshevists, that it was supported mainly or entirely by 
alien radicals and that its real objects were the overthrow of established 
leaders and established institutions of organized labor and perhaps the 
overthrow of the established government of the coimtry" (page 21, 
line 18). 

This is undoubtedly not a fair or accurate statement of 
the charges made or the feelings held in regard to radicalism 
in the strike. These did not insist that the radicals involved 
were "alien" except in their point of view. The most con- 
spicuous leaders accused of radicalism were in fact known to 
be American citizens. Moreover it was probably never 
seriously felt, that the "direct objects" of the strike were 
the overthrow of established organized labor or of the es- 
tablished government of the country. All that was felt or 
seriously alleged was that the strike was conducted by men 
who had that general object and who meant to use the strike 
as far as possible as a step in that direction. 

This statement by the Interchurch Report of the allega- 
tions of radicalism are so precise and definite, however, 
that it offers perhaps the most simple outline on which to 
analyze the question of radicalism in the strike. 

The first allegation as stated and denied by the Inter- 
church Report is : 

" The strike was plotted and led by Reds or syndicalists or 

The idea and the plan and the strategy of the steel strike 
were originated by Mr. William Z. Foster personally. 

Mr. Foster states this fact specifically and with details 
as to steps of procedure, in his book The Great Steel Strike, 
page 27, which has already been quoted extensively. This 
fact was also alleged frequently dming the strike and was 
never publicly ofiicially denied by labor leaders and as far 
as is known never denied at all. The Interchurch Report 
.itself states (page 157, line i): 

"He (Foster) saw the stockyards unorganized, the steel industry 
unorganized. Instead of merely trying to sting the A. F. of L. into 


moving . . . he thought out a plan of action . . . He took the plan to Mr. 
Fitzpatrick who saw its possibilities, the A. F. of L. indorsed it, etc. " 

Moreover the Interchurch Report constantly features 
Foster as the conspicuous moving spirit of the steel strike. 

There is no question that Mr. Foster had been a pro- 
nounced and extreme radical. He had been secretary of the 
Syndicalist League of North America — had been a conspicu- 
ous leader of the I. W. W.— had been the official delegate 
from these organizations to the world famous radical con- 
vention in Buda Pesth. Through a period of years he had 
not only written a widely circulated book on radicalism but 
had been a constant contributor to ultra radical magazines. 
In these various writings he had said : 

"The wages system is the most brazen and gigantic robbery ever 
perpetrated ... the thieves at present in control of the industries 
must be stripped of their booty . . . this social reorganization will be 
a revolution. ... For years progressive workers have realized the 
necessity for this revolution. They have also realized that it must 
be brought about by . . . themselves ... the Syndicalist . . . con- 
siders the state a meddling capitalist institution. ... He is a radical 
opponent of 'law and order' as he knows that for his unions to be l^al 
in their tactics would be for them to become impotent. . . . With him 
the end justifies the means. Whether his tactics be legal and moral or 
not does not concern him so long as they are effective. ... He pro- 
poses to develop, r^ardless of capitalist's conceptions of legality, fair- 
ness, right, etc., a greater power than his capitalist enemies have . . . 
He proposes to bring about the revolution by the general strike. 
Besides its program of incessant skirmishes (ordinary strikes) the trade 
union is engaged in the work of int^^-al emancipation ... Its fun- 
damental task is to take possession of the social wealth now in the hands 
of the bourgeois class and to reorganize society on a communist basis. 
. . . Every great strike is accompanied by violence . . . but the pro- 
spect of bloodshed does not frighten the syndicalist worker ... he has 
no sentimental regard for what may happen to his enemies during the 
general strike." Excerpts Senate Hearings, page 387, 394, 392, 417, 418. 

These writings were all shown by the Senate Investigat- 
ing Committee to Mr. Foster and were acknowledged by 
him as his own. 

Such was the man who conceived and planned the Steel 


Strike. Moreover Mr. Foster was one of the two principal 
officers of the committee who organized the strike. His 
name was one of the five signed to the letter asking the 
conference with Judge Gary which conference was to put the 
steel industry on a trade union collective bargaining basis 
with Mr. Foster as one of the official bargainers. These 
are all matters of printed record. 

Moreover, Mr. Foster not only personally conceived and 
developed the plan of the steel strike and was one of the 
two highest official leaders in organizing and conducting the 
strike but there can be no doubt that his ability and per- 
sonality made him the dominant factor on the labor side. 

Of the labor leaders who appeared before the Senate 
Committee one was obviously a strong, sincere, stubborn 
fighter but with a mind palpably slow and awkward. When 
he got away from his set speech or from questions that could 
be answered by stock phraseology, he floundered, made 
ridiculous statements and contradicted himself to an extent 
that was only saved from being himiorous by his obvious 
sincerity. Some of the other labor leaders that appeared 
before the Senate Committee showed skill in parrying and 
thrusting with verbal phrases, appeared adroit, experienced 
manipulators and negotiators but were patently opportun- 
ists and fundamentally "soft." 

Mr. Foster stood out. He was a dynamic force. He 
showed quick, keen insight and sure power of mind and 
tongue. No one can read the whole of the Senate testimony 
and particularly Mr. Foster's testimony, which for over an 
hour constituted a battle of wits between Mr. Foster and the 
five experienced cross-examiners who made up the Senate 
Committee, and not realize that with his particular ability 
and his official position, Mr. Foster must inevitably have 
been the dominant factor among the strike leaders. 

The men at the head of the steel companies and the men 
at the head of our public press are presumably familiar 
with the general workings of committee management — 
including the disproportionate influence of any dominant 


personality in that management, — and also at least aver- 
age judges of human nature. Both the steel men and the 
newspaper men undoubtedly knew well before the strike 
the notorious history of Mr. Foster including his beliefs 
and points of view. They knew that he originated and 
planned the unionization drive of the steel industry and of 
course knew his official position on the managing committee 
and the committee that sought to make itself the instru- 
ment of collective bargaining in the steel industry. They 
undoubtedly also knew, what the Interchurch Report ad- 
mits, that radicals were actively agitating among the steel 
workers. They undoubtedly knew also, what the Inter- 
church and Mr. Foster freely admit — that the unionization 
work was being most conspicuously carried on among the 
foreigners who were most inclined and most susceptible to 

On the basis of these outstanding facts, all known before 
the strike, there can be no question, not only that the steel 
officials who were asked to turn over a considerable part of 
the management of their industry to a collective bargaining 
arrangement with such a committee, but the leaders of the 
press, were justified in believing and charging that the 
"strike was plotted and led by reds and syndicalists or 
bolshevists." Moreover that they were entirely right about 
this was freely admitted by Mr. Foster as soon as the steel 
strike was over, and is also admitted (as will be emphasized 
later) in the later and more obscure sections of the Inter- 
church Report. 

All this evidence as to the extreme radicalism of the 
man who was one of the two most officially prominent, 
and who in the public mind was the most conspicuous 
of the strike leaders, was so widely published at the time 
and radicalism became such a prominent factor in the strike 
situation that the strike leaders made a special effort, par- 
ticularly before the Senate Committee, to offset this im- 
pression. This effort was made along two lines: first, to 
show that Mr. Foster had given up his radicalism; and 



second, to show that Mr. Foster was not really an important 
factor in the strike management. 

In the Senate Hearings, Part I, page 77, Mr. Fitzpatrick 
testified in regard to Mr. Foster and his radical views: 

" They are things that are past and gone . . . they have not got any- 
thing on Foster except something that has been dead and buried so long 
that it has no more use . . . absolutely they are not his present views. 
. . . (He is) absolutely confining himself to the activities and scope 
of the American Federation of Labor." 

In regard to Mr. Foster's alleged change of attitude Mr. 
Gompers testified as follows : 

" Chairman: You say then, do you, Mr. Gompers, that his (Foster's) 
views expressed by him in his book on Syndicalism and his views ex- 
pressed at the time you speak of have changed? 

" Mr. Gompers: I have no doubt and I have no hesitancy in saying so, 
sir."' (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 1 12, line 26.) 

Mr. Foster himself was cross-examined at great length 
by the Senate Committee as to whether or not he still 
held his old syndicalist views. His first line of defense 
was to assert that his personal views were not material 
as he was working with the American Federation of Labor. 
This point of view the Senators refused to accept and 
they presented to him extensive excerpts from a volume 
and pamphlets and letters which he was alleged to have 
previously written, each of which Mr. Foster acknowl- 
edged as his own writing and his own views at the time they 
were written. In each of these cases he was particularly 

' "Foster is just back from Russia where he was in touch with Lenin 
and Trotzky. Judging from his own statements no man visiting the 
Soviet was ever treated better. . . . Immediately upon his return to 
the United States he proceeds to organize the Trade Union Educational 
League. Presumably Foster is the educator . . . Back of that resolu- 
tion (Foster's) is the propaganda of radical revolution to overthrow 
the Constitution of the United States . . . and William Z. Foster 
wants to become an autocrat of America." 

Samuel Gompers, 
April 30, 1922. 


pressed to state whether or not he held the same opinions 
at the time of the strike. Mr. Foster evaded direct answer 
to such questions with great cleverness by giving such an- 
swers as *' Well, I have my own ideas about the functions of 
government of course :" *' That does not seem to be a very 
startling proposition nowadays :" * ' No. I would not state 
it that way now.'* *' I do not think I would state it in ex- 
actly the same terms but I believe the men in the industries 
as far as possible should be given a right to operate those 
industries. " "I wouldn't go that far probably, ' ' and other- 
wise skillfully evaded being cornered into saying specifically 
that his convictions had changed from his former extreme 
radicalism to any material degree. 

Thus the much heralded "repudiation" of Mr. Foster's 
past radical views consisted merely of a repudiation of 
them for him by his fellow leaders in organized labor. 

The Liberator, the leading organ of the Syndicalist Party 
said at this time (issue of Dec, 191 9) of Mr. Foster: 

" The intellectual honesty which distinguishes his tjrpe prevented him 
when on the stand at Washington from even pretending to disavow his 
motives. And though his present tactics enjoin a discreet silence about 
those motives, they are an open secret. He is in the A. F. of L. to assist 
that organization in its transformation into a modern labor organiza- 

The second argument by which the strike leaders sought 
to overcome the charge of radicalism in the steel strike on 
account of Mr. Foster's radical views, was by emphasizing 
Mr. Foster's unimportance in the unionizing and strike 

Mr. Fitzpatrick dwelt at length in his testimony on the 
fact that the strike was called and was entirely managed 
by twenty-four International Unions and avoided any men- 
tion of Mr. Foster's connection with the strike until specifi- 
cally asked, and then insisted that Foster was absolutely 
confining himself to the "activities and scope of the Amer- 
ican Federation of Labor." 

Mr. Gompers after carefully describing the strike as an 



effort of twenty-four International Unions went out of his ^jH 
way to insist: ^fl!^ 

"Mr. Foster is not an executive officer; he is not a member of that 
body. He has been chosen by them as secretary to perform the secre- 
tarial work." (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 1 12, line 34.) 

In view of the fact that Mr. Foster had just previously 
planned and successfully led the stockyards* strike— one 
of the greatest victories organized labor had achieved in 
a good many years— that he had originated and set in mo- 
tion the whole steel organization plan, and that the carrying 
out of that whole plan had been deferred till he was person- 
ally free to put his energy into it— that in all labor's own 
official documents in connection with the strike Mr. Foster 
is referred to, and deferred to, far more frequently than any 
other labor leader — ^and particularly in view of the compara- 
tive quality of mental strength and energy which all the 
evidence shows Mr. Foster to possess, this statement of 
Mr. Gompers, volunteered under the circumstances, can 
hardly evoke more than a smile. 

The Interchurch Report while it states the same conclu- 
sion as that of the strike leaders, namely that radicalism was 
not a factor in the strike, reaches this conclusion by quite 
another course of reasoning, to which particular attention 
is called. 

Instead of denjring Mr. Foster's importance in the strike 
the Interchurch Report insists (page 35, line 7) Mr. Foster 
was a ' * causative factor in the strike. ' ' It speaks of the whole 
organizing strike movement as "the Foster machine" (page 
153, line 21). It calls him the "large scale promoter" of the 
unionizing movement (page 157, line 14); as "Inactive 
charge of the organization drive" (page 169, line 32), and 
toward the end of the book, devotes ten continuous pages 
chiefly to Mr. Foster's importance in the steel strike and 
otherwise frankly recognizes him as the dominant factor on 
the labor side. 

Moreover the Interchurch Report carefully avoids not 



only any admission but any direct discussion of Mr. Foster's 
alleged "repudiation of radicalism" by attacking this 
question offensively instead of defensively. It accuses the 
steel companies of having "dug up" Mr. Foster's syndical- 
ist book and his voluminous writings on radicalism and of 
having borne the expense of reprinting these documents and 
. supplying them to the newspapers. In other words instead 
of arguing the question on its merits as to whether Mr. 
Foster, who the Interchurch Report itself features as the 
"large scale promoter" of the strike, was an ultra radical, 
an I. W. W. and a syndicalist or not, it attempts to evade 
and cover up these questions with a counter charge which it 
concludes merely with the counter question: 

"... the question was Mr. Foster really sincere in recanting 
syndicalism inevitably raises the other question, was Mr. Gary really 
sincere in charging Bolshevism? It seemed best to leave such analysis 
to speculative psychologists." 

After thus side-stepping the first point at issue as to radi- 
calism in the steel strike, the Interchurch Report seeks to 
justify its conclusion that radicalism was not a factor in the 
strike by the other argument used by the strike leaders 
themselves, namely: that Mr. Foster, irrespective of his 
personal views, was, as far as the steel strike was concerned, 
working entirely along standard trade union lines. 

Whatever weight, however, might otherwise be given to 
this argument, which both the strike leaders and the Inter- 
church Report strive so hard to maintain, is entirely over- 
balanced by two further groups of evidence, the first con- 
sisting ot Mr. Foster's own account of the history and aims 
of the steel strike as stated in his book the Great Steel 
Strike and second, the last two chapters of the Interchurch 
Report itself in which, in a lengthy technical discussion of 
the relation of the steel strike to the labor movement, the 
Interchurch Report entirely contradicts its conclusions in 
the front of the book and entirely bears out Mr. Foster's 
own evidence that the steel strike was not only plotted by 


an alien-minded radical, but, at least as far as Foster's 
faction in the leadership was concerned, was a deliberate 
attempt on an immense scale to further substantially the 
same type of radical aims as those Foster had expressed in 
his book on syndicalism and which aims, the Interchurch 
Report states, the whole American Federation of Labor 
were "in 1919 forced automatically into considering." 

Rousseau pointed out over a century ago that the minor- 
ity laboring class, if it were organized as a unit, could, with- 
out any positive action, but merely by stopping work and 
doing nothing, exert a more powerful pressiire on all society 
than could be exerted by all the rest of society in spite of its 
numerical superiority or any superior ability or leadership. 
Concretely, if it could be organized and persuaded to do so, 
coal labor or railroad labor or steel labor or the labor of any 
other basic industry cotdd, by merely slowing up work, de- 
crease production and raise prices to the whole country— 
or by stopping work and shutting off the nation's supply of 
coal or steel or raih*oad service or some other vital national 
necessity, bring more pressure on modem society to enforce 
its own interests irrespective of general social interests 
than can be exerted in any other way by any other class or 
by all other classes. Moreover society is particularly help- 
less against any such united action on the part of all the 
workers of any industry for it can find no adequate sub- 
stitute for the labor of a whole industry. Even if it sought 
to make such action by the labor of a whole industry unlaw- 
ful, which it at present is not, it is futile to attempt to fine a 
largely propertyless class, and radical leaders have more 
than once dared a government to try to put all the workers 
of a great industry in jail. 

These particular facts and conditions in modem industry 
have been seized on by radicalism as the basis of its organiza- 
tion because in them radicalism sees its one hope of realizing 
its aims. 

The "general strike" which Mr. WilHam Z. Foster con- 
tinually refers to in passages akeady quoted and elsewhere. 


as the method by which syndicalism, I. W. W.ism, etc., 
proposed to bring about the seizure of industry, is necessar- 
ily based on the organization of all the workers in an industry 
and their control as a unit. 
Mr. George Soule says in his "New Unionism," page 191 : 

"An analysis of the strat^y of the (new) unionism will discover in 
it two fundamental objectives to which all other policies are subor- 
dinated. The first is to organize all the workers in the industry; the 
second is to develop them . . . into a class-conscious army able and 
ready to assiune control of industry. " 

This radical plan of labor organization is called "radical 
unionism," "revolutionary unionism" or "industrial union- 
ism," all meaning the same thing and is also spoken of as 
the One Big Union Idea. This is the form of labor organiza- 
tion on which the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the 
I. W. W. and the W. 1. 1. U. are all built, and on which syndi- 
calism, Bolshevism and all other kinds of radicalism insist. 

The ordinary form of trade union is organized craft by 
craft instead of industry by industry because the craft union 
contributes best to the purposes of ordinary trade unionism. 
The industrial union on the other hand, and every step to- 
ward industrial unionism is distinctly a step toward radical- 
ism because the industrial form of organization is incompat- 
ible with the objects of ordinary trade unionism and inher- 
ently works toward radical ends. 

As a result therefore, there has been for years a constant 
conflict between the advocates of craft unionism and of 
industrial unionism. 

When Mr. William Z. Foster left the I. W. W. and joined 
the A. F. of L. under whose auspices he conducted the steel 
strike, he definitely stated in his letter of October 4, 1914, 
to his fellow radicals his purposes in doing so. He said : 

"I am satisfied from my observation that the only way for the 
I. W. W. to have the workers adopt and practice the principles of revolu- 
tionary (industrial) unionism is to give up the attempt to create a new 



labor movement . . . get into the organized labor movement and by 
building up better fighting machines within the old unions, . . .revolu- 
tionize these tmions. 

"Yours for revolution, 

"William Z. Foster." 

As soon as he became a member of the A. F. of L. Mr. 
Foster at once began putting "a more eflFective fighting 
machine" into operation with conspicuous success in the 
stockyards strike and at least with great energy and deter- 
mination in the steel strike. These two facts as well as his 
announcement that he intended to build up in the A. F. of 
L. a radical fighting machine, make it particularly pertinent 
to examine the type of machine which Mr. Foster tried to 
build up, and to a certain extent did build up, in the steel 

In regard to Mr. Foster's plan and organization in the 
steel strike the Interchurch Report says (page 157, line i): 

"The committee attempted to carry the temporary and artificial 
ttnity of the 24 Internationals into permanent organization in two 
directions. One was in setting up District Steel Councils, designed to 
maintain imited or quasi-industrial action in dealing with separate 
plants. . . . The other Committee effort specifically authorized by 
the May 25 congress was towards setting up a national council or Iron 
and Steel Department within the A. F. of L. " 

Thus the whole plan of the unionization of the steel in- 
dustry involved a unionizing effort which was contrary to all 
former trade union practises and conspicuously suspicious 
of industrial unionism. That the whole tendency of the 
movement was suspiciously in that direction was emphasized 
by Mr. Gompers' warning that his "Endorsement (of the 
plan) in no way meant any personal leaning toward the 
One Big Union idea." 

Moreover, in regard to the operation of the plan in certain 
particulars, Mr. Foster says, 

"He saw the stockyards unorganized, the steel industry unor- 
ganized. . . . He thought out a plan of action which was to get all 
the unions having 'claims' on stockyard trades, to unite in one on- 
slaught . . . and they led the united unions triumphantly through the 
stockyards. Then they turned to steel." 

In the next paragraph, the Interchurch Report speaks 
of the proposition of consolidating the efforts of a score of 
imions to control a whole industry as **a prospectus of 
trust magnitude" of which Mr. Foster was the "large scale 
promoter," which prospectus of trust magnitude was man- 
aged as a unit by a single small strike committee of which 
Mr. Foster was the prominent member and which committee 
the Interchurch Report speaks of as at least a "specious 
industrial effort." 

Moreover that the existence and functioning of this 
committee definitely worked toward industrial unionism is 
later specifically stated by the Interchurch Report when it 
says on page 176, line 11 : 

"This splendid solidarity and rapid modification of trade union tactics 
and institutions to meet an emergency is probably without a parallel in 
American labor annals. " {Great Steel Strike, page 214, line 17.) 

and he otherwise emphasizes the revolutionary significance 
of the steel campaign in trade union practise, the revolution- 
ary significance being all in the direction of revolutionary 
industrial unionism. 

In other words, the unionization drive in the steel indus- 
try while it did not nominally and perhaps not technically 
attempt to organize industrial unionism in that industry in 
that it recognized the rights and turned over a certain per- 
centage of the members secured to craft unions, did con- 
template and largely achieve such a coordination of present 
unions with a single small organization in charge of union- 
izing and strike work, that it was in its operation and effect 
equivalent to the radical One Big Union plan. Finally and 
most important of all it had the same effect as the One Big 
Union idea in that it attempted to tie up a whole industry 


: I'i 


irrespective of whether large classes. of the workers had 
grievances or not. 

Again the strike leaders' report in regard to the number 
of steel workers *' organized" and the way they were ap- 
portioned to the different craft unions is very significant 
in this connection. This report which is reproduced in both 
the Interchurch Report and the Great Steel Strike show that 
according to the strike leaders' own figures, 40% of all the 
steel workers enrolled were not thus turned over to the craft 
unions. How this 40% which were not turned over to craft 
unions would have been organized if the steel strike had 
succeeded and the union organization had become permanent 
can only be surmised, but the 40% which were not turned 
over to craft unions would certainly have made a very effec- 
tive nucleus for an industrial union in the steel industry. 

Finally the Interchiu-ch Report specifically admits (page 
160, paragraph 2) that: 

" In many plants the instinct of the immigrant recruit was to associate 
with his shopmates of different crafts rather than with his craft mates 
from other shops. He fell more easily into a shop or plant union which 
however would have been an industrial union. Some local leaders so 
organized him. Thus an internal conflict arose ... the artificial 
harmony of the 24 International Unions conflicted with the inexperienced 
immigrant drift (?) toward real industrial unionism" 

If, in view of this array of facts, Mr. Foster who had come 
into the A. F. of L. for the express purpose of working to 
turn it into a radical or industrial union organization, had 
been able successfully to carry out his plan by winning the 
steel strike, it seems impossible to doubt that such a success 
following such a success as the stockyards unionization 
would have been regarded as so great a strategic triumph 
for the radical influences within the A. F. of L. that it would 
have constituted a most important advance for all radical 
influence in American industry. That, irrespective of its 
defeat, Mr. Foster himself regarded the steel strike as a 
marked victory for radical unionism, is not only clearly 
indicated by a careful reading of his whole book, the Great 



Steel Strike but is specially emphasized in the last chapter 
which is devoted to showing that the steel strike marked a 
great advance in trade union methods and practises which 
advance he describes as follows : 

"For many years radicals in this coimtry have . . . maintained that 
the trade tmions are fundamentally non-revolutionary. ... If they 
were to look sharply they would see that the trade imion movement is 
traveling faster than any other body toward the end they wish to 
reach. . . . Like various other social movements (trade unions) have 
more or less instinctively surrounded themselves with a sort of camou- 
flage or pTotective colouring designed to disguise the movement and thus 
to pacify and disarm the opposition. This is the fimction of such ex- 
pressions as 'a fair day's pay for a fair day's work' — 'the interests of 
capital and labor are identical,' etc. In actual practice little or no atten- 
tion is paid to them. They are for foreign (public) consumption. ... 
It is an indisputable fact that the trade unions always act upon the 
policy of taking all they can get. . . . They are as insatiable as the 
veriest so-called revolutionary imions. ... In every coimtry they 
are constantly . . . solidifying their ranks, building ever more gigantic 
and militant combinations . . . and they are going incomparably faster 
towards this goal than any of the much advertised so-called re- 
volutionary imions" (Excerpts, Great Steel Strike, pages 255-265). 

In spite of the Interchurch Report's insistence in its 
"Conclusions" in Chapter I and in its discussion of radical- 
ism in the steel strike in Chapter II, that the strike was not 
"plotted and led by reds or syndicalists or Bolshevists and 
that "its real objects were not the overthrow of established 
leaders and established institutions of organized labor," 
parts of Chapters VI and VII at the end of the book not 
only show plainly and in detail that the authors of the 
Interchurch Report knew Foster's radical views — ^knew that 
he had come into the A. F. of L. merely to use it as a vehicle 
to radical ends but these chapters constitute through page 
after page only a thinly veiled glorification of Foster and 
his aims. The Interchurch Report says : 


' Mr. Foster's business might be described as making the labor move- 
ment move. . . . When he took up making the labor movement 




move, he tried it first as a very intense syndicalist, an I. W. W. outside 
the trade unions. Little motion resulting, he 'repudiated' syndicalist 
methods and joined the Railroad Carmen's union in order to 'bore from 
within * the A. F. of h. In the steel campaign he was most intensely boring 
from within and the labor movement knew it and let him bore. It was 
considered that his boring might be through the unions but was cer- 
tainly against the anti-union employers. That is, he decided the labor 
movement was the A. F. of L. and not the I. W. W. and that his job 
was making the A. F. of L. move. . . . ' 

"It ('boring from within') did not mean a campaign among the steel 
workers at the end of which they voted the I. W. W. ticket. . . . It does 
mean putting inside the trade unions radical minded men who will make 
more trade tmionists. It does involve the possibility that . . . these 
radically minded organizers may convert the trade unions if they can. . . . 
The real problem which confronts the A.F.of L. ... is industrial union- 
ism and the larger side of it is not borers but economic conditions 
. . . which latterly have exposed weaknesses in craft imions and have 
driven them to essay amalgamations and other approximations of industrial 
organization. When a craft imion on strike sees brother imions in the 
same industry sticking to work . . . that craft imion begins to do a lot 
more thinking about industrial unionism. . . . When craft unions 
promulgate ambitions as did the A.F.of L. in igig {date of the steel strike) 
. . . they are forced automatically to considering industrial union prob- 
Urns'* (Interchurch Report Excerpts, pages 156-159).* 

This whole quotation — ^in fact most of the entire section 
from which it was taken continually resorts to the "under- 

» It will be better appreciated after reading Chapter XXIV of the 
present analysis that the Interchurch Report constantly faces this 
dilemma: Its basic policy puts it under the necessity of white- washing 
the whole strike movement to the general public and at the same time 
urging upon the working classes the desirability of industrial as con- 
trasted with craft unionism. As part of that argument it constantly 
points out in this section how the A. F. of L. in the steel strike was forced 
to "various specious industrial efiEorts, " or to " quasi-inj u^/ria/ action, " 
or to "leaning towards the One Big Union Idea, " all leading up to the 
present definitely stated point of view, which Foster and Debs and " Big 
Bill" Heywood and all ultra-radicals insist on, namely that industrial 
conditions are making industrial (radical) imionism necessary and in- 
evitable and therefore the workers should repudiate craft unionism and 
adopt industrial unionism. (See also pages 343 to 345 of the present 



cover" phraseology of technical radical terms which are 
carefully calculated to convey much more meaning to those 
who are familiar with these terms than to outsiders. 

The Third International, in its convention July, 1921 at 
Moscow, is on record as officially recognizing three different 
radical programs in America:— that of the I. W. W. which 
is seeking to radicalize the American worker; Big Bill Hey- 
wood represents this group which has just been awarded 3 
of the 16 American votes in the supreme world radical 
council; — that of the "independents" like Foster who are 
"boring from within" the A. F. of L. and who have just 
been awarded 2 of America's 16 votes; and that of the 
"New unions" (described by Mr. Soule in his book, the New 
Unionism), chief among which is the Amalgamated Cloth- 
ing Workers, who are organizing chiefly the foreign workers 
into industrial unions and whose power has just been greatly 
increased by being awarded 11 of America's 16 votes in the 
Third International. 

To any one who is familiar with these facts and the 
phraseology used and its real meaning, the above quotations 
from the Interchurch Report, taken in connection with the 
voluminous intervening context, plainly show without any 
regard to any other information about the individuals who 
wrote them, that those individuals intimately S5niipathize 
with the "industrial unionism" for which Mr. Foster stands, 
but regard "boring from within" the A. F. of L. as too 
indirect and subject to too much antagonism to be an effec- 
tive way of advancing "industrial unionism." They ob- 
viously believe and glory in the fact that the A. F. of L. is 
rapidly progressing toward "industrial tmionism" but they 
believe this progress is less because of the influence of such 
men as Foster than because it is being forced, by the class- 
conscious ambitions of certain types of labor and by its own 
chauvinistic ambitions, to see that craft union principles 
continually handicap it and that the only real scope for 
those ambitions is along the line of industrial unionism. 
Even without the eulogy of the Amalgamated Clothing 


Workers, the open approval or disapproval of each other 
form of labor organization in proportion as its theories and 
practises do or do not coincide with those of the A. C. W., 
makes it entirely obvious that the authors of the Inter- 
church Report are in intimate sympathy with this latest 
third type of revolutionary unionism, — ^the so-called "New 
Unionism" — ^and look at the whole labor problem ac- 

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers, whose radical aims 
are specifically stated in the preamble to its constitution, — 
which Mr. Heywood, the escaped I. W. W. leader, especially 
referred to in his speech before the Moscow Radical 
convention as "one of the few favorable influences 
in America" and which is the chief exponent of the "New 
Unionism," is defended by Mr. George Soule in the June 
8th, 1 92 1 issue of the Nation as not actually being radical 
on the grounds that its members have not "marched in 
with red flags and taken possession of the factories" or 
"thrown bombs into the City Hall." 

Following the same line of argument, the Interchurch 
Report concludes that because the "steel strike did not 
mean a campaign among the workers at the end of which 
they voted the I. W. W. ticket," that therefore the whole 
strike was not radical but on the contrary " extremely old- 
fashioned." Such a course of reasoning, however, will un- 
doubtedly seem to the average American to show, not that 
the steel strike was less radical, but that the authors of the 
Interchvu-ch Report are more so. 

Not only, however, is it a matter of the plainest fact that 
the steel strike was planned and as far as its most prominent 
leader was concerned, "led by alien-minded radicals" — 
whose object was to go as far as possible in "overthrowing 
the established principles of organized labor" ; not only is it 
plainly admitted by Mr. Foster and the Interchurch Report 
that the whole organization movement verged so close to 
"industrial" union as to be "without parallel in American 
labor annals" but there is ample evidence that radicalism 


in the steel strike permeated the rank and file of the strikers 

This was repeatedly alleged by the managers and better 
class of workers who were called as witnesses by the steel 
companies and also was conspicuously evident in the testi- 
mony of strikers that the Senate Investigating Committee 
picked at random on the streets of the steel towns. The 
fact that these men testified in practically the same words 
of broken English that they were striking for "eight horn- 
day — no boss — dollar an hour — ^government run mills — 
get on street car — no pay nickel — government run street 
cars, etc.," speaks for itself. 

In regard to all such evidence of radicalism among the 
rank and file of the strikers the Interchurch Report in its 
second chapter insists that all great strikes are always taken 
advantage of by independent radical proselyters and that 
this must have been particularly the case in a strike involv- 
ing so many illiterate foreigners as the steel strike, but that 
such a fact cannot be held against the strike leadership. 
Moreover the Interchurch Report further insists in its 
second chapter that in this strike, of the large ntunber of 
radicals arrested in many districts, few if any were tried and 
convicted. ' It states that certain radicals who attempted to 
go among the men or circulate radical literature were pre- 

'The Interchurch Report tries to give the impression that the fact that 
men arrested as radicals were not convicted indicated that there was 
little or no evidence of their radicalismi. Pages 911 through 951 of the 
Senate Hearings are devoted to detailed and specific evidence of radical- 
ism in the steel strike and of prominent strike leaders who were radicals, 
including the president of the strikers' organization at Gary, also their 
attorney, Paul Glaser, an I. W. W. worker who admitted to govern- 
ment officials, "you bet I am a Bolshevik " and dared the officials to try 
and do something about it (page 925). The reason why these men were 
not convicted was not lack of evidence but as Senator McKellar re- 
marked (page 945) because "we have a very liberal provision in our 
Constitution about the freedom of the press and freedom of speech." 
Yet the Interchurch Report devotes pages to discussing the infringement 
of the right of free speech in the steel strike. 


vented by the labor leaders. It emphasizes that local steel 
ofl&cials offered insufficient proof for their allegation of 
radicalism in the strike; and it particularly emphasizes that 
in certain instances I. W. W. leaders and Mr. Eugene V. 
Debs "severely criticized the whole plan in public speeches. 
It was necessary to send a committee to Debs before he could be 
induced to drop the subject'' (Interchurch Report, page 36, 
line 1 5) . Incidentally it would be interesting to know what 
this committee said to Debs that he thus so quickly changed 
his point of view as to the steel strike. 

Again, however, all these arguments in Chapter II of the 
Interchurch Report entirely lose whatever weight they 
might otherwise have in face of the fact that the Interchurch 
Report itself in Chapter VI entirely repudiates them and 
devotes page after page to showing that radical points of view 
on the part of the strikers were primary causative factors in 
the strike. In describing what it calls the " psychological 
causes" of the strike the Interchurch Report, beginning 
page 148, line 12, says: 

"Whetting this state of discontent were two other psychological 
factors . . . together they were far more important than Mr. Gompers, 
or Mr. Foster or anybody, possibly except Mr. Gary. . . . 

" The data before the Commission show that at the beginning of the 
steel strike workers in great numbers had the liveliest expectation of 
governmental assistance . . . some believed Mr. Wilson will rim the 


"The second psychological factor . . . sprang from events in Europe. 
The news of two years' happenings there deeply influenced all labor 
but the evidence indicates peculiar influence on steel workers, " these 
foreign influences being, "news of the probability or possibility of a 
labor government of the British Empire . . . (and) the 'Russian idea' 
embedded in the mind of the great majority of immigrant workers . . . 
that the Russian government is a laboring man's government. " 

In view of the fact which will be emphasized later in de- 
tail, that the unionization drive and the strike at no time 
had the active support of more than 20% of the steel workers 
and that these were almost entirely from the "mass of low- 
skilled foreigners" these statements by the Interchurch 



Report that " Steel workers in great numbers had the liveliest 
expectation of governmental assistance — that some believed 
"Mr. Wilson will run the mills"— that the "fact that the 
Russian government is a laboring man's government (was) 
embedded in the minds of the great majority of the immigrant 
workers" and that these "were psychological factors" of 
major importance in causing the strike can hardly mean 
anything else to the average American than a strong bias 
towards radicalism on the part of such "great majority of 
inmiigrant workers." The fact that the Interchurch Re- 
port does not seem to regard such a point of view as radical 
again may merely indicate not that the steel strike was less 
radical but that the authors of the Interchurch Report are 
more so. 


> 9 





As a general proposition leadership is of primary impor- 
tance in any movement but this is not necessarily nor uni- 
versally true. There are conspicuous instances of events or 
movements which have originated spontaneously and, 
though perhaps coordinated by leadership, have developed 
and moved independently and irrespective of that leadership. 

In spite of the fact, therefore, that the whole idea and 
plan of the steel unionization movement which culminated 
in the strike, was plainly originated outside the steel indus- 
try by men who had no connection with the steel industry 
and at least some of whom had ulterior motives, it is still 
possible that when that plan was once put into operation, 
the steel workers themselves might have been so conscious 
of their grievance and so eager for any favorable opportunity 
for seeking a remedy, that their own impetus and influence 
in the organization effort and the drive made all leadership, 
and so all facts as to the origin of the plan itself and as to 
the radical or other motives of the stiike leaders, entirely 

This is precisely the point of view toward the whole strike 
movement which the Interchurch Report takes. It says 
in its "Conclusions," page 15: 

" 12. No interpretation of the movement as a plot or c»nspiracy fits 
the facts; that is, it was a tnass movement in which leadership became of 
secondary importance. " 



In Chapter VI (page 153, line 21), irrespective of the long 
eulogies of Foster and his organizing ability and his scheme 
already quoted which occur in almost succeeding pages, the 
Interchurch Report says: 

" To the very end the Foster machine was a poor thing as a system of 
control; the strike moved on its own legs; it was a walkout of rank and 

In Spite of the lengthy emphasis which it later puts on the 
brilliancy and strategy of Foster's plan and of what Mr. 
Fitzpatrick and the A. F. of L. thought of its possibilities 
and of how it won triumphantly in the stockyards cam- 
paign, in the argument in connection with its featured 
"Conclusions," the Interchurch Report passes this all over 
with the statement (page 144, line 27 and 147, line 17): 

" The labor movement initiated the organizing campaign, invited by 
the steel workers, according to the labor leaders, invading where it 
was not wanted according to the employers. Both statements are 
correct and neither lays emphasis on the principal fact . . . these steel 
workers are more important than their leaders. ..." 

" It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a strike does not consist 
of a plan and a call for a walkout. There has been many a call with no 
resultant walkout; there has been many a strike with no preceding 
plan or call at all. Strike conditions are conditions of mind. ..." 

"What made 300,000 steel workers leave the mills on September 22 
and stay away in greater or fewer numbers for a period up to three and 
a half months? " 

But did 300,000 steel workers leave the mills on Septem- 
ber 22d or did any important proportion of 300,000 stay 
away from the mills anything like three and a half months? 
The Interchurch Report offers no evidence that they did, 
and there is every evidence that they did not. 

It is true that at the time of the strike the strike leaders 
issued flaming statements that over 300,000 men were out, 
just as it is true that before the Presidential election a year 
later, the Democratic poHtical leaders issued flaming state- 
ments announcing in statistical detail the rising flood of 
Democratic sentiment which was sweeping the country to 



overwhelm the Republicans; and just as it is true that in 
any great movement dealing with average psychology, 
leaders invariably talk in big figures of sure victory to keep 
up the enthusiasm of the rank and file. 

These figures of the strike leaders were specifically con- 
tradicted at the time by the steel companies. Although of 
course the steel companies had an equal motive for putting 
out sinall figures as the strike leaders had for putting out 
large figures, the strong denial by the companies that any- 
thing like 300,000 men were out at least indicates that these 
figures are open to question. ' But the Interchurch Report 
not only accepts the strike leaders' figures but does not sug- 
gest there is the slightest ground for questioning them. It 
simply assumes as a basic hypothesis, disregarding all the 
evidence, of which there is much, about the soundness of that 
hypothesis, that the steel strike actually consisted of an 
open revolt against unbearable working conditions on the 
part of over 60% of the whole industry, or, considering only 
the manufacturing departments which were actually in- 
volved, a bona fide revolt of over 75% of the whole industry. 
On this and one other pure assumption the Interchurch 
Report bases its whole argument as to the causes of the 
strike and reaches its conclusions that it was a "walkout of 
rank and file . . . in which leadership was secondary." 
The method of reasoning of the Interchurch Report as 
to the cause of the steel strike is simple and obvious. En- 
tirely disregarding the fact that a strike has become a very 
ordinary thing and a very casual thing to many workers 
and that this had become particularly true in the period 
under discussion in which the country had been having from 

' Mr. George Soule, who had charge of field investigators which were 
sent by the Commissioners of Inquiry into the Pittsburg district, has 
stated that in view of the utterly contradictory claims of steel officials 
and of strike leaders in r^ard to the number of men on strike and in 
view of all the circumstances surrounding the strike situation, he found 
it impossible to gain accurate data as to the number of men striking or 


three to four thousand strikes a year — ^many of them for 
such objects as sympathy for the Irish Republic or as a pro- 
test against Poland's fighting Russia or as a political move 
in some Brindell's ambition to get rich quick and a host of 
similar causes — the Interchurch Report thinks of a strike 
only as a great desperate last resort of men in a desperate 
last resort frame of mind. This assumption that a strike is 
necessarily a great desperate last resort step on the part of 
men in a desperate last resort frame of mind plus the as- 
sumption that an overwhelming proportion of the steel 
workers so revolted is the basis of the Interchurch Report's 
whole argument as to the grievances of the steel workers and 
of its conclusion that these grievances were actual. 

Moreover the line of reasoning of the Interchurch Report 
based on this hypothesis is not only correspondingly subject 
to fallacy but becomes more and more fallacious the farther 
it goes until it finds itself accusing the Federal Administra- 
tion and Attorney General Palmer and General Pershing 
and the Senate Committee (pages 148-149) — ^and what has 
more truth — the success of the Russian revolution of being 
major contributing causes of the steel strike. 

It has already been emphasized in the introduction to this 
section of the analysis that in regard to the question of 
working hours, working conditions and similar alleged griev- 
ances of the men, the fact as to whether or not they were 
grievances depended on whether or not the majority of the 
steel workers regarded them as grievances and that the best 
available evidence on this point, other things being equal, 
consisted of the degree to which the workers themselves 
actually responded to the unionization drive and strike 
order, which at least to a certain extent was supposed to 
constitute a "vote" on these very points. 

Again for the same reason, the best available evidence as 
to whether or not the men themselves wanted the proposed 
Trade Union Collective Bargaining as a remedy for the 
alleged grievances and therefore whether or not Judge Gary 
was justified in refusing to institute such Trade Union Col- 


lective Bargaining is to be found in the actual response of 
the men to the unionization drive and the strike order. 

Finally it is the plain statement of the Interchurch 
Report that its "rock bottom evidence" was the "affidavits 
of 500 strikers" and it is most obvious that its chief method 
of reasoning and presenting evidence consists of finding out 
and showing the attitude of a few strikers and then predicat- 
ing the same attitude to the whole industry on the assump- 
tion that the whole industry struck. 

For all these reasons, therefore, the actual facts as to how 
the workers did respond to the unionization drive and of how 
big a percentage of workers really responded to the strike 
call is perhaps the most important single group of facts in the 
steel controversy. 

In spite of the fact that the Interchurch Report does not 
even mention its existence, there is a very considerable 
amount of very definite evidence as to the actual response by 
the workers to the strike order. This evidence is available 
chiefly from three sources : first, the evidence of the Senate 
Hearings; second, evidence from the financial statements 
and wage budgets of the Steel Corporation which the 
Interchurch Report accepts as authoritative in other con- 
nections; third, evidence from the circumstances and 
development of the whole situation. 

On September 25th John Fitzpatrick, Chairman of the 
Special Strike Committee, testified (Senate Hearings, Part 
I, pages 25 and 26) that over 300,000 men had joined the 
unions and that all of them were on strike. 

The official statement signed by the National Committee 
of organization of steel workers circulated generally at the 
time and reproduced in full in Senate Hearings, Part II, 
page 498, says: 

"On September 22 . . . the following is the number of men on strike 
at the various places: 

Homestead g 000 

Braddock 5^000 


Rankin 3.000 

Clairton 4,000 

Duquesne and McKeesport 12,000, 


Mr. Foster in his book. The Great Steel Strike (page 100) 

"On Tuesday the 23rd (September) 304,000 had quit their posts in 
the mills and furnaces. All week their ranks were augmented till by 
September 30th, 365,000 were on strike. . . . The niunber of strikers 
were as follows: 

Homestead 9,000 

Braddock 10,000 

Rankin 5,000 

Clairton 4,000 

Duquesne and McKeesport 12,000, 

In regard to the number .of men on strike in two cases, 
Donora and Wheeling, the evidence before the Senate In- 
vestigation tends to show that the strike leaders' figures 
were substantially correct. In every other case, however, 
where the subject was investigated, the Senate Investiga- 
tion showed conclusively that the official figures of the 
strike leaders were not merely inaccurate but ridiculously 

The strike leaders' figures show 9,000 men on strike at 
Homestead. The Senate Committee personally visited and 
went through the Homestead Mills on October loth. Out 
of a normal working force of 11,500, 9044 were actually at 
work and only 2455, of whom none were Americans, were 
away from work for any reason. Moreover at the Senate 
Committee's request, Mr. Oursler, the Superintendent, 
furnished an exact tabulation of the number of men working 
and the number of men away from work for each day the 
strike had been in force. On no day had there been more 
than 4358, or a little less than one half the number the 
strike leaders claimed, absent from the mills for any reason. 
(Senate Hearings, page 481.) 



The strike leaders* statement claimed that 4000 workers — 
the entire working force — were on strike at Clairton. The 
Senate Committee found by personal visit that 2600 men 
were working and only 1400 men were away from the plant 
for any reason. 

The strike leaders* statement claims 12,000 men actually 
on strike at Duquesne and McKeesport. The Senate Com- 
mittee personally visited the Duquesne works. Out of a 
normal working force of 5700, 5370 were actually at work 
and only 330 men away from work for any cause. Again at 
the request of the committee, Mr. Diehl, the manager, fur- 
nished the committee a statement as to the number of men 
working or absent each day since the strike began. This 
statement again showed that instead of the 100% claimed 
by the strike leaders to be on strike, on only the first two 
days of the strike had there been as many as 25% of the men 
absent from the mills for any cause. The balance of the 
12,000 total working force of the Duquesne, McKeesport 
district, which the strike leaders claimed were all on strike, 
consisted of the employees of the National Tube Company 
at McKeesport. Of the normal working force of 7000, the 
Senate Committee found by personal visit to this plant that 
6500 were at work and only 500 absent for any reason. For 
this district therefore instead of a total of 12,000 men on 
strike, as the strike leaders stated, only 830 men were 
absent from the mills for any cause. 

In other words in these four important districts in which 
the strike leaders claimed in detailed public statements that 
25,000 men were striking the Senators found by personal 
visit that at the beginning of the third week of the strike 
only 3696 men, or only 16% of the number claimed by the 
strike leaders, were away from their jobs for any cause. 

Because of motor trouble the Senate Committee could 
not make a personal visit to Braddock and Rankin but there 
is ample evidence to indicate that instead of all the men 
being on strike, as the strike leaders claimed, at these plants, 
these plants were practically in full operation. 


Judge Gary stated before the Senate Committee' that the 
Steel Corporation was keeping the closest possible record of 
the niunber of men away from the mills during the strike 
and that at no time were there more than 28% of all steel 
workers, or more than 40% of the men in the plants actually 
involved in the strike, absent from the mills for any cause, 
which included those sick, intimidated, or playing safe by 
taking a vacation, as well as those striking, and that the 
high mark of absenteeism was reduced rapidly after the first 
few days of the strike when measures were taken to protect 
the workers from strike violence. 

In other words Judge Gary stated that the number of 
workers absent from the mills for all causes and in all plants 
was, when at its height, less than half the number claimed 
by the strike leaders and that that percentage reduced 
itself rapidly from day to day as soon as protection was 
furnished. Ten days later the Senate Committee by per- 
sonal investigation at a number of the mills found that the 
nimiber of workers absent for all causes averaged only 16% 
of the number the strike leaders claimed to be on strike and 
even less than 16% of the total number of employees. 
Considering the fact that the strike leaders' statements 
were entirely untrue in the case of the mills visited by the 
Senate Committee and the fact that the Senate Conunit- 
tee's personal investigation, as far as it went, entirely sub- 
stantiated Judge Gary's statements in regard to the whole 
industry, it is correspondingly probable that the strike 
leaders' statements were equally false in regard to most 
other plants and that at the end of the first two weeks of 
the strike the percentage of strikers everywhere dropped 
to some 20% of the workers even in the plants actually in- 

That the number of strikers throughout the industry 

had dropped to approximately 20% by that time and 

dropped even lower during the succeeding period is also 

clearly indicated by the second group of evidence which 

* Senate Hearings, page 154. 




specifically includes all the plants of the Steel Corpora- 

The eighteenth annual report of the U. S. Steel Corpora- 
tion is the official statement of the directors of the company 
to their stockholders in regard to its operation during 1919. 
This report was made on March 23, 1920, more than two 
months after the steel strike had ended in victory for th 
steel companies and had ceased to be an issue. This report 
consisted chiefly of a financial statement as to the company's 
condition which was audited by Price Waterhouse and 
Company and which was accepted by the United States 
Treasury Department as the basis on which 466 millions of 
dollars taxes was levied and paid. It is inconceivable that 
any attempt should have been made under such circum- 
stances to manipulate this statement because of a strike 
that had ended victoriously for the company months 

On page 29 of this report is a table showing in detail for 
191 8 and for 19 19 the number of steel employees and the 
wage budgets. Both the total number of employees and the 
wage budgets, as shown in these figures, the Interchurch 
Report accepts and uses without question in its chapter on 
wages, and, as has already been stated, they are an impor- 
tant part of the general financial statement by the corpora- 
tion which was certified to by Price Waterhouse and Co. 
These figures show that the average number of em- 
ployees per month in 1919 was 6.18% less than in 

Now in 1 91 8 the war was at its height. 191 9 was a year 
of at least some let-down and it is inevitable that, without 
considering the strike, there should have been some decrease 
in emplo5Tnent all through the year. But even if it is as- 
sumed that there was no decrease in employment whatever 
as compared with 191 8 up to the time of the strike, and 
that this whole decrease was concentrated into the strike 
months, from September 22nd on — one quarter of the year 
— ^this wotdd only be a decrease of 24% for these months. 

-.'* ijrf^^. 


But it is a known fact that' there were less men employed 
from January to September, 1919, than during the height 
of the war period so that the average number of men on 
strike must have been correspondingly less. 

This same table also states specifically that during the 
month in 1919 in which the average number of employees 
was least — October, the peak of the strike period — the pay- 
rolls show an average of 213,081 men working. This is just 
39,025 less than the average for the year therefore is 15% 
of all employees. Assuming that these absentees were all 
from the manufacturing plants which were affected by the 
strike, they show only 20.5% of such workers away from 
their work for any reason during the month the strike was 
at its height. 

Both the Interchurch Report, and Mr. Foster in his book, 
the Great Steel Strike, repeatedly assert that the steel strike 
involved chiefly the low-skilled foreign workers. 

The Senate Committee, through personal visits to leading 
steel plants, established as a fact that on October loth, some 
two weeks after the strike started, that at least in those 
plants, an average of not more than 16% of the steel workers 
who the strike leaders claimed were striking, were actually 
away from the mills for any cause. 

The official payroll and wage budget figures of the U. S. 
Steel Corporation state specifically that in only one month 
during the year — October, the peak of the strike period — 
did the number of men actually working drop as low as 15% 
under normal for the entire Corporation or as low as 20% 
under normal for the manufacturing plants and the same 
figures show clearly that for the rest of the strike period less 
than 20% of the normal working force in the manufacturing 
plants were away from their jobs for any cause. 

The whole steel strike itself, therefore, far from being an 

» U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Review for June, 1920, 
page 152 says: "Maximum (steel employment) is reached in the month 
of January, 19 19. From that point there is a general tendency to 







Open revolt of three-fourths of all steel workers was very 
plainly a movement involving half, and probably less than 
half of merely the low-skilled foreign workers of the industry. 

The question remains as to whether, even in regard to 
this half of the low-skilled foreigners which constituted 
only a fifth of the steel workers, the movement was actually 
a ''walkout of rank and file" as the Interchurch Report 
states, "in which leadership became secondary," or whether 
it was merely the result, as the steel companies stated, of 
clever and persistent agitation which achieved such success 
as it did entirely through an appeal to the ignorance and 
prejudice of these unskilled foreign workers. 

The whole unionizing attempt was begun, as has been 
shown, by Foster's original plan to send into the steel cen- 
ters "crews of organizers with large sums of money" to 
"hold great mass meetings built up by extensive advertising 
everywhere" and to make a "hurricane drive that would 
catch the workers* imaginations and sweep them into the 
unions en masse." This whole plan was obviously based on 
strong leadership and the clever manipulation of mass 
psychology by that leadership. 

At the psychological moment the movement was to be 
turned into a "decisive flood" by the "formation of com- 
mittees to formulate grievances." Then these grievances 
were to be presented to the employer on threat of strike. 
The basis of this second step — the decision as to when the 
psychological moment had arrived and the manipulation 
of events accordingly were preeminently matters of wise 
and able leadership. 

The instigation of the unionization drive was heralded 
immediately and stentoriously to steel workers throughout 
the country not only by the labor leaders but everywhere 
in the public press. Yet not only did the steel workers them- 
selves fail to show any signs of starting any "mass move- 
ment which made leadership secondary" but their primary 
response was so negligible that it necessitated an entire 
change of tactics on the part of the leaders. This initial failure 


Foster specifically admits and blames specifically and re- 
peatedly on the lack of enough leadership and enough money 
to "lead" properly. 

In regard to the decisive nature of leadership or lack of 
leadership at this stage of the movement, the Interchurch 
Report itself says: 

"... great drops in active membership had occurred . . . after the 
'flu ban' in the Chicago district had caused the National Organizers 
to be withdrawn" (page 154, line 14). 

The unionizing effort failing in its original aim of union- 
izing the steel workers by assault, "by catching their imag- 
inations and sweeping them into the unions en masse," 
the union leaders entirely changed their tactics and for 
their previous plan of unionization by assault, substituted 
the plan of unionization by siege and accretion. More 
organizers were called in, more money was raised and a 
prolonged campaign begun to bring home to the workers 
a realization of their grievances and to educate them as to 
the need of Trade Union Collective Bargaining as a remedy 
for those grievances. In other words more leadership was 

The basis of this campaign of siege was the constant plea 
to the workers of: "Organize and all these things shall be 
added unto you" (Interchurch report. Page 160, line i). 
As to what "all these things" were that were to be " added 
unto" the steel worker it is clear from the Interchurch 
Report's own statements that they consisted of almost any 
promise which the individual organizer thought could get the 
individual foreign worker's name or mark on the union card. 

Foster refers repeatedly to the effectiveness in this part 
of the campaign of many clever devices of leadership, in 
regard to one of which, a red, white and blue membership 
card, he says, "more than one man joined merely on that 
account" (Great Steel Strike, page 35, line 33), and in 
regard to the general effect of this leadership he says on 
page 38: 




"Organization . . . depends almost entirdy upon the honesty, 
intelligence, power and persistence of the organizing forces." 

And again on page 105: 

" It is noteworthy that the strike followed strictly the lines of organitO' 
Hon. In hardly a single instance did the unorganized go out s^on.- 
taneously. " 

But again far from arousing any mass revolt that took 
matters out of the leaders* hands and made leadership 
secondary, this second line of tactics obviously succeeded 
little or no better than the first. 

The skilled and the American worker were practically 
not being influenced at all. Even Mr. Foster says in regard 
to the American worker: 

"It has been charged that the unions neglected the American Steel 
workers ... If anything the reverse is true. . . . the Americans 
and the skilled workers generally proved indifferent tmion men in the 
steel campaign . . . when compared with the foreigners they made a 
poor showing. . . . They organized slowly; then they struck reluc- 
tantly and scatteringly. . . . the foreign unskilled workers (however) 
covered themselves with glory. . . . They proved themselves altogether 
worthy of the best American labor traditions " (Excerpts, Great Steel 
Strike, pages 196, 200). 

Even in the case of the unskilled foreign worker, however, 
whose ignorance and prejudices could be so much more 
easily played upon by skilled agitators, the unionizing effort 
so failed in general to educate them as to their grievances, 
just as it had failed to "sweep them off their feet en masse," 
that even by August, 191 9, a year after the drive started, the 
strike leaders themselves did not claim a union membership 
of more than 100,000 — 20% of all steel workers, or J^ even 
the unskilled foreigners. 

As to this fact there is no question. In making his report 
to the A. F. of L. on the steel campaign, in July, 191 9, Mr. 
Fitzpatrick only claimed the union membership to be 100,- 
000 and he testified later (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 15) : 


"Senator Wolcott: What was the total ntunber of members in the 
steel mills in yoiu- organization at the time this vote was taken? 

*'Mr, Fitzpatrick: At the time the vote was taken (August) I should 
say about 100,000. 

''Senator Wolcott: And the total number of men in the industry 
available for entrance into the organization, if they saw fit, was how 

" Mr. Fitzpatrick: There was probably about 500,000. We had one- 

Moreover this conspicuous failure on tne part of the great 
mass of steel workers to show any interest in the unionizing 
drive after a whole year of such intensive and expensive 
effort was not the only problem that confronted the strike 
leaders. By the summer of 191 9 even their one-fifth began 
alternately to show signs of getting out of hand and of dis- 

Foster said: 

" The foreigner wants more money. . . . His idealism stretches about as 
far as his shortest working day. ... He comes in (to the union) quite 
readily but if you don't get him the results, he drops away quite readily 
also" (Interchurch Report, page 162). 

The Interchurch Report itself states on' page 154: 

"Herd psychology was far more powerful than . . . doctrines ... the 
leaders' greatest difficulty beginning in the spring . . . was in with- 
standing the mass feeling they had fostered ... the movement before 
getting to the hundred thousand mark reached a point where by the 
working of the very idea that built it, it threatened to break out in 
sporadic strikelets or break down altogether." 

It was obviously these conditions — ^the meager success 
of their year long agitation and the immediate threat of los- 
ing even what they had achieved, which in the summer of 
1919 forced the strike leaders back to their only alternative 
strategy — that of risking everything in a second "sweeping 
the workers off their feet" campaign. 

The election of committees to *' formulate grievances and 
present these to the employers" under threat of strike was, 
according to the original plan, to have been the climax of 






the first ** hurricane drive" a year before. But this drive, 
as has been stated, had not achieved sufficient results to 
warrant risking such a step. The situation was such in 
August, 1 91 9, however, that as the last trump card it had 
to be risked. 

" The leaders had to let it (the whole movement) go on to a strike as 
the next means of success or let it go all to pieces" (Interchurch Report, 
page 155)- 

Accordingly the *' grievances were formulated" consisting 
of 12 demands and although Judge Gary was the head of 
only one of the many employing companies, a sensational 
appeal was made to him under circumstances of the utmost 
publicity. The strike vote was widely advertised and 
taken at the same time this appeal was being made. An- 
nouncements were sent widespread that 50,000 men a week 
were now joining the unions. The President of the United 
States was appealed to through the newspapers as well as 
directly, and in general every possible method of arousing 
and maniptdating mass psychology was used with all the 
ability and force the Labor Movement could command. 

At the time of the strike itself, whether or not the threats, 
intimidation and violence played as big a part as was 
claimed, there is no question but that every psychological 
device was adopted to make the strike seem a mass move- 
ment — an ** overwhelming revolt of rank and file." The 
widely published statement that 300,000 and then 365,000 
workers were actually on strike was obviotisly one such 
device. Yet at the very time such claims were being adver- 
tised, the Senate Committee found in the plants it visited 
an average of over 84% of all workers at work as usual and 
during the first and admittedly most successful month of the 
strike, an average of over 80% of all workers of the Steel 
Corporation even in the plants directly affected by the 
strike, worked as usual. 

In so far then, as the unionization drive and the strike 
constituted a vote — as the strike leaders insisted in advance 

that it would — as to the attitude of the steel workers them- 
selves towards their alleged grievances and towards trade 
union collective bargaining, both the unionization drive and 
the strike showed that 80% of the steel workers did not 
regard the alleged grievances as real, and did not desire 
trade union collective bargaining in the steel industry. 

Moreover, even in regard to the 20% of steel workers, 
who, through their action in the unionization drive and the 
strike, ** voted" that they did believe the alleged grievances 
to be real, and did desire trade union collective bargaining 
as a remedy, these further facts must be taken into con- 

This 20% consisted almost entirely of illiterate, unskilled 
foreigners. It represented only about one-half even of such 
unskilled foreigners in the industry. Such unskilled for- 
eigners obviously were most susceptible to skilled agitation 
cleverly calculated to take advantage of their ignorance and 
prejudices, so that their "vote" did not necessarily repre- 
sent their own unbiased judgment. 

When therefore, after a year of intensive and expensive 
but largely unsuccessful effort — and under the additional 
incentive of the fact that even such organization as they 
had was showing signs of going to pieces — ^the strike leaders 
took the bold step of publicly demanding that Judge Gary 
should meet them in a conference which was to institute 
trade union collective bargaining, and thus officially give 
them the recognition which the steel workers themselves 
had consistently refused to give them. Judge Gary in refus- 
ing to meet the strike leaders in such conference, undoubted- 
ly represented, as he stated he did, the opinion and desires 
of the steel industry itself, including the great mass of 
steel workers as well as of the management. 

There can be no question, however, that as a matter of 
fact, and more and more as a matter of general recognition, 
industrial controversies and particularly controversies that 



affect great basic industries or have to do with the working 
and living conditions of great masses of people, involve the 
interests of three parties — not only of the employers and 
employees that constitute the industry, but of the public as 

Even if it must be granted then that the steel industry 
itself, by an immense majority vote of all parties in the 
industry, refused to recognize the 12-hour day and other 
conditions existing in the industry as grievances, and re- 
fused to accept trade union collective bargaining for the 
industry, nevertheless the question still remains as to 
whether or not these, and perhaps certain other issues raised 
dtiring the strike, have such a social significance as to 
warrant an independent and perhaps a different decision as 
to their desirability in the steel industry from the point of 
view of public interest. 

The Interchurch Report lays great stress on the general 
social aspect of collective bargaining as a means of con- 
trolling working conditions. It makes a particular point of 
the social aspect of the 12-hotir day. It raises and strongly 
emphasizes other social questions in connection with the 
steel strike. Moreover it advances points of view and ex- 
presses conclusions in regard to these questions which it 
specifically seeks to apply to industry as a whole, and espe- 
cially recommends to public attention as a basis of public 
opinion and action. The social aspects of such issues in the 
steel strike therefore deserve special attention. 



Issues in the Steel Strike and arguments of the Interchurch 
Report which largely involve social issues or questions 0} public 
police and therefore personal opinion or point of view. 

No attempt is here made to present a full, adequate argument 
on such subjects. What is chiefly attempted is to analyze the 
argument and conclusions of the Interchurch Report as to such 
subjects and to present briefly facts whose consideration is 
necessary to any sound conclusion but which the Interchurch 
Report hcLS failed to consider. 





The grounds upon which the Interchurch Report most 
bitterly and frequently denounces the 12 hour day are 
those of its alleged social effects. 

It characterizes the 12 hour day as a ** barbarism that 
penalizes the country." It claims that workers are being 

"Un-Americanized by the 12 hour day" and that "Americanization 
. . . cannot take place while the 12 hour day persists " (page 84) 

and recommends (page 250) that the 

"Government provide by law against working days that bring over- 
fatigue and deprive the individual, his home and his commimity of that 
minimum of time which gives him an opportunity to discharge all his 
obligations as a social being in a democratic society." 

The Interchurch Report however entirely fails to make 
any adequate argtiment or present any adequate evidence 
as to the unsocial effects of the 12 hour day. Its whole 
evidence consists of: 

First: A page of testimony of A. Pido, an immigrant 
striker who was a witness of the strike leaders before the 
Senate Committee and who stated he could not go to night 
school because of his long hours: 

Second: The testimony before the same committee of 
Father Elazinci, a Slovak priest, who, in contrast to practi- 
cally all other priests and ministers in the strike district, 




who Mr. Foster complains were unanimously against the 
strike, became a prominent strike leader and who stated 
that working hours and conditions were disgusting the 
foreign worker with America and tending to make him go 
back to the old country : 

Third: A table showing that over a certain period, 
whether of months or years is not mentioned, 169 workers 
"dropped out" of night English classes in South Chicago 
public schools **for reasons connected with hours" ; and 

Fourth: Miscellaneous references to strikers' statement 
that the 12 hour day left no time for family life. 

The Interchurch Report, moreover, does not even suggest 
that anything may be said in favor of the individual or social 
value of long hard work and otherwise treats the whole 
subject of the social aspect of the 12 hour day as though the 
mere statement of one of its smaller aspects carried its own 
conclusion as to the whole problem. 

This type of argument, which seeks to show through 
quoting isolated instances that the 12 hour day makes 
education impossible, can of course be met by a host of 
isolated instances of men who have worked 12 hours or more 
a day and still educated themselves and advanced rapidly in 
the world. Charles M. Schwab, Farrell, Buffington, Frick, 
Carnegie, Carnegie's famous group of 29 partners, and most 
of the other outstanding steel leaders all came up from day 
labor in the steel industry and every one of them worked 
the 12 hour shift. Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, 
Thomas Edison, are merely conspicuous examples of a great 
class of Americans whose success has been our special 
national pride because it was built up in spite of the fact — 
or perhaps, as many of these men themselves have claimed, 
because of the fact — ^that they have had to get their own 
education while working 12 hours or more a day at harder 
work than the steel employee with his modem automatic 
machinery, is perhaps ever called upon to do. There is no 
doubt that the well-known type of modem sentimental 
writer could have become most pessimistically eloquent over 


the probable fate of a young Lincoln splitting rails 14 hours 
a day with a 16 pound maul and then walking 20 miles to 
borrow a single book which he had to read before an open 
fire for the lack of money to buy candles. 

Any argtmient on this basis, however, merely resolves 
itself into the question of the personal point of view of the 
arguer. The man who has achieved, or is capable of achiev- 
ing, under such circumstances is temperamentally prone to 
glorify hard work and to think of its results chiefly in terms 
of Lincolns and Schwabs and Edisons. The man who him- 
self has not, and probably could not, achieve under such 
conditions inherently shrinks from the rigors of such a sys- 
tem and is temperamentally impelled to be most impressed 
with its failures. 

But the merits or demerits of the question of long hours of 
work from the social point of view, cannot be satisfactorily 
argued on an individual basis, which inevitably consists 
of sentimentalizing over isolated instances either of men 
who have stayed down under its strenuous demands or of men 
who have found in strenuous necessity a specially valuable 
schooling for marked accomplishment. From the social 
point of view, it is the average results and the general effect 
on the whole social body which are most important. These 
the Interchurch Report does not discuss or mention. 

In discussing any such broad question it is of course 
necessary to begin with a clear understanding of just what 
the discussion does and does not involve. 

The seven day week is not being here discussed. 

Practically all farming is necessarily on a seven day a 
week basis. The public demands that drug and many other 
retail stores stay open, that milk be delivered and police 
and fire protection be afforded seven days a week. More- 
over in such cases it is hardly possible to employ special 
help for Sunday so that seven day operation means seven 
day work by the individual worker. The public demands 
that trains and street cars be run seven days a week. Phys- 
ical laws necessitate that blast furnace departments be 


operated continuously. In both these cases however, it is 
possible to employ special *' swing crews" so that seven day 
operation can be maintained with a six day working schedule 
for the individual worker. It is hardly possible to condemn 
seven day work in stronger language than the ofl&cials of 
the U. S. Steel Corporation have condemned it and they 
state categorically that with the exception of the war period 
their employees have all been for years on a six or less than 
six day schedule. All the detailed government statistics 
on the subject from 1913 on, substantiate this statement. 
To the extent that seven day work exists in the rest of the 
industry, no matter how small the actual number of workers 
involved, and irrespective of the attitude of the worker 
himself, the fact that the seven day schedule is both in- 
herently unnecessary and unsocial leaves it without defense. 

Long hours which unduly exhaust or impair the health 
of the worker are not being here discussed. 

A 12-hour working day is not in itself unduly exhausting 
or detrimental to health. Our 10,000,000 farmers who 
consistently work these or longer hours are notoriously 
about the healthiest class in- the population. All Americans, 
in fact all the world, up to a generation ago worked such 
hours. Eight hours at many kinds of work are more ex- 
hausting and detrimental to health than 12 hours at many 
others. The really hard work in the steel industry has for 
years been on an eight-hour schedule and five days a week; 
and it is generally considered in the industry that such jobs 
at eight hours are harder than the 12-hour jobs both in 
themselves and because the 12-hour workers are seldom 
actually working more than half of the hours on duty. 
Government agencies have been active for years, and very 
properly so, in regulating hours or other working conditions 
which are detrimental to the health or longevity of workers. 
They have reduced the hotirs in copper mines to 6 a day; 
they have regulated work in brass foundries; in industries 
using sulphur and in many other special industries. Various 
government studies of working conditions in the steel in- 




dustry have already been discussed in the present analysis. 
Their detailed reports have been quoted to show that steel 
workers are only subject to extreme heat for a few minutes 
at a time — generally about i minute to 7 minutes — ^inter- 
mittently, and generally for a total time of only some 20 
minutes to 2 hours out of the 12 ho\irs. These government 
reports show by detailed time studies that the 12-hour 
worker only actually works some 5 to 7 hours out of the 12. 
Steel work in the 12-hour departments is particularly 
emphasized as "necessarily of rather leisurely character." 
The Interchurch Report throughout insists on making a 
distinction between the high skilled American steel worker 
and the low skilled immigrant worker. It says (page 11): 

"Rates of pay and other principal conditions were based on what was 
accepted by common labor; the unskilled and semi-skilled force was 
largely immigrant labor. " 

"The amoimts earned by the low skilled (the bulk of the labor) are 
determined chiefly by the extraordinarily long hours" (page 90), etc., 

Moreover the fact that it insists (page 13) that : 

"Skilled steel labor was paid wages disproportionate to the earnings 
of the other two thirds, thus binding the skilled class to the companies " 


"The twelve hour day made any attempt at 'Americanization' or 
other civic or individual development for one half all immigrant steel 
workers arithmetically impossible" (page 12) and 

"Americanization of the steel workers cannot take place while the 
12-hour day persists" (page 84). 

— all make it plain that the Interchurch Report is not 
discussing the 12-hour day and the American worker but 
the 12-hour day and tlie Americanization of the immigrant 

What is here discussed then, is whether or not 12 hours on 
duty — ^which of course brings 12-hour pay — ^necessarily 


means that "Americanization of the steel worker cannot 
take place" or whether as a matter of fact higher pay may 
not be one very practical road to the Americanization of the 
worker and his family. 

America is a nation of immigrants and we have had 
much experience with immigrants and their Americaniza- 
tion. Our immigrant forefathers created out of a wilderness 
the America and Americanism of today, including American 
education, ideals, social system and all. How did they do 
it, by working hard and long for bigger retvims or through 
leisure? To the America of today have come, particularly 
in the last generation, hosts of other immigrants. They have 
come largely from different races than our forefathers and 
their Americanization has involved different problems — 
those of adopting and absorbing Americanism rather than 
of creating it. Large proportions of such immigrants, and 
particularly their children, have become the best kind of 
Americans — ^in education, in ideals, in every social sense. 
How, not as a matter of theory and sentimentalism, but as a 
matter of practical fact, have they chiefly or most effectively 
done this — through long, hard work or through leisure? 

It has already been pointed out that American standards 
of living are distinctly an achievement. It is equally true, 
and cannot be over emphasized, that all advanced social 
standards are achievements. Many such advanced social 
standards have been so largely achieved in America today 
that it is easy to take them for granted as things that have 
always existed and will go on existing irrespectively. The 
war, however, and many events in connection with it, plainly 
showed that even such "always-taken-for-granted" stand- 
ards of modem social advancements as enough food to sus- 
tain life, the most ordinary liberty of individual action, the 
very principles of individual freedom and right, far from 
being inherent, have required a worid struggle to reestab- 

The shorter working day is in no sense inherent or to be 
merely taken for granted as something that exists irre- 


spective of other circumstances. It is distinctly an achieve- 
ment and one of the most recent and advanced 
achievements of modem social life, and its possible existence 
absolutely depends on the prior establishment of other facts 
and circumstances. 

One of the chief characteristics on which Americans have 
always prided themselves, has been their national energy 
which at least for all the earlier years of national history 
meant a willingness and habit on the part of the whole 
people to work hard and long. 

When Alexander Hamilton first advocated governmental 
encouragement of American industry in order that Ameri- 
cans might enjoy more and cheaper manufactured commodi- 
ties, and when Washington signed the first American pro- 
tective tariff to encourage American industry, one of the 
stated reasons was to make American women and children 
more economically productive.' 

Howe invented the sewing machine after a 12 hour day's 
work in a machine shop in Cambridge. Peter Cooper did 
the research work that laid the foundations of American 
railroading after 12 hours in a glue factory, and Fulton and 
Morse and McCormack made other basic mechanical in- 
ventions on which modern industrial and social life is built, 
under similar conditions. 

In other words, American energy in other generations 
meant not only a universal 12 hour or longer working day for 
men, women and children but it meant that much of the 
inventive and other special progress was achieved through 
hours of work beyond these. 

Through inventions and improvements in machinery and 
through better methods of combining individual skill with 
that machinery, the average American today produces 
about three times as much as the average individual could 
produce in 1850 which inamense extra margin of production 

« This fact which is repugnant to our social standards of today is 
worth particular notice as evidence of how far from inherent and merely 
to be taken for granted our modern American standards actually are. 


has been tised in eliminating child labor and the hardest part 
of women's labor, in improving standards of living and 
finally in shortening the working day. But these modem 
standards of living and working hours and other standards 
generally referred to as American, have plainly been possible 
only because former generations of Americans built up, 
by long hard working hoxirs and foresight and sacrifice, the 
margin of production which could be used as capital to 
create more and better machinery and the better methods 
which have brought about the greater productivity which 
has made the modem American standards of living and 
leisure possible. 

Moreover, though of course there are many isolated 
exceptions, the average American individual and family 
have progressed exactly as the nation has progressed. 
Either through hard work and sacrifice and foresight, a 
margin of capital is built up, the use of which in farming or 
trade is added to personal energy, or by special education 
or in some other way, some type of extra ability or efficiency 
is acquired and added to personal energy to command the 
living standards and the leisure which the average individ- 
ual American enjoys. 

But for generations now this normal American develop- 
ment has been complicated by the fact that increasing 
numbers of immigrants have come into our national, in- 
dustrial and social life. These immigrants have seldom had 
either the heredity or education for measuring up to Ameri- 
can standards of individual productivity which are neces- 
sary to command American standards of living and leisure 
and they have seldom had any reserves of capital to use to 
increase their individual productivity ability. 

In earlier years the great bulk of such immigrants went 
directly to the land and there in general through exactly the 
same methods of long hard work with which Americans of 
earlier generations accomplished the same results, they 
built up the margins of capital, consisting of land and tools 
and money in the bank, which made it possible for them, in 


their later years, to enjoy at least higher standards of living 
and leisure than they had ever known or could have 
achieved in the countries from which they came; and which 
made it possible for them to give their children, thru that 
capital and the special educational advantages it made 
possible, every chance for ftill American standards of living 
and leisure. 

In later years the great mass of immigrants have been 
going, not to the land but into commercial and industrial 
centers. No American who has ever paid the least atten- 
tion to the type of names across the store fronts along the 
main as well as the side streets of almost any American city 
can fail to realize that the immigrant has had his full share 
of American commercial success. As a matter of fact in a 
ntunber of prominent lines of retailing, in the tremendous 
business of public entertainment and in certain lines of 
manufacturing, the more recent American dominates the 
entire business, and he has become an important factor in 
almost every commercial field. 

Moreover there are probably few Americans who have 
not had the opportunity to observe personally the means 
by which such immigrants succeed, — how, beginning with a 
vegetable wagon or a corner stand or in some other small 
way, they build their success bigger and bigger through 
inordinately long hours of work and through accepting 
standards of living which makes possible a maximum saving 
to be combined as further capital with their hard work to 
make that work still more productive. 

Both on the farm and in commerce then, great classes of 
immigrants, initially lacking either the capital or special 
personal efficiency to individually produce an American 
standard of living in an American standard of hours, have 
compensated for their inherent handicap by initially 
accepting less than the American standard of living and 
working more than the American standard of hours and by 
this means have built up a margin of capital and acquired a 
special ability which have later made themselves and 



partictilarly their children full productive, and later social, 
factors according to ftill American standards. 

The great majority of immigrants who have gone into 
industrial work, however, have had a very different and in 
general much less favorable experience. There are doubt- 
less a number of reasons for this. The older established 
industries are operated on a large scale with large capital- 
ization. There is far less chance therefore to begin with a 
few dollars and the energy of the worker's own family and 
perhaps a few friends as has been possible in retail and 
commercial lines and in the clothing industry. 

But no careful analysis can fail to reveal one very signi- 
ficant fact in connection with the immigrant worker in 
industry as compared with the immigrant worker in farming 
or conmierce and that is the fact that under the fixed work- 
ing conditions of a large part of industry, the immigrant is 
denied the opportunity to overcome his special inherent 
handicaps — lack of special individual productive ability — 
by a maximum employment of his single biggest asset — ^his 
willingness to work hard and long and sacrifice for his 

For when the immigrant worker goes into the average 
American industry, he is automatically barred by fixed 
standards of working hours, based upon supposed standards 
of individual productive ability of the American workers, 
from compensating for his own less individual productive 
ability by harder work. Moreover he is at once introduced 
into an atmosphere in which any ambition to achieve Ameri^ 
can standards of productivity, and consequently to achieve 
by his own efforts American standards of living, is subject 
to organized discouragement and organized propagation of 
a theory that shorter hours of work are primary and 
production secondary. 

Considered then not on sentimentality or mere isolated 
instances but on the real facts and merits of the case the 
whole question of the Americanization of immigrant labor 
resolves itself into these propositions: — 

Given the undisputed fact that the immigrant worker 
generally lacks American standards of industrial efl&ciency 
which handicap him in competing on the same level with 
American labor for general American standards of living and 
leisure, can the immigrant worker advance more rapidly and 
surely to full American standards through an initial econo- 
mic advancement irrespective of American standards of 
hours, or by being artificially limited to American standards 
of hours in the hope that he will use his leisure to achieve in 
some other way other American standards? 

The first proposition that economic advancement is a 
definite and direct step toward other forms of social advance- 
ment, is supported not only by all the conspicuous facts and 
experience available as to the methods by which American 
immigrant workers actually do advance, but by all general 
htunan experience as to the invariable method of all htmian 

The cultural supremacy of Athens came only after its 
acquisition of the Delian treasure and the Laurium silver 
mines had given it the commercial supremacy of the ancient 
world. The Renaissance was the foundation of modem 
cultural advance of all western civilization, but the Renais- 
sance came only after the great economic advances due to 
the development of East Indian trade and South American 
gold mines. The great era of popular education in western 
Europe and America came only in the countries and only 
after the tremendous economic advancement of the modem 
era of industrial machinery. Throughout the world na- 
tional standards of education and living conditions are 
invariably in proportion to per capita wealth. 

As regards the second proposition that leisure is the 
foundation stone to social advancement this may be said. 
Socialists and all other radicals can appeal to the individual 
or mass much more succesfully in proportion as the in- 
dividual or mass is still economically unsuccessful. The 
immigrant who is both ignorant in regard to American in- 
stitutions and principles and at the bottom of the economic 


ladder offers the most promising material for education along 
radical lines. All radical leaders therefore may hope to 
derive maximum advantage out of a situation in which im- 
migrant workers are prevented by arbitrarily restricted 
hours from using their chief asset to economic advancement 
and because of these restricted hours have ample leisure to 
receive the kind of education to which they are most sus- 
ceptible under those conditions. Radical leaders therefore 
always seek to emphasize the "Leisure for education and 
Americanization." But this proposition is invariably 
supported by mere sentimentalities and as far as is known 
cannot be supported on any other basis.* 

Certainly the Interchurch Report does not advance one 
scintilla of evidence to show that in the many industries 
where the immigrant's hours are limited to 8, he does as a 
matter of fact use his extra leisure for self-education or any 
other effort to acquire American standards. Nor does it 
even advance any theory to show why he may be expected 
to do this. Instead it quite characteristically bases its 
whole conclusion on the mere assumption that the im- 
migrant worker would do this. Moreover the Interchurch 
Report does not seem to have the faintest suspicion that all 
the facts and experiences as to how human progress is, and 

* It is interesting to note in this connection that the affiliated radical 
organizations, of which the Amalgamated Qothing Worker is the chief 
unit, and which has recently been given, by the " Third International, " 
the leadership in the American radical movement — ^taking that place 
from the I. W. W. — particularly features its educational efforts among 
the workers. The head of this "Educational Committee * ' is Mr. David 
Saposs, named by the Interchurch Report as one of its special investiga- 
tors and as the author of part of the Second Interchurch Report. Mr. 
George Soule, another such special Interchurch investigator and joint 
author of the second Interchurch Report, has been connected with this 
general organization and his wife is a member of this "Educational 
Committee." Mr. William Z. Foster is featured as one of the special 
lecturers of this "Educational Committee." To what extent such 
"educational" efforts have succeeded is unknown, and whether or not 
they contribute towards Americanization of course depends on the 
definition given Americanism. 


always has been, actually achieved plainly refute its 

The 12 hour day in the steel industry represents the most 
conspicuous opportunity in industry for the immigrant 
worker to better his economic standing by making up for 
his inherent handicaps through a maximum use of his 
greatest asset. Because of the 12 hour day the immigrant 
steel worker could earn $34.19 a week which, according to 
United States Bureau of Labor statistics already frequently 
quoted, was about the average wages at the time of carpen- 
ters, cement workers, electric wiremen, sheet metal workers, 
linotype operators, railroad machinists, boiler makers and 
other great classes of American skilled labor. In other 
words by working 12 hours a day in the steel industry the 
unskilled immigrant worker was on practically the same 
economic plane as the average skilled American worker in 
other industries, which meant that except in the matter of 
personal leisure he had available the same standards of liv- 
ing for himself and his family as a large percentage of 
American skilled workers. 

The average immigrant worker, however, coming from a 
country where wheat is too much of a luxury to be con- 
sumed even by the man who raises it, and where the staple 
article of national food is black rye bread — ^where not only 
the whole family but often various domestic animals live in 
a single room, naturally and generally sees less need for 
trying to maintain American standards of living than he 
does for saving up a margin of capital which will help carry 
himself and his family still further on the road to economic 
and ultimately general advancement. 

The tendency of the great proportion of the immigrant 
steel workers to save money was repeatedly emphasized in 
the Senate Hearings. Mr. Foster in his book The Great 
Steel Strike, on page 117, says: 

"When they tried to foreclose on the Church mortgage, he (Father 
Kazind) promptly laid the matter before his heterogeneous congr^a- 



tion of (Slavic) strikers who raised the necessary $1200 before leaving 
the building and next day brought in several hundred dollars more. " 

Again the fact that some 50,000 strikers, mostly unskilled 
foreigners, could support themselves and their families for 
three months ' 'on their own resources'* indicates considerable 
prior saving. Finally the plain fact that the very class of 
workers (immigrants) who have so conspicuously shown a 
tendency to go into fields of work where they cotddwork 
long hours in order to save margins of capital, have gone in 
far greater numbers into the 12 hour steel than into any 
other industry, and stayed in it in spite of the temptation 
of ample wages for much shorter hours which was held out 
to them during the war by other industries, raises the strong 
presumption that this was in general deliberately done for 
the purpose of making and saving this extra money. 

It is, of course, not possible to trace directly the social 
result of the extra money made and saved by immigrant 
workers in the steel industry as it is possible to trace directly 
the social result of money saved by the immigrant who 
works from 7 in the morning till 10 at night building up his 
comer fruit stand into a leading fruit and confectionary and 
ice cream parlor; or as it is to trace the social result of the 
savings which the immigrant worker puts into a vegetable 
patch, which by long hard work he develops into one of the 
profitable truck farms which dot the outskirts of our great 
cities. It is obvious on every side, however, that foreign 
bom citizens are multiplying every type of small business 
venture, all of which require capital which the immigrant 
does not possess when he comes to the country. The fact 
that the 12 hour day in the steel industry has long 
offered perhaps the most conspicuous opporttmity in the 
whole cotmtry for the immigrant without any asset but his 
willingness to work to earn and save most qtdckly the few 
hundred dollars with which such workers are able to start 
in some little business of their own, makes it reasonable to 
presume that the steel industry has contributed more than 


its share to the capital which has started tens of thousands 
of oiu- immigrants on the road of steady economic advance- 
ment which according to all experience is the most direct 
and sure road to full Americanization. 

Moreover, it must be bome in mind that years before the 
present Americanization movement, as such, had ever 
come to public notice the steel companies were spending 
tens of millions of dollars in an Americanization movement 
of their own among their immigrant workers. This move- 
ment offers the worker himself easy and special educational 
advantages, far beyond those the 12 hour working earlier 
American ever had available. But it has also made an even 
more direct and intensive effort to reach the children of 
such workers who, according to all sociological authorities; 
offer the most fertile field for Americanization not only as it 
will affect the next generation but for its reaction on the 
immigrant parents themselves. 

There are of course certain types of people who are 
temperamentally impelled to judge the social results of an 
industry or of any other system chiefly by its effect on the 
*' small impoverished," or otherwise disaffected minority 
of which few himian institutions, irrespective of other 
conditions, are free. 

There may be many other Americans who have the same 
faith as the Interchurch investigators that if the immigrant 
worker was arbitrarily handicapped in the steel industry, 
as he is in many other industries, from taking the same road 
to Americanization that practically all immigrants have 
taken, — through first achieving their own economic advance- 
ment, — ^and if American standards of leisure were made 
compulsory ; that such a free gift of what the American people 
themselves have had to earn through generations of hard 
work and sacrifice and foresight, would inspire such immi- 
grants to acquire more rapidly full American standards of 
efficiency and responsibility. 

Various other points of view are possible and different 
shades of view inevitable, for the problem of the American- 


ization of the immigrant worker is undoubtedly broad and 
complicated and many of its phases necessarily involve 
matters of opinion. 

Nevertheless, the fact cannot be disputed that long hard 
work which brought correspondingly big returns, was 
ftmdamentally the basis on which all modem American 
standards of living were built and through which alone they 
were made possible. It cannot be disputed that the 12 
hour day in the steel industry offers exactly the same op- 
portunity today which earlier Americans all used to make 
possible modem American ideals and which the immigrant 
worker had consistently used in other fields to make pos- 
sible his enjoyment of full American standards. The 12 
hotir day is not a "barbarism without valid excuse" which 
is inconsistent with "the Americanization of the steel 
worker." On the contrary it offers one type of special op- 
portunity, and is being widely used as an opportimity, 
towards Americanization. 

Whether or not a different opportunity or method might 
be better may be open to question. But there is little doubt 
that that question cannot be answered merely on the opin- 
ion of an Interchurch Report which entirely fails to grasp 
its real merits. Nor can that question be turned over for 
answer to Foster, the radical and his I. W. W. partisans 
or to Fitzpatrick or other members of the A. F. of L. who 
are definitely committed by self-interest to one side and who 
under no circumstances would have to, or would be willing 
to, bear the responsibility of their decision. 

Judge Gary took the initiative before the Senate investi- 
gation committee of personally suggesting that the best 
method of solving the great social problems that are in- 
herent in industry would be to put at least the great basic 
industries tmder the supervision of a governmental body simi- 
lar to the Inter-State Commerce Commission which cotild 
go into such subjects impartially and make decisions which 
were intelligent and based on real public policy. (Senate 
Hearings, Part I, page 216.) 


In March, 1921, when the chief interest of the steel 
worker was in keeping his job and there was no question of 
any labor troubles. Judge Gary again took the initiative in 
suggesting in an official public statement, that the Steel 
Corporation wotdd welcome the assistance of a properly 
constituted governmental commission as a means of solving 
the social problems of the steel industry on a basis of real 
public policy. 

If public opinion feels, or shall come to feel, that the 12 
hour day constitutes a social problem, surely such a means 
of solution promises more truly social results than a blind 
yielding to organized agitation and propaganda which will 
put the solution in the hands of irresponsible, self-interested 
professional labor leaders. 

On page 15 and again on page 144 the Interchurch Report 

"The organizing* campaign . . . and the strike were for the pur- 
pose of forcing a conference in an industry where no means of conference 
existed ; this specific conference to set up trade union collective bargaining, " 

It says on page 15, 

" 15. Causes of defeat (of the strike) . . . lay in the organization 
and leadership not so much of the strike itself as of the American labor 
movement. " 

"16. The immigrant steel worker was led to expect more from the 24 
International Unions of the American Federation of Labor conducting 
the strike than they, through indifference, selfishness or narrow habit 
were willing to give." 

It insists on page 35 : 


That the control of the movement to organize the steel industry, 
vested in 24 A. F. of L. trade imions, was such that Mr. Foster's acts 
were perforce in harmony with old line unionism. " 

On page 158 in discussing Foster's activities and known 
"boring from within" tactics in the strike, it says: 

"It (boring from within) does me^ putting inside the trade unions 
radically minded men who will make more trade tmionists. It does 
involve the possibility that after all the unorganized are gathered into 




/ — 


the old line trade imions, these radical minded organizers may convert 
the trade unions, if they can. That is the trade imions' lookout. " 

It doubtless has already been made sufficiently clear that 
in the attempt to *' organize" the steel industry which led 
up to the 1 91 9 steel strike, the difficulties to be encountered 
were so clearly recognized by the strike leaders, yet the 
prize of victory would have been so great, that the Labor 
Movement decided to put its united strength — of both old 
line unions and radical organizations — ^into the effort. In 
apportioning the leadership accordingly^, and for obvious 
strategic reasons, general control was vested in the hands of 
*'24 old line trade unions" and the active management put 
in the hands of the radical, Foster, with each side constantly 
working for its partisan advantage as well as for general 
victory. Moreover, in spite of its insistence in its ** Con- 
clusions" in the beginning of the book that the movement 
was entirely in the control of "old fashioned trade union- 
ism" — ^that as a matter of fact "the whole strike seemed 
extraordinarily old fashioned" — ^that Foster was working 
along old fashioned trade union lines — ^there is no question, 
in view of the quotations above and all the general evidence 
through the last two chapters of the book, that the Inter- 
church Report clearly recognized this dual nature of the con- 
trol and aims, and distinctly sympathized with the tactics, 
leadership, and aims of the radical faction. 

Thus when the Interchurch Report — except for some of 
the generalizations in the entirely separate and afterwards 
added "Findings" and "Recommendations"^ argues 

* On page 17 at the end of its Introduction, there is incorporated 
among a great many other Recommendations two very brief sections 
which recommend that the government should: "Devise with both 
sides and establish an adequate plan of permanent free conference to 
r^:ulate the conduct of the industry in the future" and "continue and 
make nationwide this (the Interchurch Report) inquiry into basic condi- 
tions in the industry. " In view of the fact that the government just had, 
through the Senate Committee, made a far more lengthy and detailed 
and specific examination into the steel strike than the Interchurch 
Report, which arrived at opposite conclusions, which investigation and 



throughout for trade union collective bargaining, standard 
trade union collective bargaining is plainly at least the 
minimum for which it is arguing. 

Quite characteristically, however, the Interchurch Re- 
port does not argue the subject of trade union collective 
bargaining on its merits at all. Except that it frequently 
insists that in European countries trade union collective 
bargaining is regarded as a matter of course and the lack 
of it as being "industrially extraordinarily old fashioned," 
it entirely assumes and takes for granted the one-sidedness 
of what was recognized by common consent as the chief 
issue in the whole steel strike. 

The fact that Bishop McConnell, Chairman of the Inter- 
church Commission of Inquiry, in one of his recently pub- 
lished works which will be referred to later and other men 
connected with the Interchurch investigation in other 
published works have so much to say about English trade 
union collective bargaining and the fact that Foster as the 

conclusions the Interchurch Report condemns, this recommendation 
seems rather puzzling on its face. The strategy of such a recommenda- 
tion is discussed in greater detail later but it should be indicated at this 
point that strike leaders* strategy is frequently first to appeal to the 
government to give them just what they want but which they doubt- 
less know in advance the government will not give them, after which 
they loudly proclaim that so long as the government refuses to do what 
they want for them, they have to do it for themselves. The Interchurch 
Report follows this strat^y precisely. At the b^inning of Volume I 
it asks in eflFect that the government repudiate its own investigation and 
asks specifically that the government act on the Interchurch investiga- 
tion and recommendations. In its second volume a year later on pages 
327 to 330 the Interchurch Report emphasizes that this unstressed 
7th sub-section of its 19th recommendation was the principal recom- 
mendation of the entire Report, and as the government did not repudi- 
ate its own investigation and act on this recommendation of the 
Interchurch Report, the Interchurch Report here emphasizes and re- 
peats that: 

" The government as much as the Steel Corporation is to blame and 
again the Corporation and the government have seen fit to leave the 
field of reform to the Trade Unions. " 







climax of his Great Steel Strike sets up the English labor 
unions as the model for American radicalism, makes 
this frequent reference of the Interchurch Report to 
English trade union collective bargaining as a reason for 
American trade union collective bargaining extremely 

This argtmient is advanced by the Interchurch Report 
in several places but is most definitely stated on page 41 by a 
quotation from the London Times that — 

" They (American employers) have been apt to compare with some 
complacency their own relations with labor to those existing in this 
cotmtry (England) and to attribute their comparative immunity from 
labor troubles to the superior atmosphere of the United States or to 
their own superior management. It is really due to the simple fact that 
the Labor Movement in the United States is historically a good many years 
behind our own. But it will infallibly tread the same broad course . . . 
and to resist the inevitable is a great mistake. " 

That there are two sides to the argtmient in regard to the 
advantages and disadvantages of trade union collective 
bargaining and trade unionism may be admitted. But that 
these partictdar arguments — that America has less labor 
trouble because we haven't yet got much of *' Labor Move- 
ment," and that the Labor Movement is inevitable and it is 
a "great mistake to resist the inevitable" — constitute valid 
and sufl&cient reasons why American industry and Ameri- 
can public opinion should unquestioningly embrace the 
*' Labor Movement" and its *' trade union collective bar- 
gaining," is a proposition that at least a great many 
Americans very definitely refuse to accept. 

The expressed reason advanced by Judge Gary for oppos- 
ing trade union collective bargaining in the steel industry 
was that the steel industry and its workers themselves 
preferred the Open Shop. 

Herbert Hoover says,^ 

" The principle of individual freedom requires the Open Shop. 
» (Open Shop Encyclopedia, page 278). 




Cardinal Gibbons says, {ibid.y page 276) 

"The right of a non-union laborer to make his own contract freely, 
and perform it without hindrance, is so essential to civil liberty that it 
must be defended by the whole power of the government. " 

Bishop McCabe (Methodist) says, (ibid., page 276) 

" I want to state the attitude of the church and this statement is offi- 
cial. We are opposed to having a small percentage of laboring men run 
the entire laboring class in a high handed and authoritative manner . . . 
it is an imposition for a few men to say, 'Join our union or you cannot 
work. . . . As now constituted labor unions cannot long stand.' " 

Archbishop Ireland says, (ibid., page 276) 

•'Labor unions . . . cannot be tolerated if they interfere with the 
general liberty of non-union men who have a right to work in or outside 
of imions as they please ... it is wrong in the labor unions to limit the 
output of work on the part of its members. The members themselves 
are injured. They are reduced to a dead level of inferiority." 

President Eliot of Harvard is quoted by the Citizens 
Alliance of Minneapolis as follows : 


' Nothing in the way of good industrial relations is to be expected from 
organized labor as represented by the American Federation of Labor 
and the four (railroad) brotherhoods. The only peace which can come 
out of those organizations is the peace of an absolute domination, not 
only of the American industries but of the government itself. " 

Woodrow Wilson, as an economist and historian, in his 
last Baccalaureate sermon at Princeton, said, 

" You know what the usual standard of the (union) employee is in our 
day. // is to give as little as he may for his wages. Labor is standardized 
by the trades tmions ... no one is suffered to do more than the average 
workman can do; and in some trades and handicrafts no one is suffered 
to do more than the least skillful of his fellows can do . . . I need 
not point out how economically disastrous such a regulation of labor is 
... the labor of America is rapidly becoming improfitable imder its 
present regulation by those who are determined to reduce it to a mini- 
mimi." (Senate Hearings, page 98). 



President Hadley in his last Baccalaureate sermon at Yale 
(1921) condemned the class conscious theories of organized 
labor as one of the most serious menaces to Americanism. 

President Harding in his message of August 18, 1922, to 
Congress in connection with the coal strike said: 

" These conditions cannot remain in free America. If free men cannot 
toil according to their own lawful choosing, all our constitutional guaran- 
tees bom of democracy are surrendered to mobocracy and the freedom 
of a hundred million is surrendered to the small minority which would 
have no law. " 

Senator Beveridge has said in regard to labor forcing over 
the *'Adamson" law on threat of tjdng up the railroads 
during the war: — 

"When (labor) organizations by threat to strangle the nation can 
dictate laws for their own advantage at the expense of all the people, 
then regular government by all for the good of all is annihilated. " 

— ^and Chief Justice Taft, Vice President Coolidge, Lyman 
Abbott, Theodore Roosevelt and a host of our most able 
and public-minded citizens have all pointed out the anti- 
social effects of many of the principles and practises of the 
Labor Movement in terms equally definite and specific. 

Again Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago are the 
three great American communities in which the modem labor 
movement has been perhaps longest and most strongly es- 
tablished, and where, therefore, there has been the best 
opportunity for the results of modem organized labor's 
theories and practises to have been thoroughly demon- 
strated. In all these three conspicuous cases — as well as in 
many other communities throughout the country — not 
merely the employer but the whole pubHc have become so 
utterly disgusted with the inefficient un-American results 
of organized labor theories and practises — not only as they 
have affected the employers and the public but as they have 
affected the workers themselves — ^that Los Angeles has, 


and Chicago and San Francisco as well as St. Louis, Boston 
and many other American communities are at present 
conspicuously engaged in, literally running the "Labor 
Movement " out of town. 

In view of the fact therefore that the four last Presi- 
dents of the United States — the Presidents of our three 
great universities and of many other similar institutions — 
the leading bishops of the two largest religious bodies in the 
country — ^and perhaps the majority of other unbiased, in- 
formed public leaders, and many of the great American 
communities in which the modem labor movement's 
theories and principles have been most thoroughly tried out, 
thus sweepingly condemn the whole ** Labor Movement" 
as at present constituted or at least many of its notorious 
theories and practices, it seems little short of ridiculous 
for any body of investigators merely to assume that the 
question of trade union collective bargaining has only one 
side and, irrespective of what it thinks of conditions in the 
steel industry, merely assume that trade union collective 
bargaining would better those conditions. 

As trade union collective bargaining does not exist in the 
steel industry and the question of whether or not it would 
improve conditions in the steel industry cannot therefore 
be determined on the basis of the results in the industry 
itself, it is necessary to judge this question on the basis of 
how trade union collective bargaining has affected other 
industries, and then to determine whether or not there are 
any particular reasons why it should operate any differently 
in the steel industry. 

Certain of the chief complaints against the theories and 
practises of the modem labor movement are emphasized in 
the foregoing quotations. They are; 

Firstt that the modem labor movement systematically 
and deliberately attempts to decrease production which not 
only puts an immense tax on the public but reduces the 
worker himself to "a dead level of inferiority." 

Second, that the modem labor movement seeks to domi- 


nate absolutely, for its own group interest, all conditions of 
employment, irrespective of the interest or rights of the in- 
dividual worker, and often of a majority of the workers or of 
the industry itself or of the public. 

Third, that the modem labor movement insists on operat- 
ing entirely outside the laws which govern all other human 
relations, and that, through its lawless disregard of con- 
tracts, its lawless factional feuds, and its lawless and arbi- 
trary insistence on enforcing its own will, wherever pos- 
sible, irrespective of right or justice, it constitutes not 
only a menace to all orderly operation of industry, but a 
menace to all orderly govenmient. 

FIRST, Decrease of prodiution: 

It is a basic economic axiom that the more of all kinds of 
goods there are produced, the more there will be for the 
whole country to have and use and enjoy, and therefore the 
greater will be general prosperity and the general demand 
for more goods and consequently the greater emplo5mient 
of labor. All American industrial advancement has been 
based on and has demonstrated this principle. Yet or- 
ganized labor insists on acting entirely on the opposite 
principle. From Mr. Gompers down, its leaders with per- 
haps a very few notable exceptions have blindly insisted 
that the less work each individual does the more work 
there will be to go round, and *' Organized Labor" has con- 
sistently applied this principle of lessening production in 
every industry on which it has obtained a sufl&dent hold 
to put it into effect. 

In printing newspapers it is necessary in order to save 
time to have an advertisement set into type in advance 
from which type matrixes or "Mats" are made and fur- 
nished to different papers all over the country. The 
imions, which almost completely dominate the printing 
field, allow the use of "mats " in order to save time but they 
arbitrarily insist that after using the "mat" and printing 
the paper from it that each such advertisement shall be set 
up in type all over again and then immediately unset. 




Throughout the country some 16,000 printers are said to be 
thus employed in merely setting up type that is never used 
and is immediately "knocked down." 

In the Lincoln Motor Company, 400 of certain auto- 
mobile parts were polished per man per day and a good 
man could polish 600 such parts. The tmions, however, 
in the shops they control arbitrarily stiptdate that no man 
shall polish more than 80 such parts per day in a day of the 
same niunber of hours. 

An average molder can easily set 75 to 80 "snapflasks" 
a day. Under union control the men are arbitrarily 
limited to setting 30 a day. 

After the complete union domination of the building 
trades in Cleveland, because of labor shortage during the 
war, a Cleveland grand jury Investigation reported that 
carpenters, paper hangers, painters, brick layers and practi- 
cally all other such classes of workers, in spite of the fact 
that their pay had been doubled, actually did only about 
half as much work per man per day. 

These are some of the union rules which, entirely in addi- 
tion to the encouraged inefficiency of the union worker, 
add to the cost and delay of building jobs. 

Plumbers and steam fitters union rules provide that all 
pipe up to 2 >^ inches must be hand cut on the job instead 
of being machine cut at a great saving of time and effort, in 
the shop. 

Ornamental plaster work used to be made in molds in the 
shop. Union rules now say it must be hand done on the 

Spraying machines are much more cheap and efficient 
for painting large flat surfaces. Union rules do not allow 
their use and will not allow the use of a brush more than ^yi 
inches wide. 

Bath tubs, radiators and heavy pltunbing can not be 
swung up to the proper floor by derrick to save time and 
labor. Union rules provide that skilled plumbers must be 
paid for their time to take it up by hand. 



Such union rules needlessly decreasing efficiency and 
piling up costs could be recited literally by the hundreds. 

These cases are in no sense exceptional. On the con- 
trary they are typical of the universal experience through- 
out all industry wherever the modem Labor Movement 
obtains sufficient control to put its fundamental principles 
into practice. That all such consistent decreasing of 
efficiency and piling up of costs have raised prices 
tremendously to the whole country cannot be doubted. 

But the *' Modem Labor Movement" has not only con- 
sistently lowered current standards of efficiency in produc- 
tion, but has fought advanced standards or methods of 

It is an obvious fact of all industrial history that the in- 
troduction of new or better machinery not only cheapens 
prices to the public but consequently results in far more 
employment of labor. It is a matter of the commonest 
knowledge, for instance, that in the present age of ma- 
chinery, every trade employs thousands of workers to every 
one worker the same trade employed before the age of 

Yet in 1900 unions condemned, and union workers struck 
against, the introduction of the turret lathe which has since 
made the modem automobile industry possible. If the 
unions had been strong enough to win this fight, the whole 
automobile industry on its present scale would have been 

Today machinery exists which could materially increase 
the production of coal. Yet the powerful United Mine 
Workers Union is able to and does prohibit its introduction 
in the coal industry. It costs $2000 for every day the aver- 
age ocean-going vessel is loading in American ports. Ma- 
chinery exists which could greatly facilitate loading 
operations. The President of the longshoremen's union 
personally approves the introduction of such machinery 
but the "Labor Movement" prohibits its introduction and 
handicaps all shipping accordingly. 


Again such instances in which the use of labor-saving 
machinery to increase production is absolutely prohibited 
by the "Labor Movement" wherever it has had the power 
to do this, could be multiplied indefinitely. 

As indicative of how such theories and practices ac- 
tually work out, "The Constructor" (June, 1922) publishes 
a study covering Wages, Savings Bank Deposits, Building 
Activity, Rents, and Employment, doubtless the chief fac- 
tors indicative of local prosperity and particularly labor's 
prosperity, in a large group of "union" cities as compared 
with "open-shop" cities. The conclusions are in part as 

"Comparisons between cities where building is on an open shop basis 
and on a closed shop basis reveals 56% more biiilding, 34% higher money 
wages and 18% greater average savings deposits in the open shop towns, 
. . . with 126% more «ffemployment and rent increases 30 times as 
great in the closed shop cities." 

SECOND, The modern labor movement seeks to dominate 
absolutely for its own group interest all conditions of em- 
ploymenty irrespective of the interest or rights of the individual 
worker or often a majority of the workers, or of the industry 
itself or of the public. 

That it is the fundamental principle of the modem 
"Labor Movement," and its consistent practice in every 
industry where it has gained sufi&dent control to enforce 
its principles, to force all workers, irrespective of their de- 
sires, into the union and to insist that non-tmion men shall 
be refused employment, is so consistently admitted by the 
leaders of organized labor themselves as to require no fur- 
ther proof. Also these admissions are so widely known 
that they do not require repetition. 

But the modem labor movement today goes far beyond 


New York City is what is called a "union town" just as 
Chicago, San Francisco and St. Louis have been until 
recently "union towns." There is at present writing a 
Joint Committee of the New York Legislature to investigate 


housing conditions (Lockwood Committee) investigating 
certain union conditions in New York City. This legisla- 
tive committee has already discovered and published a host 
of such organized labor practices as the following: 

Certain carpenters were expelled from Carpenters' Union 
Local 1456 for criticizing Brindell, the New York labor 
leader who is now in state prison for extortion. Being ex- 
pelled from the New York union they could not join the 
union in any other town or get work in any "union town " in 
America. And as this particular union is very powerful 
this meant most of the country. 

Although there are from 12,000 to 15,000 electric work- 
ers living in New York City, the Electrical Workers* 
Union has arbitrarily limited its membership to 3800 and 
will not admit any of these other New York electrical 
workers into its union or allow them to work in New York 
except, under "permits" to work from week to week at its 
pleasure on the pajrment of $2.50 a week to the union. 

In October, 1920, the Plumber's Union "closed its books " 
admitting no new members except the son or brother of men 
who were members on that date. Not only has it been 
impossible, therefore, for two years, for any pltunber to 
come from outside communities into New York, even 
though they were union members in these outside communi- 
ties, and work at their trade, but the Committee brought 
out that New York Plumbers' apprentices who had spent 
four and five years working up in their trade were pre- 
vented from joining the union at the end of their apprentice- 
ship and so from following their trade in their own town. 

The fact that the same or worse conditions were dis- 
covered by the courts or legislative or citizens' committees 
to have existed in Chicago, San Francisco, and St. Louis 
and many other communities, was among the chief reasons 
why the labor movement has been forcibly ejected from 
power in these cities. That they exist to a greater or less 
degree throughout the country where organized labor is in 
the saddle is known, though in the absence of specific public 




investigation it is of course not possible to state to just 
what degree they exist. 

There is another widespread group of arbitrary labor 
union practises which operate in the opposite direction to 
handicap a large part of the workers and raise prices and 
otherwise tax the pubHc. There are about 500,000 workers 
in the bituminous coal industry. This is about 100 to 150 
thousand more workers than the efficient operation of the 
industry requires. This has been stated by former Fuel Com- 
missioner Garfield and by many other competent authori- 
ties. Because of this excess of workers, the average coal 
miner can only get work some 150 to 200 days a year and 
the union leaders say that he only averages about 6 hours' 
work even for these days. If this 100 to 150 thousand men 
were distributed among the many other industries where 
under normal conditions there is a shortage of labor, the 
remaining coal miners could work a normal amount of time 
and earn a very good wage at a much lower wage rate. But 
except for the workers in West Virginia and a few isolated 
sections, all these men belong to the United Mine Workers' 
Union and pay dues— between $1 1 ,000,000 and $20,000,000 
a year dues— into the Union Treasury. Therefore this 
union, which has for years dominated the coal industry, in- 
sists on keeping all these men in the industry and forces the 
payment of such a high wage scale that these men can earn 
ordinary wages by thus working about half the time. There 
are, of course, other factors which contribute to the exces- 
sive price of coal but there is Httle question that the chief 
cause is the fact that all the consumers of soft coal-^nd so 
ultimately the public— must pay this tax to the unions of 
one and a half men's wages for one man's work on every 

ton of coal they buy. 
THIRD, the modern ''Labor Movement insists on opera- 

ting outside the law. 

That men and organizations shall keep their word and 
their contract and otherwise be responsible for their acts, is 
the only basis on which orderly human relations are pos- 


sible. Every other class in American society takes this for 
granted and if it does not do so is forced by law to live up to 
these fundamental business and social obligations. 

That modem labor organizations as a matter of fact fre- 
quently do not keep their contracts and frequently try to 
avoid responsibility for their acts is of course generally 
known. But that the modem "Labor Movement" in- 
sist, as a matter of principle and right, that it shall not be 
subject to the laws on which all organized society and all 
modem civilization are based, has been frequently hinted at 
and has recently been frankly and officially admitted by 
Mr. Samuel Gompers. 

In his already famous, and what will doubtless prove 
historic cross examination before the Lockwood Committee, 
April 21 and 22, 1922 (pages 6714 to 6889 of the Record), 
Mr. Gompers testified as to organized labor's own point of 
view as to its relations with its members, with employers 
and with the public. It must be particularly remembered 
throughout this testimony that New York is a "union 
town" in which no man in the trades discussed can get 
work unless he is a member of the union, and no employer 
can get workers to do his work except through the unions 
and on the union terms. 

After discussing many labor union practices which result 
in injury and often extreme injury to the workers them- 
selves, and which practises Mr. Gompers had to admit were 
wrong in themselves, Mr. Untermeyer, Coimsel for the 
Lockwood Committee, asked: 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Where they (the unions) do confessedly a wrong 
thing, an oppressive thing, a vicious thing to their own people, don't 
you think the law should step in and give redress? 

"JIfr. Gompers: No sir. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Suppose it appeared, as it does in the record here, 
that practically every Labor Union in this state connected with the 
building trade?, and certainly in this City, having a constitution and 
by-laws, have provisions for expulsion of members without any power of 
review; don't you think that the State should legulate that so that the 
courts would have the right of review over the expulsion of members? 


"Mr. Gompers: No sir. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: You think that the Labor Unioiu should be per- 
mitted to exercise this autocratic and despotic power of capital punish- 
ment without any say-so by the courts? 

" Mr. Gompers: God save Labor from the courts. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: You would not allow the right of review to a man 
who wanted to get into a Union and who was refused admittance on the 
pretext that he was not qualified, if he could show, overwhelmingly, 
that he was the best qualified man in the Union, you would not allow 
the right of review in the courts in such a case, would you? 

" Mr. Gompers: I would not. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: You also heard did you not, those two young men, 
one of whom had been a plumbers' apprentice four years and a half and 
the other for five and a half years, tell of their efforts to become journey- 
men plimibers, did you? 

" Mr. Gompers: Yes Sir. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: And you would disapprove, would you not, of any 
relief for them except through the Union? 

" Mr. Gompers: Yes sir. That is not through the courts. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Then as I understand you, you would prefer to 
see them go without any redress until they can get redress from the 

" Mr. Gompers: Yes sir. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Would it be true no matter to what extent the 
abuse might go? " 

" Mr. Gompers: Yes sir. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: It appears here that some of these Unions keep no 
books, no accounts of receipts; that their officers take in dues in cash, 
dispose of them, and that there is no accotmting. There is no relief from 
that unless the Union chooses otherwise, is there? 

" Mr. Gompers: Until the Labor movement 

" Mr. Untermeyer: I mean there is no relief now. We are not talking 
about the dim future and the Labor movement we are talking about 
existing conditions. 

"Mr. Gompers: Yes. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Take a case in which the officers steal the fimds of 
the Union, and there are no books to show and no way of proving that 
they steal, don't you think the Legislature should regulate those associa- 
tions to the extent of requiring that they should keep books of accounts 
of their receipts and expenditures in the interest of common honesty. 

"Mr. Gompers: I think the Legislature should not interfere in the 
matter at all, regrettable and bad as the condition may be. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: If all the trade unions in New York, engaged in the 
Building Trades agree with all the employers engaged in the building 


trades that the rate of wages for a plasterer for the year should be nine 
dollars, it would be a gross breach of contract for the employers, because 
of a depression in business, to try to get them to work for eight dollars, 
wouldn't it." 

" Mr. Gompers: Yes eir. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Wouldn't it be an equal breach of contract on the 
part of the union and its members to take advantage of an activity to 
try to get ten or twelve dollars in the face of its contract to work for nine 

"Mr. Gompers: No. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Then what is the good of a contract if it cannot be 

" Mr. Gompers: Because time develops self -discipline. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: They (the members of a union) ought to be able to 
fiatmt the contract and disregard it just as they please? 

" Mr. Gompers: I did not say that. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Is not that a flaunting of the contract, if they 
simply stop in the middle of a job and demand a 30% increase? 

" Mr. Gompers: Well, flaimting is disregarding the contract. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: And you say that there ought to be no remedy? 
' Mr. Gompers: Not by law. 
Mr. Untermeyer: Where are you going to get the remedy? 

" Mr. Gompers: By the organized labor movement. 

*' Mr. Untermeyer: But there is no such remedy now, is there? 
' Mr. Gompers: But there is constantly growing improvement. 
Mr. Untermeyer: But there is no such remedy now. Never mind 
what is growing. There is no such remedy now is there? 

"Mr. Gompers: There is no remedy now.' 



■ « 



The jurisdictional dispute between the plumbers and the 
steamfitters upon a $30,000,000 power house at Hell Gate 
being built by the city was drawn to Mr. Gompers* atten- 
tion. He said that the President of the International of 
which both local unions were members had rendered de- 
cision in the matter, but acknowledged that the President 
had nothing to do with the enforcing of his decision and that 
the American Federation of Labor was without power to 
enforce it. The testimony continued : 

" Mr. Untermeyer: There being this jurisdictional dispute between the 
two unions, and there being no authority within the imions or within 
organized labor that can function so as to enforce a settlement of that 

^rx . -.^ .' _-- 

. ^ ^- 'oi J? .> L> 



dispute, do you want us to understand that you would not approve of 
any interference by the courts to protect that contractor against the 
consequences of that jurisdictional dispute between the Unions? 

" Mr. Gompers: I hold that the courts could not compel these men to 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Won't you answer my question? Do you think 
there should be no right of redress to the courts? 
' Mr. Gompers: I say that there is no 





'Mr. Untermeyer: Won't you answer me? 

"Mr. Gompers: I think that the courts should not be given that 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Do you think then that in such a case that man 
should be entirely without redress? 

" Mr, Gompers: The man 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Won't you answer me? 

" Mr. Gompers: That is not the alternative. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Has he any redress? 
' Mr. Gompers: I do not know. 

' Mr. Untermeyer: If he has no redress, you think he should be with- 
out redf ess? 

"Mr. Gompers: From the courts? 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Without any redress— if he has none, do you think 
he should remain without redress? It is a plain question. You can 
answer it yes or no. 

"Mr. Gompers: That is one of the risks of the industry. ... I do 
not see where he can have any redress. 

Mr. Untermeyer: Do you think he should remain without redress? 
Mr. Gompers: Yes sir, rather than 

"Mr. Untermeyer: I am going to ask you the next question. Don't 
you think that in such a case the courts should have the right to give him 

" Mr. Gompers: The courts cannot give him any redress. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Don't you think they ought to have the right to 
make the try? 

"Mr. Gompers: No sir. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Did you know that in the Plasterers' Union where 
their own men did an inferior job of work against the protest of the 
employer, that they would send for the employer and fine the employer 
for that work and make him pay for doing it over again and not fine the 
men who did the work; did you know that? 
"Mr. Gompers: No. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: That was proven here before this Committee by 
the men themselves; you would not approve of that would you? 

"Mr. Gompers: No." 




Counsel drew attention to the fact that in the erection of 
the Ambassador Hotel in New York, the owner had mantels 
made of Keene's cement which enables the affixing of the 
mantel to the building at less cost than by other methods. 
The plasterers compelled the builder to destroy these 
mantels and substitute others to be attached by a more 
costly method. The testimony continued: 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Don't you think that if such a practice is indulged 
in under resolution of the Union, that the employer who suffered that 
loss should have a remedy in damages against the union for the one 
hundred and odd mantels that he lost in that way? 

"Mr. Gompers: No. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: You think he should have no remedy whatever? 

"Mr. Gompers: Not by a recourse to any new law. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Where should the remedy be, what remedy should 
he have? 

" Mr. Gompers: He has none. That is the risk of the industry. " 

Counsel referring to the record advised the witness that 
the Executive Conmiittee of the Plasterers' Union had com- 
pelled the owner of the Ambassador Hotel to tear down part 
of a wall because the delegate, a plasterer by trade, did not 
approve the color and style in the imitation of Travatine 
marble from an artistic point of view, although it was 
entirely satisfactory to the owner and the architect. The 
testimony reads (page 6861) : 

"Mr. Untermeyer: But what would you do about it? The owner has 
had to tear down the walls and he has had to do the thing in a different 
style to meet the view of that gentleman, Mr. Pearl, I think his name is. 
Don't you think there ought to be some right lodged somewhere to that 
owner to get damages for the action of the Executive Committee? 

"Mr. Gompers: I think not. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: I know but why shouldn't you be in favor as a just 
man, of giving a remedy to the man who has suffered damages by that 
act? That is what I mean to ask you . . . don't you think we can 
bring you to the point, Mr. Gompers, at which you will agree with us 
that there should be a l^al remedy for such a wanton act? 

"Mr. Gompers: I think not." 



! h\ 



Mr. Gompers went on to explain that labor is : 


'An organization of a mass — ^masses of men and are likely to make 
mistakes, likely to err. They have the right to err. They have the 
right to make mistakes in their struggle for their protection and im- 

"Mr. Untermeyer: If they do err and make mistakes that injtire the 
public and injure innocent third parties with whom they deal, is it your 
idea that there should be no relief for that? 

"Mr. Gompers: Not by law. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Where should the remedy lie? 

"Mr. Gompers: The law should not provide a remedy. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Where should the remedy lie? 

" Mr. Gompers: By their own experience and sense of justice. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: That means you would support no regulation 
whatever except by the unions that are committing the abuses? 

" Mr. Gompers: No. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Where wotdd there be any redress for these abuses 
except through their correction by the imions by which the abuses are 
being perpetrated? 

" Mr. Gompers: By the general labor movement. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: But you say none of these general labor movements 
have any compulsory power over a local? 

"Mr. Gompers: And I would not. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: You would not give them any, would you? 

"Mr. Gompers: I would not. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: Then why do you say that the general labor move- 
ment could do anything toward correcting these admitted abuses for 
which you will allow no other form of correction? 

" Mr. Gompers: The influence of the American labor movement has 
been great in eliminating many of the abuses which have existed; it has 
not succeeded entirely. 

"Mr. Untermeyer: Are you not aware, Mr. Gompers, as a historical 
fact, that as the labor imions have grown in power the abuses have ac- 
cumulated and increased? 

"Mr. Gompers: In some instances, yes. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: But don't you know that that is the rule, a natural 
thing, that where the power gets stronger and stronger the abuses 
grow greater and greater? 

" Mr. Gompers: In some instances, yes. 

" Mr. Untermeyer: In the last five years is there a single reform in all 
the constitutions and by-laws of these different tmions, in some of which 
there are as many as fifty abuses in a single union? 





^ Mr. Gompers: Probably, 
'iff. Untermeyer: Has one been reformed? 
' Mr. Gompers: Not those to which you refer. 
Mr. Untermeyer: Any others, can you refer to one that has been 
reformed in five years in any union in Greater New York? 
"Mr. Gompers: I cannot say that I can." 

Of course the country has been long familiar with a host 
of such arbitrary, utterly lawless acts on the part of in- 
dividual unions or union officials. The public has been 
apt, however, to regard these as merely isolated and excep- 
tional incidents. But Mr. Gompers' plain statement made 
categorically and in detail that the "Labor Movement" 
demands the right of practising the widest variety of the 
gravest injustices to labor itself, to the employer and to the 
public "no matter to what extent the abuse might go," 
without any responsibility before the law or any other au- 
thority than their own will, has established the fact that 
lawlessness is not a mere incident in its practices but is 
claimed as an inherent right of the modem "Labor Move- 
ment." That is why our unbiased public leaders who are 
really informed have long insisted just as has Senator 
Beveridge that: — 

"When (labor) organizations by threat to strangle the nation can 
dictate laws for their own advantage at the expense of all the people 
then regular government by all for the good of all is annihilated. " 

— ^and as does Bishop McCabe that: 

"As now constituted labor unions cannot long stand. Either they 
must reform themselves or they will cease to exist. " 

There is one further important fact in regard to "Or- 
ganized Labor " which also explains the attitude of informed 
public leaders in regard to it but will doubtless come as a 
surprise to the average American who has obtained his ideas 
of the "Labor Movement" chiefly from " Organized Labor" 

1 ' 


Organized labor itself has always made every effort to 
spread the fiction that it represents American labor as a 
whole. The Interchurch Report speaks of the fight of the 
Steel Corporation for the Open Shop against the Labor 
Movement. As a matter of fact, however, the opposite is 
true and this whole situation is the result of an attack on 
labor and labor conditions as a whole by the surprisingly 
small percentage of all labor which is under the domination 
of the *' Labor Movement." 

Dr. Leo Wollmann, who is himself entirely favorable to 
and is at present working for one of the great factions of the 
modem *' Labor Movement,'* in an article entitled, "The 
Extent of Trade Unionism," prepared on the basis of the 
last ofl&cial figures in 1917, states that of all American labor 
only 7.7% are members of unions and that even considering 
the limited classes of labor among which the labor unions 
have made their greatest success, only 18.4% were mem- 
bers of unions. In Mr. Gompers' own trade, for instance, 
the cigar makers, less than 25% belong to the tmion. 

There is, of course, another side to the whole trade union 
question. Undoubtedly organizations of workers, not only 
for mutual protection but for the discussion of questions of 
mutual interest and united decision and action on legiti- 
mate programs for mutual advancement, would often be to 
the best interests not only of the workers but often of their 
industry. Many sincere and intelligent men who recog- 
nize all the evils of modem trade unionism still feel that it 
performs a valuable service at least to the extent that it 
serves as a constant threat to the short-sighted employer 
who otherwise might not only take advantage of his own 
men but establish a standard which more decent employers 
might believe they had to meet in order to meet his 

Large numbers of people who hold such views — some of 
them inside as well as outside of modem trade unions — 
believe that industry can be best served by a reformed 
trade unionism. 



Moreover, there are tmquestionably a certain percentage 
of individual unions in the modem Labor Movement which, 
because of the high type of their individual membership or 
leadership or both, adequately represent the best spirit and 
ideals of American Labor and have proved a valuable con- 
structive force for both their members and their industry. 

The fact, however, that 80% of the steel workers them- 
selves — ^tens of thousands of whom were former union 
members — definitely refused to accept the kind of trade 
union collective bargaining that was proposed for the 
steel industry, together with all the facts which have already 
been considered in connection with that proposed unioni- 
zation, and the leadership under which it was agitated, 
raise a strong presumption that it did not promise to be 
more democratic or otherwise very different from the or- 
dinary modem trade unionism which 90% of all American 
workers have refused to accept because of its working and 
results in industry in general. 

Nevertheless, the proposition of the unionization of the 
steel industry has been so particularly stressed by both the 
first and second volumes of the Interchurch Report and 
the interest of the great basic steel industry so vitally affects 
the public interest that the probable particular results which 
would follow the unionization of that particular industry 
warrant specific discussion. 



It was frankly admitted by the strike leaders themselves 
that they plamied the steel unionization drive without even 
the knowledge of the great majority of the workers, and that 
otherwise the whole idea of trade union collective bargaining 
in the steel industry was originated, and all the organiza- 
tion arrangements for attempting to carry it out were put 
into operation, by professional labor leaders. 

Judge Gary stated, and the results of the unionization 
drive and the strike showed, that the great majority of the 
steel workers themselves were either indifferent to or did 
not want trade union collective bargaining in the steel 

These facts in themselves indicate that unless the con- 
trary can be shown it must be taken for granted that the 
particular trade union collective bargaining proposed for 
the steel industry was the stereotyped professional labor 
leader kind which involved the adoption in the steel in- 
dustry, as rapidly as should prove practicable or possible, 
of the fundamental principles and practices of the "Labor 
Movement " which have already been described. The only 
apparent probability that trade union collective bargaining 
would have worked any differently in the steel industry than 
it has in most other industries was the possible extent to 
which Mr. Foster and his faction might have been able to 
modify it toward radicalism. 



After the failure of the unionization drive to interest 
more than a fifth of the workers, after the first week of 
the strike when at least the National leaders probably al- 
ready knew that the strike was a failure, and particularly 
after Judge Gary had especially attacked, both in public 
statements and in his Senate testimony, the proposition 
of the closed shop in the industry, the strike leaders at- 
tempted in their testimony before the Senate Committee to 
insist that they were not demanding the closed shop in 
the steel industry. 

The closed shop is a fundamental policy and practice of 
the Labor Movement in general and particularly of the 24 
International Unions involved in the steel strike. It is 
a matter of common knowledge that the closed shop has 
been insisted on and exists in every industry in which or- 
ganized labor is strong enough to make its policies effective, 
and that in each new industry where the Labor Movement 
obtains a hold it enforces the closed shop just as rapidly as 
it can acquire the power to do so. 

Moreover, even while they were insisting that they were 
not then demanding the closed shop in the industry, Mr. 
Fitzpatrick and Mr. Gompers were forced tmder cross- 
examination by the Senate Committee to admit that their 
unionization plans and policy led directly and inevitably to 
the closed shop and Mr. Tighe, President of the Amalga- 
mated Association, in answer to Senator Walsh's question 
as to whether or not the strike leaders "had it in their 
hearts," or in any way proposed to bring about the closed 
shop in the steel industry, merely answered that that ques- 
tion had not, as far as he knew, been definitely discussed by 
the strike leaders. 

Mr. Gompers testified (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 

"Senator Phipps: What is the attitude ... as regards employing 
non-union men in shops where you have organized the employees? 

" Mr. Gompers: The national trade imions* effort has been to try to 
organize the workers. 


"Senator Phipps: And to exclude the employment of non-union men 
wherever possible? 

"Mr. Gompers: To organize the workers, to try to have the workers 
organized in a plant ioo%." 

In regard to the same point Mr. Fitzpatrick also after 
much cross-examining finally testified (Senate Hearings, 
Part I, page 53) : 


'Senator Stirling: And you object in a union shop to the taking in of 
non-union men, do you not? 

"Mr. Fitzpatrick: No. 

" Senator Stirling: Do you not try to prevent the employment of non- 
imion men in the union shop? 

" Mr. Fitzpatrick: In the tmion shop the employer and the employees 
have agreed that the union men will be employed. Then ... in case of 
inability of the tmion to furnish union men or of the employer to secure 
union men, that in that situation, then the employer can employ non- 
tmion men. ... 

" Senator Stirling: That is only however in case he is not able to secure 
union men that he is permitted to employ non-imion men? 

'Mr. Fitzpatrick: Yes." 


Moreover, ntmiber 9 of the 12 demands which the strike 
leaders made of the steel companies shows plainly, as will 
be developed later, that it was the express intention of the 
strike leaders to enforce the closed shop in the steel industry 
or otherwise demand number 9 wotild be meaningless. 

Considering then the fundamental principles and prac- 
tices of the present Labor Movement, and that the 24 Inter- 
national unions which instigated the steel strike held to 
exactly these same principles and practices and often carried 
them to extremes, and considering the fact that their trade 
tmion collective bargaining in the steel industry was to have 
worked directly towards the closed shop imder which as a 
matter of fact and practice every worker would have had 
to come under direct and secret union control or lose his 
job, there is obviously every reason to believe that trade 
union collective bargaining in the steel industry would also 
have meant the decreased production, the interference with 


the introduction of new machinery and other technical im- 
provements, and the subjection of the whole industry to the 
constant labor agitation fostered by the selfish ambitions 
of rival labor leaders or rival unions, which have marked 
conditions in most other industries which have come under 
the control of the Labor Movement. 

Entirely in addition to this, however, there were many 
specific factors in connection with the proposed unioniza- 
tion of the steel industry which would have exaggerated 
these ordinarily unfavorable results. 

These special factors were: 

First, the particular professional labor leaders who were 
to have instituted and who would undoubtedly have con- 
tinued to have a large voice in carrying out of trade union 
collective bargaining in the steel industry. 

Second, the fact that there were 24, and the particular 
rivalries and other relations of these 24, International 
unions which would have controlled the majority of the 
steel workers and whose many various individual and often 
hostile interests and policies would necessarily infinitely 
complicate the labor policy of the steel industry; and 

Third, certain of the special 12 demands which the strike 
leaders made on the companies as a basis for collective 
bargaining in the steel industry. 

Mr. Foster was one of the chief leaders who was to have 
instituted trade union collective bargaining in the steel 
industry. On his own plain definite admission and that of 
the Interchurch Report, Mr. Foster's whole interest in 
trade union collective bargaining in the steel industry or in 
any other industry was to make every possible use of it as a 
means to carrying out certain aims of his own, which aims 
he described several years before the strikes as being to seize 
industry and set up a syndicalist soviet government and 
which aims he described after the strike merely by the 
words *' radical" and ** revolutionary." 

It is accordingly clear that as far as Mr. Foster's leader- 
ship in it was concerned, the particular proposed trade 


union collective bargaining would not be for the best 
interests of the steel industry or the country.* 

The second most important individual among the steel 
leaders and also on the committee which was to inaugurate 
the proposed trade union collective bargaining in the steel 
industry was John Fitzpatrick. 

Mr. Fitzpatrick testified: 

Some of them (steel workers) get $20 and I40, as I understand it as 
high as $60, a day but . . . it is not anything like what he ought to 
have, no matter what he gets," (Senate Hearings, Part I, page 61, line 
29); . 


"A group of steel emplyees . . . passed resolutions stating that the 
conditions in the steel mills were very satisfactory; that the wages were 
all that could be hoped for, and that there was absolutely no complaint 
on which to justify any kind of grievance and therefore that they 
were absolutely content with the conditions that existed. Then they 
. . . went in to their slave holes in the steel mills** (Senate Hearings, 
Part I, page 81, line 22); 

and again 

" Mr. Fitzpatrick: If we undertook to postpone the strike or wait until 
October 6th (as President Wilson requested) . . . then we would have 
been shot to pieces. There would not have been anybody here to make 
any report. 

** Senator Smith. You said if you had delayed the strike you would 
have been shot to pieces; your organization would have been shot to 

■^ i 

» " Foster is just back from Russia where he was in touch with Lemn 
and Trotzky. Judging from his own statements no man visiting the 
Soviet was ever treated better. . . . Immediately upon his retmn to 
the United States he proceeds to organize the Trade Union Education- 
al League. Presumably Foster is the educator. . . . Back of that re- 
sohition (Foster's) is the propaganda of radical revolution to overthrow 
the Constitution of the United States . . . and William Z. Foster 
wants to become an autocrat of America." 

Samxtel Gompers, 
April 30, 1922. 


" Mr. Fitzpatrick: And with the shooting of our organization to pieces 
our members would have been shot in cold blood . . . "(Senate 
Hearings, Part I, page 20). 

Mr. Fitzpatrick's whole Senate testimony indicates his 
sincerity. But the point of view which believed that, in 
view of the relation between wages and prices, workers ought 
to receive $18,000 a year and "more if they can get it," 
and which scathingly condemned any workers who stated 
that they did not feel the grievances which his self-interested 
prejudice thought they ought to feel, and which argued 
volubly and in perfect seriousness that the strike leaders 
didn't dare postpone the strike two weeks, as President 
Wilson requested, for fear that all their members would 
have been "shot down in cold blood," so that "no one 
would have been left to report," hardly represents a point 
of view which the pubHc can afford to have given a domi- 
nant voice in the management of the steel industry. More- 
over the quality of Mr. Fitzpatrick's executive ability is 
further indicated by the fact that in the Chicago district 
where he had for years been President of the local American 
Federation of Labor grand juries have recently uncovered 
more labor graft, blackmail and intimidation and general 
preying on the public than has ever been known to exist in 
any other city in the country.' 

The continuation of collective bargaining, if it had been 
established in the steel industry, would have been carried 
out as it effected about 60% of the men, by the 24 Inter- 
national unions who claimed jurisdiction over the steel 
industry and to whose organizations (according to Mr. 
Foster's records) 60% of the unionized steel workers had 

» As a dimax to organized labor conditions in Chicago which have 
been growing worse and more notorious for years, on May 10, 1922, the 
Chicago headquarters of the various imions were raided by the police, 
material for bombs found and seized and 200 labor leaders arrested, who 
were characterized by the Chicago Chief of Police as "hoodlums and ex- 
convicts," who "no more represent honest labor than the Haymarket 
anarchists did." 


been variously assigned. In other words, all such ques- 
tions as "control of the job," "promotion," "working 
hours" — which the Interchurch Report particularly men- 
tions — and in general all questions having to do with labor, 
including rate of production and pay, would all have been 
determined under the proposed trade union collective 
bargaining by representatives of the company and repre- 
sentatives of each of these 24 International unions. 

Mr. Gompers' testimony before the Lockwood Com- 
mittee plainly indicates that the large proportion of all 
strikes and other labor agitation and trouble which notori- 
ously and constantly disrupts the country's building opera- 
tions, is caused, not by any question between employer and 
employee affecting the interests of the men, but because of the 
rivalries and jealousies of the different unions involved. 
That the same conditions applies to a more or less degree 
wherever the Labor Movement is in control, generally in 
proportion to the ntmaber of unions which claim jurisdiction 
in the particular industry is well known. 

The very fact then that there were 24 rival International 
tmions involved in the proposed trade union collective 
bargaining in the steel industry of itself was particularly 
calculated to make such trade union collective bargaining 
particularly hectic. 

Moreover the fact that these 24 International tmions 
could not even wait until they had established such trade 
union collective bargaining to demonstrate how hectic and 
generally disruptive that bargaining would be is repeatedly 
admitted and emphasized by both Mr. Foster and the 
Interchurch Report. 

The Interchurch Report states 

"The third cause (of the failure of the strike) was the disunity of 
labor " (p. 1 79) . " The Stationary Engineers and the Switchmen, two of 
the 24 Internationals, did not call their members out of the steel plants 
and yards but a number of Switchmen's locals did. The Amalgamated 
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers after a month b^an ordering 
its men back into independent plants' '(175). "In the Calumet district. 


the Switchmen refused to pull out their men because the organizer said 
* Trade control was at stake.' The Switchmen were rivals of the Train- 
men for the men in the plant yards and if they'd have struck, the Train- 
men would have stuck, filled up the places, broke the strike and the 
Switchmen could never have got back." (p. 181) "Electricallnternational 
officers say their people did not want steel organized because electrical 
workers, during slack times in imion shops like to be free to get steel 
jobs which they couldn't if steel was organized " (p. 181). "Among the 
24 unions, besides the fights over s^r^ating recruits, there came up in 
devastating form the unsolved problem of the sacredness of contracts 
. . . the Amalgamated was acrimoniously charged (by rival unions) 
with choosing between its contracts with employers and its contracts 
with fellow unions. Its choice was called treason. . . . Moreover 
there was no imity ... as between the steel unions and the American 
Federation of Labor," p. (179). 

Mr. Foster goes into even greater detail to show how 
utterly impossible it was for these 24 unions to forget their 
jealousies and rivalries and work together even for a few 
months in order to achieve a common advantage that ad- 
mittedly they could not achieve save by the strongest 
possible unity of action. 

But under trade union collective bargaining, these 24 
unions would have to work month in and month out, not 
only with each other but with what they at least secretly re- 
gard as their inherent class enemies — ^the steel companies — 
as well. Working agreements would have constantly to be 
formulated and maintained not merely in regard to a few 
simple policies but on a host of practical details, on many of 
which every separate union might have a different point of 
view and interest. 

For the interests and policies of each of these 24 unions is 
inevitably determined not by conditions or necessities in 
the steel industry, where most of them would only have a 
minority of their members, but by conditions or necessities 
in other industries where most of them would have their 
majority memberships. This condition would also in- 
evitably involve many further complicating probabilities. 
The tmions embracing the low-skilled foreign workers would 


have a constant tendency toward radicalism. The personal 
ambitions of some Skinny Madden or some Brindell would 
be 24 times as likely as ordinary to further agitate the labor 
political waters or muddy them with graft and corruption. 
In view of these perfectly plain and admitted facts, there 
can be no doubt that any attempt to establish such a 
hydra-headed type of trade union collective bargaining in 
the steel industry would constitute the deliberate establish- 
ment of a condition which, according to all available labor 
experience and all general experience, would merely promise 
a state of industrial chaos of which the building trades offer 
a most conspicuous example. 

The third particular factor in the steel situation which 
promised to exaggerate the normal tendency of trade union 
collective bargaining towards decreased production and a 
general condition where the worker must give his loyalty to 
his union instead of his job, and depend on the union in- 
stead of on personal efficiency and ambition for advance- 
ment, consisted of certain of the particular 12 demands 
which the strike leaders made upon the steel companies as 
the basis of the proposed trade union collective bargaining 
in the steel industry. 

Of these official 12 demands, ntimber 3 and number 6 
called for the 8 hour day throughout the industry and an 
"increase of wages sufficient to guarantee an American 
standard of living." The merits of these demands and the 
results of their possible acceptance have already been 
sufficiently discussed. 

Demand ntmiber 10 insisted that "Principles of seniori- 
ty apply in maintaining, reducing or increasing working 
forces" — ^this demand meant that all incentive among the 
workers to be efficient in their jobs in order to achieve more 
rapid advancement was to have been taken away. The 
most able worker was to be always kept below even the 
most inefficient worker who had merely been employed 
longer than he had. In any reduction of the working force 
the newer employees, no matter how efl&dent or brilliant, 



had to be let go and slightly older employees, no matter how 
inefl&dent, retained. Under such a system workers like 
Schwab, and BuflBngton and Farrell and all of Carnegie's 29 
partners would still be, merely because of age and number 
of years worked, just getting out of the semi-skilled into the 
skilled worker's class or else they would have had to seek 
the outlet for their ambitions in labor politics or in some 
other industry. 

Demand number 12 called for "abolition of physical ex- 
amination." The steel industry to a partictdar degree in- 
volves the handling of molten metal and very heavy ma- 
chinery, both of which involve possible danger to many 
workers. The companies in their regard for the safety of the 
men and the machinery have always insisted on a careful 
physical examination as to the eyesight, hearing, mental 
and muscular reactions, and other physical qualifications of 
the workmen to whom such responsibilities were entrusted. 
It was one of the basic demands of the unions that such ex- 
aminations be abolished, the object of course being to take 
away the company's last vestige of control over its 

Demands ntmibers 11 and 9 insisted on "the abolition 
of company unions" and "check-off system of collecting 
union dues and assessments." The first of these, providing 
that no steel worker cotdd continue to belong to the local 
steel unions to which many of them had belonged for years 
before the strike, was of course only a step towards pro- 
viding that he must belong to one of the unions which in- 
stigated the strike. The * ' check-off system ' ' provided that 
the unions, instead of having to collect their regular dues 
and special assessments from the men themselves, should 
collect all dues in a lump sum from the steel companies, 
the companies in turn to take such sums out of the wages 
of the men. The whole purpose and effect of the "check- 
off system," which is so obviously pernicious that only a 
few of the most powerful and radical unions dare resort to 
it. is to make it automatically impossible for any workman 


to stay out of the union or to leave it while he keeps his 
job. Moreover it gives the National union, through its 
local business agent who collects all revenues directly from 
the companies, a secure, arbitrary power and leaves the local 
members correspondingly powerless in union affairs. The 
"check-off system" is so generally recognized as perni- 
cious that when it was brought up in the Senate Hearings, 
certain of the strike leaders attempted to explain that they 
only meant to apply it to a part of the industry. But it 
was one of the plain, unqualified general demands upon 
which the strike was called and there can be little question 
that if the strike had been won and the strike leaders had 
had power to do so, they would have enforced it to the 


Mr. Tighe, who incidentally was not a member of the 
National Conmiittee of Strike Management, may not have, 
as he said in the Senate Hearings he had not, heard any 
definite discussion of the closed shop in the steel industry 
but discussion was not necessary in the face of demands 
ntunbers 9 and 11 whose direct effect would have been, 
and obviously whose only purpose was, to establish a very 
tightly "closed shop" in the steel industry. 

Agriculture, coal, the railroads and steel are the four 
cornerstones of modem industrial existence and progress. 
Railroads and the coal industry are highly unionized. 
Agriculture and steel are not. During the special exigen- 
cies of the war, the railroads and the coal industry conspicu- 
ously failed to measure up to the national needs. This was 
of course due to other factors also, but it is notorious that 
when the government took over the railroads during the 
war, the Labor Movement "held up the government," to 
quote President Garretson of the Railroad Conductors 
Union, not only for wage increases which except for govern- 
ment support would have bankrupted the railroads, but for 
a system of lessened efficiency which required that nearly 
200,000 extra workers be added to run the railroads at this 
time when the maximum use and efficiency of all labor was 


of paramount national importance; and the coal industry 
held on to the 150,000 men it didn't need but which the rest 
of industry did need, just as it has held on to them (by 
demanding full time earnings for half time work) both 
before and since. 

Because of the peculiar importance of steel, the war un- 
doubtedly made heavier comparative demands on the steel 
industry than on either the railroads or the coal industry. 
Yet not only did the non-union steel industry never show 
the least sign of breaking down or requiring special artificial 
assistance, but under the spur of this crisis, the non-union 
steel workers turned out steel faster than the railroads 
could furnish facilities to transport it or manufacturing 
equipment could be multiplied to use it. And there can 
be no question that this fact was due primarily to consistent, 
able management, including labor management, which in 
turn included the unhampered ability to control promotion 
and working conditions against which the Interchurch 
Report argues so strongly and for which it would substitute 
the kind of trade union collective bargaining which holds in 
the coal industry and the railroads. 

Since the war both the railroads and the coal industry 
have again become notorious national problems, largely 
because of conditions which have been created by the power 
of the unions to enforce trade union collective bargaining 
and the kind of bargains they have used that power to 
enforce. But no one except the defeated and disgruntled 
strike leaders and the Interchurch Report have ever even 
suggested, either before or since the war, that the steel in- 
dustry constituted or threatened to constitute such a 
national problem as our other two great basic industries 
conspicuously constitute. 

But all the circumstances surrounding the unionization 
drive including its leadership, the diversity and rivalries of 
the different unions claiming jurisdiction, and the official 
demands on which it was to be based, all indicate that if the 
proposed trade union collective bargaining had been estab- 



i; If 


Hshed in the steel industry, the steel industry might very 
rapidly have become, not merely a national problem, but 
the kind of national scandal that the building trades, with 
their many-rival-union control, have so notoriously become. 

But this kind of trade union collective bargaining did not 
get its hold on the steel industry because, contrary to 
the statements and impression of the whole Interchurch 
Report, the men themselves did not want it. 

On August 1, 1920, two days after the Interchurch Report 
was released for distribution, the books of the U. 8. Steel 
Corporation showed 90,gS2 owners of its common stock. On 
November i, 1920, S3 ^000 employees of the U. S. Steel Cor- 
poration were actual stockholders and 26,000 more em- 
ployees were paying for stock. (Figures furnished by the 
U. S. Steel Corporation.) 

These steel workers which the Interchurch Report de- 
scribes as being in "a state of latent war" and "waiting 
only for the next slrike" thus constitute by far the largest 
number of their company's stockholders. This fact and the 
whole relation between the men and the company which it 
typifies, constitutes a far more promising industrial and 
social prospect for the workers, the industry and the whole 
country, than any trade union collective bargaining arrange- 
ment with the men tied hand and foot by union regulations, 
union politics and the "check-off" system and with Foster, 
Fitzpatrick et al as their ofl&dal bargainers. 



"social consequences" of the attitude of the public 

towards the steel strike 

There can be no question that all the social forces in 
closest touch with the strike situation— press, pulpit, citi- 
zens organizations, and public opinion in general— were 
overwhelmingly against the steel agitation and the steel 
strike, just as were the great majority of the workers them- 
selves. Foster complains of this continually and most 
bitterly and the Interchurch Report admits it freely. 

Foster speaks in his book. The Great Steel Strike (page 2), 
of the 

" Crawling, subservient and lying press, which spewed forth its poison 
propaganda in their (the steel companies') behalf . . . selfish and in- 
different local church movements which had long since lost their Chris- 
tian principle . . . hordesofunscrupulousmunicipal, county, state and 
federal officials whose eagerness to wear the steel collar was equalled 
only by their forgetfulness of their oath of office . . . with the notable 
exception of a few honorable and courageous individuals here and there 
among these hostile elements, it was an alignment of the steel companies, 
the state, the courts, the local churches and the press against the steel workers" 

Also, according to Mr. Foster: 

"the lackey-like mayors and burgesses" in steel towns (page 30), "the 
organized bodies of war veterans" and . . . "the petty parasites who 
prey upon the steel workers— the professional and small business men" 
(page 97) . . . "the local unions" who refused "to recognize the national 


t i 


committee's strike call" (page 106) . . . "the rowdy element of the 
American Legion" (page no) . . . "the infamous (Attorney General) 
Palmer" (page in) . . . 'the plug-ugly state constabulary' (page 
119) .. . "pliable city authorities and business men from the steel 
towns" (page 145) . . . "the slip-shod haphazard" Senate committee 
(page 157) . . . "the whole news gathering and distributing system" 
(which he calls) "a gigantic mental prostitution" (page 165) . . . 
General Wood who used the steel strike merely as "a jwlitical stunt to 
giveGeneral Wood publicity?" (page 172) . . . Mobs "led by W. R« 
Limip, Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. and H. L. Tredennick, President of 
the Chamber of Commerce" (page 189) . . . 

all, he says, opposed the steel strike and the whole strike 

Except then for Father Kazinci and the few other *' honor- 
able and courageous individuals here and there" who are 
not mentioned by name, and the Interchurch Investigation 
which "impressed (Mr. Foster) by the scientific methods 
and apparent desire to get at the truth" (page 157), every 
general social organization or group which came into close 
touch with the steel strike, from the Senate Committee to 
local American Legions, Y. M. C. A.'s, Chamber of Com- 
merce, Churches and Merchants and Citizens in general, 
were, according to Mr. Foster's specific statement, openly 
opposed to the methods and aims of the strike leaders, just 
as were 80% of the workers themselves. 

The Interchurch Report is not so vituperative as Mr. 
Foster in regard to the forces which were against the union- 
ization and the strike movement. In general it takes the 
attitude toward such forces of pity rather than censure and 
in effect assures them that they know not what they do. 
But the Interchurch Report is equally specific with Mr. 
Foster in stating that in general all the agencies of govern- 
ment and of public opinion which had first-hand informa- 
tion about the unionization movement and the strike 
opposed it. 

After saying the same thing over again and again on the 
preceding pages, the Interchurch Report says in summary 
on pages 238 and 239, that 


"great numbers of workers came to believe 

—"that local mayors, magistrates and police officials try to break 

— "that state and Federal officials, particularly the Federal Depart- 
ment of Justice, help to break strikes, and that armed forces are used 
for this purpose"; 

— "that most newspapers actively and promptly exert a strike 
breaking influence; most churches passively." 

"... TheSteelStrikemadetensof thousands of citizens believe that 

our American institutions are not democratic or not democratically 
administered. " 

The Interchurch Report then proceeds through a number 
of pages to "hastily summarize" the evidence which it 
states is at "the basis of such beliefs." 

It states that Sheriff Haddock of Allegheny County had a 
brother who was a superintendent of an American Sheet, 
Iron and Tin Plate plant; that Mayor Crawford of Du- 
quesne was the brother of the President of the McKeesport 
Tin Plate Company, and that three other local public 
officials were connected with the steel company. 

That out of the scores of plants in which the strike was 
agitated, and that out of the thousands of public officials 
in these communities, these five were thus themselves con- 
nected, or had some relative connected, with the steel in- 
dustry is the first reason which the Interchurch Report 
advances as to why the strikers had a 

"deep-seated suspiciousness of everything and everybody connected 
with public executives, courts, Federal agents, army officers, reporters, 
or clergy" (page 239). 

The Interchurch Report then spends a paragraph in 
alleging that strikers were fined "from ten to fifty or sixty 
dollars" and imprisoned for terms which "ran up to 
months" for causes which the Report alleges were insuf- 
ficient. Therefore, concludes the Interchurch Report : 

"local mayors, magistrates and police officials try to break strikes." 

On page 240, it condemns the Department of Justice for 
cooperating with private detectives and condemns Attor- 



ney General Palmer for his activities and statements about 
* reds * in the steel strike. This is its basis for the allegation 

"Federal oflficials, particularly the Federal Department of Justice, 
try to break strikes." 

Next the Interchurch Report condemns the Senate 
Committee's investigation as having 

"filled the strikers with a bitterness only to be understood by detailed 
comparison of the Committee's report and the facts. ' * (Page 240) 

The Interchtirch Report next condemns the use of armed 
forces in the strike area and particularly the use of the 
United States army under General Leonard Wood. In 
order to show that the use of armed forces was entirely un- 
necessary and that the strikers were the victims rather 
than the cause of such violence as there was, the Inter- 
church Report states (page 241) : 

"The strikers made frequent complaints of violent raids carried out 
by bands of citizens calling themselves Loyal American Leaguers, 
who were charged with clubbing groups of strikers on street comers at 
nights. A crowd of strikers leaving a mass meeting tried to pull a negro 
strike breaker oflE a street car; the negro was slightly injured and a 
number of strikers were clubbed. On this case of 'mob violence' . . . 
Indiana state guards were sent in, parades were forbidden. "... Ten 
thousand strikers held a parade ... in disregard of the guardsmen. 
" On this second case of mob violence, known as the Outlaw Parade, the 
United States r^:ulars occupied Gary with General Wood in personal 
charge, xjrodaiming martial law. The regtdars were equipped with 
bayonets and steel helmets and the force included many trucks mount- 
ing machine gtms and bringing field artillery. 

"General Wood declared that the army would be neutral. He es- 
tablished rules in r^ard to picketing. " When these niles were broken, 
"strikers would be arrested. Delays and difficulties would attend the 
release of these men from jail or bull pen." The feelings of the steel 
workers then was "that local and national government not only was not 
their govenmient, i.e. in their behalf, but was government in behalf of 
interests opposing theirs." 

The Interchurch Report (page 242) next accuses the 

"Press in most communities," because it "suppressed or colored its 
records, printed advertisements and editorials urging the strikers to go 
back, denounced the strikers, and incessantly misrepresented the facts. 
. . . Foreign language papers largely followed the lead of the English 

In regard to the *' pulpit," however, the Interchurch 
Report plainly hedges; it states (page 243) 

" Research among clergymen revealed a large minority deeply suspicious 
of the newspaper version of the strike, but ineflFective for organizing 
concerted action even for purposes of self -information." It however 
follows Foster at least to the point of stating that "where some clergy- 
man preached or wrote against the strike or where another gift to a local 
church by a steel company became public . . . the workers' attitude 
to the church followed these few individuals, deeming the church another 
strike breaker, " after which series of carefully calculated insintiations is 
added the phrase, "after the strike, workers generally were m a k ing no 
eflEort to make the church their church. " 

Now it would seem, as a matter of plain common sense, 
that these very facts— that the local press and the local 
churches which obviously receive their support in far 
greater proportion from steel workers than from steel offi- 
cials — that the great body of local merchants whose cus- 
tomers were obviously in far greater proportion among the 
steel workers than among steel ofl&cials — ^that local Ameri- 
can legions and Y. M. C. A.'s who are certainly made up of 
a far greater proportion of workers than capitalists — ^that 
foreign language papers who receive their entire support 
from the lowest ranks of the workers, were admittedly all 
thus opposed to the unionization drive and the strike, 
should in itself raise a strong presvimption that all these 
other forces of society in close touch with the situation and 
disinterested or naturally sympathetic to the worker, were 
probably right, and the strike leaders and their minority 
following probably wrong. Such an obviously logical pre- 
sumption from the facts, however, never seem to have 


1 • 


occurred to either Mr. Foster or to the Interchurch 

As regards Mr. Foster's point of view he saw in such 
facts, merely another argument to radical labor that all 
society was against them and must be fought accord- 
ingly. His conclusions from these facts are merely that 

"In the next steel strike, " all labor must unite, and fight the rest of 
society "with such a combination of allied steel, mine and railroad work- 
ers .. . (that there will be) small likelihood that the steel companies 
or the public at large would consider the question of the steel workers' 
right to organize of suflficient importance to fight about." {Greai 
Steel Strike, page 239.) 

But Mr. Foster, of course, is frankly a radical and, on his 
own admission, against all the rest of society and against 
all modem social institutions and on his own admission was 
organizing labor to fight the rest of society and overthrow 
modem social institutions. Foster's conclusion, therefore, 
that when all the rest of society opposed him and his plans, 
all the rest of society was of cotirse wrong, is at least 
natural and understandable. 

The Interchurch Report agrees with Mr. Foster that when 
all the rest of society opposed his steel strike plans, all the rest 
of society was wrong. But instead of following Mr. Foster 
in openly threatening all the rest of society with the power 
of organized labor it seeks rather to point out to and warn 
all the rest of society of the cost of defending its interests 
and of how much trouble could be escaped by merely 
yielding gracefully to Mr. Foster and his program. It 
sprinkles such warnings throughout the book, and uses 
all of Chapter VII, which it calls "Social Consequences," 
in emphasising and stmimarizing these warnings. 

These "social consequences" — including the "degrada- 
tion, persisted in and approved by public opinion, of civil 
liberties" — ^which the whole public has brought upon itself 
because the steel companies and public opinion were not 
willing to turn the steel industry over to the collective 


bargaining of Mr. Foster and his fellow strike leaders, the 
Interchurch states on page 197 to be as follows: 

"... for the employers : 

"i. 'Discharging workmen for unionism,*" i.e. for agitation during 
the unionization drive. 

" 2. ' Black lists* ' ' ; that is keeping a list of radicals, agitators and other 
undesirables and exchanging such lists with each other. 

"3. 'Espionage and the hiring of labor detective agencies' opera- 

The use of detectives, the Interchurch Report regards as 
a particularly awful "social consequence." It practically 
always refers to detectives by the sinister sounding titles 
of "under-cover men" or "under-cover spies" just as it 
refers to the police as * * cossacks. ' ' It spends pages in prov- 
ing that both the steel companies and the United States 
Department of Justice used detectives in the Steel Strike 
and that they sometimes cooperated with each other and 
as its climax of this frightful accusation, states on page 221 
in italics, that 

"These company spy systems carry right through into the United 
States Government. Federal immigration authorities testified to the 
Commissionthatraidsandarrestsfor "radicalism" were made ... on 
the dentmciations and secret reports of steel company * under cover ' men 
and the prisoners tiu-ned over to the Department of Justice. ** 

The last emphasized dire "social consequence" to the 
employer was — 

4. The necessity for hiring "strike breakers, principally negroes." 

These, however, are only the social consequences to the em- 
ployer. Entirely in addition to them, are the "social con- 
sequences" which the whole country must suffer because of 
the blind unwillingness of the steel companies and public 
opinion, to give Mr. Foster and the other strike leaders 
their way in the steel industry. These "social conse- 
quences" the Interchurch Report goes right on to solemnly 
warn the whole country, are: (Page 197) 




' II 

" I. The abrogation of the right of assembly, the suppression of free 
speech, and the violation of personal rights. 

" 2. The use of state police, state troops and of the United States army 
and "the expenditure of public money." 

"3. Such activities on the part of constituted authorities and of the 
Press and the pulpit as to make the workers believe that these forces 
opposed labor." 

As regards this whole general argument as to the dire 
"Social Consequences" to employers and all the rest of the 
cotmtry because employers and all other interested social 
forces refused to give Mr. Foster and his fellow strike leaders 
a free hand in the steel industry, the most striking thing is 
its remarkable similarity to the well-known argument of 
Wilhekn II that the rest of the world brought all the conse- 
quences of the war on itself by not quietly and peaceably 
permitting him to do anything he pleased. 

Certain particular arguments on this subject, however, 
because of the way they are advanced and repeated and 
emphasized, and because they presume to involve a dis- 
cussion of fundamental American rights deserve special at- 
tention. These are the so-called "Abrogation of the Right 
of Free Speech,'* " PoUce Brutalities " and "Judicial Dis- 





The argument of the Interchurch Report in regard to the 
alleged unwarranted abrogation of the right of free speech 
and assembly by local authorities diiring the steel strike 
merits detailed consideration not only because of the em- 
phasis which the Interchurch Report places on it, but 
because the whole argument touches upon one of the most 
fundamental questions in modem democracy. 

Beyond this it merits particular consideration because 
of the fact that there has been developed in recent years a 
system of organized propaganda which has been persistently 
and widely disseminated for specific ulterior purposes which 
propaganda entirely misrepresents the plain law and the 
facts in regard to this whole subject. 

Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are unques- 
tionably fundamental American rights, constituting one of 
the most important guarantees of American liberty. More- 
over there are perhaps no rights which Americans have 
insisted more tenaciously on exercising or wotild fight more 
vigorously to protect, if they were actually threatened. 

But this does not mean that these rights are without 
limit. On the contrary they are, as are all other individual 
and group rights, strictly limited by the superior rights of 
the public as a whole. And when the rights of free speech 
and assembly, just as in the case of any other individual or 
so 289 




group rights, come, for any reason, into conflict with the 
superior right of the public as a whole, it is not only a basic 
principle of our law but is a basic principle of democracy 
itself that this individual or group right must be subor- 
dinated to the public right. For any theory or prac- 
tice which puts individual or group rights above the 
public rights of course leads directly to despotism or 

The practical exemplification of many of the ways in 
which the rights of free speech and assembly are thus 
limited is a matter of commonest knowledge. The regula- 
tion that the soap-box orator may not indiscriminately 
collect a crowd in the middle of a main thoroughfare and 
block traffic is of course a limitation on the right of free 
speech on the part of the orator and his listeners, in favor 
of the greater right of the public to pass uninterruptedly 
up and down its own thoroughfare. There are many similar 
limitations of the rights of free speech and assembly, estab- 
lished and enforced in proportion as the exercise of the in- 
dividual right in the given circumstances would endanger 
the free enjoyment of the greater rights of the public. 
Such limitations therefore vary with circvunstances. Limi- 
tations are enforced as to main thoroughfares which are not 
enforced as to side streets ; in large conmiunities which would 
be unnecessary in small communities; special limitations 
are frequently set in time of fire, flood, riot or other exi- 
gencies, so that what may be done or said under ordinary 
circumstances may not be done or said under those exi- 
gencies. Under many circtmistances a man might have the 
right to call out the word "fire" but to call out "fire" in a 
crowded theatre when there was no fire, would constitute 
an obvious crime. A man may freely express criticism of 
the government's policy under ordinary circumstances 
which if expressed in time of war, might, by giving aid to the 
public enemy, constitute a crime against the public welfare. 
No man of cotirse may carry his individual right of free 
speech to the extent of counselling or urging crime. 


Perhaps the most frequent occasion in which the indi- 
vidual right of free speech may come into conflict with the 
superior rights of the public is under circtmistances in which 
the unlimited exercise of this right would subvert or en- 
danger the public peace. As a matter of fact from the 
beginning of our history and back into the earlier history of 
the common law, the conflict between the right of free 
speech and the public right to peace and order, has been so 
recurrent and the law in such cases is so firmly established 
that the very legal definitions of the right of free speech 
have almost invariably included the statement of this par- 
tictilar limitation. 

Justice Story, one of the greatest of all otir constitutional 
authorities years ago defined this fundamental but not 
imlimited right of free speech to mean that : 

"Every man shall have a right to speak, write or print his opinions 
upon any subject whatever, without any prior restraint, so always that 
he does not injure any other person in his rights, person, property 
or reputation; and so always that he does not thereby disturb the public 
peace OT a.tteTDpt to subvert the government." (Story, Commentaries 
on the Constitution, Sect. 1874.) 

Moreover it is plain fundamental law as well as plain 
justice and common sense that where there is a question as 
to whether or not the exercise of the individual right of free 
speech does, under a given condition, endanger the public 
peace or otherwise conflict with the superior rights of the 
public, the right to decide that question shall rest with the 
public and not with the individual or individuals in the case. 
If the rule were otherwise, and each soap box orator for 
instance, or the group which at the time were interested 
in listening to him, had the authority to decide whether or 
not the exercise of their individual right of assembly under 
the circumstances was in conflict with the right of the public 
to use the streets freely, there would of course be no limita- 
tions whatever to the exercise of such individual rights and 
the public right would be n[iade subordinate instead of 




II 1 








superior; which of cotirse is incompatible with the whole 
theory of democracy. 

But on the other hand it is equally against our theory of 
democracy that any majority, no matter how great, merely 
because it is a majority and has the power, shall be per- 
mitted to construe its rights as greater than they actually 
are, or otherwise to limit individual rights where they do 
not, as a matter of fact, conflict with the public rights. 
Therefore the courts will always carefully review the actual 
facts in any case of alleged conflict between the rights of 
individuals and the right of the public, and if it finds, as a 
matter of fact that they do not actvially conflict, it will 
uphold the individual in his rights and enjoin the public, 
through its duly elected public officials or otherwise, from 
any unwarranted infringement of individual rights. 

In the question of the fundamental rights of free speech 
and assembly and their alleged abrogation during the steel 
strike two other basic principles of law are involved and 
must be considered. 

Since 1842, the courts without the aid of any legislative 
enactments have recognized the "right to withhold labor," 
i.e., the right to strike, as a legitimate economic weapon. 
A strike in its essence, is an agreement among a number of 
individuals to withhold their labor. It is generally the 
specific purpose of this agreement to injure the employer 
as a means of forcing him to accede to the demands of the 
workers. An agreement to act in concert to cause injury 
to a third party is generally regarded as a conspiracy and 
ipso facto illegal. Therefore in recognizing the right to 
strike the cotirts have modified the law of conspiracy in 
favor of labor. Labor itself has widely and loudly criticized 
the courts for what it calls their assimiption of legislative 
function. It is, therefore, interesting to note that perhaps 
never in any other connection have the courts more clearly 
**made law" or made law involving more fundamental and 
sweeping changes than in this case of the recognition of the 
right to strike, — a change wholly in favor of labor. 



During the rapid rise of industrialism in the first part of 
the last centtuy, in the same period when the use of the 
strike as an economic weapon was being developed and 
recognized by law, there arose in Europe a strong movement, 
led by the Russian anarchists Bakounin and Nechayeff , that 
insisted that the strike should not be used merely as an 
economic weapon of competition with the employer for a 
fair share in the proceeds of industry, but should be used as 
a weapon to overthrow the employer and seize the control 
of industry. This movement insisted that violence con- 
stituted a part of the strike weapon and was necessary to 
make it really effective. 

For a generation this movement fought for, and for con- 
siderable periods held control of at least the European 
continental labor movement. To it later was added the 
influence of the Syndicalists who had the same views as to 
violence and from time to time the I. W. W. and other forms 
of radicalism. Partly as a result of the constant agitation 
of such doctrines and partly as a result of the tendency of 
htrnian nature to use the most effective means possible to 
its ends, there is no question that labor's theory of the strike 
has been permeated with the notion that the right to strike 
involves the right to indulge in at least the minor forms of 
intimidation or violence. 

The law, however, under no circumstances recognizes 
any right to commit violence great or small. The man who 
commits or threatens murder is of course more severely 
punished by the law than the man who commits or threatens 
mild bodily injury. But the law does not recognize the 
right to commit mild violence any more than it recognizes 
the right to commit murder. Thus, when exercising their 
entirely legal right to strike, workers have no more right to 
commit the mildest forms of intimidation or violence than 
they have to commit the most serious violence. When 
therefore the law condemns and punishes or enjoins the 
committing of any form of violence during a strike that 
does not mean that the law is denjdng the right to strike 


any more than the fact that the law would punish a man for 
breaking windows as he passed down the street, would mean 
that the law was denying him his right to walk down the 

The rules of law involved then are plain and simple: 

1. All Americans have the fundamental rights offre speech 
and assembly so long as the way or the conditions under which 
they exercise those rights do not infringe the greater rights of 
the public; 

2. The public has the right to judge, through its duly con- 
stituted officials, whether or not in a given case the exercise of 
those individtml rights would conflict with the public right; 

J. But the law at the same time very plainly guards against 
majority or official tyranny and will carefully review the facts 
in any given case and if the facts do not show that the authori- 
ties were warranted in believing that the exercise of the indi- 
vidual rights would jeopardize public rights, it will protect the 
individuals in the exercise of these rights; 

4. The courts clearly recognize the right to strike; 

5. They do not recognize the right of strikers, any more than 
any other persons to commit or threaten violence, and they 
refuse to admit, in the case of strikers as in all other cases, that 
anyone can have the right to commit a crime merely on the 
grounds that it is a small crime; 

— ^which basic law will doubtless appear to average Ameri- 
cans as also the plainest common justice and common sense. 
During the steel strike the authorities in various com- 
munities involved placed certain limitations on the rights 
of the strikers to hold meetings. These limitations varied. 
In some cases merely open air meetings were prohibited. 
In others it was specifically required that all speeches be 
in English. In some cases all strikers' meetings were finally 
prohibited. In each case these various limitations were 
established on the specific grounds that violence had 
occurred or was threatened and the public peace was thereby 
endangered. The Interchurch Report contends, as the 
strike leaders contended at the time, that these limitations 


infringed the strikers' rights of free speech and assembly. 
They further contended that such regulations were un- 
warranted by the conditions — ^that the real reason for their 
being enforced was not because of fear of violence but 
because of an alleged relation between the public officials 
and the steel companies. This last contention, however, 
which the Interchurch Report makes very strongly, it fails 
to reconcile with its other equally strong contention, already 
referred to in detail, that Church, Press, Business associa- 
tions and all other forces of society in the strike areas were 
equally against the strike and that therefore the ofi&dals at 
least represented overwhelming public opinion. 

Moreover the strike leaders at once took the case to the 
courts, advancing substantially the same argtmients the 
Interchurch Report advances. But in every case, the courts 
held that the local officials, because of the special circtun- 
stances in each case, were entirely within their rights. The 
labor leaders carried one of these cases — doubtless the one 
they considered strongest — ^to the Supreme Cotut of Penn- 
sylvania, which court held (City of Duquesne vs. Fincke; 
112 Atl. 130 Pa.) that: 

"A strike was on which divided even the working men into opposing 
factions and thus gave to those agitators who are the enemies of all 
government the opportimity, which they eagerly seized, to stir up strife 
and disorder by distributing anonjrmous and seditious pamphlets 
throughout the city; and hence, as the Mayor was responsible for the 
maintenance of peace and good order, he was justified, if he beUeved the 
public good required it, as he sajrs he did, to refuse an open air meeting 
at this particular time. . . . The liberty of speech does not require that 
the dear legal rights of the whole community shall be violated." 

As a matter of fact in its second voltune the Interchurch 
Report admits (page 164) that: 

"A well-known attorney has stated that there is no l^al escape from 
either of these restrictions (i.e. refusing or revoking permits for meet- 
ings), since the city ordinances r^ulating meetings have been tested 
and found constitutional, and the Sheriffs' proclamation can be at- 
tacked only on the ground that the situation did not warrant it. With 

it I 






the local officials of the same mind as the Sheriff, as they were in this 
case, it would be practically impossible to prove in court that the 
sheriff's action was tmwarranted. " 

As a matter of plain logic then, the Interchurch Report 
can only argue to its conclusion, that the meetings should 
not have been thus limited, on one of three grounds: 

1. That the rights of free speech and assembly should be 
absolute irrespective of the fact that it may endanger the 
public peace, or — ^which amounts to the same thing; 

2. That the power of deciding whether or not such meet- 
ings endangered the peace of the pubHc should be taken out 
of the hands of the duly elected officials of the community 
and turned over to the individuals who wanted to hold such 
meetings, who in most cases were not even citizens of the 
community; or 

3. That the courts decisions in these cases were, either 
through error or bias on the part of the court, against the 
actual facts. 

The Interchurch Report asstunes to condemn the limita- 
tions of strikers' meetings on this third ground, that such 
limitations were not warranted by the facts, but actually 
throughout this argtunent it obviously tries to argue to its 
conclusions on all three grounds. 

Before analyzing the specific Interchurch argument, 
however, which is based on only part of the facts, and on a 
very special interpretation and explanation of each of those 
facts, consideration should be given to certain phases of the 
general situation which the Interchurch Report does not 
consider, and certain facts should be stated which the Inter- 
church Report does not state, but all of which doubtless 
had a determining influence on the decisions reached by 
local public opinion, local officials and the courts, which 
decisions the Interchurch Report is condemning. 

New York witnessed a milk strike, in the Fall of 192 1 in 
which every milk driver who remained on his job, carried 
his life in his hands, in which women were followed and 
intimidated merely for buying milk for their children, and 


in which 40 strikers were arrested for violence in a single 

Chicago, at about the same time, witnessed a packers* 
strike in which the strikers seized housetops from which to 
fire into the crowds of workers and went to other similar 
extremes of violence. The whole country knows of the ' * war 
in Mingo" in which thousands of union men armed with 
rifles and machine guns, marched into West Virginia 
seizing train and private automobiles and private supplies 
of all kinds, and otherwise depleting the country like an 
enemy army on their march. In other words the whole 
country has long been forced to recognize that great strikes 
and violence frequently if not usually go hand in hand. 

In the industrial districts of western Pennsylvania a 
great strike is likely jto involve a far greater proportion of 
the population than in New York or Chicago and is there- 
fore a matter of far greater public concern. 

Foster, in his book, The Great Steel Strike, speaks on page 
II of the great Homestead steel strike of 1892 as charac- 
terized by "extreme bitterness and violence." He em- 
phasizes the bitterness with which the steel strike of 1909 
was fought. The Interchurch Report on page 4 speaks of 
the Homestead strike as being "with guns and flames." 
The Homestead strike was spoken of in the Senate investi- 
gation as running red with blood. 

Particularly in the old steel towns, therefore, responsible 
citizens and officials could hardly be expected to forget 
the blood and guns and flames of former steel strikes. 

In 1919 they knew that the conspicuous leader of the new 
strike was Foster who had widely published his opinions 
that "whether his tactics be legal and moral or not does not 
concern him so long as they are effective" — ^that "he al- 
lows no consideration of legality, religion, patriotism, 
honour, duty, to stand in the way of his adoption of effec- 
tive tactics," etc., etc. They knew that the nominal leader 
of the strikers was John Fitzpatrick, local head of the labor 
unions in Chicago where labor corruption and violence has 


'.' 1 



perhaps reached its high water mark. Mother Jones whose 
trail of violence and bloodshed through past labor conflicts 
was common knowledge appeared early on the scene. 
They knew from frequent past experience how crowds of 
ignorant foreigners are susceptible of having their mass 
psychology whipped to a frenzy by clever agitators. These 
very definite facts and experiences were the basis on which 
many local citizens and public officials, who themselves 
would have to meet the situation and whose own cities 
would have to pay the price if violence did occur, were led 
to conclude that strike meetings under these circumstances 
would probably endanger the public peace. 

If therefore, local public opinion and local officials in 
many cases in the steel strike did, and local public opinion 
and local officials in general often do, believe that the very 
existence or prospect of a great strike raises a presumption 
of violence; and if, acting on this prestunption such officials 
and local public opinion believe it is necessary to limit the 
holding of strikers* meetings during such times; and if 
organized labor and the Interchurch Report believe that 
labor's interests are thereby prejudiced, they have only 
labor itself, and its present as well as its past record to 

But local officials in many cases in the steel strike, did 
not have to base their decision as to the likelihood of 
violence in the steel strike on merely past experience. 

It will be remembered that agitation had been going on 
among the steel workers for nearly a year before the strike 
and that during August and September it was cleverly 
brought to a climax by means that have already been 

The Senate Hearings, page 888 and succeeding pages, 
presents a ntunber of affidavits from the Mayor and leading 
citizens of McKeesport, Pennsylvania, — ^where the limita- 
tion of meetings is specifically condemned by the Interchurch 
Report — stating that on September 2nd, three weeks before 
the strike, a crowd consisting of 4000 foreigners had 


marched to the local police station and threatened to 
destroy it, and had made other threats as it marched from 
point to point in the city. 

On page 885 and succeeding pages of the Senate Hearings 
appear affidavits and petitions signed by large ntunbers of 
ministers, doctors, merchants, lawyers, business men and 
men of all walks of life, of Donora, Pa., stating that mobs, 
in one instance of 3000 foreigners, largely armed, were 
marching through the city and that already there had been 
"several clashes between the authorities and these foreign- 
ers." These petitions particularly requested the help of 
the state constabulary. 

That inflammatory propaganda was being widely dis- 
seminated at this time is specifically declared by the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the quotation appearing 
above. The exact nature of much of such propaganda that 
was openly radical is shown by reproductions of voluminous 
quotations from it in the Senate Hearings pages 912 and 
succeeding pages, 948 and succeeding pages, etc. 

Such inflammatory propaganda, however, counselling 
extreme violence, was not limited to the radicals. Follow- 
ing are excerpts from a " Manifesto" by a prominent mem- 
ber of the A. F. of L. widely circulated some three weeks 
before the strike (see Senate Hearings page 670 to 672). 

(By Bob Edwards of Martins Ferry, member Amalgamated Association.) 

•* Now that the steel workers of the United States are on the verge of 
a tremendous struggle, a strike that will decide for the coming years 
whether the steel workers are to remain wage slaves or freemen, it be- 
hooves every worker who has the welfare of his class at heart to devote 
the entire powers of his mind and intellect to study and devise a means, 
a strat^ic plan, by which the forces of labor can win the conquest with 
the consequent defeat and demoralization and, we hope, the utter 
destruction of the enemies* powers of resistance. A strike of workers 
in this period is an actual declaration of war between the proletariate 
(the workers) and the capitalist; between a system of cooperation and a 
system of exploitation; between right and wrong; between humanity 





:: ^ 

and brutality in short, between all that is noble and elevating and that 
which is debasing and low. A strike is war, because all the horrors of the 
battlefield are repeated in a strike — ^men killed, homes disrupted, noble 
and conscientious workers put on the list of tramps and undesirable 
citizens. . . . 

A strike then is war, and war recognizes one end — the imposition of the 
will of the conqueror upon that of the vanquished. To do this properly 
we must so manipulate and direct our forces that the offensive must 
immediately be taken, so that the struggle will be short but strenuous. 

• • • 

Second plan is to change the ownership of the means of producing 
the stock of wealth of the capitalist. This plan is the most reasonable 
and logical that can be adopted and will do away with and eliminate 
the hardships, brutalities, and killing that is incident and inevitable 
in all strikes and particularly so in the coming struggle. 

If the representatives of the United States government do not see 
fit to take over the steel industry and control and use it for the benefit 
of the people, then let them keep hands off in the coming struggle and be 
an impartial observer of the conflict. . . . 

When a community is in a state of anarchy, the individual man must 
take the law into his own hands, and defend his life and his rights with 
violence, if need be. 

When armed thugs and strike breakers are imported into a community, 
that community is in a state of anarchy and every individual is fully 
empowered to take up arms and defend his life and rights,'* 

Affidavits through pages 902 to 906 of the Senate Hear- 
ings recite instances of attacks on police ofl5cers with bottles, 
clubs, and pepper, by mobs, or individual men or women 
from mobs of strikers. 

Senate Hearings pages 806 to 809 also by specific quota- 
tion of official proclamations and other records, show the 
methods by which such very obvious threats or actual 
breaches of the public peace were met by the ofl&cials and 
united public action. 

Quite characteristically however, the Interchurch Report 
does not mention any of this Senate evidence or refer to the 
facts which it brings out. In several instances, it makes a 
strong point of the fact that orders prohibiting strikers' 
meetings were issued before the strike began. In view of the 
fact that threatening and violence was begun long before 


the date of the strike, this argimient is obviously a mere 


It will doubtless be remembered that the Interchiu-ch 
Report particularly insists in its introduction on page 4 that 
the 1919 steel strike was "without violence" and though as 
a matter of fact, it mentions violence frequently — the *'gun 
riot" at Wheeling (page 181), the "mob violence" at Gary 
(page 241) and frequently "slight riots," or "ahnost riots" 
or "riots with no serious consequences," it nevertheless 
insists in general throughout this argument that there was 
no violence or at least not sufficient violence to warrant 
suppression of strikers* meetings, and it insists particularly 
that where there was violence, it was not because of strikers* 
meetings and where there were strikers* meetings, there 
was no violence. 

Disregarding the fact that the Interchurch Report makes 
no mention of the voluminous Senate evidence in regard to 
threats, intimidation and actual violence, and considering 
merely the evidence and argimient which it itself advances 
to support its contention that where there was violence it 
was not because of strikers meetings and where there were 
strikers* meetings there was no violence — ^taking that argu- 
ment paragraph by paragraph and merely discounting cer- 
tain tricks of phraseology and quibbles the essential facts, 
as there stated, show (Interchurch Report, Vol. II, page 165 
and succeeding pages) : 

At Braddock, meetings were allowed till a crowd of 
strikers gathered at a mill gate and precipitated a street 

At Duquesne there were no meetings and no serious 

At McKeesport, permits to hold ordinary meetings were 
granted but denied for one particular meeting because of 
particular circumstances and immediately there was a riot. 

At Homestead there were meetings and there was violence. 

In each of these cases then, the simple facts are directly 
to the contrary of the Interchurch Report's argument. In 

1 1 



each case however the Interchurch Report has some particu- 
lar explanation— the *'riot had no serious consequences," 
a number of men had merely been beaten up but no one was 
actually killed, the violence did not occur at the meeting 
or as a direct result of the meeting, etc., etc. 

In other words, in each case, where there were meetings 
the Interchvuch Report admits the violence but insists 
upon substituting itself, just as the strike leaders insisted on 
substituting themselves, in place of the responsible public 
officials and the cotirts as the judge of whether or not the 
violence was sufficient to endanger the public peace. 

In the next chapter it will appear by quotation from 
numerous of the Interchurch Report's " 500 rock bottom 
affidavits" that when duly elected public officials or police 
officials, in searching houses for arms "disregarded the 
presence of mother and child. They entered the house to 
search. They tore down the curtains, and broke the flower- 
pots and overturned the chairs . . . because of the terroriza- 
tion the children didn't sleep that night "—because officers 
similarly searching for arms used a hatchet in opening a 
trunk and scattered the clothes around— because an officer, 
obviously refused admission by a woman swung her roughly 
ag^nst the door — ^because various men were fined I5 or $10 
for things they themselves said they didn't do — ^because a 
man who was arrested didn't get his dinner on time— be- 
cause Trachn Yechenke was arrested in connection with the 
shooting of Peter Luke even after he himself had told the 
officers he didn't do it ; the Interchurch Report features such 
''police brutalities" in special affidavits as "a degradation, 
persistent and approved by public opinion, of civil liberties." 

It is correspondingly interesting therefore, to speculate 
in connection with this present Interchurch argument as to 
just how large a strikers* riot would have to be, or just how 
many people would have to be "actually killed" by the 
strikers to constitute what the Interchurch Report would 
regard as a breach of, or even a serious threat, to the public 


The Interchurch Report continues its argument (page 
166 and 167) by mentioning three localities where meetings 
were allowed and where it alleges no violence occurred, 
*'at the meeting'' or *' during the assemblies.'' These were 
Johnstown, Pa., Farrell, Pa., and Wheeling, W. Va. The 
specific degree of violence that occurred at or away from the 
meetings at these particular places, does not seem to be a 
matter of public record. But it is to be noted that the Inter- 
church Report itself speaks incidentally (page 181) of the 
"gun riot " at Wheeling, and two statements, one made by a 
local ex-Senator appearing in the Senate Hearings (page 
884 and 885) refer indirectly to the attempt at violence in 


The Interchurch Report then makes the same statement 
in regard to Steubensville, Youngstown and Cleveland, 
localities whose record for violence during the strike, is a 
matter of public record. 

At the bottom of page 167, Part II, the Interchurch 
Report says* 

"In Steubensville, O., . . . three or four meetings were held every 
week. No disturbance of any sort ever occurred in this town . . . perfect 
peace was maintained throughout this district both at the public meetings 
and on the picket lines. " 

The Senate Investigation (pages 472 and 473), however, 
emphasized conspicuously and in detail and published 
copies of the public records of the action that it was 
necessary for the governors of West Virginia and Ohio to 
take to prevent 5000 of these same Steubensville strikers 
from carrying out a resolution which they passed at one of 
these strike meetings to march over en masse into West 
Virginia and attack 1000 workers at Weirton who had re- 
fused to strike. It seems strange that the Interchurch Re- 
port which quotes so freely Senate evidence that may be 
interpreted in favor of the strikers should have so com- 
pletely overlooked all the evidence in regard to such a con- 
spicuous case of the direct relation between the holding of a 


strikers' meeting and violence or is it depending on the 
qtiibble that the prompt action of the governors of two 
states prevented the program of violence which was speci- 
fically adopted at the meeting from being actually carried 

In the next paragraph on page i68, the Interchurch 
Report states that at Youngstown, Ohio, 

*' On an average, nine mass meetings a week were held. At none of these 
meetings was there ever any necessity for police intervention and at no 
time was there any disturbance at a meeting. " 

The Senate Investigation on the other hand on pages 309 
to 316 lays special emphasis on the amount of intimida- 
tion and threatening and stoning of American workers by 
foreign strikers at Youngstown and particularly emphasizes 
that the only attempt to interfere with a meeting in Youngs- 
town was when the strikers themselves stoned a meeting of 
Americans who remained at work. 

In the next paragraph, the Interchurch Report states: 

"In Cleveland, O. . . . from 3 to 6 meetings were held daily from the 
b^jinning of the strike . . . no trouble of any nature developed." 

Ex-Governor Joseph F. Brown of Georgia has made a 
special study of violence in the 19 19 steel strike from original 
public records, affidavits, and other specific data available 
to any responsible investigator and much of which was 
widely published at the time. His study has also been pub- 
lished in a pamphlet entitled, "The Threatened Strike in the 
Steel Plants. ' ' This record for violence in Cleveland include 
such attacks on non-striking workers as follows: 

C. Brailey attacked evening of September 23rd by four men — ^laid up 
for about 3 weeks; 

J. Galganski attacked evening of September 23rd on way to work — 
jaw broken — laid up for seversd weeks; 

4 colored employees attacked September 24th by crowd of strikers — 
escaped to street car but were followed and pulled oflf — one sustained 
broken arm, two cuts and bruises; 


Henry Arps, 65 years old, knocked down and beaten by striking 
wire drawer November 13th while on way home from work; 

and 17 other Cleveland steel workers who did not strike similarly 
beaten or stabbed or shot in Cleveland during this short period. 

Either the Interchurch Report regards this as "no 
trouble of any nature" or else it is basing its whole argument 
that the strikers' meetings which were held did not result in 
violence and therefore public officials elsewhere were not 
justified in prohibiting or stopping strikers' meetings on the 
mere quibble that the violence did not occur in the meeting 


The Interchurch Report in its main volume mentions 
only one strikers' meeting. On pages 240 and 241 it says: 

"At Gary . . . agreements . . . were reached with the city authori- 
ties concerning picket line rules. Huge mass meetings were held in the 
open air . . . a crowd of strikers leaving a mass meeting tried to pull a 
negro strike breaker oflE a street car: the negro was slightly injured. 
On this case of violence, the only one alleged, Indiana 
state guards were sent in. Parades were forbidden." The meetings 
were also forbidden. 

It is interesting to note that in this only mention of a 
strikers' meeting in the main Interchurch Report, violence 
in direct connection with the meeting is admitted. The 
Interchurch Report tries to emphasize the point, however, 
that the strike-breaker was only injured " slightly " which is 
untrue. It entirely fails to state, as plainly brought out in 
the Senate evidence that 4 or 5 other workers were attacked 
by strikers in the official picket line and only saved by the 
police; that another negro was shot in the outskirts of Gary 
and that it was only because of these and many other cir- 
cumstances which are detailed at great length in pages 906 
to 952 of the Senate Hearings, that the city authorities re- 
voked the permission for meetings and parades which they 
had previously freely granted. In addition to hiding or dis- 
torting the plain evidence in this case, the Interchurch 
Report further resorts to insinuations for which it gives no 



shred of evidence that all the trouble was started by police 
or citizens and not by the strikers. It says : 

" The strikers made frequent complaint of violent raids carried out by 
bands of citizens calling themselves 'loyal American leaguers' who were 
charged with clubbing groups of strikers on street corners at nights. " 

In describing the attack of the "crowd of strikers leaving 
a mass meeting" on the negro, it passes lightly over the in- 
juries of the victim but stresses the fact that "a number of 
the (attacking) strikers were clubbed," and otherwise shows 
the highest degree of bias as well as inaccuracy. 

Passing from specific instances which the Interchurch 
Report itself brings up to general conditions as to violence 
.Governor Brown's records show such further facts in regard 
to the quantity and degree of violence in the steel strike as 

At South Chicago and Joliet, the ** union organizations and strikers 
had several automobiles circulating the districts inhabited by steel mill 
workers from which attacks were made on workers, stones thrown at 
them or their homes," etc., etc. On October 24th one of these auto- 
mobile squads was caught threatening Mrs. John Schorey by a group of 
deputy sheriffs and in escaping arrest one of the strikers was shot. 

W. R. McGowan and Harry F. Stock swear that on October 12, 1919, 
on going home from work they were accosted by 4 men of foreign appear- 
ance who after charging them with working for the Illinois Steel Com- 
pany assaulted them, beating and kicking them and then disappeared 
on a passing train; 

53 similar affidavits are on record from the employees of the Illinois 
Steel Company or members of their families: 

On October 23rd John Johns, an employee of the American Sheet 
and Tin Plate Company of Elwood, Indiana, who refused to continue 
in the steel strike was stopped by a crowd of strikers. Dave Rogers, a 
former fellow- worker, held him while the crowd clubbed him almost to 

At New Kensington, Pennsylvania, T. B. Pollard, atinmilldoubler 
was shot on his way to work on October 20th; 

On November 2nd the homes of Pollard, Charles Spencer, August 
Adams and Peter Smith were dynamited, etc., etc. 

At Bridgesjwrt and Martins Ferry, Ohio, strikers were stationed on 
the hillside above the plant with high powered rifles to fire at workers in 


the plant. A special watchman was woimded. Later Harry Lemon 
was killed; 

The homes of David Jones and Don Cecil were dynamited and two 
other non-striking employees were killed; 

Howard Green was shot point blank by a striker while stepping off a 
street car and subsequently died— the striker, Jake Ulrich, was tried 
for the shooting and convicted; 

53 of the non-striking employees of the American Steel and Wire 
Company were shot, stoned, stabbed or otherwise assaulted during the 
strike, one of them so badly that he was disabled from October 24, 1919, 
to April 6, 1920, and another one died. " 

These are typical of hundreds of affidavits of cases in re- 
gard to which detailed evidence exists, in many cases sup- 
ported by court records. To the average American with 
his sense of fair play it will also be interesting to note that 
in only two cases were these victims attacked by as few as 
two assailants — ^in most cases the worker was attacked by 
from 5 to 20 strikers whom the affidavits or other records 
often mentioned as wearing union badges or being parties 
from the union picket lines. 

The Senate Investigation abounds not only in detailed 
evidence such as already quoted in regard to intimidation 
and violence in the steel agitation and strike, but also in 
evidence that further and greater violence was in many 
cases only prevented by the prompt action of local authori- 
ties and local public opinion in taking steps to prevent it. 
(See particularly Senate Hearings, pages 883-892.) 

This Senate evidence in regard to violence of strikers 
was taken and largely made public before the Interchurch 
investigation began and was published in full months be- 
fore the first Interchurch Report appeared. The same thing 
is true of much other evidence in regard to violence on the 
part of the strikers. The Interchurch Report makes no 
attempt either by analyzing such evidence, by making 
fuller investigation of the specific facts it brings out or 
otherwise to refute it. It merely ignores it and insists on 
the fiction that the " 1919 steel strike was without violence," 
at least on the part of the strikers. It is on this pure fiction 


which it attempts to support by the suppression or distor- 
tion of facts or clever quibbles as to facts that the Inter- 
chxirch Report builds up its whole direct' case as to the al- 
leged "abrogation of the right of Free Speech" and makes its 
sensational appeal to the national government and na- 
tional public opinion against the judicially approved exei^ 
cise of the rights of local self-government in Pennsylvania. 

' The Interchurch Report is constantly actually arguing through this 
section for a fundamental change in our laws which would place the right 
of the individual agitator above the right of the public. This will be 
still more clearly appreciated after consideration of the facts brought out 
on pages 354 to 359 of the present analysis. 


"police brutality" and "denial of justice" 

Including an analysis of one group of the " 500 rock-bottom 
affidavits" on which the Interchurch Report 
itself states it is based 

Although strongly denying violence on the part of the 
strikers themselves, the Interchurch Report makes the 
strongest and most sweeping allegations as to violence in the 
steel strike on the part of local public officials and police 
officers and local citizens whom it spends pages in accusing 
of systematically practising every form of brutality on the 
entirely peaceful and non-resisting strikers. 

In its main voltune, on pages 238 and 240, the Interchurch 
Report makes categorically the sweeping general allegation 

"During the strike violations of personal rights and personal liberty 
were wholesale; men were arrested without warrants, imprisoned with- 
out charges; their homes invaded without legal process, magistrates* 
verdicts were rendered frankly on the basis of whether the striker would go 
back to work or not . . . the charges of beatings, clubbings, often sub- 
stantiated by doctors' and eye witnesses' affidavits, were endless and 
monotonous. " 

Voltune II which is supposed to present the evidence on 
which Volume I makes its categorical and unqualified 
statements, says on page 177. 

"The diarges brought against the state constabulary, deputy sheriffs 
and company police deal with the murder of men and women — one as he 



was in his own yard— and the wounding of hundreds of others; the clubbing 
of hundreds; the assaulting of men while lawfully and peacefully pur- 
suing errands on the streets and of prisoners while they were locked 
up in their cells . . . the excessive punishment meted out to these 
strikers by the different justices of the peace, burgesses and police 
courts, and the frank discrimination in the courts between those* who 
were at work and those who were out on strike. ..." 

These charges of "murdering men and women, wounding 
hundreds, clubbing hundreds," of false arrest, false im- 
prisonment and judicial discrimination against inoffensive- 
strikers, are made on the basis of 41 statements and affida- 
vits which the Interchurch Report publishes and which it 
states are representative of hundreds of others which it has. 
As the only evidence offered for a most sweeping attack on 
the whole basis of our organized social system, and particu- 
larly as this is the only considerable group it anywhere 
publishes of the "500 rock-bottom affidavits and statements" 
on which the Interchurch Report itself says all its findings 
are chiefly based, these documents deserve the most careful 

The first thing to be noted is that, with two or three pos- 
sible exceptions, all these documents are signed by names 
that are distinctly foreign and that the affidavits signed by 
such names as Harry Barstow, H. J. Phillips, Henry Mc- 
Neely make no such accusations as those signed by the 
obvious foreigners. It is noticeable also that many of these 
affidavits are signed by marks indicating that the foreigner 
could not read or write even his own name. 

The Senate investigation took the testimony of many 
ignorant foreign steel workers. Its verbatim stenographic 
records of the testimony show that these witnesses have an 
inevitable tendency to talk very vaguely and ramblingly, 
to repeat themselves over and over again and frequently to 
unconsciously contradict themselves and to leave out im- 
portant connective parts of their statements, which con- 
tradictions and omissions were only straightened out by 
It is to be particularly noted on the other hand, that the 


affidavits presented by the Interchurch Report usually tell 
a clean, concise story, go directly to a point and make that 
point clearly and even cleverly and even frequently show 
the utmost cleverness in the use of exclamations and vivid 
descriptions to create strong impressions without actually 
alleging anything. 

The Interchurch Report, Volume II, page 178, frankly 
states that: 

"The language used in many of these documents is 'interpreters' 
English* .... Generally after a lengthy examination of the witness, 
a brief statement, summary or affidavit would be written out in English, 
translated back to the witness by the interpreter and after final correc- 
tion signed by the witness." 

But the whole value of affidavits so arrived at of course 
depend on the clear understanding and scrupulous impar- 
tiadity of the one who formulated the affidavits and of the 
interpreter. It is extremely material, therefore, to consider 
whether the men who played such an important part in 
determining the nature of these affidavits were competent 
or scrupulously impartial. 

The Interchurch Report itself states that part of these 
statements and affidavits were taken by the Interchurch 
investigators and part of them by Mr. J. H. Maurer who is 
mentioned or quoted repeatedly in connection with them. 

Mr. Maurer was at this time president of the Pennsylvania 
Federation of Labor. He and Scott Nearing signed the 
famous cablegram to Russia of March 3, 1918 stating that 
they represented "300 radical groups in 42 states" and urg- 
ing the Soviet authorities to stand by peace terms sub- 
stantially the opposite of those to which America and the 
allies were committed. ' 

The question of the competence and impartiality of the 
Interchurch Investigators who prepared such affidavits as 
were not prepared by Mr. Maurer, is discussed in Part II 
of the present analysis. 

* For full text of this docimient see New York State Investigation of 
Radicalism, Vol. I, page 1076. 




The Interchurch Report, Volume II, page 176 specifically 

" Most of these affidavits were obtained by joining strikers' groups 
castially in the different communities. Other affidavits which were sent 
to Governor Sproul by President Maurer of the State Federation and 
were presented to the U. S. Senate Committee are included in the Re- 
port, but only after re-examination of them in conference with Mr. 
Maurer 's investigator. Not more than one day was spent in any of the 
towns by the investigators and on several occasions two or three nearby 
towns were covered in the same day. 

"In most instances a line of men and women ready to testify and 
swear to their accusations had formed and had to be broken up when 
the investigators left. " 

But in spite of this seeming superfluity of original evi- 
dence thus described by the Interchurch Report as offered 
to its own investigators, an examination of these afi&davits 
themselves — ^as far as they are published — ^immediately 
reveals the fact that 20 of the 41 show dates of or before Oc- 
tober 3rd — ^that is before the Interchurch investigation of the 
steel strike had even been proposed. Thirty of them show 
dates before the Interchurch Commission of investigation 
was even appointed and several more of them before any of 
the investigators, as such, could have reached the strike area. 
As far as these published affidavits are concerned then, it is 
plain that practically all, if not all of them, are those col- 
lected by Mr. Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania State 
Federation of Labor who officially signed himself in his 
correspondence with the Soviet authorities as *' represent- 
ing 300 radical groups in 42 states." 

When these affidavits are examined in detail a number of 
very interesting and on the surface puzzling facts appear. 
A large number of what seem to be allegations prove on 
examination to be merely exclamations or pieces of vivid 
description cleverly bound together and sworn to. Al- 
though these affidavits are signed by a wide variety of 
people who live in widely different places, and though the 
details vary the substance of the allegations, the main 


points emphasized and the way they are emphasized ap- 
pear strangely similar. The victim is regularly described as 
entirely peaceftil— frequently performing an errand of 
mercy at the time — trying to save some little children or 
trying to persuade an officer not to beat a helpless victim 
—the assaulting police seemed drunk or crazy— they sud- 
denly charged without cause, " firing as they came" when the 
victim is prostrate they continue to beat him— the woman 
victim almost invariably has a child in her arms or is 
in a "delicate condition," etc., etc. To this strange simi- 
larity must be added the fact of frequent lack of plausi- 
bility. For instance one or two blows on the head with 
the heavy type of police club known to be used wotdd 
seem almost sure to render a man unconscious. The alle- 
gation therefore, that a mounted officer continued to beat 
a man over the head for "about a block" does not on its 
face seem plausible. 

A great deal of light, moreover, can be thrown on these 
affidavits as a whole by analyzing them with reference to 
certain well-established and pertinent outside facts and it is 
only thr6ugh an understanding of these outside facts that 
the strange inconsistencies and consistencies — ^including 
the general uniformity of date — of these afi&davits can be 

It is a well-known fact that the moment any great strike 
is started its leaders immediately begin to circulate "atroc- 
ity stories" for the obvious purpose of inflaming the workers 
and stirring them to greater determination and resistance. 
At the very beginning of the strike, before any incidents 
which could be interpreted as atrocities have had time to 
occur, such stories are often brought in from outside and 
connected in some vague way with the current strike. But 
as the current strike proceeds, every possible little incident 
that can be so ttimed to account is at once seized on by the 
strike leaders and cleverly colored or distorted to build up a 
larger and larger supply of atrocity stories to continue and 
strengthen such propaganda. 



Exactly this method of procedure was instituted at the 
very beginning of the steel strike. Before it was possible 
to get "atrocity" stories in connection with that strike itself 
a story was imported in regard to the death of a Mrs. Fanny 
Sellins which had occurred in connection with a previous 
small local coal strike. This story was vividly colored. 
Gruesome photographs of Mrs. Sellins as she lay dead were 
prepared and widely circulated. Foster in his book The 
Great Steel Strike, pages 147 and 148 goes into this story 
in gory detail. It was introduced into the first day's hear- 
ings before the Senate Committee and although a thorough 
investigation had been made, the Coroner's Findings fully 
published and these findings reviewed by a grand jury — 
which facts were brought out at the first day's Senate 
Hearings — nevertheless, ten days later at a psychological 
moment, Mr. Rubin, the strikers' attorney tried to intro- 
duce before the Senate Committee some bloody clothes said 
to have been worn by Mrs. Sellins when she was killed in 
this entirely different strike, and the strike leaders otherwise 
again and again brought up this story, circulating it always 
with more and more gruesome details in connection with the 
steel strike as though it were part of the steel strike. 

The Coroner's Verdict, specially reviewed by a grand jury 
had stated that Mrs. Sellins came to her death from a gun 
shot wound in the left temple caused "during attack on the 
sheriff's deputies." The Coroner's jury also particularly 
condemned the use made of this incident by "foreign agita- 
tors" who "instil anarchy into the minds of un- Americans 
and uneducated aliens." 

An understanding of just how this story was exaggerated 
and colored for propaganda presentation in a form that was 
provably at least 95% false is extremely significant because 
of the parallel between this known stock propaganda story 
and a large share of the Interchurch affidavits. The story 
of Mrs. Sellins' death, as widely circulated by strike leaders 
and as published specifically by Foster in his "Great Steel 
Strike," pages 147 and 148 accompanied by one of the grue- 


some photographs, which in view of the coroner's verdict was 
entirely faked, alleged : 

1. "All was going peacefully." 

2. "When a dozen drunken deputy sheriffs . . . suddenly rushed 
the pickets, shooting as they came." 

3. Mrs. Snellins "rushed first to get some children out of danger. " 

4. "Then she came back to plead with the deputies who were still 
dubbing the prostrate Strzelecki. " 

5. She was not on company ground but just outside the fence of a 

6. Then a mine ofl&cial brutally snatched a club and felled the woman 
to the ground. 

7. As she was trying to get away they shot her three times, "each 
taking effect." 

8. As she lay prostrate they shot her again. Then they brutally 
dragged her by the heels. 

9. Then another police ofl&cer "took a cudgel and crushed in her skull 
before the eyes of the throng of men, women and children who stood in 
powerless silence before the armed men." 

10. Then "Deputy picked up the woman's hat, placed it on his 

head, danced a step and said ' I'm Mrs. Snellins now.' " 

11. "She was 49 years old, a grandmother and mother of a boy killed 
in France fighting to make the world safe for democracy. " 

This story, which as a matter of the most careful court 
records is known to be — at least as here published — ^almost 
purely inflanmiatory propaganda, brought in from outside 
and used in the steel strike merely for that purpose, obviously 
consists of the most clever arrangement of phraseology and 
ideas to have a maximum inflammatory effect on credulous 
hearers. Yet when the Interchurch rock bottom affidavits 
as published are analysed, it appears that these documents 
admittedly composed not by the men who signed them but 
either by Maurer or the Interchurch investigators, are many 
of them to a greater or less extent, carefully arranged and 
phrased to bring out the same kind of ideas and to get the 
same kind, though not always the same degree of effect. 
This parallel will be remarked on more specifically as the 
Interchurch affidavits are individually referred to. 

The first widely circulated atrocity propaganda based on 

1. I 



incidents occurring in connection with the steel strike itself 
— and which the Interchtirch Report strongly features — 
consist of two statements by the Reverend Father Kazinci 
of Braddock which appear in slightly different form in letters 
to Governor Sproul, in the Senate Hearings and in a letter 
to William Z. Foster in which latter form they were widely 
published for propaganda purposes. As published on page 
122 of the Great Steel Strike ^ Father Kazinci's atrocity 
charge made through clever insinuation by description and 
exclamation which obviously does not actually allege any 
atrocity at all, is as follows: 

*' Tuesday afternoon the little babies of Number i were going to the 
school. They loitered for the school bell to summon them. And here 
come the Kozaks (Cossacks). They see the little innocents standing 
on the steps of the school house, their parents on the opposite side of the 
street. What a splendid occasion to start the 'Himkies* ire. Let us 
charge their babies. That will fetch them to an attack upon us. They 
did, but the Hunky even at the supreme test of his coolheadedness 
refused to flash his Imif e to save his babies from the onrush of the cruel 
horses' hoofs. " 

Also — 

"Oh, it was great; it was magnificent. They, these husky, muscle- 
bound Titans of raw foice walked home . . . only thinking, thinking 

Although it was of course recognized that this clever 
insinuation which actually states nothing at all was p\ire 
inflammatory propaganda, this statement was so widely 
published by the strike leaders that Governor Sproul made 
a special investigation and it was found to be based on the 
trivial incident that some school children gathered out of 
curiosity around the horses of Corporal Nelson Smith and 
Private John Tomek while the horses were tied near a school 
building — that the officers warned the children away for 
fear the horses might hurt them and later rode off in another 
direction (Senate Hearings, page 881). 


The Senate Committee also cross examined Father 
Kazinci on this statement (Senate Hearings, page 543) : 

" Senator Stirling: Were any of the children hurt? 

" Father Kazinci: By some miracle, I do not know how, they were 
not hurt. 

" The Chairman: How could they have ' jtunped the horses in among 
those children * and not any of them hurt? 

" Father Kazinci: I suppose they acted the same as you and I act. 
When I see the horses coming I run. 

" Chairman: Did you see that yourself? 

" Father Kazinci: I had it from the sisters. 

"Mr. Rubin (strikers' attorney): Do you know the sisters and do 
you know where they are? 

" Father Kazinci: They are all willing to testify to what they have 

" Mr. Rubin: Will you bring one of the sisters here this afternoon? 

" Father Kazinci: They are imder the jtirisdiction of the authorities 
and not allowed to leave their convent without their pei mission or I 
would do it. 

" Mr. Rubin: Will you try to have permission for one of the sisters to 

come here? 
" Father Kazinci: Yes sir. " 

No witness to this widely published atrocity of ''Charg- 
ing the children" was ever produced. 

The Senate Committee at the same time went into the 
second allegation by insinuation of Father Kazinci's which 
the strike leaders had widely circulated as part of their 
"atrocity propaganda" (Senate Hearings, page 543): 

" Father Kazinci: On the 21st / personally walked out in the middle 
of the street leaving the church to stop these men (state police) and ask 
them what did they mean by clubbing peaceful worshippers leaving the 
church. " 

On cross examination, however, the following was brought 

"Senator McKellar: Have you seen any persons clubbed by the state 

" Father Kazinci: No, sir, I have not. 

"Mr. Rubin (striker's attorney): Have you seen them after they 
have been clubbed? 




" Father Kazinci: I have seen one. 

" Mr. Rubin: Did you see any wounds? Describe the wounds. 
" Father Kazinci: He did not show me any of the wounds but he told 
me about the incident." 

Yet as the first evidence presented under its heading "As- 
saults and Police Brutality" the Interchurch Report writ- 
ten months later and fully familiar with all this Senate 
testimony says (Volume II page 175): 

"At the very beginning of the strike charges of brulaJ assaults and 
attacks were made by the strikers and their leaders against the State Con- 
stabulary, the deputy sheriffs and the company guards. The first 
audible protest against these violations from an outside person came 
from the Reverend (Father) A. Kazinci of Braddock when he wrote to 
Governor William C. Sproul and described in detail the assault of state 
troopers upon his people as they were coming out of chiu"ch; and the 
driving of horses by the same State Police upon little children as they were 
assembled in the school yard. Numerous charges of assaults and attacks 
were also brought out before the U. S. Senate Committee. " 

The Interchurch Report does not mention or suggest the 
fact that Governor Sproul thoroughly investigated these 
charges and proved them false or that Father Kazinci him- 
self under oath and cross-examination had entirely repud- 
iated all the essential part of these charges. 

It will be noted that Father Kazinci's "atrocity" charges, 
as they were originally published, and as they are published 
by Foster and in part by the Interchtirch Report, even after 
their repudiation before the Senate Committee, parallel the 
standard atrocity propaganda allegations as built to order 
around the incident of Mrs. Snellins' death in that — 

1. Alleged victims were entirely peaceful. 

2. The "act of mercy" idea is supplied by "peaceful 
worshippers coming out of church" — "little children going 
to the schools." 

3. The attack is brutal, wanton and reckless though 
craziness and drunkenness are not here charged. 

4. The "powerless silence before the armed men" of the 
Snellins story is paralleled by the "coolheadedness" of the 


"muscle bound Titans of labor who were only thinking — 
thinking hard." 

5. The charge of diabolical heartlessness, as shown by 
the alleged taking of the dead woman's hat, donning it and 
the ribald dance over her dead body is at least approximated 
by the charge of deliberately attempting to ride down 
little children. 

Another early incident connected with the steel strike 
itself, which the strike leaders immediately seized on, highly 
colored and published widely in most inflammatory form, 
grew out of the breaking up a strikers' meeting in North 
Clairton, Sunday afternoon September 21st, the day before 
the strike. The question of whether or not this meeting 
should have been allowed was in dispute but this point was 
entirely overshadowed by the atrocity allegations which 
grew out of the affair. 

As six state troopers were dispersing the crowd one of 
them evidently accidentally knocked down an American flag 
which is variously stated to have been on the platform and 
carried by one of the strikers. The flag was picked up by 
Mr. Brogan, or picked up and handed to Mr. Brogan, a 
Secretary of the A. F. of L., one of the speakers at the meet- 
ing and one of those arrested. While the crowd was being 
dispersed, some of the strikers threw only "ashes. There is 
no brickbats there" (Senate Hearings, page 549). The 
police then evidently fired over the heads of the crowd. 
No one was hit or otherwise hurt in this connection although 
in the same afternoon, a woman on her way to the store who 
got into the crush along the road was knocked down by a 
mounted trooper and her hand stepped on so that she had to 
carry it in a sling for a week. 

Around these incidents the strike leaders immediately 
built the most vivid atrocity stories. Twenty-two special 
affidavits, according to the Interchurch Report, were ob- 
tained obviously by Mr. Maurer — of which the Interchurch 
Report itself publishes two — one by Mr. Terzich exclaiming 
but making no statements whatever (page 185) that — 


"But when the state troopers rushed to the platform and tore down 
our flag that the men became incensed and some ex-soldiers, seeing our 
flag being insulted and defiled, rushed at said troopers in defense of our 
flag and started the excitement and almost caused a riot. . . . That 
there was no provocation for said interference and riding over women 
and children." 

The other Interchurch affidavit concerning this ciroim- 
stance surrounding the breaking up of this meeting is signed 
P. H. Grogan. This man, however, when he appeared 
before the Senate Committee gave his name as 5rogan. 
He is also referred to by his associate W. Z. Foster in his 
book The Great Steel Strike (page 59) as P. H. B rogan. 
Before the Senate Committee he, moreover, stated that he 
was Secretary of the A. F. of L., which fact the Interchurch 
Report fails to mention in his Interchurch "affidavit." No. 
38. Mr. Broganlike Mr. Terzich gets his entire atrocity effect 
by vivid insinuation and description instead of by direct 
statement, as follows (page 184): 

"State policeman . . . acted like he was 'either crazy or drunk.' He 
started to shoot and the people were scrambling as fast as they could 
get away. He emptied the gun more than once — I could not tell 
how many shots. ... He got to shooting the people for trying to get 
up the hill and get away . . . (then he) started to shoot in the other 
direction. Horses were standing up on their hind feet. . . . There 
were lots of women and children — many children in baby carriages." 
He then states that he and another man tried to pick up the flag and 
then he was arrested. 

When these "affidavits" are compared with the standard 
propaganda agitation document built up around the death 
of Mrs. Sellins, it is again seen that the incidents are 
grouped and colored and carefully focused to build up 
almost exactly the same points: 

1. That the people were entirely peaceful. 

2. The police acted like they were either crazy or drunk. 

3. The impression is built up that the attack was wanton 
and unnec^sary and the troopers fired as they came. 


4. The * ' act of mercy' ' in this case was rescuing the flag ; 
according to one affidavit Mr. Brogan and another man 
picked it up and were arrested; according to the other, the 
people started to run away but "some ex-soldiers, seeing our 
flag being insulted and defiled, rushed to rescue our flag and 
almost caused a riot." 

5. "Firing volley after volley into a fleeing crowd"; 
" shooting"— not shooting at or over the heads of but 
"shooting the people for trying to get up the hill and get 
away"; "riding over women and children"— particularly in 
connection with the strikers' general claims and the Inter- 
church Report's context about "men and women being 
mtirdered and hundreds being wounded"— all seek to build 
up the same kind of picture of utter brutality as the allega- 
tions that the police fired repeatedly into Mrs. Snellins' 
dead body, dragged it about by the heels, etc. 

The Senate Committee went very particularly into this 
widely alleged atrocity also. The strikers brought two wit- 
nesses. The first, a Mr. Lurgu Sidella, testified about the 
"trampling and defiling of the flag," under oath as follows 
(Senate Hearings, page 569) : 

" Mr. Sidella: . . . and the first thing he done he got hold of the club 
and he knocked the flag down. The horse he walked a little bit and 
came over on top of the flag. 

"Mr. Rubins (strikers' attorney): Do you mean the horse trampled 

the flag? 

"Mr. Sidella: The horse he came over the flag. ... I said 'don't 
knock no flag down.' He said *we never knock any flag down.' 

"Senator Stirling: Do you think he struck at the flag deliberately 
for the purpose of knocking down the flag, or did the flag get knocked 
down, he striking at it accidently? 

" Mr. Sidella: I could not say that. I know I say here he went and 
strike the flag down, he went and struck the flag down and grabbed 
Mr. Brogan and he says, 'watch I am going to get that flag' and 
Mr. Brogan grabbed the flag off of the groimd and he had it in his 


"Senator Stirling: But you would hardly say that he deliberately 
knocked the flag down — intended to knock the flag down? 

"Mr. Sidella: I could not say." 




The second witness the strike leaders brought to testify 
as to the North Clairton atrocities was Mr. P. H. Brogan 
himself, local secretary of the A. F. of L. , one of the speakers 
at the meeting and the man who picked up the flag — and the 
man whose lengthy affidavit the Interchurch Report pub- 
lishes over the signature of P. H. Grogan. 

In his testimony before the Senate Committee Mr. 
Brogan obviously attempted to build up the same atrocity 
picture by vivid description of how the troopers fired into 
the crowds, etc. Under cross-examination he for a time tried 
to avoid admitting that the firing was done only over the 
heads of the people and that no one was hurt but the final 
testimony on this point was as follows (Senate Hearings^ 
page 549) : 

" The Chairman: And he didn't hit anybody? 

" Mr. Brogan: Well, he was shooting mostly at those who were on the 
side of the railroad company's right of way. There were a couple of 
thousand people at the meeting. 

" The Chairman: Was he shooting at the people? 

"Mr. Brogan: Yes. Those that were piling up trying to get away 
from him on the bank of the railroad. 

** Senator McKellar: He was not a very good shot then, was he? 

" Mr. Brogan: He was a good distance away, you know. He was too 
far away for them to throw any brickbats. 

"Senator McKellar: t)o you think he was shooting to frighten them? 

** Mr. Brogan: I could not tell. 

"Senator Stirling: Nobody was hit? 

"Mr. Brogan: Nobody was hit that I know of."' 

Mr. Brogan tried also before the Senate Committee to 
give the same impression about women and children being 
trampled (Senate Hearings, page 549) : 

" Mr. Brogan: Yes, sir, then they (state police) got in on the ground 
and they knocked down some women. 
"Senator Phipps: Are those women here? 

' It need hardly be pointed out that in handling a sullen crowd of 
2000 to 3000 who were throwing ashes and might momentarily 
break out into worse violence 6 less experienced and disciplined men 
than these state troopers might quite possibly have lost their heads 
and precipitated some real tragedy. 


" Mr. Brogan: Yes, sir. One lady had a little baby in her arms and he 
trampled on her wrist. The baby rolled down over the bank. 

"Senator Phipps: Did you see that? 

" Mr. Brogan: I did not see it but I have got the lady here . . . this 
gentleman (indicating) was standing alongside the lady. This gentleman 
had a flag that was torn down. " 

The Senate Committee then called this woman— Mary 
Wickowicz, who said through an interpreter that she had 
not been at the meeting at all but was on her way to the store 
(Senate Hearings, page 568). 

" The Interpreter: She sa3rs she went down to the store ... she was 
not right in the crowd but along the road some place ... she says 
the state police came up on a horse and walked over her and the baby 
rolled off her arms and then finally she rolled over and got up and picked 
up the baby and looked up to see what happened and she saw this state 
trooper hit one of the men over the head. 

" The Chairman: Did any policeman hit her? 

" The Interpreter: No, just the horse. The policeman did not touch 
her; just the horse; walked over her hand. " 

Yet in spite of the fact that Mr. Brogan himself swears 
that nobody was hit as far as he knew and his testimony to 
this effect appears in the Senate Hearings, the Interchurch 
Report months afterwards published his original ** affidavit 
about "drunk or crazy troopers" firing into the crowd and 
about " riding over women and children" as evidence of its 
charges that **men and women were murdered," hundreds 
wounded, etc., not only without mentioning the fact of Mr. 
Brogan's sworn repudiation, but publishing his "affidavit" 
without his title, with half of the name of the locality 
omitted and with the first letter of his name changed so that 
through neither the index of the Interchurch Report or the 
Senate Hearings can the fact that he repudiated the whole 
substance of the Interchurch affidavit be discovered. 

The Interchurch Report in repeating the charge about the 
"murdering of men and women . . . one on the steps of his 
own home" on page 190, Volume II, says: 


" The policy of the Farrell authorities, it may fairly be inferred, was 
to shoot to kill. Thus in Farrell two persons were killed outright, one 
while on the steps of his own house; several persons were wounded 
badly among them a mother of 6 children." 

Immediately after this charge of deliberate killing the 
Interchiirch Report publishes three affidavits. One of these 
only alleges that one man, standing on a street comer in the 
trouble area, but who it is emphasized was "not provoking 
any disorder whatever," heard firing, turned to see what it 
was about and was hit by a stray bullet fired *'from up 
street. ' * The other affidavit only alleges that a woman was 
struck by a. stray bullet fired * * from up the street. ' ' Neither 
of these affidavits even insinuates anything beyond an 
accident from a stray bullet from distant firing. Yet they 
are thus closely tied up and given as evidence of the deliber- 
ate policy of the police to shoot to kill, and also are directly 
tied up with the third affidavit which does plainly insinu- 
ate but does not directly charge deliberate shooting. 

This third affidavit, if it could be considered entirely 
alone, makes a very serious charge in a plausible manner. 
But no matter how favorably its evidence may be regarded 
it cannot be regarded as conclusive, nor can it be regarded 
alone. First, it is obvious that there was a coroner's in- 
quest at which facts were of course more fully brought out 
than in any single statement by one man. Yet neither the 
coroner's inquest nor other evidence that must have been 
available in regard to so serious an affair is mentioned. 
Again the date of this "murder" affidavit — September 23d 
— ^indicates plainly that it belongs to the Maurer group. The 
fact that this affidavit is also signed by a foreigner who 
could not even write his own name, and the whole natiu-e 
of the doctmient shows plainly that it was composed and 
its phraseology and arrangement entirely determined by 
the Maurer investigators. Finally a close examination of 
it shows that it also contains all the earmarks of the other 
affidavits which are provably standard atrocity propaganda, 
for it alleges that: 


1. Two brothers were in their own yard entirely peaceftd. 

2. The state troopers came out from the gates of the wire mills 
"firing shots in all directions." 

3. He was playing with his little four year old child at the time and 
was shot as he was trying to take her into the house. 

4. His brother was first wounded, then shot and killed as he was 
trying to get away into the door of the house. 

5. Before he was taken to the hospital his house was searched and 
the police woidd not allow him to attend his dead brother. 

6. His wife was in a "delicate condition." 

On its face then the credibility of this Interchurch 
"affidavit" is open to serious question. Moreover in a 
different connection in Vol. II, page 126, the Interchurch 
Report itself, quoting from a local newspaper, publishes an 
entirely different statement of this case. This statement 
briefly is as follows : 

The house of Nick Gratichini, known conmionly as Nick 
Grato, overlooked the mill gate. Men going to work and 
guards at the gate were being systematically fired upon from 
this neighborhood. Finally the firing was located as com- 
ing from Nick Grato's house and four State police armed 
with Springfield rifles were sent to arrest the inmates. 
While one inmate was resisting arrest on the porch, the 
officers were fired upon from within the house. When 
therefore Nick Grato was seen to come out of the house and 
sneak around the corner towards one of the officers, he was 
immediately fired at by another officer, and his brother, 
who ran into the yard at the same time was shot in the leg. 

In other words, the Interchurch Report is on notice that 
the facts of this case as locally stated and believed at the time 
are substantially the opposite of those alleged in its 
** affidavit." Yet without making the least reference to 
police court records or coroners* findings which of necessity 
examined and recorded the evidence in such a case in great 
detail, or furnishing one shred of outside evidence to support 
this entirely different version, it publishes this "affidavit" 
composed and phrased by a notorious radical labor leader 
and merely signed by the mark of the accused in the case, as 





the only evidence on which it makes its sensational state- 
ments about ** the murder of men and women." 

The above affidavits are all that can be related to the 
Interchurch Report's sweeping general allegations about the 
"murder of men and women," and all that can be related 
to the alleged "wounding of hundreds, the clubbing of 
hundreds" in so far as that alleged wotmding or clubbing 
involved other than single individuals. 

There remain two other groups of affidavits, those relat- 
ing to alleged brutalities to single individuals and those 
relating to alleged false arrest and imprisonment and a 
general discrimination by both police and courts against 
strikers merely on the ground that they were strikers. 

It is almost impossible, in the very nature of the case, to 
express any final conclusion in regard to a certain proportion 
of the large nimiber of Interchurch affidavits which allege 
individual brutal acts, in regard to which the man or woman 
claiming to be the victim of the act makes the affidavits, 
and where there is no other evidence with which to check 
the affidavit. 

Paul Yagodisch swears (Interchurch Report, page 206) 
that he was standing in the street doing nothing and that : 

"... As he was standing watching, two deputies came over and 
placed him under arrest. As they grabbed him to take him to the police 
station he refused to go, claiming that they had no right to arrest him 
as he had done nothing. He was then kicked and thrown on the groimd 
while a third deputy who came over, hit him first across the shoulders 
with a piece of iron pipe and later took a knife out and deliberately cut 
his head open." 

But a large proportion of the Interchurch affidavits are 
of this kind — ^mere allegations of an individtial that he was 
beaten over the head without any reason or grabbed like a 
dog and arrested without reason, etc — ^none of them sup- 
ported in any adequate way, none of them cross-examined 
and in many cases, though the Interchurch Report calls 
them affidavits there is no evidence in the form or otherwise 
that they were sworn to. 


Aside from the points already emphasized — that this is all 
evidence of highly excited and incensed men reciting their 
own grievances, and that the affidavits were collected and 
to a large extent formulated not by impartial investigators 
but except for a few cases by one highly interested individual 
or his representatives— there are two outside sources of 
information against which these affidavits can at least in 

general be checked. 

As has been stated some hundred of these "atrocity" 
affidavits were sent to Governor Sproul. He had some of 
the worst of them carefully investigated and found the 
allegations to be utterly without foundation or highly 
colored exaggerations of trivial incidents. The facts 
brought out by Governor SprouVs investigations of these 
affidavits were supplied to the Senate Committee and are 
published with the detailed statements of many witnesses 
in the Senate Hearings, pages 879 to 906. It does not ap- 
pear from the records that Governor Sproul went on to make 
a detailed examination of every such individual allegation. 
The Interchurch Report affidavits here considered are with 
one exception among those in regard to which there is no 
other record except in the archives of the local police or 


The only basis on which such affidavits can be judged 
then is to consider their source, the man or men who actu- 
ally composed at least most of them together with his mo- 
tive and the use to which he originally put them, the fact 
that many other affidavits of the same nature and from this 
same group proved under careful examination by Governor 
Sproul or the Senate Conmiittee to be without any sub- 
stantial basis in fact; that many of them cleverly insinuate 
as facts what they will not thus state under oath as facts, 
and finally that the Interchurch Report publishes such 
affidavits as valid evidehce after they have been repudiated 
under oath by their maker. 

In this particular connection this fact cannot be over- 
looked. In the charges of "hundreds wounded, himdreds 



II 1 


clubbed" the Interchurch Report often and particularly 
features Braddock as one of the storm centers. Father 
Kazinci was one of the most conspicuous strike leaders in 
addition to his relation with his people as their priest. It 
seems incredible that any of them should have been clubbed 
without his knowing it. Yet in repudiating the statement 
by insinuation of the clubbing of his congregation he says 
he never saw any one clubbed and only knew of one person 
being clubbed and that seems not to have been at all 

There are a surprising ntmiber of the Interchurch affida- 
vits, however, which far from even alleging any actual 
brutality consist chiefly of petty complaints of obviously tri- 
vial happenings which only the context gives any particular 
significance to. Men make affidavits to the fact that when 
they were arrested they didn't get dinner for seven hours. 
On page 187 the Interchurch Report spends one whole 
affidavit of its 41 brutality documents alleging that George 
Koshel was arrested in a perfectly ordinary way and fined 
$10 for refusing to move on when ordered to by the police. 
This might of course happen under any conditions in any 
city in the country. 

The Interchurch Report spends two full affidavits and 
four attestations confirming the first affidavit which is in 
full as follows (Vol. II., page 187): 

"Ella Syrko of 633 Third Street at about 7.15 a.m. told trooper to go 
to bed and not bother around her house. Trooper swung her against 
the door, breaking it in. This woman was in a delicate condition. " 

The strike leaders brought a group of the makers of such 
affidavits to the Senate Hearings. The record shows pages 
of their excited and obvious exaggerations of such triviali- 
ties, many of which are amusingly contradictory. Finally 
(Senate Hearings, page 786) Senator StirHng, turning to Mr. 
Rubin, the strikers* attorney asked : 

** Senator Stirling: Mr. Rubin, don't you think this is a little far 
fetched to bring a man on the stand, as precious as our time is at present, 
to testify that somebody shot through his house?" 


But Mr. Rubin did not withdraw his witness and the 
testimony continued. 

'* Senator Stirling: Where did you find that bullet? 
" Mr. Supinen: Inside of the stove . . . it went through the wall and 
went through the stove and stopped inside of the stove. 
"Senator Stirling: Now how did it enter the stove? 
" Mr. Supinen: It went through the stove and stopped inside of the 

stove. , 

" Senator Stirling: It is a cast-iron stove is it? 

"Mr. Supinen: A cast-iron stove. 

"Senator Stirling: Would not you have supposed that it would have 
battered that bullet if it went through the house and the stove? The 
bullet is smooth." 

Finally two pages later the testimony ended in about the 
way it had continued, as follows: 

"Senator Walsh: Is there anybody else here who has seen the hole in 
the house — in the wall? 
"Mr. Supinen: Yes, sir. 

" Senator Walsh: You are the only one here who saw it? 
" Mr. Supinen: Yes, sir." 

After Mr. Rubin had put a Mr. Colson on the stand to 
testify as to what kind of a bullet he thought the one found 
by a striker in his house was, he produced Mary Kropeck, 
whose affidavit the Interchurch Report publishes (page 186), 
doubly attested. The Interchurch Report makes no refer- 
ence to the fact that the important Father Kazinci evidence 
was cross-examined under oath before the Senate Com- 
mittee. It does not mention the fact, and sufficiently 
changes the spelling of his name to make the fact difficult 
to discover, that its sensational Brogan evidence was 
cross-examined under oath before the Senate Committee. 
But it calls special attention to the fact that its Kropeck 
affidavit was also part of the Senate Hearings. In view of 
this fact it is interesting to note that the trivial subject 
matter of this affidavit appears so increasing^ more trivial 
through three pages of cross-examination that Mr. Rubin 
himself finally shuts it off. 








I 'I 

i f 



All such circumstances — ^that a man finds a bullet in his 
parlor stove, or that a woman is fined |io — ^are of course 
unfortunate. But under the strained conditions of a great 
strike with sullen mobs gathering to the number of 4000 and 
attacking a public bmlding; frequently gathering by hun- 
dreds to threaten workmen at the mill gates; throwing 
bricks from alleyways, and ashes and pepper into the faces 
of the police; parading with arms and issuing threats; — 
all of which violence or threats of violence is only a small 
part of that brought out by the Senate Conmiittee and to 
which specific reference is made herein — ^the chief wonder 
is that the Interchurch Report finds so few really serious 
cases that it spends pages detailing how a man didn't get his 
dinner for seven hours, that some flower pots were broken 
and chairs overturned and that children didn't sleep one 
night ; that a woman was pushed roughly against a door or 
that a man was fined $10 for something he said he didn't do. 

The foregoing *'rock bottom affidavits" deal chiefly with, 
or have been analyzed in connection with their allegations of 
''police brutality." Most of these "affidavits" however, 
which complain of arrest also complain of the injustice or 
discrimination of the courts. 

In its general summary of the charges as to "Denial of 
Civil Rights" the Interchurch Report, Volume II, page 177, 
repeating in substance the same charge in Volume I, 
particularly emphasizes : 

"the excessive punishment meted out to these strikers by the different 
Justices of the Peace, Burgesses, and Police courts and the frank discri- 
mination in the courts between those who were at work and those who were 
out on strike. " 

In addition to these generalizations, the Interchurch 
Report cites the following specific charge (Volume II, page 
216) that in Pittsburgh: — 


"Attorneys for the strikers testified before the Senate Committee 
that they were not permitted to consult with their clients; that they 
were refused transcripts of the proceedings; that magistrates discharged 


men who promised to go to work and fined others who insisted on 
remaining on strike. ' " 

The facts as to any fine or imprisonment including the 
reason for such fine or imprisonment are of course matters 
of police court record. The Interchurch Report investiga- 
tors could have examined those records. They could have 
talked with the judge in the case concerning those records. 
Instead of this, however, they merely print affidavit after 
affidavit from the prisoner in which the prisoner affirms he 
is innocent and complains that his sentence of $10 or $15 
fine or 5 or 10 days in jail was unjust and excessive. Does 
the Interchurch Report think that the average prisoner 
ever admits his guilt or is unbiased enough to discuss his 
case fairly or that a piling up of protestations of prisoners 
that they were not guilty proves that they were not guilty? 

The Senate Committee, however, did go into this widely 
repeated charge of the strike leaders that police and judges 
"frankly discriminated against strikers," going in detail 
into the one specific case which the Interchurch Report 
brings up, that quoted above in regard to Pittsburgh. The 
Interchtirch Report, features that "Attorneys for the 
strikers testified before the Senate Committee" as to such 
discrimination as though the mere fact that they testified 
proved the case. It is strangely silent, however, on what 
that testimony showed under cross-examination and in re- 
gard to the other evidence. 

The "Attorneys for the strikers" were Mr. McNair and 
Mr. C. W. Sypniewski. The former's testimony is con- 
tained on pages 575 to 581 and the latter's on pages 587 to 
596. They allege about what the Interchurch Report al- 
leges, namely that : 

1. They were "not permitted to constdt with . . . 


2. They "were refused transcripts of the proceedings." 

3. "The magistrates discharged men who promised to 
go to work and fined others who insisted on remaining on 






The Senate Committee called the Pittsburgh Police 
Commissioner Peter P. Walsh and cross-examined him under 
oath (Senate Hearings, pages 681-687) in regard to, among 
other things, these three complaints of Attorney Sypnie- 
wski that — 

I. ''Strikers* lawyers were not permitted to consult with 
their clients.'' 

**Senator McKellar: It has been testified at this hearing that even 
when a person charged with being a suspicious person had lawyers to 
represent him, that the judge of the court would not permit the lawyer 
to examine him. . . . 

" Mr. Walsh: Well, in the last three weeks there have been three 
different attorneys here. Perhaps I could enlighten you if I knew which 
one said he was refused. That man Sypniewski? Was that the man? 

"Senator Phipps: Yes. 

" Mr. Walsh: I can state about him. 

"Senator Phipps: Go ahead. 

" Mr. Walsh: He came over there in the morning and he said, ' I am to 
represent some of these men, Judge.' He said, 'Who?* He said, *I do 
not know. I want to go into the cell room.' I said, * How do you know 
who you represent if you have not got his name?* 'Well,' he said, *he 
was arrested. * I said, ' Give me his name. There are 7 men back there; 
give me the name, and whatever man you are representing I will bring 
him out. * He could not tell. I said, ' Wait until the hearing begins, and 
if you can recognize him and he asks you to be his cotmsel point him out 
and you can defend him.' 

" The Chairman: Did not you know that he was employed by the 
American Federation of Labor to represent its men who had been ar- 
rested there? 

"Mr. Walsh: No, sir, he did not make that known. The hearing 
b^an and there was one man that came up — there were four men who 
were arrested and charged with being suspicious persons. They were 
arrested in an alleyway up near joth Street, around 5 o'clock where there 
had been several complaints of men being attacked going to work. Those 
four men came down, and I asked him, ' Is any one of these four men the 
man you represent. * He pointed out a man and I said, * All right. * The 
Judge asked this man 'Are you a citizen?* This man said he could not 
speak English. Mr. Sypniewski said, 'He cannot speak English.* The 
Judge says, ' He knows what I am talking about. ' Mr. Sypniewski then 
said, * If you was in France you would not be able to understand French. ' 
He (the Judge) said, 'I was in France,' and Sypniewski yelled out, 'You 
are a liar; you never were in France.' 


• i 


After this it seems that this strikers* attorney hurriedly 
left the court room. 

After Attorney Sypniewski had thus left court Mr. 
McNair according to his own testimony (page 576) was 
sent to take Mr. Sypniewski 's place. 

" Mr. McNair: The attorney before me had been expelled from the 
court and refused — they had refused him permission to defend a man, and I 
was taking his place. ' ' 

He thus obviously got into court late when it seems but 
three persons remained. In regard to his complaints about 
not being allowed to represent strikers, Mr. Walsh testified 
as follows (page 687) : 

" Mr. Walsh: I believe they had a man here this morning that com- 
plained; ... by the name of McNair. This man came here, and he 
said he came to represent some person but he didn't know who; and 
three men came out charged with being drunk and he stepped up to 
defend those men and he did not know the men and he didn't know who 
he was to defend. They were discharged by the magistrate. ' ' 

A third attorney, Mr. Brennan, testified that they (the 
Courts) "always treated me right over here." 

2. Strikers' Attorneys were refused transcripts of the 

After Attorney Sypniewski had left court as already 
described, it seems he came back. 

"Mr. Walsh: He went out and later on he sajrs, 'I want some tran- 
scripts.' I said, * Leave 75 cents for all you want and you can get them. 
You as an attorney know you have five days to take an appeal.' 

"Senator McKellar: Was 75 cents the only cost for the transcripts? 

" Mr. Walsh: For eadi one. 

" Senator McKellar: Was there any reason why any lawyer could not 
take an appeal upon paying 75 cents? 

"Mr. Walsh: Not at all." 

Moreover in spite of the fact that Attorney Sypniewski 
had €pecifically alleged that he couldn't get transcripts he 
later testified (page 592, Senate Hearings) : 






" This is one of the men I represented and here is the whole transcript.** 
"Lieutenant McAfee sworn: Arrested defendant at 1.45 in front of 
2520 Carson Street for stopping men on the street. Had much trouble 
on the street with this man last week. Ordered him away several times. 
Oflficer Connors sworn: Defendant has been stopping men going to 
work . . . warned him several times. Officer McCtdlough sworn: Have 
had complaints of this man, etc., etc. " 

Attorney Sypniewski brought up this transcript to allege 
that it was inaccurate in that according to him the true 
testimony was that: 

" This man came out of a pool room and there was complaints by the 
pool room keeper against threatening other people in that house and 
they arrested this man as he came out." 

Whatever else Attorney Sypniewski showed by this point 
he at least showed he could and did get his transcripts. 

3. Judges and magistrates ** frankly discriminated 
against strikers.'' 

Senator McKellar in cross-examining Mr. Walsh stma- 
marized strikers* Attorney McNair's charge of discrimina- 
tion against strikers with special reference to certain particu- 
lar cases and questioned Mr. Walsh as follows (Senate 
Hearings, page 685) : 


^SentUor McKellar: There has been a charge made here that there is 
a custom of arresting those who look like strikers on a charge of (being) 
suspicious persons . . . (when) brought up before this particular 
magistrate he asked them whether they were citizens or whether they 
were foreigners and whether they were at work. ... If they said they 
were at work they were discharged but if they said they were not at 
work, well, they were put in jail and fined and put in jail and kept in 
jail. Is that correct? 

"Mr. Walsh: No, sir. 

" Senator McKellar: Explain that, please. 

" Mr. Walsh: Well, they have been arrested at 5 o'clock in the morn- 
ing or half past 5 or 6 o'clock, four or five men who were standing in alley- 
ways and doorways near the street car stands. . . . They interfered with 
the men going to work and wherever they may be going. In a great 
many cases we fovmd bricks in their pockets. These men were charged 


with being suspicious persons and were arrested at 5.30 o'clock and 
they had a hearing on the charge at 8 o'clock. The judge would ask 
them if they were at work. He said, * No.' Then the Judge would say 
to him — ^he wotdd ask, 'What were you doing out on the street at 5 
o'clock in the morning with a brick in yotu- pocket?' They would say, 
'I don't know.' Then the Judge would say, 'Are you on a strike?' 
They would say, 'I don't know.' Then the Judge would ask, 'Are you 
a citizen?* 'No.' 

"He would then get a man to interpret and speak to this man, and 
the judge would ask the question, 'What were you doing on the street or 
in the alleyway with a brick in your pocket at 5 o'clock in the morning,' 
and they wotdd not answer the question. 

"Senator Stirling: The officer had previously testified that that was 
the condition in which he found the men? 

" Mr. Walsh: Yes, sir, and he would show the brick to the magistrate. 
Before the magistrate would question the person he would take the 
testimony of the officer. 

"Senator Stirling: Is that lawyer (strikers' attorney McNair) here? 

" Mr. Rubin: No. 

"Senator Walsh: That man omitted any reference to the brick." 

u \ 

1 1 




The object of the publication of the Interchurch Report 
on the Steel Strike six months after the end of the strike it- 
self was, according to the statement of the Report itself 
(pages 3 and 4) , to call pubHc attention : 

(i) — to what the Interchurch Report states were the real 
facts at issue in the steel strike which it states were "un- 
comprehended by the nation," and also the "engulfing cir- 
cumstances" which also persist, both of which it seems to 
think are "in general characteristic of American industrial 

(2) — to the alleged fact that "the main issues were not 
settled by the strike." 

(3) — ^to the alleged fact that the steel industry therefore 
continues "in a state of latent war" in which employers and 
employees are both "merely waiting for the next strike." 

(4) — ^and finally to the alleged fact that "if the steel in- 
dustry is to find a peaceful way out of its present state (of 
latent war) it must do so on the basis of a general under- 
standing (by the public) of such facts as are here (in the 
report) set forth." 

In other words the Interchurch Report, signed l>y prom- 
inent reHgious leaders of the cotmtry and countersigned 
by the Interchurch World Movement, and certain of whose 
signers have publicly stated that it represents the ofl&cial 
opinion of American Protestantism, definitely states that it 



embodies the results of a careful impartial study of one of 
America's greatest basic industries and constitutes an im- 
partial report to the American people of conditions in that 
industry on which it is reconmiended that they judge that 

As a matter of fact, however, a careful analysis of the Re- 
port itself clearly shows that the Interchurch Report is in 
no sense a careful or impartial study of conditions in the 
steel industry. For entirely in addition to its mere assump- 
tions, its unwarranted and sweeping generalizations and 
other faulty methods of argument which constantly lead it 
into palpable self-contradictions and other logical absurdi- 
ties, the Report itself admits at the outset that it bases its 
conclusions chiefly on "500 affidavits" largely of low-skilled 
foreigners — ^it deliberately leaves out practically all the 
important facts that in any way favor the steel companies, 
and constantly resorts to a studied expurgation of testimony 
and other evidence, to misleading insinuations and state- 
ments and to the clever manipulation of statistics and tables 
in an effort to make plausible entirely false and obviously 
preconceived hjrpotheses and conclusions.' 

The question remains, and is very pertinent, as to just 
what these obviously pre-conceived hypotheses and conclu- 
sions are. In other words, what is the actual purpose of the 
Interchurch Report as far as that purpose can be deter- 
mined by an analysis of the Report itself, and where do the 
fallacious arguments, which it goes to such lengths to bolster 
up, actually lead? 

' "It (the Interchxirch Report) has quite obviously been prepared 
from the standpoint of some mind convinced beforehand that the 
United States Steel Corporation is an insincere, oppressive and iniqui- 
tous organization . . . the Interchurch protested impartiality and 
those who saw the inquiry b^:in certainly expected something like a 
judicial rendering of opinion — ^not a brief for the prosecution. " 

The Continent (Presbyterian), 
Editorial, Nov. 4, 1920. 



From the first appearance of the Report — as a matter of 
fact, during the investigation that preceded the Report, it 
has been widely alleged that the Investigation was largely 
conducted by radicals and that the Report itself was largely 
merely radical propaganda. Such allegations, however, 
were in general based on entirely insufficient evidence and 
contained many obvious misstatements of fact. Moreover, 
most such allegations dealt chiefly in personalities and paid 
only a minimum of attention to the principal fact, i. e. — 
the merits of the Report itself. 

The New York State Legislative Investigation of Radical- 
ism, the most thorough and competent official study yet 
undertaken on this subject, states on pages 1137 and 1138: 

" The most recent proof of the invasion of the churches by subversive 
influences is the Report on the Steel Strike by a committee appointed by 
the Interchurch World Movement. . . . It is not generally known that 
the direction of this inquiry was not in the hands of unbiased investiga- 
tors. The principal 'experts' are David J. Saposs and George Soule 
(Heber Blankenhom joined the investigators later) — whose radical view- 
points may be gathered from their association with Mr. Evans Clark 
. acting under the direction of Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, head of the 
Soviet Bureau in the United States, their connection also with the Rand 
School of Social Science, and certain revolutionary labor organizations." 

Again in many cases in the present analysis, arguments 
and points of view in the Interchurch Report have been 
pointed out as being exactly parallel to arguments and 
points of view advanced by radicals and in certain instances 
it had been pointed out that argimients presented by the 
Interchurch Report undoubtedly show a distinct S5rmpathy 
with radicalism. 

The term radicalism, however, is in general so loosely used 
to mean anything, depending on the user, from- merely an 
intelligent questioning of modem economic values to pure 
Bolshevism that it is correspondingly important that in an 
analysis of the Interchurch Report in regard to its possible 
radicalism, the term "radicalism" shotild be specifically de- 
fined and used merely within these limits. 


In so far as it is significant to the present consideration, 
radicalism consists of the advocacy of — 

First: a revolutionary, as distinct from an evolutionary, 
change in our modem social and industrial system — the basic 
fulcrum of that change being the ownership and operation of 
industry by the workers themselves, and 

Second: the bringing about of such revolutionary change 
by other means than those of the orderly processes of gov- 
ernment by majority action. 

In other words a consideration of radicalism involves a 
consideration not only of the radical theories themselves, 
but also of the means advocated for carrying out those 
radical theories. For it must be clearly recognized even by 
the most bitter opponents of radicalism that throughout 
history the various social and industrial systems which in 
the heighths of their acceptance were the basis and bul- 
wark of conservatism, were generally, at the time of their 
inception, regarded as radical. While therefore much that 
is called radicalism may be combatted — and is combatted 
by the great majority of Americans — as unsound and unde- 
sirable, nevertheless the men who advocate such theories 
and seek to extend them, are entirely within their rights as 
American citizens, so long as they only seek to extend such 
theories by persuading a majority of their fellow citizens of their 
desirability and seek only to bring about such changes by 
orderly processes of majority self-government.^ 

' It is necessaiy to make a distinction though that distinction is gen- 
erally somewhat vague and often imaginary — between radical theories 
and some of the individuals who hold those theories. An individual 
may hold theories which are themselves revolutionary, which actually 
could only be realized through revolutionary action, and whose main 
body of adherents and their official leaders recognize as revolutionary 
and necessitating revolutionary measiu"es, yet such an individual may 
protest that he is trying to realize those aims only through peaceful 
evolutionary means. Undoubtedly in some cases such protestations 
are sincere; in many others they are a mere doak behind which the 
individual radical believes he can work most effectively. 

One such individual for instance in a private conversation with the 




Modem radicalism does not seek to advance its theories 
through orderly processes of government by means of 
majority action. On the contrary it definitely and admit- 
tedly seeks to bring about its revolutionary changes through 
deception and a strategic application of force against, or ir- 
respective of, the will of the majority. August Claessens, 
sociaHst member of the New York State Legislature, said in 
a speech at the Park View Palace November 7, 1919: 

"Kwe thought for a minute it (socialism) was merely ... a great 
political controversy, until we have a majority of men elected, and then 
by merely that majority declare the revolution, if any of you smoke 
that pipe dream; if that is the quality of opium you are puflBng now, 
give it up, give it up." 

The American Socialist Left Wing ManifestcTof June, 
1919, says: 

"The conquest of the power of the state is an extra-parliamentary 
act. It is accomplished not by legislative representatives of the pro- 
letariat, but by . . . the political mass strike. . . . The power of the 
proletariat Ues fimdamentally in its control of the industrial process." 

author and another person, expressed the hope that his theories about the 
ownership of industry by the workers could be realized peaceably. He 
stated however that they would be realized by revolution if necessary 
and stated particularly that if the government should attempt certain 
action which President Harding specifically recommended in his last 
message, the revolution would come within five years. Because of this 
and other expressions of very radical opinion, the writer asked him why 
he did not have the mental honesty and moral courage to express such 
views openly instead of posing publicly as a mere "liberal." He replied 
that it was because he believed he could " serve the cause better outside 
of jail than in." 

The term "radical" therefore as used in the present analysis, when 
applied to a theory or movement, means a theory or movement that 
aims at revolutionary changes which its oflBcial advocates propose or 
seek to carry out by revolutionary measures. When applied to an 
individual it means one who advocates or is working to advance 
such theories or movements irrespective of what he may individually 
think or admit about the way they should be carried out. 


Moreover that all schools of modem radicalism advocate 
the accomplishment of their ends, not through legitimate 
majority legislative action but through getting control of 
the production of all the peoples' necessities of life by organ- 
izing and controlling the workers, and then using that con- 
trol to force the acceptance of its further theories, is stated 
as a fundamental principle of all radicalism by Eden and 
Cedar Paul in their *' Creative Revolution" — ^in the con- 
stitution of the Socialist Party — ^in the constitution of the 
I. W. W. — ^in manifestos of the Communist party — ^in 
printed literature of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers — 
by Mr. Foster and his group of radicals working within the 
A. F. of L. — ^and by all other known radical groups. 

Radicalism, as thus defined, consists of many schools 
whose theories and objects and methods differ in detail. All 
of them, however, irrespective of whether their ultimate aim 
may be the enforced revolution of society to an anarchistic, 
socialistic, syndicalist, or other state, are seeking to bring 
about that revolution by certain definite methods. These 

First: the control of industry through an organization of the workers ; 

Second: this organization of the workers to be along industrial union 
lines, as opposed to craft imion lines, with a view of bringing all the 
workers in any given industry under tmited control in order to make 
possible the "general strike"; 

Third: agitation and propaganda among all workers to the effect that 
under the present system they are invariably and inevitably exploited 
by their employers, through the employer's alleged control of the gov- 
ernment, the covu*ts, the police power, the army and all present forces 
of law and order, and that therefore all these forces must be fought by 
the workers; 

Fourth: it is generally possible of course for radicals to keep secret 
or cover up their unlawful conspiracies and often their acts. Agita- 
tion and propaganda, however, which are necessary to influence and 
organize the workers, cannot be thus hid. All radicals therefore insist 
that *' the right of free speech " be made absolute imder all circumstances. 
They demand constantly and loudly that neither the courts or police or 
local officials or local public opinion as a whole shall be permitted to 
prevent their saying or writing anything they please including the coun- 
ciling and urging of criminal acts. 



Fifth: in addition to the organization of the workers into industrial 
unions, under a single control, as a means of controlling and owning 
industry, all radicals seek to facilitate and hasten the ownership and 
control of their industry through the practice of every possible device 
which will make the ownership and control of industry unprofitable or 
otherwise tmdesirable to present ownership and management. Radical- 
ism's principal and most emphasized such device is that of forcing up 
wages so disproportionately to production that the business cannot be 
run at a profit and therefore cannot maintain or obtain operating capital 
to continue. 

Sixth: with the same object of making industry unprofitable to its 
present owners, radicalism admittedly openly preaches and encourages 

Seventh: in order to give its workers free scope in practising sabotage 
and carrying out other practices to the detriment of their industry and 
as a means of getting control of their industry more and more in the 
hands of the workers, radicalism continually insists on the adoption of 
every type of device that will take the possibility of disciplining or 
controlling the workers out of the hands of the employers, even to the 
extent of openly denying the employer the right to hire or discharge the 

Because radicalism's whole object is the dictatorship over 
the majority by a minority class which it can only hope to 
achieve by strategy, and because its aims and methods are 
in general so unlawful that many of its leaders have gone to 
jail for a too open acknowledgment of them, radicals today 
are particularly careful to state those aims specifically only 
where necessary and to state only as much of them as is 
necessary under the circumstances. Doubtless largely for 
the same reason, radicals have also adopted an elaborate 
technical phraseology, whose meaning is entirely clear to all 
fellow radicals and can easily be made clear by word of 
mouth to those for whom it is intended, but is not sufficiently 
expHcit to make its full import entirely clear to the average 
non-radical reader. It is almost invariably necessary there- 
fore in order to get the full meaning of almost any radical 
document to build up the true meaning through a compari- 
son with many other utterances that are known to be 

The Interchurch Report of course assumes to be some- 


thing very different from radical propaganda. In the 
nature of the case, therefore, if it is radical propaganda, as 
has been so frequently alleged, its chief hope of effective- 
ness as such propaganda would consist chiefly of keeping 
that fact from being apparent. 

A careful comparison, however, of the main and most 
featured arguments and conclusions of the Interchurch 
Report, with the seven main principles and aims of radical- 
ism as above stated, together with a careful comparison of 
statements in regard to those principles and aims made by 
leading known radicals with the arguments and conclu- 
sions and phraseology of the Interchurch Report on the 
same subjects clearly brings out a number of facts that 
are entirely unapparent in a casual reading of the 

The seven main principles and objects of modem radical- 
ism have been stated as : 

FIRST, the control of industry through an organization of 
the workers. 

The Interchurch Report insists throughout on the neces- 
sity of the organization of the steel workers. It is of coxirse 
true that the necessity of the organization of the workers 
is also insisted on by many entirely non-radical trade 
unionists and is advocated by many thinkers who have no 
connection with either radicals or the workers themselves. 
But while non-radical trade unionism insists on organiza- 
tion of the workers by crafts^ all radicalism denounces craft 
unionism which, as such, works against radicalism, and 
insists on — 

SECOND, the organization of the workers along industrial 
lines with One Big Union under one control in each entire 

Eugene V. Debs says: 

" The trade union is outgrown and its survival is an tmmitigated evil 
to the working class. Craft imionism is not only impotent but a crime 
against the workers." 




h ■ 


The preamble to the constitution of the Amalgamated 
Textile Workers, an ultra-radical union associated with the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, states in terms that are 
typical of similar statements in the constitutions of other 
radical unions, that : 

"The working class must accept the principles of industrial unionism 
or it is doomed to impotence." 

The New International (an official radical propaganda 
organ) in February, 191 8, states what all radicals were par- 
ticularly emphasizing at the time, that — 

"We are convinced that the technical development of the capitalist 
world makes conditions ripe (for industrial unionism) ... at tihis very 
moment." . . . 

The Interchurch Report continually condemns craft 
unions and definitely presents the exact argument of Debs 
and other radicals that craft unionism is inimical and in- 
dustrial unionism favorable to the interests of the workers 
and that economic conditions are making industrial 
unionism inevitable. 

It tells the steel workers (on page 15) that the "indiffer- 
ence, selfishness or narrow habit" of the A. F. of L. (craft 
unions) was one of the chief reasons for the defeat of the 

It speaks on page 157 of the officers of the A. F. of L. 
(craft tmions) tending to be "job holders rather than 
apostles" and more expert "in figuring out scales of dues for 
their own organizations than in figuring out what is due to 

It says on page 179 that many of the workers felt "they 
had been let down by the Labor Movement" (craft unions) 
and in general — though usually indirectly by the addition 
of "it is alleged" or "the workers thought" — ^the whole 
Report continually undermines craft unionism. 

In regard to industrial unionism, it says on page 159: 


" economic conditions . . . have exposed weaknesses in craft unions 
. . . when craft unions promulgate ambitions . . . they are forced 
automatically to considering industrial union problems," 

and again on page 158 : 

"The real problem which confronts A. F. of L. trade unions ... is 
industrial imionism, and the larger side of it is . . . economic 

THIRD, radical agitation and propaganda always em- 
phasizes to the workers that they are, under the present system 
invariably and inevitably exploited by their employers through 
the employers* alleged control of the government, the courts, 
the police power, the army, and all present forces of law and 
order, and that therefore all these forces must be fought by the 

Even the most casual reader of the Interchurch Report 
cannot fail to note its constant condemnations — often 
quaUfied, but generally more effective for the qualifications 
— of courts, magistrates, the Attorney General of the 
United States, public officials, the police; and its constant 
insistence to the workers that all these were used against 
them and in favor of the steel trust and that this was one 
of the chief causes why they lost the strike. As a matter of 
fact, not only the attitude of the Interchurch Report itself 
towards all the forces of law and order in the country, but 
the peculiar grounds on which it condemns them and the 
peculiar phraseology it uses in this connection cannot fail 
to be noted. 

To any one familiar with average radical propaganda 
literature, these sections of the Interchurch Report are 
self-explanatory. A comparison of these sections with any 
typical radical propaganda doctunent cannot but make this 

»The way in which the Interchurch Report carefully leads up, 
through numerous tentative qualified statements, to these definite 
statements has been pointed out in Chapter XVI and specifically 
emphasized in the footnote on page 204. 


i 1 



plain even to those most unfamiliar with radical aims and 

Just about the time of the steel strike, the New York 
branch of the Communist party — ^undoubtedly the most 
radical organization in America — ^issued a manifesto to the 
longshoremen who were then engaged in an "outlaw" strike. 
This manifesto is a typically radical document, in the propa- 
ganda it seeks to advance, in the forces of present govern- 
ment it attacks, and in technical, radical phraseology which 
means much more to the radical than it does to the average 
American reader. 

This ofl&cial Conmiunist Manifesto says: 


I. Workers . . . you have repudiated your scab form of A. F. of L. 
unionism. You must . . . unite with all those who are employed in 
the transportation industry for One Big Industrial Transport Workers' 

On this specific point the Interchurch Report on page 
159 says: 

"When a craft tmion on strike sees brother unions in the same in- 
dustry sticking to work or even filling the strikers' jobs (i. e. scabbing) that 
craft union b^;tns to do a lot more thinking about industrial unionism,** 

The Communist Manifesto says: 

" The bosses hired their strike breakers /rom strike-breaking agencies.** 

One of the most featured charges which the Interchurch 
Report brings against the steel companies in Chapter VII 
is that they hired "strike breakers" and it spends pages in 
emphasizing that they sometimes hired them from "strike- 
breaking agencies." 

The Manifesto continues: 


Now they use the army itself as a strike-breaking agency.** 

The Interchurch Report on pages 238, 241 and 242, 
emphasizes: "the use of the Federal army to break the 

Again, the Communist Manifesto says: 

"The Government (Federal) Wage adjustment Board, . . . did it 
decide in your favor?" 

The Interchurch Report says on page 238 : 

"Federal officials, particularly the Federal Department of Justice, 
help to break strikes." 

The Communist Manifesto says: 

" The police, whose heads are they going to crack, when you go on the 
picket line?" 

The Interchurch Report on page 238 says: 

"... policeofficials try to break strikes," and Off page 240 it says: 
"the charge of beatings and clubbings (of strikers by the police) were 
endless and monotonous." 

The Communist Manifesto says: 

"The Press! whose side are the newspapers taking, yours or the 

The Interchurch Report on page 238 says: 

"Most newspapers actively and promptly exert a strike-breaking 
influence" and repeats the same statement on page 242 and elsewhere. 

The Communist Manifesto says : 

" Don't you see that the bosses own and control the whole govern- 
mental machinery? " 

The Interchurch Report on page 242 says: 

"... that local and national governmait not only was not their 
government [i.e. in their behalf], but was govo-nment in behalf of int«-- 
ests opposing theirs; that in strike times, governmental activities 
tend to break strikes." 



In other words each ridiculous attack which this ultra 
radical Communist Manifesto makes on each force of law 
and order in language that is calculated to arouse most the 
prejudice and hostility of the workers, is, in argument and 
phraseology, almost exactly paralleled in the Interchurch 

This further point is to be noted. The term *'scab" or 
"strike breaker" (meaning the same things) is the most 
arousing and damning term, from the point of view of the 
radical workers, that can be used against any individual 
or group of individuals. Foster's Syndicalism says on 
page 14: 

"A large portion of the syndicalists' success in their strikes is due to 
their energetic treatment of the strike breaker. ... He becomes so 
much vermin to be ruthlessly exterminated." 

The Communist Manifesto, it will be noted, only calls 
certain of the forces of law and order by this ultimate 
epithet "strike breaker." The Interchurch Report, on the 
other hand is carefully worded to call each separate force 
of law and order by this, from the radical point of view, 
worst possible epithet — "strike breaker." 

Now it will be noted that in its argument for industrial 
(radical) unionism, in its attack on the U. S. Department of 
Justice and in all similar attacks, as these have already 
been emphasized and otherwise, the Interchurch Report 
builds up an elaborate case by a mixture of unsupported 
statements, alleged evidence, insinuation, etc., which exactly 
parallels standard radical propaganda, and then states 
in almost standard radical phraseology the standard radical 
conclusion — ^but generally qualifying it with the phrase 
"the workers believed," or "this made the workers be- 
lieve," etc. By the use of such quahfying phrases the 
Interchurch Report, of course, technically shifts the re- 
sponsibiUty for the conclusions to which its whole argument 
plainly leads and with which it obviously agrees from its own 



shoulders to that of the workers, thus creating a loophole 
through which the author or authors of the Interchurch 
Report may attempt to escape actual responsibility for the 
logical and psychological effects of their whole argument. 
But the very method by which it seeks to do this is standard 
radical propaganda practise. 

Mr. Heber Blankenhom, together with Messrs. William 
Z. Foster, Scott Nearing, Carl Sandburg, Representative of 
the Finnish Red government, Paul Hanna, publicity agent 
of the I. W. W., and other well-known radicals are now 
openly and officially working as correspondents of the 
Federated Press which supplies news service to the New 
York Call, The New Solidarity, the Chicago News Majority, 
the Daily Free Russia, the Chicago Socialist, the One Big 
Union Monthly and other official radical publications. 

Mr. Blankenhom's other and previous sub rosa radical 
activities will be discussed later but at present he is openly 
and officially engaged in writing the kind of feature articles 
on industrial subjects which are used by the editors of 
official radical publications for official radical propaganda 
or as the basis for such radical propaganda. Mr. Blanken- 
hom is also engaged in agitation propaganda to the general 
public. But to the public of course the whole effect of his 
radical arguments would be lost if they were openly and 
admittedly radical. So Mr. Blankenhom in his propaganda 
to the pubHc resorts to exactly the same methods used in 
the Interchurch Report, including the qualification of the 
conclusions which he carefully builds up to, by the same 
phrases, "The workers believed," "this made the workers 
believe," etc., etc. 

An agitation propaganda article of this sort to the general 
public and signed by Mr. Blankenhom appeared in the 
September 14, 1921 issue of The Nation. This article is in 
defense of the union miners who recently marched into West 
Virginia to force the non-union miners to unionize at the 
point of the rifle and machine gun. By quoting somebody's 
comparison of this attack to John Brown's rebellion at 



Harper's Ferry and then reiterating this comparison by 
clever insinuation and sarcasm, by unsupported accusations 
against the courts and the state constabulary, by accusing 
the local government of all sorts of discrimination against 
union leaders including the suppression of meetings, in 
other words, by precisely the same type of argument so gener- 
ally employed in the Interchiirch Report — this whole article 
which seeks to justify the miners* taking the law into their 
own hands ends with this statement: 

"Thus 10,000 mountaineer miners have come to believe that certain 
persons have been taking the law pretty completely into their own hands. 
They retaliate in kind. It is hard to interest them in senatorial inves- 
tigations. They may come to believe that the Federal as well as the State 
Government cloaks operators who take the law into their own hands. 
Then they will talk even more of John Brown and Harper's Ferry. " 

This interesting parallel is even more significant in view 
of the fact, which will be established later, that Mr. Blan- 
kenhom who was officially secretary of the Interchurch 
Commission was the actual author of the Interchurch Report 
on the Steel Strike. 

Such remarkable parallels in what is argued for and 
against, in the arguments used, in the way the argument is 
presented, in the conclusions and particularly in the very 
extraordinary phraseology used, between the Interchurch 
Report and the arguments of Debs and other well-known 
radicals, and of various official communist and socialist 
propaganda documents is so striking, so point by point even 
to detail, so repeated that it is obviously impossible to lay 
it to coincidence. As a matter of fact, the non-radical simply 
does not know and could not use such technical radical 
terms and phraseology — even radical slang — with the flu- 
ency and subtle effects with which they are consistently 
used in many parts of the Interchurch Report. 

Moreover such parallels are not only found in the ntmier- 
ous instances and in connection with the subjects already 
pointed out but extend to the subjects of methods of cost 


accounting, of labor management, of bonuses and could 
be multiplied almost indefinitely. Certain of these will be 
touched on in other connections later. 

There is however one other particular parallel between 
this sweeping Interchurch attack on the forces of law and 
order and standard radical propaganda that deserves 
special attention. 

Anyone who is familiar with the history of radical activi- 
ties and points of view or with radical literature, whether in 
Europe or America, knows that while the socialists and the 
followers of Proudhon disagree with Bakounists and S)^!- 
dicalists and Bolshevists as to whether their chief enemy is 
the capitalist or merely capitalism — ^that while the same 
groups differ even more widely as to whether the "bour- 
geoisie" or middle class is to be won over or treated with 
contempt and ignored, the one group in all organized society 
against which all radical schools in all countries and from 
Nechayeff to the present are united in bitter hatred and 
implacable enmity is the police. 

In 1870 Bakounin himself in one of his most vindictive 
diatribes against certain of his enemies, after calling them 
"doctrinaire, insolent, loathsome, stupid," works up to the 
climax *' police blood flows in their veins — they should he called 
policemen and attorney generals in embryo." 

Even as early as the time of Stelhnacker, Austrian radicals 
began the custom of holding special meetings of honor for 
those who murdered officers of the police. 

One of the earliest meetings of French radicals was held 
to decide what conspicuous public building — ^whether the 
Bank of France, the Palais d'Elys^ or the Ministry of the 
Int6rieur — should be blown up in order to strike most 
terror to the government and the people. But the hatred 
against the police was so strong that they decided on the 
home of the Prefect. 

The first great radical outrage in America was the throw- 
ing of djmamite bombs among a crowd of police officers in 
Haymarket Square, Chicago. 



Johann Most*s statement, *' Murder is the killing of a 
human being and I have never heard that a policeman was a 
himian being" has become a radical proverb. 

That the radical individuals and schools which openly 
preach and seek to practise violence should have this inher- 
ent hatred of all police powers seems perhaps natural but as 
a matter of fact the very radicals which have been the loud- 
est in publicly disclaiming the use of violence seem to be 
often most bitter and vituperative in their attacks on all 
police agencies. 

Even so mild a socialist as Mr. Robert Hunter in his 
book Violence and the Labor Movement, dedicated to 
Eugene V. Debs, and which is written to express the author's 
personal disbelief in the efl&cacy of violence, devotes his 
longest and next to the last chapter to a most bitter and 
sweeping denunciation of the police. 

Mr. Hunter, though writing in 191 6, goes back to 1869 
in American labor history and to 1832 in European and 
combs the field for alleged police atrocities. The latest 
police "atrocities" he actually attempts to allege were in 
connection with strikes of 1886 to 1892, a period during 
which nation-wide anarchistic bomb outrages led to certain, 
not always mild, police counter activity, which has long 
since however died down or been stopped by public opinion. 
Yet Mr. Hunter not only wrote in 191 6 as though these were 
current police practise but in his anti-police frenzy he 
entirely changes the comparatively restrained style of his 
other chapters and laimches into a most unrestrained, sweep- 
ing and often self -contradictory charge of "police brutality" 
which can only be compared with the Interchurch charges 
of "men and women murdered," "hundreds wounded," 
"hundreds clubbed" based on affidavits or statements 
about "drunk or crazy" police firing volley after volley 
into fleeing crowds, "riding down women and children," 
"clubbing peaceful worshippers leaving church," which 
"affidavits" and "statements" are on their face largely 
mere exclamations or descriptions and not statements at 

all and which under oath and cross-examination were publicly 
repudiated by their own authors. 

Again "The Socialist Party Platform" 1920 says: 

"i. Congress should enact effective laws ... to abolish detective 
and strike-breaking agencies** . . . 

and all radical groups argue, in season and out, against 
"detectives" or "spies" or "under-cover men," beginning 
with "strike-breaking detective agencies," against which 
certain arguments can be reasonably advanced, but always 
carrying this argument on to an insistence that all " detective 
activities" should be abolished. The motive of such argu- 
ments in such cases is of course apparent. 

There is little question that the very idea of the use of 
detectives or "spies" to get information by misrepresenta- 
tion or deceit is distasteful to the average person. No right 
minded person approves the use of such means except where 
necessary or will fail to condemn the misuse of such agencies. 

Unfortunately, however, as long as criminal cupidity and 
passion threaten life and property; or criminal fanaticism 
plots Haymarket or Wall Street bomb outrages; or equally 
criminal but more cowardly fanaticism furnishes the propa- 
ganda or "justification" which incites the more ignorant or 
daring of their fellows to thus take the law into their own 
hands, detective activity is at least a necessary evil. 

That the Interchurch Report continually attacks "under- 
cover men" and "spy" activities from those of the " Federal 
Department of Justice" down, has already been emphasized. 
It builds its attack on the fact that one " Sherman Agency" 
representative was indicted — ^but not convicted — of "con- 
spiracies of riot, insurrection and murder." It tries by in- 
sinuation to tie this case up with the steel strike but does 
not directly allege any such connection. 

Beyond this one incident the Interchurch Report builds 
its case against "under-cover men" almost entirely on in- 
formation which it specifically states was freely given it by 



the steel companies themselves. This evidence so fails to 
prove anything in connection with the steel strike that the 
Interchurch Report itself admits in connection with it 
(Volume II, page 4) : 

"It is impossible then to criticize the present Report on under-cover 
men in the steel strike as *an exceptional instance'; instead it is a 
typical spadeful out of the subsoil of 'business enterprise.' " 

Yet through page after page to a total of over 100 pages 
it mulls this evidence over, weaving it through with insinua- 
tions and otherwise trying chiefly through mere voltmae of 
words to make plausible the conclusion which anyone 
familiar with this type of argument knows is coming; 
namely, that all detective activities should be abolished. 
This conclusion in this case is featured as the climax of the 
Introduction in the second volume and it is frankly signed 
by Mr. Heber Blankenhom's initials. It says: 

"The questioning sweeps wider. Must our social organization, our 
civilization, be shot through with spies? . . . Can we live without 
spies? The question is raised by the facts: hence the importance of this 
study. jj g „ 

FOURTH. It is generally possible of course for the radicals 
to keep secret or cover up many of their unlawful conspiracies 
and acts. Agitation and propaganda however, which are neces- 
sary to influence and organize its followers cannot he hid. All 
radicals therefore, insist that the ' ' right of free speech ' ' he made 
absolute under all circumstances. They demand continually 
and loudly that neither the courts or police or local officials or 
local public opinion as a whole shall he permitted to prevent 
their saying or writing anything they please. 

"The Socialist Party Platform," 1920 says: 




"i. The constitutional freedom of speech, press and assembly should 
be restored." . . . 


The fact that the Interchurch Report makes a major 
argument out of this subject of "free speech" and that its 
argument and conclusions in regard to "free speech," the 
"right of assemblage" and so-called "Civil liberties" are 
built up by hiding the true facts as to violence and threat of 
violence and by resorting to either the deception or the 
quibble that there was no violence merely because there was 
no violence at strikers' meetings has already been em- 
phasized. A careful comparison between the Interchurch 
arguments on this much radically agitated subject and the 
arguments that are advanced by ofl&cial radical propaganda 
on the subject, is correspondingly interesting. 

Mr. Roger Baldwin was, at the time of the preparation 
of the Interchurch Report, the conspicuous radical head of 
a radical organization known as the National Civil Liberties 
Bureau, dev.oted during the war to propaganda against 
preparedness and the draft — ^for attempting to carry out 
whose theories Mr. Baldwin served a year in prison — and 
known since the war as the "American Civil Liberties 
Union" of which Mr. William Z. Foster is a director and 
whose theories and activities Mr. Baldwin has himself 
described as follows: (New York Legislative Investigation 
of Radicalism, page 1979, and succeeding pages). 

"The American Civil Liberties Union was organized on January 12, 
1920, being a reorganization of the National Civil Liberties* Bureau . . • 
a change in name to indicate that the character of the organization had 
changed from a btu*eau of legal service to a propaganda organization. 
. . . Expression of opinion, as we define it, includes any langtiage 
unaccompanied by any overt act — . . . language unaccompanied by 
such an act even if the logical consequences of it lead others to the com- 
mission of the act, is legitimately within our conception of free speech. 
For instance the advocacy of murder, unaccompanied by any act, is within 
the legitimate scope of free speech. . . . The view I have set forth, how- 
ever, is I believe the view of those who believe in free speech, without 
reservations, as do the great majority of oiu* Committee. . . . I would 
say on behalf of the entire committee that all of them disbelieve the legal 
theory of constructive intent, and that all of them believe in the right of 
persons to advocate 'the overthrow of government by force and violence,' 
while all the members of the Committee totally disbelieve in any such 


doctrine themselves. . . . Because of the nature of the attacks on the 
assumed rights of individuals and organizations, the work is organized 
chiefly in cooperation with labor unions and radical political groups." 

In connection with the war activities of this organization 
and particularly in the organization of the "Peoples' Coun- 
cil" which was "to imitate in this country the Working- 
men's and Soldiers' Cotmcils of Russia," Mr. Baldwin wrote 
Mr. Louis D. Lochner : 

"We want to also look like patriots in everjrthing we do. We want 
to get a lot of good flags, talk a good deal about the Constitution, " etc. 

Perhaps no better example need be cited of a point already 
emphasized — ^that in regard to the "undercover" nature of 
radical activities, and the difference between the individual's 
protestations about what he believes and the actual effect of 
his acts. Mr. Baldwin states that he personally doesn't 
believe in "the overthrow of the government by force and 
violence" nevertheless he is directing his whole activities 
"chiefly in cooperation with labor unions and radical political 
groups** in tr3ring to obtain for these radical political groups 
the right to "advocate the overthrow of the government by 
force and violence" and he specifically includes in this the 
right to "advocate murder," posing all the time "like 
patriots in everything we do " with a " lot of good flags " and 
"talk about the Constitution" and "our forefathers." 

The ofl&dally signed propaganda pamphlets of Mr. 
Baldwin's and Mr. Foster's organization state: 

"The hysteria aroused by the war ... is now directed against the 
advocates of industrial freedom ... in the passage of laws against 
'criminal syndicalism,' 'criminal anarchy' and 'sedition.' . . . 

"We are attempting to meet the present crisis — 

"(i) By sending free speech organizers and speakers into areas of 
conflict to dramatize the issue of civil liberty . . . (and) ... by 
securing nation-wide publicity on all important civil liberty issues." 

The Interchurch Report devotes many passages through- 
out and a large part of Chapter VII in thus "dramatizing 


and securing nation-wide publicity" for precisely the same 
so-called "issues of Civil Liberty" which Mr. Baldwin and 
his "Liberties Union" specifically emphasize and advocate; 
and the supplementary Interchurch Report, Volume II, 
spends 60 pages, signed by Mr. George Soule, quotations 
from whose other published works appear herein, which 
he devotes to arguing why the rights of local self-govern- 
ment should be taken away from the people of Western 
Pennsylvania, basing his arguments on a series of 41 
affidavits which are at least more "dramatic" than they are 

anything else. 

Mr. Baldwin's organization in its official pamphlets speci- 
fically names and condemns certain social forces as being thus 
"directed against the advocates of industrial freedom" and 
as seeking to infringe the "Civil liberties" of those who are 
standing upon their "American rights of free speech" in 
preaching "Syndicalism, Anarchy and sedition." These 
social forces are according to Mr. Baldwin "patrioteering 
societies," "vigilantes," "citizens' committees," "strike 
breaking state constabularies," "the hired gun-men of private 
corporations," "the Attorney General (Palmer)' ' and " zeal- 
ous local prosecutors" . . . "by whom meetings are prohibit- 
ed or broken up" and * ' speakers are mobbed and prosecuted. 

It has already been emphasized in specific detail how each 
one of these same "social forces" which are thus accused by 
Mr. Baldwin of "infringing the civil liberties" of those 
preaching "industrial freedom," "anarchy" and " syndical- 
ism," are also specifically named and accused by the Inter- 
church Report of ' ' infringing civil liberties. ' ' These include 
" bands of citizens," " Loyal American Leaguers" (doubtless 
"Patrioteers"), the officials of Gary accused of stopping 
strikers' meetings and parades merely because they resulted 
in pulling negroes off street cars and * ' injuring them slightly' ' 
— the Attorney General of the United States who becomes 
second only to Judge Gary as the "b^te noire" of the Inter- 
church Report because of his "infringing of Civil Liberties," 
and a blanket accusation brought (page 235) against 


"local l^slative bodies, police authorities, judges, state police troops, 
Federal government departments, and the United States Army" as 
having "affected civil liberties in whole communities." 

Returning to Mr. Baldwin's official Civil Liberties Pamph- 
let the following then appears: — 

"Free Speech — 

"There should be no prosecutions for the mere expression of opinion 
on matters of public concern, however radical, however violent. . . . 

" No discretion should be given to police to prohibit parades or proces- 
sions," — and that such parades should be allowed to display red flags or 
other political emblems. 

Except for the fact that it does not mention "red flags** 
this is specifically the argument — as already shown in 
detail — which the Interchurch spends its whole "Free 
Speech" section in both volimies in "dramatizing" and 
giving "nation-wide publicity.** 

In connection with a consideration of the arguments and 
conclusions of the Interchurch Report and the vociferous 
present campaign of the "American Civil Liberties Union 
and of all radicals to be allowed the unlimited "right of free 
speech" in order to be unhindered in carrying on their 
radical propaganda, there is another fact that deserves 

The New York state legislative investigation of radical- 
ism, on page 1991, describes the organization by Mr. Louis 
B. Lochner, Scott Nearing, Roger Baldwin and other well- 
known radicals of: 

"An International labor news service, which has for its purpose the 
spreading of news relating to the revolutionary progress in foreign coun- 
tries and in general of a propaganda nature." 

In December, 1919, in the midst of the steel strike, this 
organization reorganized, changed its name to the Feder- 
ated Press and added to the list of its officers and corre- 
spondents a large number of additional notorious radicals. 
Its own published list of those so officially connected with 


the Federated Press includes the name of Mr. Heber 
Blankenhom, and later that of Mr. William Z. Foster. 

On page 243 of the Interchurch Report appears a very 
significant little advertisement of this radical propaganda 
organization, as follows : 

"... workers in many sections of the nation, in steel towns and 
out, redoubled efforts to set up their own press and inaugurated their 
own federated news service." 

And again in Volume II, page 89: 

"Immediately after the steel and coal strikes there was quickly es- 
tablished the first national news service owned by the labor unions, the 
Federated Press." , 

In other words in view of the fact that the man who wrote 
the Interchurch Report has since been openly working for an 
off -shoot of the American Civil Liberties Union, which the 
Interchurch Report thus advertises adds to the significance 
of this parallel between the argument as to "free speech" 
which the Civil Liberties Union seeks to "dramatize" and 
the argument which the Interchurch Report goes to such 
lengths to "dramatize. " 

FIFTH : in addition to the organization of the workers into 
industrial unions under single control as a means of controlling 
and owning the industry, for which purpose all radicals de- 
mand the unlimited right of free speech, all radicals seek to 
facilitate and hasten the ownership and control of their industry 
by themselves, through the use of every possible device which will 
make the ownership and control of the industry unprofitable or 
otherwise undesirable to present ownership and management. 
The means to this end which radicalism most emphasizes are 
those of forcing up wages so disproportionately to production 
that the business cannot be run at a profit and therefore cannot 
maintain or obtain sufficient operating capital to continue. 

All leaders of labor and all labor, including the most 
conservative, are of course always interested in increasing 
wages and are in general making a constant effort in this 



direction. Many non-radical labor leaders are also seeking 
blindly to limit production per worker on the theory that 
more workers will thus be employed. Such interests and 
efforts in regard to wages and production however, are 
essentially different from the expressed interest and effort 
of radicalism which is to increase wages and lower produc- 
tion, not primarily for the sake of the immediate benefit to 
the worker, but primarily for the harm to the industry. 

In the "Revolutionary I. W. W." Grover W. Perry 

" The preamble of the I. W. W. constitution says in part, 'By organiz- 
ing industrially, we are forming the structure of the new society within 
the shell of the old' , . . we will demand more and more wages from our 
employers. We will demand and enforce shorter and shorter hours. As we 
gain these demands we are diminishing the profits of the bosses. We are 
taking away his power. We are gaining that power for ourselves. ' ' 

Mr. George Soule (joint-author, Vol. II, Interchurch 
Report and member staff of field investigators) in his book 
"The New (revolutionary) Unionism" on page 274 says: 

"... real wages can rise only by diverting a larger share of the 
earnings to the workers; but under the present economic regime, this 
process cannot go beyond a certain point without driving the employers 
out of business by making it impossible for them to secure further 

and again on page 172 — 

"... business consideration is to the new unionist only secondary 
. . . immediate gains (higher wages and shorter hours) are, both to the 
members and the leaders, a by-product derived in process of work on 
the main task — the preparation of the workers for actual control of 

One of the most surprising and mystifying sections of the 
Interchurch Report, on first analysis, is the lengthy and 
elaborate arguments in regard to steel wages. 

The hourly steel wage rate and weekly wage rates were 


not only widely known but are published, as taken from 
government statistics, in the Interchurch Report's own 
appendix. At the time of, and for years before the strike, 
not only every opportunity but every inducement was given 
the steel workers to work full time and more than full time. 
All these official government figures and figures compiled 
by all other authorities showed plainly that all steel workers 
received class by class the highest wages in American in- 
dustry. Even the president of the strikers* committee 
admitted that *'of course the steel companies came up with 
the wages." Yet the Interchurch Report entirely fails to 
mention or consider all these plain, incontrovertible facts 
and spends page after page in arguing through false analogy, 
through leaving out of consideration important facts of the 
commonest knowledge, and through statistics that are 
manipulated and falsified, to the ridiculous conclusion that 
steel wages were not sufficient for a "minimum subsistence" 
and that they are *'the lowest for all trades for which there 
are separate statistics for common labor, " etc. 

Only in the light of radicalism's expressed policy of con- 
stantly agitating for "more and more wages," irrespective of 
any possible justice in their demands as a deliberate attack 
on the financial solvency of the industry involved, is this 
whole wage argument even rational. 

Again, one of the most obvious and widely criticized mis- 
leading statements in the Interchurch Report is that in re- 
gard to surpluses. A reasonable surplus, to be used as liq- 
uid capital and to stabilize business operations and wages 
in times of depression, is regarded by business men in general, 
by economists, and by all intelligent leaders of labor, not 
only as highly desirable, but the friends of labor in recent 
years have argued that it is morally incumbent on business 
to build up such surpluses as opportunity offers to protect 
the public and the workers from the necessity of too sudden 
readjustments in times of business depression. 

In 18 years, the Steel Corporation had built up a surplus 
equal to about 20% of its assets, or at the rate of sHghtly 






over 1% a year. This surplus savings per year represented 
about 2% of total business per year. These figures show the 
entire reasonableness both of the size and of the rate of ac- 
cumulation of this surplus. Moreover in times of past de- 
pression, when wages throughout the country were being 
reduced the Steel Corporation although it cut its dividends 
used this surplus to maintain wages and employment. 

Yet without in any way even suggesting any of these facts, 
the Interchurch Report attempts, by utterly misleading 
language, to create the entirely false impression already 
described in detail in regard to this surplus, and to argue by 
insinuation that this surplus was illegitimately accumulated 
at the expense of the workers and ought to be wiped out by 
being turned over to the workers. 

The whole effect of the Interchurch argument on this 
point is to prejudice the workers and the public, by mis- 
representation, against a highly desirable policy of sound 
financing which, if it could be broken down, would, to just 
that extent, result in the accomplishment of radicalism's 
express purpose, of undermining the solvency of the 

In this connection it is to be especially noted that on page 
177 the Interchurch Report, in its discussion of the causes 
of the failure of the steel strike, lists second: "// (the U. S. 
Steel Corp.) had too large a cash surplus.'' Ergo, if this 
surplus could in some way be broken down it would be just 
that much easier to win "the next strike." 

Again, on page 77, the Interchurch Report quotes a 
lengthy argument from a W. N. Polakov to the effect that 
when steel demand is below normal, steel prices should not 
include overhead on entire equipment — which of course the 
company has to pay — ^but only on that part of the equip- 
ment actually used in the sub-normal production. Again, 
if such a theory should be accepted by the public and govern- 
ment agencies, and enforced it would be most effective — to 
quote Mr. Soule — "in driving the employers out of business 
by making it impossible for them to secure further capital." 


SIXTH : With the same object of making industry unprofit- 
able to its present owners, radicalism admittedly openly practises 
and encourages sabotage. 

"Sabotage," says Mr. Robert Hunter in his book which 
is entitled, "Violence and the Labor Movement," (page 
236) is: 

" If a strike is lost and the workers return only to break the machines, 
spoil the products, and generally disorganize a factory, they are Sabo- 
teurs. The idea of Sabotage is that any dissatisfied workman shall 
undertake to break the machine in order to render the conduct of the 
industry unprofitable, if not actually impossible." 

Sabotage, however, does not necessarily consist of violence, 
and the fact that public opinion and the enforcement of the 
laws have become much more strict against property wreck- 
ing through mere spite or grievance, has resulted in the 
development and propagation, by radicalism, of another 
type of sabotage, less sensational, but in the long run even 
more effective. At the Indianapolis convention of the 
Socialist Party Delegate Slaydon said: 

"Sabotage as it prevails today means interfering with the machinery 
of production without going on strike. It means to strike but stay on 
the payroll. It means that instead of leaving the machine, the workers 
will stay at the machine and turn out poor work, slow down their work, 
and in every other way that may be practicable, interfere with the pro- 
fits of the boss." 

Sabotage generally constituting a crime, is of course, not 
openly preached. Moreover while it has always been se- 
cretly advocated and more or less indulged in by many 
radicals, the American Socialist Party, during the period in 
which it was trying to gain influence by legitimate, political 
means, and in order to free itself from the stigma of its 
past reputation, added in 1912 Article II, Section 6 to its 
constitution which specifically prohibited sabotage. 

In recent years, however, when all radicals have given up 
their attempt of seeking their aims through legitimate, 


majority political action and have concentrated their efforts 
on enforcing their aims through getting control of industry, 
the theory and practice of sabotage has become a leading 
part of their policy. As part of this general movement, the 
Socialist Party in its National Convention in 191 7 just 
after America entered the war officially revoked their 
constitutional edict against sabotage. 

There is no question that as a part of its effort to make 
industry tmprofitable to its present owners and managers, 
radicalism is today encouraging, and the members of radical 
unions are practising at least the minor forms of sabotage 
with the express aim of handicapping and slowing up produc- 
tion on a more widespread and thorough scale than ever 
before. ' 

The Interchurch Report, in many sections, condemns the 
alleged * * speeding-up * ' of workers. The burden of its whole 
argtunent on the subject to workers and the public is that 
the workers should do less work. It frequently efers by 
way of condemnation to the ''organization of the jobs for 
production" or the "running of the job for production'* 
(pages 120-121, etc.) — ^that "the steel industry (is) being 
run for the making of profits ' ' (page 77) . ^ 

The Interchurch Report, however, does not directly or 
indirectly touch on or advance any argument that could be 
interpreted to specifically encourage or point toward sabo- 
tage as such. 

Moreover the Report in its "Findings," published at the 

» It is only fair to state in this connection that the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers, previously mentioned herein as a leading exponent 
of radical unionism, two years ago partly abandoned and have seemingly 
in the last year entirely abandoned previous practices which resulted 
in large decreases in production, and are maintaining production at an 
agreed rate. Whether this is merely being done as a matter of present 
expediency, along the lines of the recent Russian Soviet compromise 
with its principles to gain certain immediate ends, or represents a basic 
change of principles can doubtless only be determined by time. 

' In this connection it is interesting also to note that the "Report of 
the Findings Committee" of the Interchurch Industrial Relations 


end of the Report but written by a different group of men at 
a different time and in general only sHghtly related to the 
Report itself, does specifically condemn labor's theory of 
slowing-up production and specifically demands that labor 
unions change their methods to encourage production on the 
part of the individual workers. 

SEVENTH : In order to give its workers free scope in prac- 
tising sabotage and carrying out other practices to the detriment of 
their industry and also as a means of getting the control of their 
industry more and more into the hands of the workers whom it 
controls, radicalism continually insists on the adoption of every 
type of device which will take the right of disciplining or con- 
trolling the workers out of the employers' hand even to the extent 
of openly denying the employer the right to hire or discharge the 


The Interchurch Report constantly urges as a major 
grievance that "control of working conditions" was in the 
hands of the employer— that "promotion was at pleasure of 
company representatives" and otherwise continually argues 
to the workers and the public that the present power of con- 
trolling and disciplining the workers should be taken out of 
the hands of the employers and placed in the hands of the 
workers and their representatives. 

It never suggests, however, directly or indirectly that 
"control of the job" be taken out of the hands of the man- 
agement and put into the hands of the workers for the pur- 
pose of giving the workers special power or protection to 
facilitate any form of sabotage. 

Moreover it must be borne in mind that the whole influ- 

Department as published by the Interchurch World Movement, Docu- 
ment "No. 187, II. 10, Nov., 1919* " states:— 

" III. The present industrial system is on trial." 
" VIII. Increasing iiimibers of intelligent and conscientious people 
believe that the conflict between the principles of Jesus 
and an industrial system based upon competition for 
private profit is sharply drawn." 



ence of organized labor, including that part of it which is 
not radical, has for various reasons sought to get much of 
the power to control and discipline the workers out of the 
hands of the employer, not at all to encourage sabotage or 
further any other radical aim, but merely to increase its own 
power as compared with that of the employer. Therefore 
the constant insistence of the Interchurch Report that the 
power to control and discipHne the workers be taken out of 
the hands of the employer does not necessarily have any 
relation to radicalism. Moreover there is the definite fact 
that the Interchtirch Report in its "Findings" specifically 
condemns the practice on the part of workers of deliberately 
slowing-up production. 

On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that one of 
the chief reasons why it has been so easy for radical "borers 
from within" organized labor to get such a hold on organized 
labor that Foster definitely states, and many authorities and 
facts bear him out, that radicalism has a dominant hold on 
the A. F. of L., is because radicalism has seized on many 
such practices which, while not established for radical ends, 
are so susceptible of being radically used, that radicalism 
has been able to turn them most effectively to its own ends. 

Whether, therefore, the authors of the main section of the 
Interchurch Report were actuated by the same motives as 
the different authors of the "Findings" which definitely con- 
demn sabotage or were actuated by different motives, the 
fact remains that in their insistent advocacy of taking 
"promotion" and "control of the job" out of the hands of 
the responsible management, they are advocating a system 
which has almost invariably resulted in the minor forms of 
sabotage and which, once established, radicalism is able to 
use as a major weapon in its attacks on industry. ' 

' As has already been stated, radicals in general have long been, and 
have been particularly in the last number of years, advocates of sabo- 
tage, which advocacy has been strong enough and general enough to 
force the whole Socialist Party recently to ofladally revoke its dis- 
approval of sabotage. 


As a matter of fact, except for Section V of the separate 
'Findings" which chiefly condemns organized labor's 
tendency to deliberately decrease production, and for cer- 
tain isolated recommendations as to government regulation 
of the steel industry, such careful study of the entire Inter- 
church Report as the present analysis has been able to make 
not only does not reveal one single argument or conclusion, 
directly or indirectly incompatible with the principles of 
radicalism, but it has not found one single argument or con- 
clusion which is not in entire keeping with the principles 
and practices of radicalism, and entirely susceptible, of being 
quoted and used in favor of radicalism. 

Throughout, the Interchurch Report constitutes a 
violent attack on the steel industry which is perhaps the 
. only great basic industry on which modem organized labor 
theories, including radical theories, have gained no hold; 
and it goes to the greatest lengths in disregarding important 
evidence, expurgating and twisting evidence, and manipulat- 

But in the meantime the whole world has witnessed the conspicuous 
inability, first of the Russian worker to operate the factories which he 
had taken possession of, and then of the Italian worker to operate the 
factories which he temporarily seized but was soon very glad to give back 
to capitalist management. As a result, very recently certain members 
of the so-called "intelligenza" among radicals have b^:un to talk 
a great deal about a theory which they call "the assimiption of responsi- 
bility for production" by the workers. The way they interpret this 
newly discovered theory to the workers is that the workers must begin at 
once to educate themselves on industrial subjects as a preparation for the 
seizure and operation by them of indtistry. To the public, they have 
somewhat vaguely interpreted it to mean reform as to their former 
theories of reducing production. The fact that the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers seem to have instituted very decided reforms along 
this line may be a case in point. 

The Interchurch Report in at least two instances, accuses the craft 
unions of not being willing to " assume the responsibility for production. " 
The use of this mere vague phrase without any further explanation or 
argument of course does not in itself commit the Interchurch Report one 
way or the other as to the generally accepted radical theory of sabotage 
to decrease production. 


ing facts and figures in order to make that attack more 
violent and sweeping than the worst interpretation of the 
real facts could possibly warrant. Moreover as part of its 
attack on the steel industry, and frequently in generaliza- 
tions in regard to industry as a whole, it constantly attacks 
fundamental principles and practices of our whole modem 
industrial system which it is the express aim of radicalism 
to attack and destroy. 

Although in at least certain respects, the steel industry 
has been generally regarded as a leader in American indus- 
trial advancement; although the present industrial system 
has unquestionably been a chief factor in America's growth 
and material prosperity, on which our social advancement 
has been largely based; and although an overwhelming pro- || 
portion of all Americans unquestionably believe in the mod- 
em industrial system, as at least the best that is presently 
practicable, the Interchurch Report, as far as can be dis- 
covered, does not advance one argument or conclusion in 
favor either of the steel companies or of our modem indus- 
trial system. 

Although there are almost inevitably two sides to any 
industrial dispute, the Interchurch Report without reserva- 
tion or qualification argues the case of the worker whom 
radicaHsm is trying to organize in its attack on modem 
industry. Moreover it particularly and strongly champions, 
even against the American workers, the foreign worker who 
is most susceptible to, and forms the bulwark of radicalism 
in America. 

Although it is wholly in favor of labor the Interchurch 
Report frequently criticizes openly, and constantly criticizes, 
indirectly and by insinuation, the elements and principles in 
organized labor, particularly craft unions which, as such, are 
incompatible with radicaHsm, and frequently openly, and 
constantly indirectly and by insinuation, argues in favor of 
industrial unionism, which works inevitably and directly 
toward radicaHsm. 

The Interchurch Report shows an intimate knowledge 


of radical theories and technical, radical phraseology and 
frequently uses that knowledge in arguments which, though 
they may seem on their face innocuous, have a very perti- 
nent meaning to those who understand their full im- 
port. Of all those connected with the strike the Re- 
port is most openly sympathetic with Foster, the radical 

RadicaHsm, in attempting to advance its theories, has 
seven principal lines of attack. As regards all seven of these 
it has been shown in detail that the Interchurch Report 
strongly attacks the particular enemies that radicaHsm 
attacks— and attacks them on exactly the same grounds, 
and generally in exactly the same phraseology which radical- 
ism uses. 

Radicalism has certain strategic conditions and practices 
and relationships which it is constantly seeking to estabHsh 
in industry with the express purpose of using them to special 
radical ends. The Interchurch Report does not, of course, 
argue these ends— in one case the *' Findings" repudiate 
the logical radical end — ^but otherwise it argues strongly 
in favor of each one of these strategic conditions and prac- 
tices and relationships. 

From its very nature, as assuming to be an impartial 
investigation of a modem industry, operating under the 
accepted industrial system, it is obvious that, irrespective 
of how extreme the radicaHsm of its authors may be, or how 
essentiaUy radical its arguments, the Interchurch Report 
could not carry such arguments to any openly radical conclu- 
sion. For this would unquestionably, immediately and 
ipso facto have condemned the whole Report in the eyes of 
the great majority of the American people, and would 
undoubtedly have restdted in a refusal of the Interchurch 
World Movement as a whole to approve and underwrite it, 
which approval by the Interchurch World Movement, and 
unsuspecting acceptance by the pubHc, constitute the es- 
sence of the Report's whole value. 

Moreover, even from the ultra-radical point of view, it is 





entirely unnecessary that the Report should go farther than 
it does. For to the ultra-radical agitator who is condemning 
the modem industrial system on the stereotyped grounds on 
which radicalism seeks particularly to condemn it; or who is 
attacking the courts and police and public officials and Press 
as mere tools of the capitalist; or who is arguing with labor 
to form "industrial" instead of "craft" unions, or who is 
otherwise preaching the fundamentals of radicaHsm, it is 
entirely sufficient that he can point to this supposedly high, 
impartial investigation of the very conditions he is attack- 
ing, as supporting his fundamental claims and arguments 
from a point of view and in phraseology that perfectly 
supports his argument. 

It is the fact that the Interchurch Report is today being 
used by radicals everywhere in exactly this way that was 
the chief incentive of the present analysis. 




Considering then merely the Interchurch Report itself 
without reference to any outside facts as to its origin or 
authorship, it is plain and conclusive that : 

First: The Interchurch Report as a whole, and in general 
as to its separate and detailed conclusions is based on evi- 
dence that is plainly insufficient. The "rock-bottom evi- 
dence" of the whole Report is stated by the Report itself to 
consist of "500 affidavits" which are chiefly from "the mass 
of low-skilled foreigners. " Irrespective of the value of these 
500 affidavits themselves, it is hardly, possible under any 
circumstances that 500 such affidavits could constitute 
adequate evidence of facts as to the point of view of 500,000 
workers and as to the operation of a great basic industry. 

Moreover, in specific and detailed argument throughout 
the Report, the evidence presented is equally inadequate, 
repeatedly consisting merely of some one or few isolated, 
dramatic incidents or allegations from* which the Report 
immediately generalizes and draws sweeping conclusions. 

Second: Chiefly because of its persistence in generahzing 
from insufficient evidence, the Interchurch Report is re- 
peatedly and conspicuously self -contradictory in regard to 
major conclusions. For instance: 

It frequently repeats the statement — ^as one of its main 
arguments for the need of "Collective Bargaining" — ^that 
the workers as a matter of practice cannot take their griev- 
ances any higher than the foreman. Yet in a majority of 


1 ' 

1 1 


the evidence which the Report itself later presents, consist- 
ing of affidavits of low-skilled foreign workers in regard to 
specific grievances, these affidavits definitely state that these 
workers actually did take their grievances "from the fore- 
man to the superintendent," or "to the main office," or "to 
the General Superintendent," or "to the general manager." 

The Interchurch Report states, as a major conclusion, 
that common labor worked (191 9) 74 hours a week — over 
12 hours a day. It states as another major conclusion that 
the annual wage of steel common labor for 191 9 was "under 
I1466 a year." As a matter of simple arithmetic, based on 
the known and admitted wage rate, if common labor aver- 
aged over twelve hours a day, their wages were not "under 
$1466 a year," but between $1700 and $1800 a year, or 
else common labor worked only 249 days a year which 
would entirely contradict the whole Interchurch argument 
that the industry was "speeded up in every direction" — 
that the workers only got a Sunday off once in 6 
months, etc. 

The Interchurch Report spends a major part of Chapter 
II arguing to the conclusion that the steel strike was not 
"plotted or led by reds or syndicalists or Bolshevists" — 
that it did not seek to "overthrow established leaders and 
estabHshed institutions of organized labor." Chapter VI, 
however, is devoted mainly to showing in detail that the 
whole unionization and strike movement was planned by, 
and its most important leader was, a man who has himself 
admitted in writing, both before and since the strike, that 
he was an ultra-radical working in general, and in the steel 
strike in particular, towards overthrowing what are at 
least the expressed present aims of organized labor, and he 
specifically refers to the steel strike as an example of the 
degree to which they are being overthrown. Moreover the 
authors of the Interchurch Report state plainly in this 
Chapter VI that they were entirely and in detail familiar 
with his point of view and his aims; in which chapter it is 
also stated that circumstances at the time of the steel strike 


and in general are forcing all organized labor from its pres- 
ent theories of "craft" unionism to the "industrial" or 
radical unionism for which they admit Mr. Foster is working. 
Moreover in this same later chapter the Interchurch Report 
specifically states that the two principal "psychological 
factors" which influenced the big majority of the "un- 
skilled foreigners" in the strike— and it is plainly admitted 
that in general the unskilled foreigners were the backbone 
of the strike — ^were such radical motives as that the work- 
ers had got control of the Russian government; that they 
had or were about to get control of the British government; 
that they expected as a result of the strike that "Mr. 
Wilson was going to run the steel mills," etc. 

On page 95 the Report states that the steel companies, 
in their efforts to force workers to over-exertion, made each 
wage raise just enough to meet the increased cost of living, 
yet, in a footnote on page 97, it states that earnings had 
gone up 150% during a period in which it is a matter of 
official record that the increased cost of living had gone 
up only half that much. 

Other of the most important major conclusions and 
many minor conclusions throughout the Report are simi- 
larly irreconcilably contradictory. 

Third: The Interchurch Report is openly and wholly 
an ex parte argimaent. The statement in the beginning 
of the Report that the scope of the inquiry was chiefly 
among the "mass of low-skilled foreigners," and that 
"the statements and affidavits of 500 (such) steel workers 
constituted the rock-bottom of the findings," and the 
repeated statements that the Interchurch Report investi- 
gators received little support or evidence from the Steel 
Companies constitute palpable admissions of the ex parte 
natiire of the whole Report. Such admissions, however, are 
entirely superfluous. The authors of the Interchurch Report 
had available all the evidence presented in the present analysis. 
They obviously, however, not only made no effort to seek 
out evidence except on one side but they deliberately 




omitted to consider the most widely known and oflScial 
facts — even facts which often form an integral part of the 
evidence the Report does use — ^whenever these facts are in 
any way favorable to the steel companies. 

In its entire discussion of wages, the Interchurch Report 
attempts to prove the contrary without once mentioning 
the existence of the official govenmient figures and other 
authoritative studies which show plainly and specifically 
that steel wages are by far the highest in industry, even 
though some of these figures are found buried away in the 
Appendix of the Report itself. 

The whole weight of evidence in the Senate Investigation 
was against the strike, as both Foster and the Interchurch 
Report tacitly admit by their repeated condemnation of the 
Senate Investigation. The Interchurch Report quotes 
frequently and voluminously from the Senate Investigation. 
Yet not only does it not quote any Senate evidence what- 
ever that is in the least favorable to the steel companies, but 
in the unfavorable evidence which it does quote, it carefully 
expurgates any statements or remarks that are favorable to 
the companies' side and quotes only that part which is 
favorable to the workers' side. 

For instance in Chapter III the Interchurch Report 
quotes on page 67, in an expurgated form, the testimony of 
Mr. Colson before the Senate committee (for complete 
Colson testimony see Report of Senate Hearings, Part II, 
pages 728 to 735). Mr. Colson's complaint was that while 
he had a good job before the war with the steel company at 
i7/^c an hotir, and while he got 44c an hour when he came 
back, he had to wait five months for his job and then only 
got a disagreeable and dangerous job. The Interchurch 
Report's expurgated quotation from this testimony entirely 
leaves out the fact which Mr. Colson inadvertently let slip 
and then was forced to explain completely under cross- 
examination that, as a matter of fact, Mr. Colson, though 
only a common laborer, was given a good, semi-skilled job 
on a crane immediately after he came back from the war, but 



was discharged because he deliberately refused to keep up 
steam and therefore had to go back to common labor work. 
Again on page 143 the Interchurch Report quotes almost 
all the Senate testimony of striker Frank Smith, an un- 
naturalized Hungarian, who said he was not naturalized 
because "1 have never stayed long enough m one place; 
stayed long enough to get my papers." Mr. Smith received 
$4 73 for a ten hour day which he said he could not live on 
because of his large family of seven. (For complete Smi^ 
testimony see Report of Senate Hearings, Part II, pages 526- 
527.) The Interchurch Report quotes all the part against 
the steel company, but carefully leaves out the following: 

The Chairman: "Are there any other causes that led you to strike 
except the lack of money?" 

Mr. SmUh: "Well, my conditions are all right. I can say nottog 
about the conditions. My conditions are all right; and I would gladly 
do it; and I would gladly keep the work if I could make a livmg. The 
conditions I was satisfied with." 

The Interchurch Report also carefully leaves out the 
fact that this man, who said that his wages were not enough 
to support his family of seven, testified that he had bought 
Hberty bonds, contributed to the Red Cross and the Y. M. 
C. A. and appeared so well dressed that it caused one of the 
Senators to comment on the fact, and that he himself 
explained that he dressed well out of his savings. The 
Interchurch Report also carefully leaves out the followmg: 

The Chairman: "Do you work on Sundays?" 
Mr. SmUh: "Well, not so much." 

Fourth: The Interchurch Report continually resorts 
to insinuations and to misleading language to create impres- 
sions about facts which it fails to state openly or argue on 

their merits. 

On page 14, line i and elsewhere the Interchurch Report 
makes, merely in passing, the ambiguous criticism that 
"increases in wages during the war in no case were at a 





sacrifice of stockholders* dividends.*' As a matter of fact, 
wages were increased more than dividends. (See page 68.) 

On page 1 1 , line 25 and repeatedly elsewhere the Inter- 
church Report makes the criticism that "Promotion was at 
pleasure of the company representatives*' but it fails to 
state whether it would recommend that the men themselves 
elect their bosses, or vote for promotion on the basis of 
popularity, or put promotion on the basis of seniority with- 
out regard for efl&ciency, as the strike leaders demanded, or 
what substitute it would offer for a practice that is common 
and basic in all American industry. 

Again in the midst of its discussion of steel wages and 
grievances (page 95), the Interchurch Report goes into a 
bitter denunciation of the speeding-up system which 
continually "shaves rates," paying less and less in order to 
make the men work harder and harder, creating the im- 
pression — though it is careful not to state it — that this is an 
evil of the steel industry. As a matter of fact all steel 
workers work on a fixed wage and only a small class of the 
highest paid are affected by bonuses which they get in 
addition to their regular wages, for extra efi&ciency. In the 
same way, the Report bitterly denounces, in such con- 
nection and language as to seem to condemn the steel in- 
dustry certain other industrial practices which may or may 
not exist in other industries but which certainly do not exist 
in, and have no relation to, the steel industry. 

Many other statements which create entirely false 
impressions have already been emphasized. Reference 
has also already been made to the repeated use of misleading 
phraseology. In referring to the class of steel workers who 
actually work 7 or 8 hours a day — 40 to 48 hotirs a week — 
the Interchurch Report always refers to them as workers 
"who work under 60 hours a week'' On page 198 it uses 
the magniloquent phrase "among the Atlantic industrial 
nations," obviously to give the impression of many nations 
when actually it refers only to Great Britain; etc., etc., etc. 
Misleading is the mildest term that can be used in regard to 




the phraseology of the Interchurch Report concerning sur- 
pluses; the phraseology used being particularly calculated 
to create an entirely false impression that the Steel Cor- 
poration had accumulated in each of several years a siirplus 
which as a matter of fact took 18 years to accumulate. 

Misleading is also the mildest term which can be applied 
to the Interchurch Report's complaint of the lack of statis- 
tics in regard to steel hazards — to its whole argiunent that 
strikers' meetings did not result in violence on the cleverly 
worded quibble that the violence did not occur in the 
meeting — and to many other of its argiunents and state- 
ments throughout. 

Fijih: In regard to its major conclusions, in so far as they 
are susceptible of being arrived at on a basis of definite fact 
— which includes those in regard to the most important 
subjects of wages, profits, hazards, the number of 12-hour 
workers, the nature of 12 -hour work, the attitude of the 
companies toward the men, etc. — ^it has been shown specifi- 
cally and in detail that the conclusions of the Interchurch 
Report are the opposite of the provable truth. 

In regard to other major issues in the steel strike, such 
as the attitude of the steel workers towards their alleged 
grievances, toward trade union collective bargaining, in 
regard to the number of workers who actually struck, in 
regard to radicalism in the strike movement, etc. , which 
issues, because they largely involve facts as to the opinions 
and points of view of large numbers of men and other 
complex facts or complicated circumstances, must be 
arrived at by a careful determination of the weight of evi- 
dence, it has been shown specifically and in detail that the 
strong weight of real evidence, which is seldom even con- 
sidered by the Interchurch Report, clearly shows that the 
conclusions which the Interchurch Report asstmies to reach 
are in general unwarranted and often definitely untrue. 

As regards the broader general social aspects involved 
in the steel controversy, it has been shown specifically and 
in detail that the Interchurch Report in almost every case 


I < 


entirely begs the question by merely assuming one point of 
view and building on that assumption without discussing 
or even mentioning many vital facts on which the opposite 
point of view is based, or even considering the existence or 
legitimate possibility of other points of view, which as a 
matter of fact are widely and sotmdly held. 

Sixth: It is obvious from the foregoing that the Inter- 
church Report is not, as it specifically assumes to be, and 
as the fact that it is signed by the Interchurch World 
Movement gives the impression that it should be, an 
impartial investigation or argument on the merits of the 
case, but that on the contrary it is a self-evidently inaccur- 
ate, self-contradictory and blatantly ex parte argument 
and as such not a safe textbook even for those who desire 
to agree with its conclusions. 

Seventh: But the Interchurch Report cannot be regarded 
merely as an over-zealous ex parte argument for it reaches 
its conclusions, which it itself frequently admits are the 
opposite of those held by American pubHc opinion in general, 
not only through the fatdty arguments and questionable 
methods already emphasized but repeatedly through means 
that are utterly indefensible on any grounds. 

A. The Interchurch Report advances, as has been 
pointed out, three arguments as to steel wages. The first 
of these self-evidently contradicts or is contradicted by its 
whole 12-hour argument. The second fails to consider one 
of the most important economic facts and one of the most 
commonly known facts in American industrial life. The 
third argimient which assumes to compare hourly wage rates 
in different trades is built around a table on page 102 which 
assumes to compare common labor wage rates in coal 
mining and building trades with those in steel. This table 
is grossly manipulated and falsified:— (i) in that while its 
own quoted authorities plainly show 22 industries, trades or 
occupations for which there are separate statistics for com- 
mon labor, this Interchurch table states that the three 
trades given are the only trades "for which there are sepa- 



rate statistics for laborers; (2) in that, while all of these 
trades show far lower weekly or daily earnings than steel, 
and 19 of them show also lower hourly earnings, yet 
ignoring these 19 and featuring only the special two, the 
Interchurch Report makes in italics the absolutely false 
statement that "steel common labor has the lowest rate of 
pay of the trades for which there are separate statistics for 
laborers." In order further to bolster up this absolutely 
false conclusion, the Interchurch Report further falsifies 
this table by (3) adding in semi-skilled labor in the building 
trades as common labor, and (4) adding in exactly the same 
semi-skilled labor twice and counting all other classifications 
of common labor only once (See pages 40 to 47, present anal- 

B. The entire 341 pages of Volume IV of Senate Doc- 
timent no, to which the Interchurch Report frequently 
otherwise refers, is devoted to an elaborate statistical study of 
steel hazards. The Interchurch Report elsewhere refers to 
an obscure sentence on page 189 of the Senate Hearings, on 
the opposite facing page to which appears a conspicuous 
detailed table of insurance statistics in regard to steel haz- 
ards. The Interchurch Report refers to the U. S. Bureau 
of Labor Bulletin for October, 19 19, more frequently than to 
any other doamient. The most conspicuous section of 
this document is devoted to an elaborate study of steel 
hazards. At least two other government studies of steel 
hazards are also available. All these government studies 
with all their conspicuous tables and charts plainly show 
and specifically state a conclusion in regard to steel hazards 
which is the opposite of the whole argtmient and conclusion 
of the Interchurch Report. In connection with one such 
study, however (October, 1919), there is one special table 
which plainly states that it represents only a special 37.8% 
of all industrial accidents and plainly states that it is used to 
show percentage of compensation, not of accidents. Yet, 
while specifically complaining about a lack of statistics, 
the Interchurch Report, ignoring all these elaborate govern- 



ment studies of steel hazards, including the one in 
connection with which its own table appears, takes this one 
table, expurgates all the figures in regard to the percentage 
of compensation, leaves out the plain statement as to 
what this table actually represents, and then so introduces 
and features this expurgated table as to make it seem to 
bolster up a conclusion which is the opposite of the truth 
(See pages 146 to 155, present analysis). 

C. In its "12-hour" chapter, in discussing steel working 
hours, the Interchurch Report consistently refers to the 
great groups of 7, 8, and 9 hour workers with the entirely 
misleading phrase, workers who "can work under 60 hours 
a week. ' ' It uses as the basis of all its argument throughout 
the chapter, figures which it calls "for 1919 " and " October, 
19 19" and otherwise represents as substantially normal, 
but which are plainly stated in their original source, and 
attention called to the fact that they are chiefly for Decem- 
ber, 1918, and January, 1919, the first two months after the 
war. Beyond this the Interchurch Report bases its whole 
sensational case about the 7-day week chiefly on a some- 
what lengthy quotation on page 72 from page 17 of the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Bulletin 2 18 andstates both beforeand 
after this quotation a conclusion which is the opposite 
of what the U. S. Bureau of Labor itself twice plainly states 
these figures actually to mean. Moreover, the Interchurch 
Report's quotation, though given as continuous, is plainly 
shown by reference to the original to be a handpicking of 
this Bureau of Labor evidence, paragraph by paragraph, 
from which the Interchurch Report pubhshes only the figures 
or statements which it can thus misinterpret and entirely 
leaves out the intervening figures or statements which are 
so plain that they cannot be thus misconstrued (See pages 84 
to 85, present analysis). 

D. To support its last and seemingly most damning 
arraignment of the 12-hour day, the Interchiu-ch Report 
undertakes to show that steel hours have "tended to 
lengthen over a decade" and that the number of 12-hour 



workers is constantly increasing. This utterly false con- 
clusion, it attempts to bolster up, partly by representing the 
December, 1918-January, 1919, figures as for the year 1919 
and as for normal, and comparing these with other govern- 
ment figures for 19 10 and 19 14. Particularly on pages 
54, 56, 71 and 72, the Interchurch Report quotes a variety 
of tables from U. S. Bureau of Labor records but in each 
case especially rearranges or rewords these tables and 
especially divides them up to compare 19 10 and 19 19, and 
1 9 14 and 1919 but never 1910 and 19 14. It then carefully 
separates these manipulated comparisons by so many inter- 
vening pages or buries them under such complicated re- 
wordings that their meaning which is entirely plain in their 
normal chronological sequence seems on casual reading of 
these carefully manipulated rearrangements to be the 
opposite, and then the Interchurch Report states and 
emphasizes that this manipulated rearrangement does 
show the opposite of the real facts which these tables in 
their normal order plainly show. 

In this same connection the Interchurch Report prints 
certain figtires which it specifically states are from U. S. 
Bureau of Labor, October, 1919, Monthly Review. One 
group of these figures show on their face they are false 
because they contradict each other. When the other group 
is compared with U.S. Bureau of Labor figures from which 
it is stated to be taken, it is found that the figures are utterly 
different from the original government figures — ^that they 
allege to show almost the opposite of what the original 
government figures plainly show — that they are so wholly 
different that no possible "weighting" or possible mathe- 
matical error, or error of copying or computing from the 
original, can reconcile them with the actual government 
figures — ^that as far as being what they are stated to be is 
concerned, they are made out of whole cloth to support 
an equally false argument — (see pages 93 to 107 present 

Moreover, in each of these cases and others, the manip- 


ulation and falsification is so skilfully done as to just what 
is left out and just what is put in, as to just how the arrange- 
ment is made, the conclusions sought to be shown are so 
cleverly led up to or heightened by the context, and this 
manipulation and falsification is so repeated in regard to 
statistics in such widely different fields, that it is impossible 
to explain these or other similar cases on the grounds of 
coincidence or accident. 

Eighth: The publication of its second volume, including 
one considerable group of its "500 rock-bottom affidavits'* 
shows that this fundamental evidence on which the Inter- 
church Report itself states that it is based is, at least as far 
as there is any basis for judging or checking it, as man- 
ipulated and falsified as the foregoing "statistics." 

The Interchurch Report begins the section in which it 
presents these * * rock-bottom affidavits * ' by citing as evidence 
of "police brutalities" Father Kazinki's sensational state- 
ments, which were widely used as strike propaganda, alleging 
an "assault by state troopers upon his people as they were 
coming out of church" and "the charging by mounted 
troopers upon Httle children as they were assembled in the 
schoolyard" and does this without any explanation of or 
reference to the fact that Father Kazinki himself, imder oath 
and cross-examination, had publicly repudiated all the 
material parts of these statements. 

The Interchurch Report itself admits that these "rock- 
bottom affidavits " were not in general composed or phrased 
by the men who signed them with their names or marks. It 
states that they were largely composed and phrased by its 
own investigators or by James R. Maurer, President of the 
Pennsylvania Federation of Labor. Mr. Maurer is a con- 
spicuous radical who signed himself in now-published corres- 
pondence with the Russian Soviet as "representing 300 radi- 
cal groups in 42 states. ' ' Of the 4 1 " rock-bottom affidavits ' ' 
pubUshed, over 30 show dates before the Interchurch in- 
vestigation began and therefore must have been secured by 
Mr. Maurer. 


Although from the very nature of the case, police court or 
other records of the facts alleged in many of these affidavits 
must necessarily have existed, the 'interchurch Report 
makes no mention of having examined into any such other 
evidence, but publishes only these complaints of the alleged 
victims of police brutality or judicial discrimination un- 
supported, or in a few cases supported by other strikers or 

Qi"rikp leaders. 

Although at most these affidavits self-evidently tell only a 
small part and only one side of the story, many of them do 
not even make any direct allegation at all but consist 
solely of vivid description and exclamations, cleverly 
worded to give an impression of fact which obviously 
whoever is actually responsible for such affidavits was 
unwilling to swear to as facts. Throughout, these "affi- 
davits" consist far more of vivid, emotional and plainly 
propaganda description than of specific allegation, their 
phraseology, the points they make and the way they make 
them being not only strikingly similar to each other but 
strikingly parallel to stock propaganda, for which purpose 
they are known to have been originally used by Mr. Maurer. 
The fact, therefore, that they were largely composed and 
written by Maurer or his assistants and merely signed by 
the name, or generally the mark, of a man or women who 
couldn't read or write English, is correspondingly significant. 
Moreover Governor Sproul, to whom these Maurer. 
"affidavits" were originally submitted, investigated the 
most striking allegations and found them to be utterly 
without foundation. Some of them were also gone into 
again by the Senate Committee. But except in one 
immaterial case, the Interchurch Report does not mention 
this. It does, however, publish one such "affidavit." It 
signs it P. F. Grogan. This "affidavit" goes into the most 
harrowing details about drunk or crazy troopers firing 
volley after volley into fleeing crowds of helpless strikers, 
their wives and babies. It follows a reiteration by the 
Interchurch Report itself of charges of "men and women 


■ fi 


mtirdered, ' * ' 'hundreds wounded. " It is followed by another 
"affidavit" which ends with the exclamation: "There was 
no provocation for said riding over women and children." 
Before the Senate Committee this same P. F. Grogan, who 
there gave his name as Brogan^ attempted to give the same 
description of the brutal and indiscriminate shooting 
and riding down of helpless men, women and children, but 
under cross-examination was forced to admit and reiterate 
that no one was hit as far as he knew, and except for one 
woman whose hand was hurt, no one was injured. Yet 8 
months later, the Interchurch Report published as the chief 
of its "rock-bottom evidence" of "hundreds wounded" the 
original propaganda statement of Mr. Brogan — ^without 
mentioning the fact that he was a strike organizer and a 
Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, without men- 
tioning the fact that under oath and cross-examination he 
had repudiated all the sensational and material part of this 
statement, and also leaving out the first half of the name of 
the town where the incident occurred, and changing the 
first letter of Mr. Brogan 's name so that this repudiation 
cannot be referred to through the index of either the Inter- 
church Report or the Senate Hearings (See Chapter XXII, 
present analysis). 

Ninth: The lengths to which the Interchurch Report 
thus constantly goes to support its ex parte argument natu- 
•rally raises the question as to just where that ex parte 
argument leads. 

That it is in favor of the workers, and particularly the 
unskilled foreign workers, and their demands, is of course 
obvious, but it is also obvious that the Interchurch Report 
argument constantly goes much further than this and it is 
conspicuous that at least certain parts of the Report argue 
to certain theories and conclusions which are generally 
regarded as radical. 

Following this lead, a careful comparison between the 

' Foster also gives his name as Brogan; see Great Steel Strike, page 


seven chief aims to which the Socialist, Communist, Syn- 
dicalist and other radical groups are in common committed, 
with the principal arguments of the Interchurch Report, 
shows that— in the attacks and the kind of attacks it makes 
on certain specific forces of law and order,— in the type of 
labor organization it specifically favors— in both the quan- 
tity and quality of its argument on free speech— in the 
phraseology in which it words these attacks and advances 
these theories— and otherwise, the Interchurch Report 
exactly parallels official manifestos of the Communist Party 
and other official ultra-radical propaganda documents. 
Moreover with this fact established, an examination of the 
whole Report shows clearly that many of its arguments and 
conclusions are entirely incompatible with the operation 
of the whole modem industrial system, while, except for one 
conclusion in the separate "Findings," not only is no 
argument in the Report incompatible with radical theories 
and aims but all its principal arguments in regard to wages, 
surplus, control of industry, labor unions, social conse- 
quences are, at least as far as they go, exactly parallel to 
the fundamental arguments of radicalism, entirely and 
particularly susceptible of being quoted and used in favor of 
radicaUsm, and are as a matter of fact being so quoted and 
used by radicals in all parts of the country today. 

♦ ♦♦»♦*♦ 

If the Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike had been 
published by any ordinary author, or had been presented by 
any ordinary investigating committee the document itself 
would have had to stand or fall on its own merits. Even 
though it had used the original device, which the Inter- 
church Report uses, of stating its most important con- 
clusions in the beginning of the book and arguing them later, 
still under ordinary conditions, those conclusions would 
have had little weight until the argument on which they 
were based had been carefully analyzed. In other words, 
under ordinary circumstances, the authorship of a report is 




entirely secondary to the merits of the report itself, and 
under such circumstances, such an analysis as the present — 
if it had seemed necessary at all — could have stopped at the 
present point. 

The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike, however, was 
not presented by any ordinary author or any ordinary 
investigating committee. It is stated in its title to be the 
work of a great nation-wide Christian organization. It is 
specifically signed by eight men' and one woman of national 
standing in the Christian world. Moreover it states that it 
was ' * unanimously adopted ' ' and approved by the Executive 
Conmiittee of the Interchtirch World Movement, a body 
largely made up of men whose great prominence in our 
national religious life has made their integrity and high- 
mindedness unquestioned. 

These facts obviously make the question of the actual 
authorship of the Interchurch Report of paramount impor- 
tance. For if such a dociunent as the Interchurch Report 
under analysis clearly proves itself to be could have been 
actually prepared and presented with full knowledge of its 
contents to American Christians as an adequate treatise on 
a great economic problem by such prominent Christian 
leaders as the men whose names are specifically signed to it 
— ^if such a document could have been knowingly, *'tman- 
imously approved" by the Executive Committee of the 
Interchurch World Movement as an expression of the 
Protestant Church's official point of view toward modem 
economic problems, that fact is far more significant than 
the Report itself to the whole American public. 

' Also by Mr. Heber Blankenhom as Secretary to the Commission. 




Facts and circumstances which led up to the Interchurch 
World Movement Investigation of the Steel Strike, including a 
chronological statement as to the principal resolutions, author- 
izations, and findings upon which committees were appointed 
or acted; as to the personnel of committees and other bodies that 
assisted toward or in the investigation; together with a brief 
history of the investigation and the composition and authoriza- 
tion of the Report, 



Introduction to Part Two . . .391 
I. — Organization and Personnel of the De- 
partment OF Industrial Relations . 393 
II. — ^The Origin of the Steel Strike Investiga- 
tion 400 

III — ^the Special *' Commission of Inquiry" to 
Investigate and Report on the Steel 

Strike 4o8 

IV. ** Staff of Field Investigators" and 

"Technical Assistants" . . .417 

v. — ^hlstory of the composition and author- 
ship of the interchurch report on the 

Steel Strike 433 

Summary of Part II .... 456 



The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike is a pub- 
lished document. Its conclusions and the alleged facts, 
figures and other evidence on which these conclusions are 
based are matters of definite record. As such they can be 
definitely analyzed and compared point by point in detail 
with other facts and figures and evidence and with the 
original sources from which they themselves were taken. 

Conclusions as to the merits of the Interchurch Report, 
therefore, in no way depend on any facts as to its origin. 
Whatever circumstances led up to its preparation and who- 
ever were its authors cannot change the facts already pre- 
sented as to the Report itself. These facts as to the merits 
of the Report, on the other hand, are themselves so con- 
clusive as to the quality of its authorship that they inevi- 
tably raise the question as to whether it is possible that the 
conspicuous Christian leaders who signed the Interchurch 
Report could have been its actual authors. 

The question of the actual authorship of the Interchurch 
Report has been frequently raised. The New York Legisla- 
tive Investigation of Radicalism states definitely that the 
inquiry on which the Interchurch Report is based was under 
the direction of certain well-known radicals. But it does 
not go beyond this mere statement. 

Part II of the present analysis, therefore, is devoted to an 
effort to present as clearly and definitely as possible all the 
facts available as to the origin, preparation and actual 
authorship of this Report. 





The facts surrounding the preparation of the Interchurch 
Report are chiefly not matter of printed or even written 
record. Many of them can only be gathered from state- 
ments of men, often with different points of view. These 
men were all officially connected with the Interchtirch 
Movement and had personal knowledge of the facts they 
state. But detailed recollection and interpretation of facts 
two years after their occurrence, while often the best evi- 
dence available is obviously not infallible. Certain con- 
clusions must be qualified accordingly. 

In addition to certain documentary evidence, the facts 
and information presented in Part II have, except as other- 
wise stated, been acquired through personal interviews with 
the gentlemen who are given as authority for each partic- 
ular fact or statement when it is presented. Written 
memoranda of the substance of each conversation were made 
by the author inmiediately after such interviews. What 
is herein stated on the authority of such individuals has 
with the two exceptions noted, in each case been submitted 
in its present form to such individual for correction, and 
includes any such corrections as have been made. 





The year 1919, during which the Interchurch World 
Movement was organized, was a period in which more new 
big questions— political, social, economic, and religious- 
were being agitated and pressed than at perhaps any other 
time in our own, if not in world, history. 

The League of Nations, Women's Suffrage, Prohibition, 
the Plumb Plan for government ownership of the railroads, 
were merely typical of a great ntmiber of plans and 
theories and ideas which were being urged upon a nation 
which, with many of its former ideals and systems up- 
rooted by the war, was honestly questioning whether or 
not there might be better ideals and systems before it de- 
cided to return to its old ones. 

Again in the consideration of economic or political or 
religious or any other broadly human problems, it is inevi- 
table that there should be widely divergent opinions as to 
the ends to be sought, the means to those ends, and the 
methods by which those means should be pursued— in 
short, that in such fields of thought or endeavor there should 
be radicals and liberals, progressives and conservatives. 

Moreover in any period of such general questions and 
questionings as that which immediately followed the war, 
it is inevitable that a disproportionately large number of 


■'1 ' 





men's minds should be influenced by the spirit of the times 
to a tendency to a more extreme point of view than they 
would normally hold. 

Finally it must be borne in mind that whereas the man of 
conservative or moderate views is generally interested and 
occupied chiefly along some line of normal work, it is char- 
acteristic of the man with extreme or radical views that he 
is most actively interested and engaged in furthering his 

All these particular facts must be taken into account in 
any attempt to analyze any of the activities of the Inter- 
church World Movement which was itself a great new effort, 
typical of the period, to find new ways to accelerate the 
spiritual and idealistic progress of the whole world. 

From the beginning of the Interchurch World sessions a 
certain faction had strongly and consistently urged, as one 
means of broadening the churches' influence, a much more 
definite and concrete appeal to the laboring classes as such. 
Part of this group also strongly urged that the churches 
should seek to make their influence felt in the great industrial 
problems of the day. 

In July, 1919, a certain organization within the Catholic 
Church made a general public announcement of a policy 
which undoubtedly materially influenced the formation by 
the (Protestant) Interchurch World Movement of its In- 
dustrial Relations Department' whose principal activity 
was the investigation of the Steel Strike. 

Mr. Tyler Dennett, Chief of Publicity of the Interchurch 
World Movement — and through his long business relation- 
ship with Mr. G. Earl Taylor, Geneiral Secretary of the or- 

» " This is inaccurate, the first step towards an Industrial Relations 
Department was taken at a general committee meeting in Cleveland 
May 2nd, 1919. Formation of the department came as a matter of 
course, and it was partly in existence before the Catholic Report became 
public." J. E. C. 

"Craig's note is correct. Nevertheless there is no doubt that the 
Catholic manifesto served as a great stimulus to the I. W. M. 's industrial 
activities." S. W. 


ganization, as well as because of his own position, in inti- 
mate touch with its activities — ^in his book, A Better World 
(page 75, lines 18-32), in referring to the influence of this 
announcement of the Catholic Church, says: 

"Nor can we overlook the fact that the Roman Catholic Church in 
the United States, through the National Catholic War Council, has gone 
on record for a form of social ownership of the means of production which is 
far more explicit and more in line with the democratic movement of the age 
in industry than many a Protestant denomination can claim," 

and he specifically quotes — 

" Nevertheless the full possibility of increased production will not be 
realized as long as the majority of the workers remain mere wage earners 
The majority must somehow become owners^ or at least in part, of the 
instruments of production." 

After the appearance of this announcement by a faction 
of the other religious body of the country, the Interchurch 
faction which had long urged that policy now insisted that 
the Interchurch World Movement should extend its influ- 
ence and activities into the industrial field and that it 
should particularly interest itself in the htmian problems of 
labor. Less than a month later the Executive Committee 
of the Interchurch World Movement created the Industrial 
Relations Department whose general executive ofi&ces, 
according to the Interchurch ofl&dal handbook, Part III, 
page 117, were: 

Dr. {Now Bishop) Fred B. Fisher ^ Director. 

Doubtless partly because of his eulogy of Bishop McCon- 
nell as a "radical Bishop " and his frequent similar use of the 
word "radical " at the time of the Interchurch World Move- 
ment activities, certain of Dr. Fisher's more conservative 
associates in the movement have characterized him as 
radical or leaning towards radicalism. A study of Dr. 
Fisher's published works, however, hardly seem to justify 
such a conclusion. Two of his three most prominent 
works, Garments of Power, A Pathway for Mystics, and Gifts 





from the Desert show his strong trend of thought towards 
what is known philosophically as ** mysticism." "Mys- 
ticism/' according to Century Dictionary, is: 

"A form of religious belief which is founded upon spiritual experience 
not discriminated or tested and systematized in thought. Rationalism 
regards the reason as the highest faculty of man; mysticism on the other 
hand declares that spiritual truth cannot be comprehended by the 
logical faculty." 

This rather than any actual radical point of view seems 
to be characteristic of Dr. Fisher's type of thinking. 

In another volume entitled, Ways to Win, Dr. Fisher 
strongly advocates the entrance of local religious organiza- 
tions as such into politics and particularly advocates that 
local ministers attempt to make themselves arbitrators in 
strikes and other industrial and social controversies and 
attempt to use the influence of the church to force an ac- 
ceptance of such arbitration. Such theories may be ques- 
tioned as to their practicability or soundness but they are 
hardly radical in the commonly accepted sense of the term.' 

Mr. Robert W, Bruere, Superintendent Research Division. 
Mr. Bruere is a graduate of Washington University, St. 
Lotiis, and was for a time a special student at the University 
of Berlin. He was a prominent member of the Intercol- 
legiate Socialistic Society. He has long been associated 
with the Rand School of Social Science, where he has been 
a lecturer on American Literature. Mr. Bruere has also 
been conspicuously associated with other extreme radical 

» "I should call Fisher an 'instinctive radical.' His first impulse on 
any question wotdd be to the radical point of view. This would be apt 
to be modified later whenever he really sat down to think the thing out 
But his snap judgement on any matter would almost certainly be 
radical." S.W. 

"Fisher is a mystic in the same sense that practically all Methodists 
are mystics. An element of it is inseparable from the creed. Personally 
Fisher is one of the least mystical of all high Methodist clergymen. " 

J. E. C. 


movements. He has published several articles over his own 
name in the New Republic defending the I. W. W. and two 
particularly radical articles in the Nation of February 21 and 
28, 1918. When Mr. William D. Heywood and other mem- 
bers of the I. W. W. were being tried by the government 
for conspiracy to urge and assist the evasion of the draft 
laws and particularly for assisting 10,000 drafted men to 
evade, for which they were convicted and are now serving 
prison sentences or are fugitives from justice, Mr. Bruere 
was conspicuously active in raising a defense fund for them, 
even going to the extent of signing his name to an advertise- 
ment appljdng for such funds published in the New Re- 
public, June 22, 1918. Mr. Bruere was one of the founders 
and is the director of the Bureau of Industrial Research, 
which organization the Interchurch Report states furnished 
the "technical assistance'* and part of the "evidence" and 
the direction of the "staff of investigators" on which "as- 
sistance" and "evidence" the Report as analyzed in part 
one of the present volumes was based. 

Moreover there is no question that many of the leading 
oiB&cials of the Interchurch Movement knew these facts as 
to Mr. Bruere's activities and points of view. During the 
time the question of whether the Steel Strike Report should 
or should not be published was being discussed by Inter- 
church officials several members of the National Civic 
Federation (of which Mr. Samuel Gompers is vice-president 
— indicating at least that this organization was not working 
in the interests of the Steel Corporation) brought Mr. 
Bruere's conspicuous radical record particularly to the at- 
tention of various such Interchurch officials. They were 
emphasized again in a special conference held between Mr. 
Ralph M. Easley of the Civic Federation and members of 
the Interchurch Commission of Investigation which had 
direct charge of the Steel Strike investigation and Report. 
Finally several weeks later (July 10, 1920) Mr. Easley 
wrote one of these members in part as follows : — 

r i 


*' We also at our interview discussed Mr. Robert W. Bruere, of whom 
you spoke in the highest terms, saying, in effect, that, if you were go- 
ing to organize any big industrial movement, he would be the first man 
to whom you would go for advice. 

" From your enthusiastic endorsement of that gentleman, I assume 
that you are not thoroughly conversant with his keen sjrmpathy an 
association with that disloyal band of cut-throats, the Industrial 
Workers of the World, or with his efforts to raise a defense fund of 
$50,000 to fight the United States in the trial of these men at Chicago 
for treasonable and seditious conduct, for which conduct, in spite of 
the money raised by Mr. Bruere, they were convicted and sent to jail. 
Also, I cannot beheve that you have read his notorious I. W. W. de- 
fense, ' On the trail of the I. W. W./ written for Oswald Garrison 
Villard, that equally notorious pro-German pacifist and warm defender 
of all radical movements. . . . 

" As you doubtless know, The New York Coil is an official organ of 
the Socialist Party and enjojrs the distinction of being denied the use 
of the mails by our government because of its peculiar seditious char- 
acter. ... As recently as July 4, The New York Call annoimced a 
series of articles by Robert Bruere in the following language: 

" ' This is the first of a series of articles by Robert W. Bruere, which 
will appear weekly in The Call hereafter. 

*• ' Bruere is a publicist of international repute. His impartial analy- 
sis of the I. W. W., published during the war in a local paper, was 
generously recognized as a notable contribution to the literature of 
labor in this country. Bruere is now connected with the Biu-eau of 
Industrial Research in this city, and has been added to the staff of 
special writers of the Federated Press, whose services The CaU presents 
exclusively in New York.' 

I >» 

Bruere, Robert W. 

Assistance in preparation of I. W. W. pamphlet 
Member I. W. W. defense committee 
Director Bureau of Industrial Research 

page 1093 
" 1094 
" 1121 

Mr. Bruere's official position and title as printed in the 
official handbook of the Interchurch World Movement is 
''Superintendent of the Research Division of the Industrial 
Relations Department ^ Thus he and Dr. Fisher occupied 

In the index to Part I (page 38) of the New York State || 
Legislative Investigation on Radicalism appears the fol- fl 


the two most important executive positions in the de- 
partment which originated the investigation of the steel 
strike, and under whose authority the investigation was 


Entirely in addition, however, to the fact that these men 
were at the head of this department, the very fact that 
radicalism's chief interest today is in the industrial field 
made it inevitable that not only whatever radical elements 
there were within the Interchurch Movement itself but 
that radical influences in genenal should concentrate their 
attention on this phase of Interchurch activity. As a mat- 
ter of fact this department rapidly became the center of a 
coterie of radicals and near-radicals whose influence, and 
the danger of that influence to the Interchurch Movement, 
soon became a subject of such comment and concern that 
Mr. Raymond Robins — certainly himself far from a con- 
servative — ^made the strongest representations to Inter- 
church ofl&dals in regard to this danger to the Industrial 
Department and the Movement. Mr. Tyler Dennett also 
strongly urged in a memorandum to Dr. S. Earl Taylor 
the creation of a special "Department of Intellectual Re- 
sources " partly for the purpose of offsetting this obvious 
tendency of the Industrial Department. 






The resolution whose adoption led to the Interchurch 
World Movement's Investigation of the Steel Strike was pre- 
sented by Mr. John M. Glenn, director of the Russell Sage 
Foundation, and a sound and able sociologist, at a meeting 
called by the Industrial Relations Department of the Inter- 
church World Movement and h&ld in Hotel Pennsylvania, 
New York City, October 3, 1919. 

It was the expressed intention of the Industrial Relations 
Department that the gathering at this meeting, which was 
to consider industrial questions, should be representative of 
employer and labor and public interest. Invitations to the 
meeting were sent out with this end in view. An un- 
fortunately large number, however, of business men who 
were invited to represent the employer interest, and of the 
more prominent conservative men invited to represent the 
public interest, did not find time to attend or attended only 
part of the long session. As a matter of fact, therefore, the 
meeting actually consisted of a preponderance of repre- 
sentatives of labor interest and of the less conservative repre- 
sentatives of public interest. This fact, irrespective of any 
definite plan on the part of the Industrial Relations Com- 
mittee, naturally and inevitably influenced the proceedings 
at the meeting. 

Before Mr. Glenn's motion the Steel Strike had been the 
subject of vigorous debate. Speeches had been made, 



depicting in vigorous terms the alleged horrors and in- 
justices of the strike, and condemning the United States 
Steel Corporation for its general policies and especially its 
refusal to institute the proposed ' ' collective bargaining. ' ' A 
resolution was being offered which included the demand that 
the steel strike be investigated and reported on with the 
apparent thought that it would be promptly condemned. 
At this point Dr. Jeremiah Jenks, Research Professor of 
Government and Public Administration of New York 
University, who had been sitting in the meeting as an in- 
vited representative of public interest, was leaving the hall. 
Realizing, however, the spirit of the resolution just offered 
and the obvious belief of the man presenting it that such an 
investigation could be made and a verdict returned in a few 
hours or days. Dr. Jenks paused at the back of the hall, and 
when it appeared that the resolution of this nature was actu- 
ally about to be put to a vote, he obtained recognition from 
the Chairman and stated that from his own experience he 
was convinced that any adequate investigation of such a 
widespread social movement as the steel strike would re- 
quire an appropriation of many thousands of dollars, an 
adequate force of experts and at least six months' time. Dr. 
Jenks further stated that if any casual investigation were 
made or any snap judgment passed the good faith of 
the whole Interchurch World Movement would be sub- 
ject to question and the success of the movement itself 

The proposer of the former motion inmiediately replied 
that in his opinion "it didn't require either much money or 
time for such a body of men to decide a moral issue such as 
was represented in the Steel Strike," and he repeated his 
motion, that included both an investigation of the Steel 
Strike and a condemnation of the steel companies.' 

It was at this point that Mr. Glenn, the Director of the 
Russell Sage Foundation, offered the formal resolution that 

« This statement has been carefully reviewed by Dr. Jenks and much 
of it is in his own phraseology. 



I :| 

) ■ 






the meeting should authorize, and a special committee be 
appointed to conduct, an investigation of the steel strike. 
This resolution was put to a viva voce vote by Bishop 
McConnell, chairman of the meeting, and declared 
unanimously adopted. 

The resolution itself was according to Mr. Glenn's best 
recollection substantially as follows: 

"The Industrial Relations Conference recommends that a committee 
be appointed by the Executive Committee of the Interchurch World 
Movement to investigate the Steel Strike and other current industrial 
disturbances from the standpoint of the moral and ethical principles 

In the Interchurch World Report on the Steel Strike 
(page 6, lines 8-1 1) it is stated that *'The Conference r^ 
jected a resolution condemning one party to the strike for 
refusing to adopt the principle of collective bargaining." 
As a matter of fact, however, a resolution condemning the 
steel companies for not accepting collective bargaining had 
been presented before Mr. Glenn's motion and had been put 
to a vote and declared by the chairman to be unanimously 
carried. The result was that the meeting at this point was 
ofl&cially on record as condemning the steel companies in 
advance on the major issue of the steel strike which was 
about to be investigated. 

Mr. John H. Walker, President of the Illinois Federation 
of Labor, however, immediately arose and pointed out that 
in view of the fact that the meeting had now adopted a 
resolution to investigate the steel strike, this previous reso- 
lution condemning one party in advance before the in- 
vestigation might tend to prejudice public opinion as to the 
fairness and impartiality of the investigation. He, there- 
fore, moved that the resolution condemning the companies 

'This meeting also appointed a special " Findings Committee " to 
draft statements and definitions of these "moral and ethical princi- 
ples." The report of this Committee is referred to later. 


in advance be rescinded and stricken from the minutes. 
This resolution was put to a vote and carried.' 

The remainder of the meeting was largely taken up by an 
extended explanation by Mr. Glenn E. Plumb of the 
*' Plumb Plan" for government ownership of the railroads. 
At the end of Mr. Plumb's discussion, a resolution was of- 
fered and numerously seconded that the meeting declare 
in favor of the Pltmib Plan for government ownership of 
the railroads. The chairman, however, ruled to refer this 
resolution to a special committee. Many objections were 
made to this ruling which insisted that the resolution be 
put to a vote, but the chairman ruled such objectors out 
of order. 

In considering these facts, however, it must be carefully 
borne in mind that the particular composition of this meet- 
ing was not principally the fault of the Industrial Relations 
Department and certainly not of the Interchurch World 
Movement, but was due chiefly to the fact that many of 
the invited representatives of other interests were not pres- 
ent. It must be borne in mind also that the officers of the 
meeting were only able in a limited way, even if they 
wished, to control the actions of the meeting. 

On the other hand no honest inquiry into conditions sur- 

«Mr. Went and Mr. Reynolds state that there is no question about 
this fact and it was their particular official duty to keep in the closest 
touch with what went on at this meeting. Mr. Went states that this 
fact was plainly emphasized in his notes on the meeting and that he and 
Reynolds talked this point over in detail immediately after the meet- 
ing. Mr. Bronson Batchelor entirely corroborates Mr. Went on this. 
When the point was first taken up with Mr. Reynolds, he refused to 
commit himself at all imtil he knew exactly how his statement was to be 
used. After he had read the entire present analysis, he ftdly confirmed 
Mr. Went's and Mr. Batchelor's statement. He stated that before the 
meeting he had been asked to take special charge of the publicity work 
of the Industrial Relations Department but that after the Hotel Penn- 
sylvania meeting and particularly because of the way the resolution 
first to condemn the steel companies and then to investigate the steel 
strike was handled, he immediately went to Dr. Fisher, discussed the 
subject with him and resigned his connection. Because of his great 


rounding the acts and results of this meeting can pass by 
certain further facts for which the ofl&cers of the Industrial 
Relations Department were entirely responsible. 

The spirit and actions of any meeting are naturally very 
largely influenced by the speakers at the meeting and partic- 
ular speakers for any given meeting are as a matter of 
course chosen with this in view. Who the principal 
speakers were at the Hotel Pennsylvania meeting was en- 
tirely in the hands of the Industrial Relations Department. 
In addition to Mr. Plumb who spoke for government owner- 
ship of the railroads, the principal speakers were: 

Mr. Julius Hecker. 

Mr. Hecker was during part of the war a Y. M. C. A. 
worker in Europe. But after a full hearing when he was 
given every opportunity to clear himself, his passports were 
cancelled by the State Department and the Y. M. C. A. 
ordered to recall him and the Department refused him the 
use of an American passport for further travel abroad dur- 
ing the war because of his pro-Bolshevistic activities. 

Mr. Hecker said at a weekly conference of the clergy of 
the Methodist Church held at 150 Fifth Avenue, June 7, 

"There are a good many folks and some Methodist ministers who 
oppose Bolshevism because they do not know anything about it. . . . 

interest, however, in the success of the movement as a whole, he ac- 
cepted the position of Superintendent of the Religious Press Division. 

In r^ard to the official connection of these gentlemen with the Hotel 
Pennsylvania Conference, Mr. Craig says: 

" Tyler Dennett was in personal charge. Re3molds was in charge of 
publicity material for the religious press. Craig (he himself ) was in charge 
of preparation of immediate copy for the daily press. Went, Reynolds 
and others handled the running report from the conference room. 
Chiquoine handled material for the Press Associations ( A. P. , etc. ) No one 
of these except perhaps Dennett could have complete personal knowledge 
of all that happened, but Went and Reynolds probably had more than 
the others. Batchelor had no ofl&cial connection whatever with the 
publicity department at the time. If he was there, it was as a 


We in the United States are not yet prepared for Bolshevism and there- 
fore we will be obliged to handle o«rrero/w<ton in a different manner . . . 

But that it (oiu- revolution) is coming there is no doubt." 

This quotation is typical not only of Mr. Hecker's speech 
at this meeting as it was quoted and analyzed in the 
National Civic Federation Review, July 10, 1920, but was 
typical of the ideas for which by all his words and acts 
Mr. Hecker conspicuously stood. 

In the index of the New York Legislative Investigation 
on Radicalism under the name Hecker, Dr. Jtilius F., 
appears "Methodist and Revolutionary Socialist, pages 

John Walker, President of the Illinois Federation of Labor. 

Mr. Walker's closest official associate was Mr. John Fitz- 
patrick, chairman of the special committee which organized 
and conducted the Steel Strike. 

Mr. Frederick C. Howe. 

Mr. Howe was former Commissioner of Immigration at 
the port of New York. After wide newspaper criticism be- 
cause of his unauthorized releasing of radicals held for 
deportation by the Department of Justice, and a Con- 
gressional investigation after which he was bitterly con- 
demned on the floor of the House by members of both 
parties for neglect of duty and extreme radical activity and a 
resolution offered to withhold his salary he resigned. (See 
Record of the 66th Congress, pages 1522, 1523) 

Mr. Howe is also a correspondent of the Federated Press 
which will be described later and he is also listed as a well- 
known radical by the New York Legislative Report on 

« "There were also one or two mildly conservative speakers; I forget 
their names but it might be well to mention them. " S. W. 

" Give full list of invited speakers." J. W. J. 

" Why not give a full list of makers of such speeches? " H. C. R. 

None of these gentlemen however could furnish such a list and the 
author has been unable to obtain it elsewhere. 



These opinions and acts of all these speakers were con- 
spicuous and widely known and could not but have been 
known to the Department of Industrial Relations when 
it invited them to speak before the Hotel Pennsylvania 
meeting. They were of course known to Mr. Robert W. 
Bruere, "Superintendent of Research" of this Department. 

However, the steel strike investigation was not in the 
hands of this meeting; nor was the committee to investigate 
the steel strike appointed by this meeting. 

To what extent if any, therefore, the type of speakers 
who were officially chosen to address this meeting and the 
actions and the spirit of this meeting itself can be regarded 
as being significant remains to be determined in relation 
with other facts as to the investigation and the Report. 

In addition to passing the resolution to investigate the 
steel strike the Hotel Pennsylvania meeting also appointed 
a special "Findings Conmiittee" which was to draft a 
statement as to the "Moral Principles Involved in Indus- 
trial Relations." After a very extensive debate and the 
cooperation of other committees, a set of "Findings" was 
presented and accepted by this meeting. The seemingly 
radical nature of many sections of these "Findings" which, 
though in vague terms, condemn the present industrial 
system, and recommend various notorious radical panaceas, 
created the widest discussion in the meeting and in the news- 
papers at the time. Dr. Jenks, however, who was called 
into consultation by this "Findings Committee" says that 
the members of the Committee themselves did not interpret 
certain sections of these Findings as many others inter- 
preted them and as they are at least plainly capable of being 
interpreted. Mr. Craig and Mr. Went both strongly em- 
phasize that no such committee could, as these "Findings" 
assume to do, officially commit the Interchtirch World 
Movement. The fact, however, that these "Findings," 
in a somewhat modified form, were later published over the 
official imprint of the Interchurch World Movement as 
Pamphlet No. 178 II, 10 November, 1919, and are exten- 



sively reproduced on page 44A of the official handbook of 
the Interchurch World Movement is admitted by Mr. 
Craig to be an official "ratification of them in fact if not 
precisely in law." 

On page 332, Volume II, the Interchurch Report in dis- 
cussing the authorization of its attempted mediation with 
Judge Gary, quotes: 

" The Findings Committee recommends to the Industrial Relations 
Department . . . that it make careful and thoroughgoing investigation 
of the strikes in the steel industry . . . likewise that the Department 
be requested ... to use their offices in trjring to bring about a joint 
conference and a settlement of this dispute by mutual agreement." 

This certainly indicates that the actual Commissioners 
of Investigation of the Steel Strike considered that they 
held a direct mandate from the Hotel Pennsylvania meeting 
and its "Findings Conamittee." 


1; ' 






Immediately after the Hotel Pennsylvania meeting at 
which the resolution to investigate the steel strike was 
adopted, there was appointed by the Executive Committee 
of the Interchurch World Movement a special "Com- 
mission of Inquiry" which was to have direct charge of 
investigating the steel strike and preparing the Strike 

The fact that this special "Conmiission of Inquiry" thus 
had direct charge of the Steel Strike Investigation and the 
writing of the Steel Report and that they signed the report 
as members of the Commission and as individuals un- 
doubtedly makes it most pertinent to inquire closely into 
its personnel. 

Facts and quotations carefully verified which tend to 
show the fundamental point of view of each member of this 
commission are summarized herewith in connection with 
the name of each commissioner. 

The point already emphasized, however, must be care- 
fully borne in mind, that facts in regard to the personal 
point of view of the investigators can only be regarded as of 
problematical value and can have no real weight except in 
connection with facts as to other dominant influences in the 
investigation and preparation of the report. 

"The Conmiission of Inquiry " consisted of: 



Bishop Francis J. McConnell (Methodist), Chairman. 

Bishop McConnell when introduced before the Hotel 
Pennsylvania meeting by Dr. (now Bishop) Fred B. Fisher, 
Director of the Industrial Relations Department, was re- 
ferred to as "that strange combination, a radical Bishop." 

In Bishop McConnell's address to that meeting, he is 
quoted in the Christian Advocate (November 13, 1919) report 
on his speech as saying, 

"Whatever we do, we must keep alive in the church the spirit of 
prophetic radicalism ... a man had better say looo wild things and 
get some good truth uttered, etc." 

In connection with which statement the Advocate said: 

" 'To say a thousand wild things in order to get some good truth ut- 
tered ' will seem to most people an entirely inadequate justification of 
the liberty of prophesying which the agitators now so copiously enjoy." 

These quotations are in no sense chosen for emphasis be- 
cause of the appearance of the word "radical" but because 
they briefly epitomize the whole spirit of his speech as sum- 
marized and commented on in an official publication of 
his own denomination. Moreover, many of Bishop Mc- 
Connell's fellow-workers, all officially connected with the 
Interchurch World Movement and all of them ostensibly 
friendly to him, speak of his point of view in terms, the 
mildest of which are that he is "extremely liberal" or that 
he is "one of our most extreme thinkers." 

Bishop McConnell's strong leaning towards radicalism 
is, moreover, quite plain from a study of his own published 


His chapter on "Individualism" in his book. Theology 
and Public Opinion (1920) makes it clear that he does not 
wholly accept the basic philosophy of socialism. In a 
number of sections in his book. Democratic Christianity, he 
defends Socialism from the charge of being basical atheistic 
and refers to those who support the present "capitalistic" 
system as opponents. He does not declare plainly in favor 

! i 


of socialism and states that socialism will have to be " Amer- 
icanized" before it can become acceptable to America, but 
these chapters leave no doubt that he is at least a very 

"Near" socialist. 
He concludes this discussion with the statement (page 54) 


"In the march towards the larger democracy the church is more 
likely to sympathize with such movements as the British Labor Party." 

It will be remembered also that the Interchurch Report 
points frequently to labor conditions abroad as an example 
to American industry. 

The general principles of the British labor party are, of 

course, well known. 

This party strongly supported the striking British coal 
miners who declared that if the government did not yield 
to their demands they would destroy the British coal mines 
and ruin the country with themselves, and whose official 
leaders openly stated: *' If we go down to defeat the Nation 

will go with us." 

Although this party has recently, after its investigation 
conmiission visited Russia, repudiated Sovietism as de- 
veloped under Lenine, it had previously strongly supported 
Russian Sovietism and still definitely maintains socialistic 
views of only a slightly milder character. 

In fact Foster spends pages 263, 264 and 265 of The Great 
Steel Strike in showing that the British Trade Union Move- 
ment, of which the British Labor Party is merely the politi- 
cal manifestation, is a model to the whole radical world of 
effective radicalism. 

Bishop McConnell who holds and recommends such 
principles to the American Protestant Church was not only 
the chairman of the Commission of Investigation of the 
Steel Strike but by common consent its most influential 

Dr. McConnell has recently been transferred from 


Denver and made Bishop of the Pittsburgh district which 
includes the great industrial section of western Pennsylvania. 

Dr. Daniel A. Poling (United Evangelical), Vice-Chairman 
Dr. Poling is associate president of the International 
Society of Christian Endeavor and evening preacher at the 
Marble Collegiate Church on Upper Fifth Avenue, New 
York City. In addition to his membership on the Com- 
mission, Dr. PoHng was a member of the General Committee 
of the Interchtirch World Movement. Dr. Poling had been 
formerly regarded as a "Moderate" in his economic views, 
but after Dr. Fisher retired and he became active head of 
the Industrial Department it is generally stated that he 
seemed to become entirely committed to the point of view 
and policies represented by Robert W. Bruere and his 
Bureau of Industrial Research group. 

Mr. George W. Coleman (Baptist). 

Mr. Coleman is head of the Open Forum in Boston and 
has long been one of those who most strongly advocated 
that the Church should make a more definite and special 
appeal to the laboring classes. Mr. Coleman himself, in a 
speech before the Congregational Club of Worcester (Mass.) 
on March 14, 192 1, said: 

"To me one of the most significant facts in this strike as a man in- 
terested in the church . . . what a burden it has been upon me many a time 
to find everywhere the working man's organization looking upon the 
church as prejudicial to his interests, when I know what was in the 
hearts of the ministers. That is the attitude for years which labor has 
had toward the church. When I was called to New York to attend a 
special meeting of the steel strike commission, to listen to Mr. Fitz- 
patrick, one of the leaders of the strike, I was amazed when I got to the 
office of the Interchtu"ch Commission, to have that man sit down and 
tell us the message he brought from 24 International Unions. The ma- 
jority of the strikers were men of the Greek and Roman Catholic 
Chui-ches, and Mr. Fitzpatrick himself was a devout Roman Catholic; 
yet he came representing all those men in their great struggle when 
everything they valued in life was at stake, they came to a body of 





Protestant Churchmen and said through this representative of theirs, 
'Gentlemen, I am commissioned in behalf of the strikers to put our 
case in your hands without any limitation or reservation.' ... I 
said, This is a Blessed day I have come to see, when a great body of 
strikers have come to have enough confidence in a body of churchmen to 
trust us to do the right thing." 

Dr. Nicholas Van Der Pyl (Congregationalist). 

Dr. Van Der Pyl's views on economic and social questions 
do not appear to be a matter of printed record. 

Dr. Alva W. Taylor (Disciple) is stated by a close asso- 
ciate to be a liberal in his theological views but a moderate 
in his views on economic questions. 

Dr. John McDowell (Presbyterian). 

Dr. McDowell is a preacher of the Evangelical type of 
vital appeal and power. He is a strong admirer of Dwight 
L. Moody, the great American Evangelist of the last genera- 
tion, and has written an effective appreciation of Mr. 
Moody's life and work. Dr. McDowell in his own statement 
of his economic and social point of view, made expressly 
for the present analysis, said: 

"I read my Christianity into my economics, not my economics into 
my Christianity. The Social question as I see it from the Christian 
point of view is not one of system, it is one of spirit. It is not a ques- 
tion of method but of motive. The primary need therefore of the Social 
worid and the industrial world is the Christian spirit in all human rela- 

As to radicalism he said: 

"I welcome to this coimtry any man who wants to enjoy our freedom 
and our opportunities. I should make it possible for him to know our 
ideals and our institutions. But if such a man after entering our land 
and having the opportunity of knowing our ideals and institutions as 
embodied in our Constitution persists in denying our ideals and defying 
our institutions, I am in favor of deporting him at once. We must make 
every individual in this land understand that this is a government of 
law and lawful processes." 


Mrs. Fred Smith Bennett, Chairman of the Home Missions 
Council, Presbyterian Church. 

Advisory Members. 

"Those who did not take active part on the Investigation 
but signed the Report after examination of the evidence." 

Bishop Melvin Bell. 

Bishop Charles D. Williams (Episcopal). 

Bishop Williams has been generally spoken of as the most 
definitely radical member of the Commission of Inquiry. 
Statements from his sermons have been frequently widely 
quoted in the newspapers as extremely radical. He made 
statements in a sermon in St. John's Cathedral in the 
spring of 1 92 1 which were not only emphasized by the news- 
papers as extremely radical but which the present Bishop of 
New York felt it necessary to repudiate in a public state- 
ment the following Sunday as not representative of the 
attitude of the Episcopal Church. 

For these reasons particular attention has been given 
to the economic point of view of Bishop Williams and a 
large number of his public sermons and writings have been 
carefully reviewed. In a sermon delivered a ntmiber of 
years ago on the subject, The Gospel of Democracy in 
which he particularly stated at length his point of view in 
regard to modern economic subjects, and in several other 
sermons, Bishop Williams made such statements as the 

*'That class consciousness hinders every effort for better 
things." Yet class consciousness is the very foundation of 
all radicalism. 

** Socialism would fix every particle immovable in one 
dead level," he states and adds : " I cherish no fool's vision of 
an impossible society wherein everybody shall stand upon 
one absolute dead level of dreary uniformity." This con- 
stitutes a definite condemnation of a basic doctrine 
of socialism. 



Under the heading, *' What is the duty and obligation of 
the working man?" Bishop Williams says: 

"Do you ever use the vast power which your (labor) organization 
gives you ruthlessly, lawlessly, tyrannously, simply to advance your own 
interests at the expense of right and justice? ... Do you . . . 
skimp your job, do dishonest or slovenly work, when the eye of the fore- 
man is not directly upon you, or when the demand for labor, in times of 
prosperity is so great that you are reasonably sure of your job? . . . 
Do you do efficient service only when the difficulty of getting and keep- 
ing a job makes it particularly prudent to make a good record? If so 
then you are just as much a sinner against the Christian ideal of society 
as the robber baron on Wall Street." 

Certainly inefficiency of production, as widely practised by 
labor and indirect sabotage as practised by radicals, covild 
hardly be more vigorously condemned. 

Bishop Williams bitterly condemns the *'idle rich*' and 
the **four hundred" but equally sternly condemns the 
** half-baked, ill-trained enthusiast or fanatic," which he 
goes on to describe in terms which make his reference to 
average radicals entirely clear. He condemns "industrial 
parasites" and "idle holders of privilege" but continues: 

" (society) could not for a moment do without its producers whether 
they are . . . captains of industry or horny-handed toilers." 

On the other hand through a period of years Bishop 
Williams has been denouncing our whole industrial sys- 
tem, not merely for its incidental failures or weaknesses 
which most right-minded men see and which the wise 
leaders of industry itself have long been making serious 
efforts to correct, but as a system that is in itself "mani- 
festly uniust and intolerable," whose chief characteristic 
as Bishop Williams seems to see it is that the wealth pro- 
duced by the workers is "largely absorbed by a lot of social 


Formerly Bishop Williams states that he was a Single 
Taxer and the basis on which he wotdd inherently change 



the modem industrial system was doubtless the theories of 
Henry George. 

In more recent speeches and sermons as they have been 
publicly quoted, Bishop Williams seems to have become 
even more convinced of the inherent and basic injustice 
and wrongness of otir whole industrial system and demands 
that that system be changed by the "democratization of 
industry." He said in a sermon in Grace Church, New 
York City, on July 20, 1920: 

"We have gone through all the stages of owner and slave, lord and 
serf, employer and employees. The next step is a co-partnership con- 
sisting of employer, employee and the public, the public coming in to 
regulate both and see that justice is done and that the consumer does 
not suffer." 

Whether or not this statement is radical depends on the 
definition of the terms he uses — and he does not define them. 
Judge Gary himself has encouraged 100,000 of his employees 
to buy stock in their company and thus become co-partners 
in the steel industry; and he has at least several times re- 
ferred to such stockholding employees as "partners in the 
industry." Also Judge Gary, the year previous to this 
sermon of Bishop Williams, publicly stated his belief that 
the public, through a special governmental commission, 
should regulate both the employer and employee in order 
to see that justice is done to all. 

In this same sermon Bishop Williams bitterly denounces 
Bolshevism as "the enemy of democracy." 

Bishop Williams may have the same point of view as all 
radicals in his overemphasis of the weakness of the modem 
industrial system and his failure to realize that many of 
those weaknesses are due not to the system but to inherent 
weaknesses in average human nature. Unquestionably he 
is also entirely unfair, and uninformed, when he insists 
continually on lajdng most of the troubles of industry to 
the "social parasites," "the idle holders of privilege" and 
"the reactionaries" which beseems to feel are the type of 





men who axe largely in control of American industry today. 
The frequent expression of such a point of view in immoder- 
ate language, doubtless often sounds like radicalism — ^may, 
according to the definition put on his terms, border on radi- 
calism, and coming from such an able religious leader is 
undoubtedly grist to the mills of radicalism. B ut no one who 
fairly analyzes Bishop Williams' chief public utterances, in- 
cluding his definite strong denunciations of socialism, and 
Bolshevism — the strongest condemnation of class conscious- 
ness, sabotage, of loafing on the job, and of using labor's 
organized power for selfish class interest — can fairly classify 
Bishop Williams as an economic "radical" as that term is 
used and meant today. 

Bishop Williams' extreme and doubtless unwarranted 
prejudice against what he calls the " reactionaryism of the 
employer class" and his belief in the inherent injustice and 
wrongness of our modem industrial system may very 
possibly haye prejudiced his point of view in the investiga- 
tion of the steel strike. But his expressed views as a whole 
clearly indicate that he would not knowingly approve the 
economic theories which are actually, though covertly, 
advanced by the Report on the Steel Strike and it is incon- 
ceivable that he should knowingly approve the types and 
methods of many arguments there used to advance those 




The Interchurch Report begins its Foreword by stating: 

•' This volume presents the summary of industrial facts as drawn from 
all data before the Commission and adopted as the Report of the Commis- 

sion. ... - «i. J 

"Another volume will be required for the supportingT reports and ex- 
hibits by the stafif of field investigators: George Soule, David Saposs, 
Miss Marian D. Savage, M. Carl Wisehart, and Robert Littell. Heber 
Blankernhorn had charge of the Field work and later acted as Secretary 
to the Commission." 

On page 6 it says: 

"Those parts of the evidence obtained directly by the Commission 
were secured through personal observation and through Open Hearings 
held in Pittsburg in November, supplemented by inspection trips in 
Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. More technical 
and detailed data were obtained by a stafif of investigators working 
under a field director from the Bureau of Industrial Research of New 
York. Other evidence was obtained directly by the Bureau of Industrial 
Research, by the Bureau of Applied Economics in Washington, by a 
firm of consulting engineers (unnamed) and by various other organiza- 
tions and technical experts (unnamed) working under the direc- 
tion of the (Commission." 

In its Foreword to Volume II the Interchurch Report 

" The field investigation lasted from the second week in October, 1919, 
to the first of February, 1920. . . . In January, February and March 

« 417 


t .1 


the Commission from its own records and the investigators* reports formu- 
lated the Report on the steel strike. . . . 

" This second volimie is the work of the investigators first submitt 
to the Commission during the investigation, then resubmitted for revisio: 
to the members of the Commission from December, 1920 to May, 192 
and ordered printed as accepted with the introductory notes of th 
Secretary as Editor. Primafy responsibility for the present Report 
(second Volume) rests with the signing investigators; the Commissi 
holds itself responsible for the use made of these reports in preparing tt 
Steel Report (ist Vol.). • . . 

"... As in the case of the first volume the supplementary reports 
were made with the technical assistance of the Bureau of Indust 
Research. To members of the Bureau the Commission is furth 
indebted for seeing this Voliune through the press." 

The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike then was 
*' formulated** by the Commission from its own records and 
the investigators' reports. It is "the summary of industrial^^^K 
facts as drawn from all data before the Commission. Thet^^g 
Commission holds itself responsible for the use made of these 
reports in preparing the Steel Report.'' This all plainly] 
indicates the degree to which the Interchurch Report ij 
based on the work of these "outside field investigators and 
technical assistants.'* 

Again, "those parts of the evidence secured directly by' 
the Commission were obtained through open hearings in 
November" and "by inspection trips in western Pennsyl- 
vania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois." 

The Interchurch Report itself states that the Commission 
began "formulating the Report in January.'* The Com- 
mission was engaged at least from November 27th to De- 
cember 5th in attempting to mediate with Judge Gary ant 
the Commission seems to have been in touch with Judge 
Gary for at least a week after this. The Commission or its! 
members are otherwise mentioned as being especially oc- 
cupied in other various ways during this period. In other 
words while the Field Investigations are specifically statedj 
to have lasted from October till February, the Interchurch 
Commission itself merely held open hearings in Novemberj 


— ^for about two weeks. It is plain, therefore, that the 
great bulk of the data on which the Interchurch Report was 
based was gathered by the outside Field Investigators. 

The Interchurch Report itself says (page 9): "The 
statements and affidavits of 500 steel workers carefully com- 
pared and tested, constitute the rock bottom of the findings." 

Ten of these statements and affidavits appear on pages 
213 to 218 of the Interchurch Report. They are the only 
group appearing in the main volume. The dates range 
from February to August, 1919, from two to nine months 
before the Interchurch investigation was even proposed. 

Forty-one such statements and affidavits are reproduced 
on pages 179 to 219 of Volume II. These are, except for a 
few isolated statements all the "rock bottom statements 
and affidavits" which appear in this voltune. Of these 41, 
16 are affidavits and 25 unsworn statements. Of the 16 
affidavits, 9 show notary's dates of October 3d or earlier — 
before the Interchurch investigation was even proposed. 
The other 7 afl&davits all show notary's dates of October 
nth or earlier — before the first Interchurch investigator 
was sent into the field. 

Of the 25 unsworn statements — which, however, the 
Interchurch Report itself continually refers to as "affidavits" 
— II show dates of September 30th or earlier — ^before the 
Interchurch investigation was proposed, and 4 show dates 
of October 8th or 9th — ^before the first Interchurch investi- 
gator was sent into the field." Ten statements, however, 
show dates of October 17th to November nth, during 
which time "the staff of field investigators " was in the field. 
But of these 10 only 3 — ntunbers 27, 28 and 38 in the order 
they are published — show dates after November ist when 
the Interchurch Commission itself went into the field. Two 
of these statements are especially emphasized to have been 
made to "Commissioner Coleman." 

Of the "500 rock bottom" affidavits and statements 
then, on which the Interchurch Report states it is based, as 
far as they are published, these 3 are all which the Inter- 



church Commissioners themselves could have been in any 
way directly responsible for. All the actual affidavits pub- 
lished and all the other statements were either collected by 
the outside investigators or came through some other 
source. As a matter of fact, as already explained, they were 
practically all borrowed from the propaganda affidavits and 
statements previously collected by or for James H. Maurer, 
the notorious radical labor leader who signed himself to the 
Soviet authorities as "representing 300 radical groups in 
42 states." 

Again of the most important chapters of the Interchurch 
Report itself, those in regard to hours and wages consist 
largely of "statistics" or are built largely on "statistics" 
and similar " technical data " ; and as the chapters on " Bol- 
shevism" and "Organizing for Conference" show the most 
intimate technical knowledge of radicalism, labor politic, 
and similar highly specialized information, it must be pre- 
sumed under the circumstances that the basis for all these 
chapters was largely furnished by these outside "technical 
assistants." As to the chapter on "Social Consequences" 
considerable portions consist of long verbatim quotations 
from sections of the 2nd Volimie which are specifically 
signed by these outside investigators. In other words, 
aside from the Introduction and Conclusion, and possibly 
one chapter, the whole Interchurch Report seems from the 
very nature of the case to be chiefly based on the con- 
tributions of the outside "investigators" and "technical 

The New York Legislative Investigation of Radicalism 
specifically credits the Interchurch Report to these outside 
assistants. The Continent, the leading Presbyterian de- 
nominational periodical, credits the whole document to the 
outside "technical assistants" and says that to call it a 
Church investigation "was and is preposterous." 

When the strike leaders, according to Mr. Foster in his 
Great Steel Strike (page 157), became so impressed by the 
scientific methods manifested by the Interchurch Investi- 


gation that they decided to have the Interchurch Movement 
try to mediate the strike with Judge Gary, Mr. Foster 
states that the arrangements were made, not with the Com- 
missioners but with Mr. Blankenhorn. The Interchurch 
Mediation Committee's report back to the strike leaders 
after the attempt at mediation is signed by Mr. Blanken- 
horn. Moreover throughout the many references vari- 
ously made by the strike leaders to the Interchurch In- 
vestigation, such references were almost invariably made 
to members of the outside body of assistants rather than 
to the Commissioners of Inqmry. 

In other words all the evidence— that in the Interchurch 
Report itself, as well as that from outside sources,— points 
so conclusively to the fact that these outside investigators 
and "technical experts" played such an important, if not 
leading, part in the preparation of the Interchurch Report 
on the Steel Strike— the ftirther evidence yet to be con- 
sidered shows that they played such a dominant part in the 
preparation of the Interchurch Report — that it is corre- 
spondingly important to inquire in detail as to just who 
and what these outside "investigators" and "technical 

experts" were. 

The "staff of field investigators" is stated in the Intro- 
duction to the Interchurch Report to have consisted of: 

Mr. George Soule. 
In its Foreword to Volume II, on page v, the Interchtirch 

Report says: 

"George Soule, Editor and writer on industrial research for many 
publications; author of War Department Report on Industrial Service 
Section of Ordinance Department; co-author with J. M. Budish of The 
New Unionism." 

This statement by the Interchurch Report, however, fails 
to indicate the nature of Mr. Soule's interest in "industrial 
research," or the type of the "many publications " for which 
he has been editor and contributor, or the lines along which 

i ■, • 


1 1 


he has written. It does not suggest that his book, The New 
Unionism, which has already been extensively quoted in 
the present. Analysis is a glorification of the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers and their new type of radical unionism 
to which the Third International of Moscow has recently 
turned over the leadership in the American radical move- 
ment. It gives no hint that Mr. Soule's writings consist 
almost exclusively of radical propaganda, often of the most 
open and pronounced kind. Mr. Soule's periodical con- 
tributions for 1920 — the year the Interchurch Report was 
written and published — ^were, as far as they can be dis- 
covered, in full as follows: 

(i .) " Liberal Tactics Again. ' ' New Republic, March 
J, IQ20. This is an impassioned appeal, in the form of a 
letter to the public, in which Mr. Soule in addition to 
insisting that — 

" There is no solution of the Railroad problem but something like the 
Plumb plan. There is no solution of the coal problem but nationaliza- 
tion of the mines/' 

urges votes for the Farmer-Labor party. 

(2.) *'The Railway Men Get Action.** Nation, 
April 24, ig20 — ^which ends as follows : 

"Disillusionment with political action (i.e., the need for 
industrial action), sudden, unheralded general strikes, in- 
dustrial and interindustrial cooperation (i.e., the radical 
One Big Union), secret organization along Soviet lines, 
suspicion and hostility toward the organs of the Botu-geoise 
(i.e., government), 'proletarian discipline' (i.e., police) — 
these things characterize the movement of the workers the 
world over . . . they are the logical result of the situa- 
tion in which the workers (i.e., 'transport workers of New 
York') have found themselves." 

(3.) " The Case Against Injunctions." Nation, May 
i\ 1920 — ^is an emphasis of the workers' need of, and a glori- 


fication of, radical industrial unionism, as represented by 
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, of which he says: 

" The Amalgamated is avowedly a socialist union and will not conceal 
the fact that it aspires to the elimination of the control of the private 
owner over industry " 

— ^and which he again refers to as: 

"... the Amalgamated which represents the most advanced and 
successful union practice, not only in its relation with the employers but 
in its attitude toward industrial problems (which is expressly syndicalist, 
and) its constructive, socialist philosophy." 

(4.) "The Transportation Breakdown." Nation, 
July 3, ip20— which constitutes an appeal to the raikoad 
workers against A. F. of L. craft unionism and in favor of in- 
dustrial unionism like that of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers, which are specifically held up as an example. 

(5.) "The Great Woolen Strike." Nation, Augus 
14, ip20— which ends with an attack on the present in- 
dustrial system and particularly the wage system. This 
is the mildest article in the group. 

(6.) "The Building Scandal." Nation, November 17, 
IQ20. Beginning with a very justifiable attack on Brindell- 
ism, this article makes a strong appeal to the workers for 
"union democracy" like that of the "men's clothing 
workers" (i.e., the Amalgamated Clothing Workers). It 
denounces "private profits and private control" of the 
building industry, which Mr. Soule insists should be state 
controlled, without profits, and emphasizes that this platform 
has already been recommended by the local Farmer-Labor 

(7.) "Labor's Impending Battle." New Republic, 
November 17, 1920. This is throughout a stirring appeal to 
labor to organize industrially, again holding up the Amalga- 
mated Clothing Workers as an example, and also offering as 








I ' 




an example to American workers the "industrially organized 
National Union of Railway men of Great Britain," which it 
will be remembered Foster in his Great Steel Strike holds up 
as an example to American radicals. 

These 1920 articles are also typical of Mr. Soule*s 
magazine contributions for 191 9, 1921 and 1922. 

The New York Legislative Investigation of Radicalism 
speaks (page 11 38) of 

"George Soule, whose radical viewpoint may be gathered from (his) 
association with Mr. Evans Clark under the direction of Ludwig C. A, 
K. Martens, Head of the Soviet Bureau in the United States, (his) con- 
nection also with the Rand School of Social Science and certain revo- 
lutionary labor organizations." 

After spending thirty pages presenting copies of letters, 
propaganda documents and other various appeals to Ameri- 
can workmen made through various American radical 
organizations or periodicals by the Russian Soviet, and pre- 
senting detailed proof that Ludwig C. A. K. Martens was 
the official Soviet representative through whom that propa- 
ganda was being put out, the New York Legislative Inves- 
gation of Radicalism, on page 655, names the personnel of 
this Soviet Propaganda Bureau in part as follows: 


. Boris Leonidovitch, Tagueeff Rousttam Bek, Ella Tuch, 
Rose Holland, Henrietta Meerowich, Rose Byers, Vladimir Olchovsky, 
Evans Clark. . 


shortly after which appears the statement: 

"In dealing with the subject, the Committee has foimd it necessary 
to withhold from the report much of the evidence which has come into 
its hands for the reason that it mav be necessary to employ it in criminal 

For at least the last year, Mr. George Soule and Mr. 
Evans Clark have occupied the same office, Room 710, 
I Union Square, New York City, where they are both now 
"Directors" of an organization known as the Labor Bureau. 


On the back page of the April 9. 1921 issue of the New 
York Call, an official radical publication-of which mcident- 
ally Mr Evans Clark is Labor Editor— appears a three- 
column article by Mrs. George Soule, known in radical 
Circles as Esther Norton, which contains the following: 

"Magon. Debs, Haywood and hundreds of others gave up their 
liberty. They did it for us. It is our fight. What wiU we do to carry 

'* "We can delay no longer. We can be satisfied with half-hearted at- 
tempts no longer. Nowisthe time for every worker to prove his sm- 
cerity to the labor movement by doing all in his power to help get the 
political prisoners, the class-war prisoners out of jail. 

"Whatever your group, L W. W., A. F. of L., Amalgamated. Com- 
munTst, SociaUst, Farmer-Labor, Left Wing, Right Wing. Center or 
Advance Guard— whatever you call yourself, get mto Ime. 

Mr. David J. Saposs, 
The Foreword, Volume II. Interchurch Report, page v, 


" David J. Saposs, Research Assistant to Professor JohnR. Commons 
co-author with Commons and Associates of History of Labor in the 
United States; special investigator U. S. Commission on Industrial Re- 
lations; Expert Bureau of Statistics New York State Department of 
Labor; Industrial Investigator Carnegie Corporation Americanization 


The New York Legislative Investigation of RadicaHsm 
lists Mr Saposs as a "radical connected with steel strike 
investigation by Interchurch Movement "—" associated 
with Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, Russian Soviet representa- 
tive to America; associated with Rand School." 

Mr. Saposs* name also appears on the Bulletin Board at 
Number i Union Square as occupying Room 710 with 
Mr. Evans Clark and Mr. George Soule. It is understood 
that he represents their "Labor Bureau" in Chicago. 

Mr. Saposs has been— whether he is now or not is not 
known— educational director of the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers,' of which Committee Mr. William Z. Foster is an 

I This committee is understood to be technically a separate organi 
zation from the A. C. W. Union. 






ofl&cial lecttirer. Mr. Saposs is also one of the incorporators 
of the radical magazine, The Socialist Review. 

In the first November, 1919 issue of the Survey is an 
article by Mr. Saposs etilogizing both Mr. Foster and Mr. 
Fitzpatrick, the two chief steel strike leaders, in the highest 
terms and going into the special technical organization of 
the strike itself. Articles for this issue are due in the edi- 
tor's hands three days before the appearance of the maga- 
zine (or about October 30th), at which time Mr. Saposs had 
been in the field about two weeks as an "impartial" in- 
vestigator of the Steel Strike. His article, therefore, 
wholly sympathetic and partial to one side, was probably 
written just when he was beginning his "impartial" investi- 
gation. If it was, on the other hand, written before this, 
this fact lends color to a widely alleged fact, namely, that 
Mr. Saposs was an active worker on the side of the steel 
strikers till called upon to help investigate the steel strike. 

Miss Marian D. Savage. 

Miss Savage is a teacher of English literature at Wellesley 

Mr. M. Karl Wisehart. 

Mr. Wisehart has been a writer of fiction and popular 
articles on novel phases of science for the American Maga- 
zine and the Century Magazine; which magazines, in 
contrast to others mentioned in this chapter, are unques- 
tionably thoroughly American. 

Mr. Robert Littell. 

Mr. Robert Littell who was employed to assist in 
obtaining the "more technical and detailed data" for the 
steel strike investigation in 19 19 was a member of the 
Class of 1 91 8 at Harvard College. At the end of the 
steel strike investigation, Mr. Littell became associated 
with his father in the editorial department of the New 

Mr. Heber Blankenhorn. 

On page 4 of its Foreword the Second Volume of the 
Interchurch Report says: 

"The Commission was particularly fortunate in its Secretary, Heber 
Blankenhorn, member of the Bureau of Industrial Research, formerly 
Captain U. S. A. attached to the General Staff at Washington; then at 
general headquarters of the A. E. F. in France; later attached to the 
Peace Commission. He had charge of the Field investigation and 

Dtiring the war, Mr. Blankenhorn was "Captain, Mili- 
tary Intelligence Department," which department had 
charge of spy and propaganda activities. Mr. Blanken- 
horn's own work was creating and directing propaganda to 
the German soldiers and working classes. It was well known, 
of course, that the Socialist revolution was at that time 
making strong headway in Germany, and in so far as they 
could f\u*ther this movement, the Allied Intelligence De- 
partments would assist in breaking down German's military 
spirit and power. Mr. Blankenhorn's associate in his 
propaganda work was Mr. Walter Lippman of the New 
Republic. Mr. Blankenhorn's work during the war was, 
from all accounts, most efficient and fully justified his repu- 
tation as a most clever and effective propagandist. The 
plan, for instance, which is generally credited to him per- 
sonally, of sending tickets in immense ntunbers over the 
German lines by balloons, which tickets guaranteed to 
each German soldier who kept and presented one when he 
was capttired, food and kind treatment, was widely spoken 
of as one of the cleverest " stunts " in its subtle psychological 
appeal of all such allied propaganda efforts. 

In regard to Lippman's work before going to France 
the anarchist, Roger Baldwin, wrote Manley Hudson 
(New York Legislative Investigation of Radicalism, page 

"Lippman and Frankfurter are of course out of that particular job 
now [war office] and I have to depend entirely on Keppel." 

1 II 





Just after this Mr. Baldwin was sent to prison for a year 
for personally carrying out the principles of his "anti- 
draft" propaganda in connection with which work he had 
been, according to himself, depending on Lippman and 
Frankfurter. Mr. Blankenhom both before and after this 
had been closely associated with Roger Baldwin and his 
work. As a matter of fact, since the Interchurch Investi- 
gation Mr Blankenhom has been most of his time working 
under Mr. Baldwin's co-worker, Louis P. Lochner, in 
an organization which is largely an offshoot of Mr. Baldwin's 
main radical activity. 

After Mr. Baldwin's release from prison, he reorganized 
(as outlined in Chapter XXIV of the present Analysis and 
the New York Legislative Investigation of Radicalism, 
Chapters VII, VIII and IX, and pagfes 1979 to 1999) his 
wartime radical activities into a "propaganda organization " 
known as the American Civil Liberties Union, to work 
"chiefly in cooperation with labor unions and radical poli- 
tical groups" to combat laws against "criminal syndical- 
ism," " criminal anarchy " and " sedition. ' ' The ' * National 
Committee" of this organization is largely made up of such 
well-known radicals as Chrystal Eastman, John A. Fitch, 
William Z. Foster, Morris Hillquit, James H. Maurer, 
Scott Nearing, Rose Schneidermann, etc., etc. 

At about the same time there was also organized by the 
same general interests and partly by the same men the 
"Federated Press." Mr. Baldwin has acted as spokesman 
for this organization and Mr. Louis P. Lochner — ^who with 
James H. Maurer, Scott Nearing and others, in the cable- 
gram already referred to, to the Russian Soviets, signed 
themselves as representing "300 radical groups in 42 
states" — ^is the chief executive officer. 

The Federated Press is described by its representatives 
as an "international labor-news service" organized in 
America because "America seemed the only country that 
has the facilities and the money to establish such a bureau." 


Its purposes are twofold: first, "the spreading (in America) 
of news relating to the revolutionary progress in foreign 
countries and in general (of) a propaganda nature," and, 
second, to furnish American labor news to foreign radical 
papers and organizations. 

The connection between the Federated Press and leading 
radicals of Russia and other European countries— as de- 
scribed in detail by Mr. E. J. Costello, who was sent abroad 
at the instigation of "one branch of the Soviet government 
service" for the purpose of establishing such connections 
and was deported from England while carrying out this 
mission— is published in the New York Legislative In- 
vestigation of Radicalism, pages I993-I999- 

On the back cover of the Nation of Marcb 30, 1 921, ap- 
peared a full page advertisement of the Federated Press. 
This advertisement features by name 17 special correspond- 
ents. The first five in the order they appear, with a list of 
some of their radical activities, as given by the New York 
State Legislative Investigation of Radicalism, are as 

Paul Hanna— Publicity agent I. W. W. 
Laurence Todd— Civil Liberties Bureau— I. W. W. 
Scott Nearing— Indicted under Esponage Act; Rand 
School; Civil Liberties Bureau; Federated Press. 
Frederick Howe— American Civil Liberties Union. 
Carl Sandberg— Finnish Red Government. 

Among these specially featured "special correspondents 
of the Federated Press appears the name of Mr. Heber 
Blankenhom— and a few months later that of Mr. William 

Z. Foster.' 
Of a number of the most radical magazines obtainable 

« The official report— now in the possession of the American Govem- 
ment—of the secret Communist Convention of August, 1922, to the 
Communist officials in Moscow says: — 

''Everywhere we support the labor press, urging unions to stand with 
the Federated Press." 






such as the New York Call, Chicago News Majority, Daily 
Free Russia, One Big Union Monthly, I. W. W. official organ, 
etc., etc., all contained in the most recent issues that could 
be obtained, April 9th, from 3 to 7 articles signed by the 
Federated Press. 

Again an appeal has recently been made in behalf of an 
organization known as "The Church Socialist League" with 
headquarters at 1 18 East 28th Street, New York, for $15,000 
funds to "carry on Christian. Socialist propaganda." This 
organization states as part of its "formulated program": 

"We are not reformists trying to patch up an outworn garment, but 
Revolutionists, striving for a complete revolution of our economic 
and social order." 

In the list of "Executives and prominent members of 
the League" appears the name "H. Blankenhom, field in- 
vestigator for the Interchurch World Movement, N. Y. C." 


In addition to these outside individuals who acted as 
"technical experts" to the Interchurch Commission of In- 
quiry two organizations are mentioned by name as having 
' ' obtained directly " " other evidence. * ' These were : 
The Bureau of Applied Economics in Washington, D. C. 

This organization is referred to on page 6, line 23, of the 
Report as a soiu-ce for data for the Steel Report. What this 
data consists of is not mentioned but as has been emphasized 
the Interchurch Report in its arguments as to steel wages 
and working hours in other industries in one place ignores, 
in another contradicts, and in others states conclusions the 
opposite of those shown by the detailed published statistics 
of this organization. 

The Bureau of Industrial Research. 

Under the heading "Socialist Propaganda in Educated 
Circles," the New York Legislative Investigation of 
Radicalism (page 11 20) says: 



"A so-called Bureau of Industrial Research . . . describes itself as 
being organized to promote soimd human relationship in industry. 
This organization cooperates with the New School for Social 
Research which has been established by men who belong to the ranks 
of the Near-Bolshevik Intelligentsia: some of them being too radical in 
their views to remain on the faculty of Coltunbia University." 

Its officers as there given are — 
Robert W. Bruere — Director. 
Herbert Croly — Treasurer. 
Ordway Tead. 
Henry C. Metcalf. 
P. Sargent Florence. 
Leonard Outhwaite. 
Carl G. Kersten. 
Mary D. Blankenhom." 

"liberal" and radical publication 

A number of the special investigators and technical ex- 
perts who are at least chiefly responsible for the Interchurch 
Report on the Steel Strike have been specifically mentioned 
as contributors on radical subjects to various magazines 
mentioned by name. As a matter of fact practically all the 
individuals and members of organizations who thus assisted 
the Commission of Inquiry are contributors on various sub- 
jects to this same group of periodicals whose names are 
perhaps better known than their particular nature and 


Some of this group of publications are self-admittedly 
radical. Others adopt the camouflage which radicals so 
frequently adopt of maintaining an outward pose of being 
merely "liberal." In regard to this whole group of maga- 
zines the following may be noted : 

The Nation is one such magazine which assumes before 
the public to be merely "liberal." The following excerpt 
of a letter written by Arthur C. Calhoun on July 29, 1919, 
and quoted by the New York Legislative Investigation of 
Radicalism (page 1114) indicates clearly what, among its 




i| li 





own circle, it is admitted that policy of the Nation realljr is. 
This letter in part said: 

* 'Deals was here last week. He is pushing the Nation. Says the 
drctdation has quadrupled since they became Bolshevik.' 


Prof. Beals is listed by the New York Legislative In- 
vestigation on Radicalism (page 11 14) as an ex-Prof eijsor 
and "open Bolshevist," while Prof. Calhoun as an important 
member of "The Tri-State Cooperative Society of Pitts- 
biirg, which promotes the production and distribution of 
Red propaganda. ' ' The editorial department of the Nation 
states that Charleton Beals was not oflficially connected 
with the Nation but has done a great deal of work for them. 

Again in the Jtme, 1920 issue of Freedom, published by 
the Ferrer group of Anarchists at Stelton, N. J., appeared 
the following: 

"Beginning with this issue Freedom will appear under the Editorship 
of Harry Kelly, etc. ... It may be asked, 'Why another paper, 
when the broadly libertarian and revolutionary movement is so ably 
represented by socialistpuhUcaXionslikethe Revolutionary Age, Liberator, 
Rebel Worker, Workers World and many others, and the advanced Liberal 
Movement by The Dial, Nation, The World To-morrow and to a lesser 
d^n*ee, the New Republic and Survey? ' These publications are doing 
excellent work in their several ways, and with much of that work we 
find ourselves in hearty agreement. They are, however, liberal in 
the best sense of the word, Bolshevik, or Socialist and we are none of 
these, even if we look with kindly eye on all of them. We are anarchists." 




The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike in its preface 
states the history of the preparation and adoption of the 
Report as follows: 

"chronology of the investigation 

Field Investigation October, 1919, to February, 1920 

Mediation Effort November 28 to December 5, 1919 

Report adopted unanimously by the 

Commission of Inquu-y March 29-30, 1920 

Report received by the Executive 
Committee of the Interchurch 

World Movement May loth 

Recommended for publication by 
sub-conmiittee of the Executive 

Committee June 25th. 

Dr. Hubert C. Herring (Congregational) 
Bishop James Cannon, Jr. (Methodist South) 
Mr. Warren S. Stone (Congr^ational) 
Adopted unanimously by the Execu- 
tive Committee of the Interchurch 
Movement June 28, 1920." 

This official chronology is obviously intended only as a 
meager outline of the most salient facts in connection with 
the investigation and their dates. It makes no mention of 
the methods of procedure of the investigation — how much 

sS 433 








of the actual investigating was done by the Commission of 
Inquiry and how much was left to the outside "field in- 
vestigators" — as to whether the "500 rock-bottom" afiida- 
vits, on which the Report states it is based, were obtained 
in testimony before the Commission itself or were merely 
obtained by the outside field investigators individually and 
presented later to the Commission of Inquiry — as; to 
whether or not the testimony of the witnesses who made 
these affidavits were subject to any cross-examination to 
test or bring out the full value of their testimony — a,s to 
whether the Report itself was written by a member of the 
Commission of Inquiry or compiled by different members, 
with or without the assistance of the outside field investiga- 
tors, or whether it was written by one or a group of the out- 
side field investigators — or in regard to any fact as to its 
methods of being organized for presentation to the public — 
all of which facts would seem to be pertinent to a deter- 
mination of the soundness of the method of investigation 
and the accuracy of presenting the results of the investi- 

In regard to the small group of 41 of these "500 rock- 
bottom affidavits" published in the Second Volume, the 
Interchurch Report admits that they were at least partly 
obtained, and the affidavits themselves show they were 
chiefly obtained, and composed by or for James F. Maurer 
who signed himself in now published correspondence with 
the Russian Soviets as "representing 300 radical groups in 
42 states. ' ' These were not only plainly not sub j ect to cross- 
examination or otherwise tested for accuracy but they 
are largely exclamations, descriptions, insinuations, often 
self -evidently coloured to seem to make sensational allcjga- 
tions which they actually do not make at all, and othenvise 
obviously composed for propaganda effect and as a matter 
of fact were originally used for propaganda purposes. I^hat 
the Interchurch Report also offers such statements and 
affidavits as bona fide evidence after their own authors had 
under oath and cross-examination publicly repudiated all 


the substantial parts of them has already been shown in 

Moreover, although the facts as to the authorship of the 
Interchurch Report were immediately, and have been a 
number of times since, much discussed and inquired into, 
members of the Commission of Inquiry have refused to 
state the authorship beyond denying that certain alleged 
authors wrote the Report. 

A Reverend Victor Bigelow, pastor of a Congregational 
Church in Andover, Massachusetts, in a debate in regard 
to the fairness of the Interchurch Report, with Mr. George 
W. Coleman, one of the members of the Commission of In- 
quiry, held before the Worcester Congregational Church, 
March 14, 1921, and of which the author was able to obtain 
a stenographic report, asked Mr. Coleman point blank who 
wrote the Steel Strike Report. Mr. Coleman replied: 

"We wrote it positively. It was not written by any man. No man 
lives today who can claim he wrote that Report." 

Just how far this statement may be regarded as being 

technically within the truth will be pointed out in detail 


A little later in the same speech, after enumerating who 

he means by "we" — that is, the members of the "Com- 
mission of Inquiry" — Mr. Coleman continued: 

"Many of them (Commissioners of Inquiry) had not seen each other 
before. They came from different parts of the country, from 8 different 
denominations. They went right to work gathering information and 
gathering testimo»y. We did not know where we were coming out 
exactly until we sat down to write our report — and wonder of wonders 
nine people representing 8 different denominations, coming from different 
parts of the country, each of them with the interests of his own denomina- 
tion at hearty all agreed. Did you ever hear anything like that in church 

And he says again: 

"It (The Interchtirch Report) stands as the report of organized 
Protestantism of North America as represented by the Interchurch 




World Movement, giving it the fullest consideration and finally putting 
their O. K. and approval on it." 

The fact that the Commission of Inqtiiry that signed the 
Report have thus chosen to take the attitude, both in the 
Report itself and in answer to inquiries in regard to it, of 
refusing to discuss its authorship beyond Mr. Coleman's 
very general statement that they all wrote it, or to discuss in 
any lengthy detail the methods adopted in making the investi- 
gation and preparing the Report— make it correspondingly 
difficult to obtain any very complete evidence on these 

The following facts, however, appear from the foUowiing 

Mr. Coleman said further, in the same Worcester speech: 

" When I was called to New York to attend a special meeting of the steel 
strike commission, to listen to Mr. Fitzpatrick, one of the strike leadei-s," 
etc., during which meeting Mr. Coleman states that Mr. Fitzpatrick 
said, "Gentlemen, I am commissioned in behalf of the strikers to put 
our case in your hands without any limitation or reservation." 

Mr. Coleman's previous statement that when the mem- 
bers of the Conmiission got together they went immediately 
to work "gathering information and gathering testimony," 
taken in connection with the phraseology of this statement, 
indicates that one of the first acts of the Commission of 
Inquiry was to thus discuss the investigation with I^Ir. 
Fitzpatrick, President of the Strike Leaders Committee, 
who during the discussion stated that he put the strikers' 
cause "without limitation or reservation" in the hands. of 
the Commission of Inquiry. 

Mr. George Soule who is the first mentioned (Interchurch 
Report Index) of the outside "staff of field investigators" 
states that he was put in immediate charge of the Pittsburg 
field work of the investigation and that he, followed shortly 
by Mr. David Saposs proceeded at once to the Pittsburg dis- 
trict with certain definite plans for making the investigation. 
He first approached certain officials of the subsidiary com- 


panics of the U. S. Steel Corporation, stating to them the 
fact and purpose of the proposed investigation, asking for 
relevant facts and figures and suggesting that the privilege 
of access to the books and records of the company and 
introductions to local superintendents be granted him. Mr. 
Soiile states that these requests were not in any case com- 
plied with and that they got a minimum of the information 
they desired from the local steel companies. He then ap- 
proached the strike leaders with the same request with 
which the strike leaders willingly comphed, putting all their 
books and records at the disposal of the Interchurch 
Investigation and giving introductions to local leaders which 
admitted to all strike meetings. 

Later — Mr. Soule does not recollect the exact time- 
members of the Commission of Inquiry spent " some time" 
in the Pittsburg District and held "hearings" before which 
all persons in the community having knowledge of the 
situation, who could be induced to testify, including clergy- 
men, government officials, industrial experts, neutrals and 
many of the strike leaders and strikers and strike sym- 
pathizers testified, of which testimony a complete record 
was made. Certain steel officials were requested to appear 
also before the Commission to give testimony. They sug- 
gested, however, that they wotdd prefer to meet the mem- 
bers of the Commission of Inquiry in their own offices. 
Several such interviews were arranged but at the request, 
according to Mr. Soule, of these steel officials, no records 
were made during such conversations of what was said. Im- 
mediately thereafter all members of the Commission present 
recorded their memories of the interviews.' 

Both the Interchurch Report and Mr. Soule also state 
that the Commission of Inquiry similarly visited certain 
other strike areas and Mr. Coleman names these as Johns- 
town and Chicago. The Interchurch Report itself mentions 
without detail Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. 

» This section in its present form has been revised by Mr. Soule so 
that a large part of it is in his own language. 

■ r. I I 


The Chronology of the Investigation in the index of the 
Interchtirch Report mentions "a Mediation effort Nov 
28th— Dec. 5th, 1919." 

Mr. Foster in his book, The Great Steel Strike, furnished 
the only available evidence of the nature of this attempt at 
Mediation until the second Interchurch volume appeared 
nearly two years later. He says (page 157) : 

"Consequently John Fitzpatiick, Chaiiman of the National (Sttilce) 
Committee, put before Mr. Blankenhom a plan for the settlement of 
the strike by mediation. Mr. Blankenhorn felt however that it might be 
better to recommend that the Commission move independently ratlier 
than as merely representing the strikers." 

Mr. Foster then devotes the next three pages to giving 
details in regard to the plan which was originated by the 
strikers but presented to Judge Gary as coming from the 
Interchurch Commission, in which it was proposed that 
the "Commission set up a permanent mediation body to 
bring about a conference between employers and employees 
in the steel industry." In other words, the Commission of 
Inquiry thus proposed to Judge Gary as their plan what 
was actually the plan of the strike leaders that Judge Gary 
yield at this time and grant the "conference" which was 
the express chief issue in the whole strike. The memo- 
randum to Mr. Fitzpatrick, containing the statement of 
Judge Gary's refusal to agree to this plan, was signed by 
Mr. Blankenhom and dated December 6th. The Inter- 
church Report's own account in Volume II while more dcj- 
tailed and from a different point of view is substantially 
the same. 

In the meantime, however, Mr. Soule had been assigned 
to a special investigation of conditions in regard to the re- 
fusal of authorities to allow strikers' meetings. As Mr. 
Soule gave his chief attention thereafter to this special work , 
being succeeded by Mr. Blankenhom as head of the general 
field work, he is less familiar with the lines along which the 
latter part of the general investigation was conducted and is 


only generally famiUar with the facts as to the preparation 
of the main report itself. All the facts available however 
and the plain statement of the Interchurch Report itself 
show, as already emphasized that the whole investigation 
was carried on almost entirely by the staff of outside "field 
investigators" under the direction of Mr. Blankenhom. 

There can be no question that Mr. Heber Blankenhom 
was also the actual author of the Interchurch Report. The 
Interchurch Report states that he "had charge of the field 
work and Mer {i.e., during the preparation of the Report) 
acted as secretary to the Commission.'' Mr. Blankenhorn 
is a writer by profession and his position as secretary would 
make him the logical author if any one man was to be the 
author The fact, definitely emphasized by the Interchurch 
Report, that he was "Edifor" of its second volume and 
that he signed the various introductions, etc., to each 
section is doubtless also significant. A comparison of the 
very distinct individual literary style of the Interchurch 
Report with the style of these sections of Volume II and 
with other writings of Mr. Blankenhom offers a type of 
evidence which is accepted by our courts, that Mr. Blanken- 
hom is the author. 1- t, J 
Moreover, any careful examination of the published 
works of various members of the Commission of Inquiry 
will also show plainly that the Interchurch Report is written 
with a style and vocabulary and particularly with a unique 
sentence stmcture, which is strikingly different from that 
employed by any of these Interchurch Commissioners in 
their own published works. 

Part One of this analysis described the nature and sources 
of the "evidence" collected by the "technical assistants." 
It emphasized the means employed in extracting figures 
from government statistics and bits of testimony from the 
Senate report to produce impressions or force conclusions 
diametrically opposed to those arrived at by the government 
statisticians and by the Senate Committee from all of the 
figures and all of the testimony available. 



It is, of course, conceivable that the Interchurch Com- 
missioners of Inquiry themselves might have accepted this 
kind of "evidence" from their "technical assistants" or 
others in whom they had confidence and written a report 
around it in good faith. 

But, as already pointed out, "evidence" throughout the 
Interchurch Report, including much that is in itself entirely 
innocent, is led up to and surrounded by context whic;h 
seems to give it a meaning that the "evidence" itself does 
not possess. Arguments, which have no substantial basis 
in the evidence submitted with them, are built upon insinu- 
ation or misleading statements, the clever coupling of 
unrelated facts, and similar devices calculated to deceive. 

It seems utterly inconceivable that any of the distin- 
guished Christian leaders who signed the Interchurch 
Report would, even if they could, handle the "evidence" 
submitted by their "technical assistants" in the adroit 
manner exhibited by the Report for the purpose of produc- 
ing impressions and forcing conclusions. Aside from oth(jr 
considerations, it would have required an unity of thought, 
purpose, and disposition, which it would have been difficult, 
if not impossible, to secure. 

Mr. Blankenhom, on the other hand, served during the 
war, as an officer in that branch of the service which d(i- 
manded the highest type of ability in creating and 
disseminating effective propaganda; and since the war he 
has been openly working with William Z. Foster, whom the 
Interchurch Report particularly eulogizes, and with other 
radicals, as a professional propagandist in a notorious radii- 
cal propaganda organization which the Interchurch Report 
twice goes out of its way to advertise, and whose 
propaganda is directed to advance at least the same genersil 
theories for which the Interchurch Report consistently 

Mr. Bronson Batchelor, Mr. Stanley Went, the original 
editor of the Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike, and 
Mr. Harold C. Reynolds, all three state not only that it 


was a matter of commonest knowledge among all those 
in touch with that part of the work of the Interchurch 
World Movement but that they know of their own per- 
sonal knowledge that Mr. Blankenhom wrote the Report. 

Two of Mr. Blankenhom*s close personal associates state 
that he has said repeatedly to them or in their presence 
that he wrote the Interchurch Report on the steel strike 
going into details as to how and why he wrote it as he did. 

Dr. William Hiram Foulkes, Chairman of the Execu- 
tive Committee, which finally passed on the "Steel Re- 
port," discussed the Interchurch Report as a product of 
Mr. Blankenhom's authorship without questioning the 
fact as to such authorship. In his conversation with Dr. 
McDowell, member of the Commission of Inquiry, the 
writer brought up the subject of Mr. Blankenhom's author- 
ship of the Interchurch Report. Dr. McDowell stated that : 

" Mr. Blankenhom was Secretary of the Commission and as such he 
prepared certain parts of the Report, which were laid before the Com- 
mission for their review and approval. The Commission passed on 
(the) Report as a whole after several careful reviews of its contents." 

This statement by Dr. McDowell, was given only after he 
had inadvertently made a much broader admission. It 
was most carefully formulated. The phrase "prepared 
certain parts of the Report" may mean that Mr. Blanken- 
hom "prepared" all the Report except the "Findings," 
"Recommendations," and certain other brief sections which 
are known to have been prepared by others, or it may mean 
less than this. Dr. McDowell refused to be specific. 

Again in a signed statement (published in full below), 
Mr. Tyler Dennett, Director of the Publicity Department, 
to whom the Report was submitted for editing, and who 
read the manuscript carefully with this end in view, refers 
to the Report as having been published ''substantially as 
Mr. Blankenhom wrote it.'' But he added at the time and 
emphasized later that in his opinion Mr. Blankenhom's au- 
thorship consisted largely of compilation — this opinion 

i' : 

, 1 




being based on the inferior literary quality of certain parts 
of the manuscript. Mr. Went, to whom Mr. Dennett 
turned the manuscript over to edit, also emphasizes the in- 
ferior literary quality of certain parts of it. This would 
obviously seem to preclude the possibility that any of the 
Interchurch Commissioners themselves could have prepared 
the material from which Mr. Blankenhom is thus thought to 
have *' compiled" these sections or have materially changed 
the Report after it was written and before it was edited. 

In regard to the editing of the Interchurch Report, Mr. 
Dennett stated: 

"A copy of the Report on the Steel Strike in its original form was put 
into my hands in the latter part of May (1920) as part of the regular 
routine of my office, for the purpose of editing and publicity. The manu- 
script was turned over to Mr. Stanley Went for this purpose. Lat<ir, 
the Report was edited without reference to Mr. Went's work by Mr. 
James E. Craig. 

"In r^ard to the editing of the Steel Strike Report this consisted 
chiefly of changes in literary style and the elimination of statements 
which the editors did not believe to be warranted by the evidence pre- 
sented. Otherwise the Report was published substantially as Mr. 
Blankenhom wrote it. No facts or statements essential to the general 
conclusions were eliminated. The editors made no attempt to pass on 
the merits of the evidence presented." 

Between the date that the "Report (was) adopt€;d 
unanimously by the Commission of Inquiry, March 29-30, 
1920," according to the Interchurch Report "chronology." 
page 5, and "after several careful reviews of its contents" 
according to Dr. McDowell, and the date of its being edited, 
the Report was "received by the Executive Committee of 
the Interchurch Movement, May 10." This was at a 
meeting at Columbus, Ohio. During the day the Execu- 
tive Committee had discussed the fact that the April finan- 
cial drive and second supplementary financial drive whic;h 
had immediately followed it, had failed and that the Move- 
ment faced the necessity of liquidation. At a dinner con- 
ference at which Dr. Foulkes presided, and at which 
Bishop McConnell, Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and Mr. 


Tyler Dennett, in addition to the members of the Executive 
Committee, were present, copies of a stunmary of the Report 
on the Steel Strike, corresponding in general to the Intro- 
duction in the volume as published, were circulated and 
Bishop McConnell urged that the Report be accepted for 
publication. This meeting appointed a sub-committee, 
consisting (Interchurch Report chronology, page 5) of Dr. 
Hubert C. Herring, Bishop James Cannon, Jr., and Mr. • 
Warren S. Stone, to go into the subject in greater detail. 
The copies of the Simmiary were not left in the hands of the 
Committee members present but were collected after the 


Some ten days later the complete Steel Strike Report 
manuscript was sent to Mr. Tyler Dennett's department 
"for the piupose of editing and publicity." After reading 
the manuscript carefully himself Mr. Dennett, as already 
stated, t\imed it over to Mr. Stanley Went for editing. 
Mr. Went was engaged in this work from the latter part of 
May until the middle of June. 

On June 17th Mr. Went returned Mr. Blankenhorn's 
original draft to Mr. Tyler Dennett accompanied by the 
memorandum which has been reproduced in part in the 
Foreword of the present Analysis in which Mr. Went con- 
demned, the bias of the Report as "so patent that it would 
make it a comparatively easy matter to discredit the entire 

He stated further in this memorandum that he had edited 
the Report as lightly as seemed compatible "with the end 
in view," "that end as, I understand it, was to present the 
Report in a form which should give the least possible im- 
pression of bias on the part of the investigating com- 
mittee. " He states that he did not follow his own feelings 
in the matter but rather had "leaned over backwards in a 
desire to present the case of the Commission as much as 
possible in the way the original writer thought it should be 

Mr. Went states that two further reasons why he did not 



attempt to go beyond this in editing the Report were because 
he considered that any adequate editing would require almost 
complete rewriting and because he doubted whether tlie 
Report even with any amount of editing would be allowed 
by the higher ofl&cials of the Interchurch World Movement to 
be published. 
Mr. James Craig who did the final editing with "an- 
• other gentleman" under the authority of Dr. Poling, states 
that Mr. Went's complete editorial notes and comments on 
the Report were turned over by Mr. Dennett to him. Mr. 
Craig states further that in order not to be in any way in- 
fluenced in advance, he did not refer to Mr. Went's notes 
imtil after he had gone over the Report and formed his o^m 
opinions. He states that his own personal opinion in many 
respects was the same as that of Mr. Went but that as it 
had been decided by his superiors to publish the Report he 
did not allow his personal opinion to enter into the matter. 
Mr. Craig has made a specific statement on this whole 
subject as follows : 

" Mr. Wetat began some preliminary editing but this work was stopped 
because of the financial collapse of the Movement following the unsuc- 
cessful financial campaign, April 25th-May 2nd. Whether the Report 
should be published or not was bound up very largely with the equally 
vexing question of whether the Movement could continue any activity. 
It was finally agreed to disband the organization except for enou^jh 
people to wind up aflfairs. The entire publicity department was dis- 
charged except myself. I was retained because I had been doing some 
special work for Dr. Cory, Dr. Poling and Dr. Diffendorfer in connec- 
tion with the supplementary eflfort to raise money. When it was de- 
cided to continue the work on the Steel Report and when sufl&cieat 
funds were in hand for that purpose I was asked to outline a publici ty 
plan and to prepare the manuscript of the Report for. publication. 
My personal economic views did not enter into the matter at all. 
This is the more evident from the fact that my own views in general 
accord with those of Mr. Went. I approached the task from the view- 
point of a conscientious newspaper copy editor, trying to do a high- 
grade technical task, in which I was looking after the interests of my 
employer. My employer was and had been for more than a yeir 
previous to this the Interchurch World Movement." 


The fact above emphasized by Mr. Craig, that the two 
financial drives in April and May so failed to raise the 
needed amounts of money that the whole Interchurch 
Movement began a liquidation in which it not only aban- 
doned all the fundamental objectives for which it had 
been organized, but the great bulk of the work which it 
had already done, raises the question that has often 
been discussed in inner-Interchurch circles as to why, 
under such circumstances, the Steel Strike Report was 
practically the only activity carried forward and how, under 
these ciramistances, the money was found for this purpose. 

The author made particular effort to get the facts as to 
how and where under the circumstances the money was 
found for completing and publishing the Interchurch Re- 
port, including the Second Volume. Three gentlemen, 
intimately associated with the Movement, told the author 
that shortly before the Report was published, Mrs. D. Willard 
Straight donated $50,000 to the Interchurch Movement 
with the express provision that the money was to be used 
in the Industrial Department only. They stated that it was 
generally believed in the inner circles of the Movement that 
the Report was completed and published with this money. 
They also stated, however, that as they were not in a posi- 
tion to substantiate the detailed accuracy of their under- 
standing, they did not wish to be personally quoted. 

Mrs. D. Willard Straight is well known as the financial 
backer of the New Republic, and more recently of The 
New Student, an inter-collegiate magazine through which 
The World Tomorrow, Nation, New Republic, Bureau of 
Industrial Research, Civil Liberties Union, etc., group are 
making a specialized effort at radical propaganda among 
American colleges. During the widespread campaign of 
radical agitation built around the Sacco-Vanzetti murder 
trial, as part of which agitation Spanish radicals attempted 
to blow up the American Embassy, Mrs. Straight, according 
to numerous published statements, gave $2,500 to the Sacco- 
Vanzetti defense fund. In fact Mrs. Straight is so well 





known as a financial supporter of various radical activities 
that when the New York Legislative Investigation of Racli- 
calism, on page 1097, publishes correspondence relating to 
Mr. Roger Baldwin's sending Chumley, the collector for tlie 
I. W. W. to Mrs. Straight, it obviously does not even regaird 
it as necessary to comment on her status in the matter. 

After the Uquidation of the Interchurch Movement, 
many of its records were turned over to the New York 
Federation of Churches. Reverend H. J. Laflamme of that 
organization is one of a large number of former Interchurcjh 
Movement officials who apparently believe that in view of 
the fact that the Interchurch activities were made possible 
through millions of dollars of public contributions the public 
certainly has a right to know the facts in regard to at least 
the most conspicuous of such activities. As a result of his 
investigation of the records in his possession, Mr. Laflamme 
on August II, 1922, wrote the author as follows: 

"Mrs. D. Willard Straight's $50,000 was given before May of 1920 
and to be used in the Industrial Department only. Beyond this I have 
no record or knowledge." 

This concrete evidence seemed strongly to substantiate 
the above mentioned statements of various Interchurch 
officials. A further search, however, of the Interchurch 
records on this subject by Mr. Laflamme shows that no part 
of Mrs. Straight's $50,000 pledge was ever paid at least into 
the regular channels of the Interchurch Movement. Ob- 
viously then either, (i) Mrs. Straight refused to pay a 
pledge she had made, which seems highly improbable in 
itself and particularly improbable in view of the fact that 
the work for which this pledge was thus understood to be 
specifically given was carried out not only by the publica- 
tion of the original Interchurch Report but by the publica- 
tion after months of further work of a second Interchurch 
Report ; or (2) this contribution was paid to individual officials 
of the Interchurch Movement who never accounted for it to 
the Movement — which seems entirely improbable, or (3) 


by some special arrangement its payment was transferred 
to the outside group associated with the Bruere-Blan- 
kenhom Bureau of Industrial Research who were actually 
chiefly responsible for the original Interchurch Report 
and admittedly responsible for the second Interchurch 

Report. J I. 4.1, 

This latter information from Mr. Laflamme and the three 
alternatives it presents was discussed with the three gentle- 
men above referred to. They believed that it tended to 
confirm their former understanding. A fourth man, how- 
ever, in perhaps the best position of all to know the facts, 
but who also would not be personally quoted, stated that 
money had already been provided to complete the Inter- 
church Report; that Mrs. Straight's pledge of $50,000 was 
to cover the expenses of work to be done by the Industrial 
Department in the following year, and that as the Move- 
ment and so the Industrial Department, was discontmued. 
and the work not carried through, Mrs. Straight did not pay 
this pledge at all. He was asked if he knew that Mrs. 
Straight did not pay this money directly to the Bureau of 
Industrial Research and if not where they got the money to 
carry on the work necessary to the publication of the second 
Interchurch Report. He replied that it is well known that 
Mrs. Straight regularly supports the Bureau of Industnal 

Evidence from anonymous sources which also perhaps 
involves a certain amount of opinion, is, of course, not very 
satisfactory. In the present instance, however, all this 
part of the evidence may be entirely left out of considera- 
tion, and there still remains, as matters of specific record, the 
following facts. Although the Interchurch Movement had 
failed to obtain the money to carry out the fundamental 
religious work for which it was started and was abandoning 
such fundamental religious work, much of which it had well 
on towards completion, it did complete and publish the 
Interchurch Report. This Report, in spite of the fact that 
it was pubUshed with full knowledge of the financial condi- 




tion of the Movement, refers in several places to the in- 
tention of preparing and publishing further reports, which 
would of course involve much further expense. A large 
further Report was prepared and published over a year latCT. 
When the financial future and so the continued existence of 
the Interchurch Movement was in doubt, Mrs. Straight, 
whose contributions to radical and "liberal" movements 
are notorious, pledged $50,000 "to be used in the Industrial 
Department only." This is the Department which orig^i- 
nated the Steel Strike investigation and of which Mr. Robert 
W. Bruere — ^whose Bureau of Industrial Research was the 
technical adviser and furnished the investigators and the 
author for the Interchurch Report — ^was Superintendent of 
Research, — "research" being the chief function of this De- 
partment. Whether, therefore, the particular $50,000 thus 
pledged, went through some Interchurch channel or to the 
Bureau of Industrial Research direct, to pay for the com- 
pletion and publication of the two Interchurch Reports, or 
whether, because of the fact that the same Bruere-Blanken- 
hom group had to function nominally as the Bureau of 
Industrial Research instead of nominally as the Interchurc;h 
Industrial Department, in the preparation and publicatic-n 
of the second Report, this particular $50,000 was not paid, 
it is at least entirely clear that these Reports are of a nature 
and represent a point of view which radical interests stood 
ready to pay $50,000 to have carried on. 

On June 25th, just a week after Mr. Went turned ttie 
edited document over to Mr. Dennett, the Interchurch R<3- 
port was recommended for publication by the sub-com- 
mittee of the Executive Committee appointed May loth. 

The Preface of the Interchurch Report itself states that 
the Report was *' adopted unanimously by the Executive 
Committee of the Interchurch World Movement on June 
28th" — three days later. 

According to the official handbook of the Interchurch 
World Movement, page 109, the Executive Committee 
consisted of: 


"executive committee 


John R. Mott, Chairman. 

Mr. Mott is General Secretary of the International Com- 
mittee of the Y. M. C. A. and has for years been a religious 
leader of world reputation. Dr. Mott's continuous ab- 
sence from the city, on account of his health, made a per- 
sonal interview impossible but his secretary has stated for 
him that Dr. Mott left for Europe before the final con- 
sideration of the Steel Investigation Report by the Execu- 
tive Committee and had never seen the Report before its 

William Hiram Foulkes, Vice Chairman. 

On Dr. Mott's resignation and departure for Europe 
Dr. Foulkes became automatically Chairman of the Execu- 
tive Committee and acted in that capacity throughout all 
the final discussion of the Interchurch Report on the Steel 
Strike. Dr. Foulkes, because of this official position, was 
the first person-mother than Mr. Batchelor and Mr. Went 
whom the writer knew personally— with whom the writer 
discussed the question of the publication of the present 
analysis of the Interchurch Report. 

Dr. Foulkes stated at once that he had voted to accept 
and publish the Report at the time because of the very high 
regard and confidence in which he held and still holds cer- 
tain members of the Conamission of Inquiry. During the 
first conversation of over two hours, many of the points dis- 
cussed in the present analysis were gone over, during which 
Doctor Foulkes stated repeatedly and in no uncertain 
terms that he had been forced to change his opinion in re- 
gard to the merits of the Interchurch Report. He particu- 
larly emphasized the obvious influence on the Report of 
the men who were employed as investigators and technical 
experts. He also proposed a program of action in the 
preparation and presentation of the present analysis which 
has already been discussed in the Introduction to the pres- 
ent volume. 



In October the complete original manuscript of the pres- 
ent analysis was placed in the hands of Dr. Foulkes, and 
one or two brief conferences held on the subject. In the 
present section of this original manuscript appeared a nura- 
ber of quotations from Dr. Fotdkes, taken from the writer's 
memorandum made immediately after the first lengthy 
conversation with him. Early in November the writer 
received the following letter from Dr. Foulkes: 


November i, 1921. 

"My dear Mr. Olds: 

"I fear that my frequent absence from the city may interfere with fur- 
ther conference with you relative to the material which you have kindly 
submitted to me for my review. 

. "I find, as I begin to read your manuscript, that it deals with so many 
allied facts and conclusions which are out of the range of my obsers^a- 
tion and knowledge that it does not seem wise for me to attempt to p<'iss 
any detailed judgment upon the statements you have made. I do not 
tmderstand, indeed, that you desire to have my general judgment but I 
am writing specifically in order that there may be no misunderstanding. 

"I note also in Section 6, page 13, yoiu: brief statement concerning 
your impression of the interview you had with me. I do not have quite 
the same memory of that conversation that you appear to have. I do 
not recall stating what you have quoted me as stating 'that there is no 
question that the Steel Strike Report was put over on the Interchurch 
World Movement' — 'that Radicals were imdoubtedly behind the 
Report and turned the situation to their own advantage.' What I re- 
call as saying is that I feared from what I had heard, after the investi- 
gation had been made, that some of the actual investigators were not as 
imprejudiced as they should have been and that po-sonally representing 
one side of the controversy their testimony was, therefore, liable to be 

"For me to assert that they are Radicals, that the Report was 'ptut 
over' and that these men turned the situation to their own advantage, 
is a conclusion to which I do not care to be committed. 

"Very sincerely yours, 
"(Signed) William Hiram Foulkes." 

William B, MiUar, Secretary, 
Dr. Millar's ofl&ce stated: 

" Dr. Millar was laid aside by a very serious illness at the Atlantic City 
Conference of the Interchurch World Movement in January, 1920, aad 
took no further active part in the a£Eairs of the Movement." 


and Dr. Millar himself later wrote in regard to the Steel 

Report : 

"I was taken sick before the report of this Committee and never got 

back into the work at all." 

George M. Fowles, Treasurer. 

Dr Fowles was Treasurer of the Interchurch World 

Movement and a member of other important committees 

as well as the Executive Committee. He is also treasurer 

of the Methodist Foreign Mission Board. Dr. Fowles 

said at once: 

"You can put me down as having voted for the Inter- 
church Report. I know others are going back on the Report 
but I voted for it and I am going to stand by my guns 
till it is proved the Report is wrong." When asked 
if he had read the Report before his vote, he replied that 
he had. When it was suggested to him, however, that he 
doubtless had not compared the evidence with the original 
sources, and a number of instances of the manipulation of 
statistics and the expurgation of testimony that made the 
evidence in the Report very different from the real evi- 
dence itself was specifically called to his attention, he said 
of course he had not gone into that becuase they had hired 
the best technical experts on such subjects— that they had 
hired Robert Bruere's Bureau of Research and that he had 
the greatest confidence in Mr. Bruere and his organization. 
When some of the facts already stated herein, m regard to 
Mr Bruere's extreme radicalism, were presented, he re- 
plied that he himself didn't believe in radicalism at all and 
that he didn't beheve in the autocratic policies of the Labor 
Unions either, but that he had the greatest confidence m 

Mr. Bruere. ^ 

Dr. Fowles asked in turn whether it was true, Yes or 
No," that the steel workers or at least most of them had to 
work 12 hours a day and 24 to 36 hours every so often. 
This impression, that practically all the steel workers were 
forced against their will to work 12 hours and frequently 
the 24-hour day, seems to be general among Interchurch 


• i 




oflficials and is the reason assigned in almost every case for 
those who did favor it, having favored at the time the pub- 
lication of the Interchurch Report. When these allega- 
tions were denied, Dr. Fowles again said he would not ac- 
cept such inaccuracies as were pointed out without going 
over such questions with Mr. Bruere and getting his side of 
the case. ' 

S. Earl Taylor, General Secretary. 

Dr. Taylor has been continually in Arizona during the 
last several years and could not be interviewed It is un- 
derstood, however, that he approved the Report. 

Robert Lansing, Chairman, General Committee. 

Mr. Lansing was at the time Secretary of State. During 
the entire period in which the Interchurch Report was 
written and discussed Mr. Lansing was in Paris as a member 
of the American Peace Commission. On June 28, 1919, the 
date on which it is stated the Executive Committee 
''adopted unanimously'' the Interchurch Report on the Steel 
Strike, Mr. Lansing was signing the Peace of Versailles. 

Fred B. Smith, Vice Chairman, General Committee. 

Mr. Smith, who is connected with the Johns-Manville 
Company, stated that he never read the Report and knevir 
nothing about it. When certain of its more glaring errors 
and misstatements, as pointed out in Part I of the present 
analysis, were called to his attention, he stated that he 
"regarded the Report on the Steel Strike as dead and 
buried" and that he had "no more interest in it now 
than in some Egyptian hieroglyphics in a college library." 

When it was further pointed out to him that irrespective 

of that fact these statements had been published to the 

world and were still being circulated as being "adopted 

unanimously and approved" by the Executive Committee 

of which he was a member, and he was asked whether or not 

he had so approved and adopted them at the time he said 

» Due to Dr. Fowles' long absence abroad it has been impossible tc* 
submit the above to him for his final correction or approval. 


he was a member of the General Committee, not the Execu- 
tive Committee. When his name was pointed out to him 
as appearing on the official list of the Executive Committee 
he stated that he remembered the question of publishing 
the Report had been brought up one morning out at Cleve- 
land while members of various committees were at break- 
fast together. He said that he personally at the time was 
discussing matters connected with another committee— 
that the Interchurch Report might have been approved—- 
as a matter of fact it must have been approved or it 
wouldn't have been published. ' 

The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike was doubtless 
"approved unanimously" by some part of the Executive 
Committee at the June 28th meeting, which was held at 150 
Fifth Avenue, New York City. But that it was not "ap- 
proved unanimously by the Executive Committee" is plain. 

In the official Handbook of the Interchurch Worid Move- 

» Although the writer had a formal letter of introduction to Mr. 
Smith, it required repeated efforts over a period of months to obtain the 
interview of which the above, written immediately after that interview 
is the substance. Repeated efforts were also made before pubUcation 
to submit the above passage in regard to that interview to Mr. Smith 
for his approval or correction. Finally, on the afternoon of Septem- 
ber 13th, it was submitted to and read by Mr. Smith's secretary 
at his office, 271 Madison Avenue. His Secretary made an appoint- 
ment, subject to confirmation by telephone, for the writer to see 
Mr. Smith personally the following day. The next morning (the 
14th) Mr. Smith personally spoke to the writer over the tele- 
phone. He asked the nature of the statement and was told that it 
was in substance that he had not read the Report before its approval and 
publication. He replied that he had a copy in his library " this minute " 
and had read it and stated that he woulS not be quoted in any way in 
regard to the Interchurch Report and demanded that the writer agree 
not to quote him in any way in regard to the previous interview. The 
writer attempted to explain the reason for, and the nature of, the quota- 
tion but Mr. Smith interrupted insisting that the former interview was a 
private conversation which the writer had no right to publish without 
his permission and stated that if he was quoted in any way, shape or 
manner, he would "make a noise that you can hear from here to Fifth 
Avenue. ' ' The writer insisted that the matter was not of a private na- 




ment (page 109) the names of the above seven gentlemen 
are prominently listed down the center of the page 
with their full titles. Obviously it was the national 
and international standing of certain of these gentlemen 
which made their supposed "unanimous approval" of 
the Report a big factor in its general acceptance. Their 
statements at this time quoted above are correspondingly 
significant. „ 

The sixteen other members of the Executive Committee, 
the ofl&cial Handbook lists in double columns and without 
titles and in alphabetical order. These men and women, 
however, are so widely scattered as to address, and investi- 
gation by correspondence on such a subject is so unsatisfac- 
tory, that no effort has been made to ascertain how much 
further less than "unanimous" the approval of the Inter- 
church Report by all the Executive Committee actually 

Moreover, it is to be noted that in the Foreword to the 
Second Voltune, published from three to six months after 
the foregoing interviews had been had and brought to the 

ture and did not concern merely Mr. Smith's personal wishes, but that 
on the contrary, as Mr. Smith had akeady committed himself or alloweti 
himself to be committed as officially supporting the subject matter of 
the Interchurch Report and approving its wide publicity, and as the 
alleged unanimous approval of Mr. Smith's committee had been used as 
part of that publicity, . . . The writer was not allowed to finish but 
was interrupted with the statement that he could doubtless imderstand 
plain English and that he (Mr. Smith) was stating in plain English that 
he was not to be quoted in any way, shape or manner and that if the 
writer did quote him he would get into trouble. 

Mr. Tyler Dennett later talked to Mr. Smith in r^ard to modifying? 
this statement for publication and at Mr. Dennett's suggestion the au- 
thor made another but unsuccessful attempt to see Mr. Smith. Th<j 
author regrets publishing a statement which obviously Mr. Smith madt; 
without due consideration. He has made every effort to have it 
modified by Mr. Smith's more careful recollection. Under the cir- 
cumstance, however, of Mr. Smith's refusal to modify it and his threat 
the author is left no alternative but to publish the statement as 
originally given. 


attention of the present Interchurch Executives, the Inter- 
church Report changes its statement that it "was adopted 
unanimously by the Executive Committee of the Interchurch 
Movement'' to the statement that ''at its session of June 
28th the Steel Report was adopted unanimously by the 
Executive Committee, all members having been informed of 
the calendar for the day.'* 

The final preparation of the Interchurch Report for pub- 
Hcation was placed in the hands of Mr. James E. Craig 
and "another gentleman," acting under the direction of 
Dr. Poling, the understanding being, according to Mr. 
Craig, that Dr. Poling was to decide any matters on which 
he (Craig) and the "second gentleman" could not agree. 
There were certain matters in connection with this final 
editing on which obviously the greatest secrecy was en- 
joined. Mr. Craig was entirely willing to state his own 
connection and that of Dr. Poling with the work but 
he would not state for publication the name of the 
** second gentleman," without the permission of Dr. 
Cory, which permission though several times asked for 

was not given. , , ^^ _^ 

This second joint final editor of the Interchurch Report 

was Mr. Robert W. Bruere. 

'0 1 


i I 



From a careful analysis then of the chief circumstanccjs 

' which led up to the Investigation of the steel strike by the 

Interchurch World Movement and its Report on that strike, 

these facts appear: 

First: The Interchurch World Movement was projected 
at a time immediately following a great world crisis in which 
the minds of a great proportion of all peoples were in a 
particularly abnormal state. It was inevitable that many 
extreme theories should be advanced and agitated in such a 
movement in 191 9. 

Second: The proposition that the Interchurch World 
Movement should especially and directly interest itself in 
the industrial problems of the day, and interest itself partic:- 
ularly in the great human problem of the relation between 
capital and labor, is entirely natural and the decision to 
establish a special Department of Industrial Relations to 
study such problems was entirely logical even though the 
basis on which this department was organized did not prove 
to be sound or wise. 

Third: Because industrial relations and particularly 
relations between employer and labor constitute the point 
at which practically all radicals and revolutionary theorists 
insist our basic institutions should be changed and our 
economic system be revolutionized, it was inevitable that all 
such radicals and theorists should at once concentrate their 
interest and attention on this particular phase of proposed 
Interchurch activities. 



Fourth: The first prominent activity of the Department 
of Industrial Relations was the calling of a special meeting 
at Hotel Pennsylvania to consider industrial problems, at 
which the most important speakers were Glen E. Plumb, the 
advocate of government ownership of railroads; John 
Walker, President of the Illinois Federation of Labor; Mr. 
Julius Hecker whose passports were cancelled by the State 
Department because of extreme pro-Bolshevistic activities, 
and the notorious Mr. Frederick C. Howe who resigned as 
Commissioner of Immigration after he had been investi- 
gated and strongly condemned by a Congressional conmiittee 
for his radical activities. 

This meeting at Hotel Pennsylvania voted to condemn 
the steel companies and then voted to appoint a special 
committee to investigate the steel strike. It was only after 
it had been pointed out that the vote to condemn might 
prejudice the acceptance of the verdict of the investigation 
that the vote to condemn was rescinded and ordered 
stricken from the minutes. This meeting also appointed a 
committee, "to formulate and give expression to principles 
and policies of industrial relationships"; and adopted the 
report or "Findings" of this Committee which are clearly 
capable of being interpreted as radical. 

Fifth: There is no question however that at least some 
effort was made by other officials of the Interchurch Move- 
ment to counteract this tendency towards radicalism. 
Thru their efforts the "Findings" adopted by the Hotel 
Pennsylvania meeting were considerably softened before 
they were published and in the appointment of the special 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the steel strike the 
Executive Committee appointed members, against most of 
whom no charges of real radicalism can be successfully 

Sixth: A far more important point however than the 
particular shade of belief which may or may not have 
influenced this Commission of Inquiry in their investigation 
of the steel strike is the fact that the Commission consisted 



K }\ 

1 1, 


predominantly of men who not only had had no experience 
with industrial problems but whose whole experience had 
been in spiritual leadership, in enthusing and inspiring mcm's 
minds and imaginations — which experience requires a 
supreme development of quite opposite mental and 
emotional qualities from those required for a careful anabasis 
of intricate material facts or a judicial determination of the 
merits of the complicated interplay of politics which ctiar- 
acterize any great industrial conflict. The fact that the 
Commission of Inquiry immediately employed, or had 
employed for them, all the outside "technical assistance" — 
the fact that except for the evidence accumulated in the 
comparatively few days they themselves spent in the strike 
area, the evidence on which they based their conclusions 
was prepared and submitted to them by their various "tech- 
nical assistants," indicates their own wise realization of 
the importance of a very different kind of experience than 
their own. The further fact that it must be regarded as 
impossible that this Commission of Inquiry itself could 
have ingeniously expurgated printed testimony and cleverly 
maniptdated and fabricated statistics to attempt to show 
the opposite of the actual truth indicates how much they 
must have relied on outside "technical assistants.'* 

Seventh: There can be no question however of the radical- 
ism of all the most important outside "technical assistants." 
The dominant members of the staff of field investigators 
have conspicuous public records as radicals. They are 
found immediately on investigation to be friends and 
associates of Foster — ^fellow-workers with Roger Bald^rin 
for the type of "civil liberties" campaign for attempting to 
carry out which he served a year in prison — officially con- 
nected with the Rand School — prominent ofl&cial members 
of committees or organizations in which they are fellow- 
workers with other prominent radical leaders — ^and chiefly 
ofi&cially engaged in furthering the new type of revolution- 
ary unionism represented by the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers to which the recent Soviet International at Mos- 


cow has transferred the former I. W. W. leadership in the 
American Radical Movement. 

Eighth: There seems little question that this type of 
outside "technical assistance" not merely furnished the 
detailed technical data but so arranged the evidence— from 
which one such outside "technical assistant," who was 
Secretary of the Commission, wrote the Report — ^that the 
Commission of Inquiry, with its own lack of experience in 
such matters and its confidence in its outside "technical 
assistants," accepted and approved this evidence and later 
accepted and approved the Report in entire good faith. 

Ninth: Two field investigators, both prominent radicals 
and notoriously committed to Labor's side on all modem 
industrial questions, initiated the actual investigation. 

Mr. Soule states that his plans contemplated an entirely 
impartial investigation of the facts but that the steel com- 
panies would not cooperate with him by giving him the 
facts. It is a matter of public record however, as already 
shown in detail, that not only Mr. Soule but his assistant 
Mr. Saposs both condemn the modern industrial system 
and believe that industry ought to be turned over to the 
workers. These men then with this point of view, and 
working almost exclusively with the strikers not only 
themselves prepared much of the evidence, but obvi- 
ously set the stage for the obtaining of such evidence as 
the Commission itself obtained when it visited the strike 


Tenth: Such investigation as was made by the Commis- 
sion itself in the strike area consisted chiefly of : 

A. Conversations held with steel officials in the offices of 
the ofl&cials — ^because "the officers refused to attend the 
formal 'Hearings' set up by the Interchurch Commission" 
— of which conversations stenographic reports were not 
permitted and from which the Commissioners seem to have 
got little satisfaction, and which doubtless tended to pre- 
judice them still further against the steel companies; and 

B. The "Hearings" in which strike leaders and wit- 




nesses for the strike leaders ftimished the chief evidence or 
at least practically the only evidence used. 

It must be remembered that such "Hearings" were held 
in the midst of a bitter industrial conflict when the minds 
of all the parties involved were warped by the most extreme 
partisanship. Under such circumstances it would have 
required a very great degree of judicial impartiality and 
judicial experience and very careful cross-examination to 
get at the real facts. It must be remembered that the 
Commission's own investigators in whom it showed it 
had the most implicit confidence but who were entinjly 
committed to labor's side and who had been working on the 
closest most friendly terms with the strike leaders — ^were 
doubtless the men who produced the witnesses before the 
Commission. Except for possibly three statements, all the 
*' rock-bottom affidavits," on which the Commission admits 
it formed its judgments and on which the Report T^'^as 
written, were, as far as they have been published, the pro- 
ducts either of these outside investigators or of their 
notorious fellow-radical, James H. Maurer. 

Eleventh: Again during the conferences in New York 
when all the evidence that had been collected was gone over, 
as Mr. Coleman describes, in order to "find out wheire 
(they) were coming out " the situation held the same poten- 
tialities and doubtless worked out in exactly the same weiy. 

As the great mass of evidence — ^hundreds of affidavits, 
statements, excerpts of testimony, figures and tables — ^^as 
being considered and passed on by the Commission, it \«'as 
obviously the simplest matter for whatever "technical 
assistant" prepared the cleverly manipulated tables or the 
carefully expurgated evidence to have such matter approved 
and its conclusions accepted. For doubtless already largcily 
convinced in favor of the strikers by the overwhelming 
proportion of testimony presented by the strikers before 
their " Hearings " in the strike area, it was perhaps not to be 
expected that men without wide experience in analyzing 
evidence should have even thought, when tables of statistics 


were presented to them by their own supposed experts, to 
take the time and trouble to go back of those tables and 
statistics to the sources from which they came or to have 
compared excerpts of testimony similarly submitted with 
the full contexts of the original, or have done otherwise than 
accept at face value the large amount of various ' ' evidence 
presented to them. 

Twelfth: On the basis of this evidence which may thus 
easily have led the Conomission of Inquiry, as Mr. Coleman 
states, to imanimous agreement as to at least the general 
nature of the Report, Mr. Blankenhom, a conspicuous pro- 
nounced radical, who was Secretary to the Commission, 
wrote the Report itself, including a far greater amount of 
insinuations, misleading statements and false implications 
than even the present Report contains. 

Thirteenth: After the Report was thus written and 8 
typewritten copies had been circulated among the Com- 
missioners and other members of the Interchurch World 
Movement, the Report was turned over to Mr. Stanley 
Went "to edit and take out the appearance of bias"; this 
editing however consisted chiefly merely of the striking out 
of certain more flagrant, obviously unwarrantable state- 
ments. In his official memorandiun of June 17th with 
which he returned the edited manuscript, Mr. Went 
strongly condemned the obvious bias of the whole Report. 

Fourteenth: The " Findings," a group of milder and more 
generalized conclusions, were in the meantime added by a 
sub-committee. On May loth these added "Findings" 
were approved by the Commission of Inquiry and the Re- 
port turned over to the Executive Committee of the Inter- 
church World Movement for its approval. After six weeks, 
during which, according to all reports, there was much 
very serious argument as to whether or not the Report 
should be published, the Report itself says it was "unani- 
mously approved" by the Executive Committee. 

As a matter of fact however of the 7 most featured and 
doubtless leading members of the Executive Committee, 

4 J 









four not only never approved the Report but never read 
or even saw it before it was published, and at least one more 
approved it without reading it. The Report was then 
finally edited and prepared for publication by Mr. James 
E. Craig and Mr. Robert W. Bruere. 

Fifteenth: Nothing could be plainer than the dominjint 
influence in the Interchurch investigation and Report of 
this notorious radical Robert W. Bruere — ^whose record is 
described on pages 396 to 399 of the present analysis — 
member of the "Federated Press" which secret reports 
to Moscow authorities, recently seized by the govern- 
ment, show is backed by the No. i, unlawful branch of 
the ultra-revolutionary Communist Party, etc., etc. Mr. 
Bruere was Superintendent of Research of the Industrial 
Department of the Interchurch Movement, which depart- 
ment initiated the Steel Strike investigation. He was 
Director of the Bureau of Industrial Research whose name 
is formally signed to the Interchurch Report on the title 
page as technical assistants. The "staff of field investiga- 
tors," on the results of whose "investigations" the Inter- 
church Report is stated to be largely based, and is provably 
chiefly based, worked under a "field director" (Mr. 
Blankenhom) "from the Bureau of Industrial Research.'' 

This same employee or partner of Mr. Bruere, as "Secre- 
tary to the Conmiission," actually wrote the Intercharch 
Report. Finally after the first editor selected by the Inter- 
church ofl&dals had strongly condemned the "obvious bias" 
of the Report, the Report was turned over for final editing 
to Mr. Craig, acting only as a copy editor, and Mr. Robert 
W. Bruere. 

Moreover, when a year and a half after the Interchurch 
Movement was forced by its financial failure to abandon 
the fundamental religious work for which it was created 
the second Interchurch Report nevertheless appeared, 
this voltune is stated in its own preface to be edited by and 
"seen through the Press" by the Bruere-Blankenhom 
Bureau of Industrial Research. 


The basic aim of Part Two of the present analysis is, as 
stated, to determine what men and interests are responsible 
for the Interchurch Report being as it is and what it is — 
not because a determination of such facts will in any way 
modify conclusions as to the Report itself but in order that 
men who are not actually responsible may not be made to 
appear responsible for the Report. 

It has already been emphasized that the details in regard 
to the preparation of the Report are not always clear or 
undisputed. But while for reasons emphasized in the 
"afterword" of the present volume, such details are de- 
sirable, and an effort has therefore been made to present 
them as fully and clearly as has, under the circumstances, 
been possible, all such details may be entirely dispensed 
with and it still can be established beyond reasonable doubt 
that neither the Interchurch World Movement nor the 
Interchurch Commission of Inquiry are more than nega- 
tively responsible for the Interchurch Report being the kind 
of document it provably is. 

For, irrespective of all such details, these main facts 
stand out. 

I. The nature of the Interchurch Report itself as 

analyzed herein. 

II. The type of men who constituted the Interchurch 
Commission of Inquiry. 

III. The fact that this Commission employed or had 
employed for them, certain outside "technical" advisers, 
assistants and "investigators"; the fact as to who these 
men were, — ^which is a matter of published Interchurch 
record; and the facts as to what the most prominent of 
these men are — ^which is a matter of widespread public 

Given merely these facts, from the very nature of the 
case, only one of two conclusions is reasonably possible. 

First: the Commission of Inquiry itself was actually the 
creator of the Report — ^itself collected the evidence, weighed 











P / 


" 1 



the evidence, and prepared the evidence for submission to 
the public in the Report, and the various *' technical 
experts" actually played only a subordinate r61e in the 
investigations, and Mr. Blankenhorn, as author, merely did 
the mechanical work of assembling and putting together 
the evidence and expressing the point of view for which the 
Commission itself is actually responsible. 

If this is true then these nine nationally prominent 
Christian leaders who made up the Conamission of Inquiry, 
who were appointed to and state that they did make; an 
impartial investigation, not only deliberately refused to 
consider all the conspicuous evidence on one side — ^not only 
warped much general evidence by a careful expurgation of 
all the facts that were not favorable to one side — ^not only 
filled the Report with misleading insinuations and mis- 
leading phraseology in order to give false impressions that 
no twisting of the real facts could have given, but also they 
either possessed, or gained within a comparatively few 
weeks' time, an intimate technical knowledge of the various 
philosophies and aims of the various radical schools, includ- 
ing a fluent knowledge of technical radical phraseology and 
slang, and finally in the same comparatively few weeks they 
gained such an intimate knowledge of the technicalities of 
wage rates and classifications and schedules of worldng 
hours throughout industry, and a vast variety of sinciilar 
highly specialized technical knowledge, that they could and 
did separate and manipulate and otherwise falsify and 
fabricate intricate statistics so cleverly as to make them 
seem to show the opposite of what the figures really do 

Such a conclusion is obviously beyond the realm of 
reasonable possibility. 

The obvious and only alternative to this conclusion, 
is the conclusion adduced from the known facts by the 
present analysis, as follows : 

Second: That the "technical assistants" whether or not 
the Conmiission of Inquiry knew it at the time or realiise it 


now, were chiefly made up of conspicuous radicals entirely 
committed in advance to one side of any labor controversy 
and always under all circumstances working for one end in 

— that these technical advisers, having gone into the 
strike area in advance and working with the strike leaders, 
either deliberately or because of inherent bias, brought to 
the attention of the Commission of Inquiry evidence only or 
chiefly favorable to the strikers, which together with the 
fact that the steel officials refused to consider this investi- 
gation seriously, resulted in bringing only one side of the 
case to the Commission's attention; 

— that when the great mass of evidence thus collected 
by the technical advisers and the Commission of Inquiry 
in the field together with tables and statistics which were 
compiled by these same or other technical advisers was 
assembled for analysis for a final determination of the 
Report, the Commission of Inquiry because of their con- 
fidence in their technical advisers never thought of going 
back of the testimony and the facts and tables as sub- 
mitted, to analyze and check them with their original 
sources but accepted such evidence at its face value and 
formed final conclusions as to the nature of the Report 

— that, having thus been led to reach their conclusions as 
to the general nature of the Report, the Commission of 
Inquiry easily accepted those conclusions substantially as 
Mr. Blankenhorn stated them in the Report ; 

— ^that such directors or other members of the Interchurch 
World Movement as approved the Interchurch Report, did 
so, because they too, perhaps naturally under the circum- 
stances, accepted the alleged evidence it contained at face 
value and because also of their confidence in the Commis- 
sion of Inquiry; 

— ^that therefore, irrespective of what the Commissioners 
of Inquiry may honestly believe, the whole investigation 
and Report, far from being actually the product of con- 





sdentious Christian thinking, was the result of the flagrant 
manipulation of circumstances and evidence by the Com- 
mission's radical "technical" advisers and assistants and 




The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike signed as it is 
by nine prominent religious leaders and underwritten by the 
Interchurch World Movement, has undoubtedly been 
widely accepted at substantially its face value, by a large 
part not merely of the religious world, but also of the general 
public. Ntunerous reviews of it have appeared in the public 
press in which the reviewers, although discounting those 
portions dealing with facts within their particular knowl- 
edge, have nevertheless accepted the Report in general at 
its face value. Inquiry has revealed that many statis- 
ticians, economists and other men of high professional 
standing, though conscious of many inaccuracies and fal- 
lacies in the Report, have nevertheless been much impressed 
by the way its conclusions are seemingly supported by facts 
and statistics alleged to be from authoritative sources. 
These gentlemen, impressed by the statistical knowledge 
and methods displayed by the Report, have accepted many 
of its conclusions accordingly. ^ This at least partial accept- 
ance of the Report by such competent authorities indicates 
the probability, repeatedly emphasized by some of those 
connected with the preparation of the Report, that the 
Report is widely accepted and used by educational institu- 
tions as a text-book on modem industrial problems. These 
facts alone amply justify the publication of the present 

Beyond all facts as to the merits of the Interchurch Re- 
port itself, however, or as to its use, is the fact that it is a 
representative document — a conspicuous typical example of 

'There have, however, been several very significant exceptions. 




\r ' 


a new type of propaganda which is being more and more 
widely used and whose motives and methods as well as 
whose merits should therefore at least be recognized and 
understood by the public. 

The application of artificial power to the production of 
the world's needs during the last 140 years has worked as- 
tonishing changes. In 1340 the population of England and 
Wales was about 4,000,000. In the following four centuries 
it increased to about 6,000,000 or about 50%. But in the 
next one and a half centuries under the modem industrial 
system it increased to 32,000,000 or 500%. In the one 
thousand years between Charlemagne and Napoleon the 
population of what is modem Germany reached 24,ooo,oo«3. 
In one hundred years under the industrial system it jtunpcd 
to 70,000,000. In the two centuries before 18 10 our own 
population reached 10,000,000. One century of industrialism 
permitted the multiplication of this to 1 10,000,000. 

It has already been pointed out that in terms of the pur- 
chasing power of wheat flour, the American skilled worker 
today receives three times as much as he did in 1850. As 
regards comparative housing conditions, so liberal an his- 
torian as Mr. Hendrik Van Loon emphasizes dramatically 
what any competent history will show, that the Europea.n 
of the pre-industrialism period Hved "in miserable hovels 
compared to which a modem tenement stands forth as a 
luxurious palace.'* That industrialism has made common- 
place among every class of otir population innumerable 
contrivances of comfort undreamed of in the days of our 
forefathers is known to every child who has listened at the 
knees of his grandfather. Our ever increasing educational 
institutions, hospitals, libraries, newspapers, facilities for 
travel and other broadly himian advantages which thoj;e 
in every walk of life enjoy today, have been made possible 
chiefly by the surplus of capital and extra leisure which ttie 
modem industrial system has created. 

But principles of social conduct and habits of thought 
move slowly. They have not changed with the phenomemil 

rapidity with which industrialism has changed actual living 
conditions. Moreover the fundamental, and by and large 
the valuable human characteristic persists that the more 
most people get the more they want. The very extent, 
therefore, to which the industrial system has advanced, 
improved and tended to equalize living standards, seems 
only to have intensified the demand that this advanced 
improvement and equalization shall be carried on still more 
rapidly. The problems to which these facts have given rise 
are becoming our dominant political issues today. The 
principles of liberty and the rules of conduct anciently 
established and cherished by many generations, may or 
may not be entirely sufficient to solve all such problems. 
There justly exists much difference of opinion upon this 
point. So far as such opinions are honestly held, so far as 
we frankly face the problem of how far we can afford to 
endanger the principles upon which we have obtained our 
present real advantages, and so far as argtmients advanced 
in support of these opinions are based on honest interpreta- 
tion of known facts, all such opinions may prove of con- 
structive value. But many opinions as to the need of fimda- 
mental changes to-day, whether honestly held or not, are 
certainly not being advanced on their merits. On the con- 
trary, they are adroitly presented and covertly advanced to 
hide the fact that they actually involve the "burning of the 
bam to get rid of the rats " — their sponsors cherishing the 
hope that the fire can be well started before those whose 
assistance is being sought in setting it are aware of what they 
are helping to do. 

Radical criticism of industrialism undoubtedly takes its 
initial impetus from Carl Marx, the father of modem social- 
ism. Marx made the definite and sweeping prediction that 
the industrial system would inevitably operate to reduce the 
living standard of all workers until it was established on a 
mere subsistence level where it would be arbitrarily main- 
tained. Upon this prediction Marx built an elaborate 
theory for the revolutionization of the ownership and 





management of all industry and of all government. Biut 
his theory still contemplated the principle of government by 
majority in the interests of all. The subsequent develop- 
ment of the industrial system has completely refuted the 
fundamental prediction of Marx. With the passing of the 
premise of his prediction has passed Marxian idealism and 
the notion of a democratic administration of industry by 
the state in the interests of all the citizens. Modem radical- 
ism is advocating the seizure without compensation of the 
different industrial units by the particular workers engaged 
and their operation in the interests of those workers. Under 
this system the industry, not the community, becomes the 
unit of interest; men are divided against each other accord- 
ing to their occupations rather than bound together accord- 
ing to the interests of the community in which they live, 
and the only persons who are permitted to express an opinion, 
to vote or to receive consideration, are the manual workers 
and their self-constituted attorneys and representatives. 

No one realizes more clearly than the radicals that no 
majority of Americans would ever adopt or willingly permit 
such a programme of plunder and class chauvinism to be 
carried out. Radicalism's programme, therefore, is ad- 
mittedly based on force strategically applied by a unit(jd 
minority against a majority they hope to deceive and divide. 
The primary effort of radicalism,— to build its active fight- 
ing minority of industrial workers through capitalizing 
discontent, preaching class hatred, appealing to envy and 
greed and maligning public officials and courts and govern- 
ment, — is more or less open and recognized. Its secondary 
effort, however, to deceive and disunite the general public, 
to confuse economic and political issues and to disrupt or 
dissipate every constructive economic effort depends for its 
success upon its more or less complete concealment. ' 

«The Executive Committee of the Third International in 192 1 ns- 
aflSrmed the principle: 

" We talk in two languages, that which we talk to the bourgoisie we fool 
them with, that which we talk to the world proletariat is the truth." 


For the achievement, therefore, of its secondary effort, 
radicalism changes its appearance and appeal — its red be- 
comes pink or "merely liberal" and its programme of hate 
and plunder becomes one of "sympathy" and "idealism." 
In this guise radicalism has created various and widely 
distributed organizations to carry its propaganda to the 
general public. Among the most prominent of these are 
the Rand School of Social Science, the Bureau of Industrial 
Research, organized by Mr. Robert W. Bruere, a teacher 
of literature in the Rand School until this school was 
being made conspicuous through government attack; the 
American Civil Liberties Union, posing as interested merely 
in protecting the constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
speech and assemblage but actually radicalism's legal 
department and one of its most important and effective 
propaganda organizations. The function of these and 
similar bureaus, schools and leagues is to prepare "statis- 
tics," "data," "legal" arguments and other allegedly scien- 
tific material for the use of radical propagandists. 

But the usefulness of such organizations wears off as time 
reveals their true nature. Radicalism therefore, has more 
recently resorted to the device of applying to existing social 
and economic institutions the programme already applied 
to craft unionism of "boring from within," in the attempt 
to get such control of non-radical organizations as will per- 
mit their use as media for radical propaganda. 

Radical "boring from within" does not, of course, mean 
the attempt to convert all the members of the organization 
subjected to this operation to the extreme radicalism of the 
"borers." Its purpose is generally served if it can tinge 
enough members or ofl&cials with sufl&cient "liberalism," or 
sufficiently play upon their idealism or sentimentalism to 
seciu*e their support or acquiescence in furnishing the mem- 
bers of the organization and their followers with such propa- 
ganda as the borers in each case deem wise. In this way 
radicalism's operations are better cloaked, while it obtains 
what support it needs from great groups of individuals 




who would not conceivably work for or accept its basic 

The means by which such "boring" is instituted and 
carried on vary, of course, with circumstances. The man- 
agement of the modem variety of social and particularly 
religious organizations, created to interest or inform the 
public in social or economic questions, is frequently in the 
hands of men whose chief qualification consists of the ability 
to make effective emotional appeals that will arouse public 
interest in their work — a type of ability which is not al- 
ways accompanied by the power of clear analysis or im- 
partial judgment. Such a situation may often be readily 
capitalized by the clever radical "borer" who, because 
of his connection with some so-called "industrial" or 
"economic" bureau or school, created and so named for 
the particular purpose of giving prestige to such radical 
activities, is able to insinuate himself into the organization 
in the guise of an "economic" or other "technical " expert. 

Again the problem of raising money is often one of the 
most important and pressing which has to be faced by the 
type of organizations under discussion. The individual or 
group therefore, which can devise successful ways and 
means to tliis end may hope to become correspondingly 
influential in the activities which such money supports. 
It is a matter of record, as has already been noted, that a 
$50,000 pledge was obtained from a notoriously radical 
source to finance the activities of the Interchurch Induis- 
trial Department. It is also a matter of record that ad- 
vertisements have appeared from time to time in radical 
and "liberal" publications offering to furnish financial 
plans to social and church organizations. Such facts in- 
dicate how keenly alive radicalism is to the value of this 
method of making its influence felt. 

The method of controlling the agents of radicalism and 
their "boring" activities in various types and widely scat- 
tered organizations is entirely clear from the casual study 
of the lists of officials of such organizations. It is a familiar 


method. It is what is popularly known as the "community 
of interests" system, operating through "interlocking direc- 
torates." The radical directors of ultra-radical central 
organizations serve as directors and officers with less radical 
and even conservative directors in a much wider group 
of "liberal" organizations, while the most intimate of their 
fellow directors in such organizations in turn serve as direc- 
tors or officers in a still wider group of more "merely liberal" 
organizations. Again we have an excellent example in the 
Interchurch Report itself. Mr. Foster, the hero of the 
Report, is a member of the No. i Communist governing 
organization, in constant touch with Moscow. As member 
of the Federated press he is in constant touch with Mr. 
Blankenhom, who wrote the Interchurch Report, and Mr. 
Bruere, the head of its technical assistants. Blankenhorn 
and Bruere in turn, in their Bureau of Industrial Research, 
are in touch with the trade unions, social organizations, 
college socialist societies, and the like, to which they supply 
data and material. Through common membership in the 
National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Foster is in active touch with James A. Maurer, who fur- 
nished most of the Interchurch "rock-bottom" affidavits, 
and Maurer in turn is president of the Pennsylvania State 
Federation of Labor, a subordinate organization of the 
American Federation of Labor. Through the same organiza- 
tion Foster is in touch with Baldwin whose assistants are 
seeking from the courts a new interpretation of the prin- 
ciples of freedom of speech, of the press, and of assemblage, 
which will destroy the power of the Government to protect 
itself and its citizens against propaganda for the overthrow 
of our government by force and violence. 

Through its control, thus secured and maintained and 
directed, of an ever increasing nvimber of organizations, 
which p;-ofess to represent, and are accepted by the general 
public as representing, some religious or broadly social work, 
radicalism is today carrying on an "under cover" propa- 
ganda campaign which is as far reaching as it is generally 


unsuspected. Thus radicalism is continually presenting to 
the public as sound bases for public opinion and action all 
manner of "social programs" which as a matter of fact are 
merely clever compositions of sentimental plausibilities and 
idealistic sounding sophistries designed to confuse the real 
issues involved and breed distrust of those who are honestly 
attempting to meet and solve those issues on a workable 
basis. Thus it is continually determining the selection of 
lecturers and subjects to which the widest variety of audi- 
ences in all parts of the country listen without the least 
suspicion that they are actually listening to organized propa- 
ganda. Thus it controls the writing and distribution of 
innumerable articles, bulletins, pamphlets, supposedly ex- 
pert reports and allegedly statistical studies on the widest 
variety of subjects of popular interest, often presented in 
the most impressive scientific guise, but actually ingeniously 
contrived to misrepresent the real facts, to confuse the trtie 
issues, to insinuate distrust in our institutions, or subtly lead 
up to some radical conclusions. 

Moreover it is a recognized fact— and one which such 
propaganda is built to take advantage of— that under 
ordinary circumstances correction and disproof can seldom 
hope to catch up with sensationally stated and cleverly 
propagated misinformation. 

That the Interchurch Report is typical of this genend 
radical " under-cover " propaganda with which, in aU 
manner of disguises, the country is today being broadcast, 
is plain from the comparison of arguments, conclusions and 
even phraseology already made, and from the fact that it 
was actually prepared by the representatives of the same 
organizations which are at least ultimately responsible for 
this general campaign. But the Interchurch Report is 
more than merely typical. From its inception, in which 
the radicals had such a prominent part, the Interchurch 
Steel Strike Report offered the possibilities of having their 
*'under-cover" propaganda underwritten and circulated by 
what promised to be the most influential religious organiza- 


tion in American history. The "borers" in this case con- 
sisted not merely of the immediate representatives of one 
particular radical group, as is usual, but of some of the 
ablest representatives of the most important interlocking 
radical groups. Their success was such that they had the 
preparation of the Report substantially in their own hands. 
With such an incentive and such an opportunity it is in- 
conceivable that these men should have made the Inter- 
church Report less than the best and strongest possible 
argument of its kind. 

Moreover the Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike 
deals on such an extensive scale with a subject of such 
recognized public importance ; its argimients and conclusions 
have been brought so sensationally to public attention and 
so reaffirmed not only by those who are responsible for this 
Report but by the widest variety of radical and "liberal" 
leaders and groups, that it cannot — as does the bulk of 
similar, but less individually conspicuous propaganda — 
evade a reckoning with the truth. 

The primary motive of the present analysis is the hope 
that such a critical examination as is here presented, of the 
actual merits of such arguments and of the methods by 
which they have been propagated, in the case of this most 
conspicuous Qxample, may make it easier for the average 
American to recognize and judge such propaganda in what- 
ever guise he may meet it. It is partictdarly hoped that 
such exact and detailed citations, as are here given, of the 
original authorities on which such argtunents are alleged to 
be based, and to the other pertinent evidence, may both 
offer the incentive, and make it easier, for those who may 
be interested in modem "liberalism" to investigate fully 
for themselves the actual merits of the most prominent 
product of modern "liberalism." 




This book is due on the date indicated below, or at the 
expiration of a definite period after the date of borrowing, as 
provided by the library rules or by special arrangement with 
the Librarian in charge. 


£—&•■;■• ^^^^ 




C28(l149) 100M 

'fS *- 




Analysis of the Interchurch world 
movement Report on the steel 

HHO f^Mr*^-J<.4t^ 

l^^f^ s, 



rr\s\\ 00337 


FEB 16 1994 


MAR ? 1 195C